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EPIGRAPH 
 
 
Trade War: noun. a situation in which countries try to damage each other's trade, 
typically by the imposition of tariffs or quota restrictions.  
 
Currency Conflict: noun. also known as competitive devaluation, is a condition in 
international affairs where countries compete against each other to achieve a 
relatively low exchange rate for their own currency. As the price to buy a 
country's currency falls so too does the price of exports. 
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ABSTRACT 
     What political and economic factors have led Northeast Asian nations to react to U.S.-
initiated trade and currency disputes differently? This dissertation analyzes the causes of 
the similarities and the divergence among the three countries in their trade and currency 
conflicts with the United States from 1971 to 2013. It argues that the divergence in the 
three countries’ policy reactions to U.S. protectionist pressures can be best explained by 
differences in the political systems and bureaucratic decision-making structures of 
foreign economic policy and monetary policy. My research design is a small-n 
comparative research project, utilizing process tracing as well as regression analysis. It is 
based on two years of on-site fieldwork on the government decision-making systems of 
China, Japan, and South Korea. The dissertation develops in-depth case studies of each 
country’s bilateral trade conflicts with the United States, as identified by disputes 
involving the United States International Trade Commission, the United States 
Department of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the World Trade 
	  	   ix 
Organization, as well as bilateral negotiations on currency appreciation carried out at the 
ministerial level. It also demonstrates causal linkages between trade and currency 
disputes, two related issues that are not addressed together in most of the international 
political economy literature. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction: 
Defining Trade Wars and Currency Conflict, 1971-2013 
 
 
 
“I have directed Secretary Connally  
to suspend temporarily the convertibility of the dollar into gold or other reserve assets,  
except in amounts and conditions determined to be in the interest of monetary stability  
and in the best interests of the United States.” 
 
- Former U.S. President Richard Nixon, August 15, 1971 - 
 
 
“The impact of the financial structure on trade has for too long been obscured or overlooked  
as a result of specialization by economists in either trade or money.  
The realization has been slow to dawn that the two must be taken together.” 
 
- Susan Strange, ‘States and Markets’, 1988 - 
 
"One of the challenges that we've got to address internationally is currency rates 
and how they match up to make sure that  
our goods are not artificially inflated in price 
and their goods are artificially deflated in price. 
That puts us at a huge competitive disadvantage." 
 
- U.S. President Barack Obama, February 2010 -  
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Introduction: Institutional Structure and Policy Responses 
     Over the past decade and a half, China has become a major economic rival to the U.S. 
and a primary target for U.S. protectionist measures. China’s economic opening attracted 
foreign investment, a large portion of which derived from the United States, and its rise 
as a manufacturing house of the world has also led to contention with many trading 
partners, but for the most part, with the United States. Just a few years after China’s 
economic opening, China found itself responding to multiple U.S. protectionist measures 
and requests for currency appreciation. Regarding the pressures, Chinese policymakers 
and scholars have come to question: “Why (only) us?”  
     In answering this question, the Chinese have felt unfairly targeted by the United 
States. However, what the Chinese often fail to realize is that U.S. protectionist measures 
have not only been imposed on other countries in the past – mainly on export-oriented 
East Asian economies – but also that these measures have been quite repetitive since the 
postwar period. US protectionist measures were imposed against Japan in the 1970s and 
1980s, on South Korea and Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s, and now, on China from the 
2000s and onwards. Every East Asian economy that has gone through the economic 
developmental phase and generated trade deficits on the U.S. side has faced U.S. 
protectionist measures. However, responses have varied. China has resisted U.S. 
pressures and has in some cases initiated actions against the U.S. Japan’s response can be 
better understood as acquiescence. South Korea demonstrated a mixed strategy in 
response to the U.S. pressures. This raises the question, “How were they different, and 
why?” In order to understand the variance amongst the cases of U.S.-East Asian trade and 
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currency conflicts, it is essential that we focus on how each country has responded, and 
why. In this dissertation, I argue that institutional variance amongst East Asian countries 
– China, Japan, and South Korea – has caused the variance of policy responses to U.S. 
protectionism. 
Research Question 
     Why did East Asian countries differ in their responses to U.S. trade and currency 
conflicts? The core of the argument is in institutional variance – the structure and process 
of policymaking that is inherent in each country’s political system. Institutions are the 
bureaucracy and policy decision-making structures and processes. The institutions of 
each country were not built are not established in a day – they are the outcomes of 
political transitions and economic development. In order to understand each country’s 
institutional preparation at home to make policy, we must turn to the historical 
background of the bilateral relationships that each country has had with the United States. 
Although East Asian countries may retain similar features based on their export-
orientation, each country has had a unique political, economic, and developmental history 
of its own. These differences became the foundation of institutions that are very 
distinctive from one another.  
     Institutions present the three bilateral cases with very strong explanatory power in 
analyzing the varied responses in bilateral economic relations. A very close look at each 
country’s institutional structure and process makes the macroeconomic and foreign 
economic policy responses more comprehensible than via other explanations such as 
those based on geopolitical or socio-cultural factors. Due to the widespread emphasis on 
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security dynamics in assessing U.S.-East Asian relations, scholars, policymakers, and 
policy analysts have overlooked the role of institutions in these countries, or at least 
failed to recognize that foreign economic policy decisions are in large part decided by 
relevant ministries, and not merely overridden by security policy decisions at all times. 
Some may also question the variance in the degree of U.S. pressures imposed on the 
countries. While the degree of U.S. pressures is a nebulous factor to quantify, more 
importantly the degree of U.S. pressures is certainly not the ultimate factor that led to the 
varied policy responses to trade and currency conflicts. The availability of domestic 
institutional preparation to address trade and currency conflicts is what ultimately leads to 
these policy variations.   
     In reviewing the literature on U.S-East Asian bilateral economic relations, I find that a 
comparative analysis of trade and currency conflicts is missing. In addition, a 
microscopic view and comparisons of China, Japan, and South Korea’s foreign economic 
making process are missing. The South Korean case, which has been investigated in less 
depth than the other two cases, is actually a peculiar hybrid case, which places South 
Korea between the Chinese and Japanese cases with regard to responses. While current 
discourse focuses primarily on the ongoing U.S.-China trade and currency conflicts, 
without a comparison to the previous cases of Japan and South Korea we fail to provide a 
clear explanation for why China presents a much tougher case for the U.S. policymakers 
today.   
A Note on Methodology 
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     The basic context of my analysis is the three atemporal, bilateral economic relations 
that the U.S. has had with Japan, South Korea, and China. My periodization ranges from 
1971 – the year of the Nixon Shock – to 2013. In order to conduct a comparative analysis 
ranging across different time periods in history, I have chosen process-tracing as my main 
method of investigation. I have examined three sets of cases: 1) bilateral trade disputes of 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations by the USITC and the USDOC; 2) 
bilateral trade disputes in the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) from 1995 (the year of WTO establishment) to 2013; and 3) 
bilateral currency appreciation pressures by the U.S. Treasury. All three cases embody 
responses from the three East Asian states.  
     My analysis is based on my two years of fieldwork in the ministries of Japan, South 
Korea, and China from 2010 to 2012. I primarily rely on my personal interviews with 
government officials, practitioners, and scholars of each country’s trade and financial 
bureaus. I also depend on secondary sources such as the memoirs of retired government 
officials, ministerial releases, official reports released by governments and economic 
institutes, as well as media news reports.  
Summary of Findings 
     In the U.S.-East Asian trade wars (Chapter 3 & 4), I find that Japan has acquiesced, 
South Korea has reciprocated, and China has retaliated to U.S. protectionist measures, 
owing to differences in institutions. In the U.S.-East Asian currency conflicts (Chapter 5), 
I find that Japan has acquiesced with strategic intent, South Korea has resisted without a 
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clear agenda, and China has demonstrated a combined policy choice between resistance 
and incremental appreciation of its currency with the intent to internationalize it.  
      In trade disputes, Japan’s policy response is based on the institutional features of a 
parliamentary system and strong technocrats – primarily in the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) – in the fields of trade and finance that the central government 
has delegated power to.. Its acquiescence is based on the strategic bargaining that the 
Japanese institutions take on for the sake of rationalizing its foreign economic policy. The 
Japanese institutions set priorities based on governmental resource scarcity and budgetary 
restraint, resulting in its preference of consultations and resolution over disputes.  
     South Korea presents a hybrid case on trade disputes based on the omnipotent 
Presidency of a five-year term cautious of public opinion, which is highly sensitive to 
trade issues. As a result, trade or currency conflict matters are a very high priority 
consideration for South Korean policymakers. The bureaucratic system embodies flexible 
and expedited policy coordination amongst the ministries – mainly the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE), and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) – often pushing the speed of procedure at the 
expense of strategic choice and focus. Public-private partnership on trade related matters 
has become increasingly stronger, in addition to the implementation of retaliatory 
measures has given more impetus to trade disputes.  
      China’s policy response to trade disputes is a result of a top-down decision making 
system under authoritarian rule descending from the Politburo to the State Council to the 
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ministerial level. While intra-ministerial coordination is quite difficult, the Vice Premier 
for trade and finance related matters and the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) retain strong 
governmental support for dealing with trade disputes.  
      On currency conflicts, Japan chose to appreciate the yen in large increments in the 
Plaza Accord of 1985, mainly due to pressures by the U.S. and other European 
economies, but also with its own intent to strategically align its economy with its western 
rivals. Japan made the choice mainly behind closed doors driven primarily by the MOF. 
South Korea’s MOF (now MOSF) resisted the U.S. pressures but without a clear agenda 
of policy direction, sometimes even making the decision to retreat from confrontations 
with the U.S. at individual levels at the MOF rather than at the institutional level. South 
Korea’s lack of strategy resulted in the accidental depreciation of the won in the Asian 
Financial Crisis.  On currency, China presents the hybrid case, in which the Chinese 
Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs and the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) fights the pressures by appreciating its currency in small increments, but 
ultimately aiming at internationalizing the renminbi in the longer run, eager to go on with 
the task of capital account liberalization.  
Trade Wars and Currency Conflict, 1971-2013 
     For the past two centuries, trade and currency matters have gone hand in hand in the 
global economy. In the policy world, it has become increasingly difficult to disassociate 
trade politics with exchange rates and monetary policy. As the world economy has grown  
more interconnected, the nexus of trade and finance has become a crucial point to address 
in the field of political economy. In a highly globalized and liberalized world economy, 
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despite international agreements to promote freer trade, trade wars have occurred in the 
forms of tariff levies, non-tariff barriers, domestic trade remedies via anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty investigations, safeguards, government subsidization, and legal trade 
disputes in international platforms. Interest rates and exchange rate policies have also 
been delicately intertwined with trade dynamics and international capital movement. 
Since the 1970s, currency appreciation pressures were placed on many export-led 
economies, which kept their local currency value low for competitive advantage in 
exports. While these pressures ignited bilateral political confrontations, some of the 
pressures worked, and some did not. At the onset of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-
10, central banks of advanced economies launched quantitative easing and low interest 
rates, which increased their money supply and prompted a global capital ‘carry trade’ to 
emerging economies with higher interest rates. Reminiscent of the Asian Financial Crisis 
of 1997-98, financial ministers of emerging economies raised their voices in support of 
measures to limit short-term capital inflows for fear of near-term inflation or currency 
appreciation and of future capital flight – hot money. In the global economy in which 
trade and currency dynamics are intertwined, trade wars and currency conflicts have been 
endemic for decades, are ongoing as of this writing, and are likely to recur for years to 
come. 
     For the last decade, the geographic focus of trade and currency conflicts has shifted 
due to the rise of China - both in security and economic terms. China has made 
remarkable progress in economic development in the past decade based on soliciting FDI 
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and excelling in manufacturing. However despite its economic growth, China has always 
been surrounded by controversies regarding its trading patterns and low currency value. 
     China presents both the repeat of an old story and a new puzzle. For one born and 
raised at the height of industrialization in the 1980s and 90s in the heart of Seoul in South 
Korea – a country in which economic miracles were made in just decades after the 
Korean War (1950-53), following the course of the Japanese developmental model – 
China’s story of development seemed quite familiar. In the beginning phase of China’s 
takeoff in economic growth and success, when it surpassed Japan in terms of aggregate 
GDP, some regarded its case as extraordinary. Technically, there are a lot of differences 
in the Chinese developmental model as compared to the previous developmental models 
of Japan, South Korea or Taiwan. The Chinese model embodied more market access via 
solicitations for FDI into the Chinese mainland. But truth be told, China’s focus on 
manufacturing, the maintaining of a low currency, and very strong capital controls were 
stories similar in key respects to the stories in the earlier developmental stages of Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan, as trade frictions and currency disputes have accompanied 
export-oriented growth. And at the bottom of it all, the opponent in the trade and 
currency conflicts was mainly the United States.  
     But while in its basic outline, U.S.-China frictions are just another iteration of the 
same old story, there are also key differences. Size is clearly one. While at first glance, it 
looks as though size is what really matters, a closer look suggests that size is not a 
significant factor in terms of policy choices. What mattered the most was the response - 
how the Chinese response to the trade and currency disputes differed significantly from 
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the responses in previous cases. Had U.S. coercion worked on China easily, perhaps 
much of the debates on the China threat would not be of much issue in the U.S. policy 
making world. In foreign affairs, it becomes problematic when you are not getting the 
responses that you wish or expect, and this was all the more the case for U.S.-China 
relations. That said, what seemed to be the more interesting puzzle was: what political 
and economic factors have led Northeast Asian nations to react to U.S.-instigated trade 
and currency disputes differently? In other words, how countries chose to respond – 
depending on their domestic institutions and decision-making structures was what made 
the differences in policy outcomes so clear. How did the Japanese government respond? 
What about the South Korean government? Why does the Chinese response present a 
tougher case than the previous two? As I unraveled this question, I found that the source 
of divergence in the reactions of the countries I was observing was what was really 
making this story special. This dissertation seeks to explain the similarities and the 
divergence of the three cases of Northeast Asian trade wars and currency conflicts against 
the United States. 
Postwar Northeast Asian Bilateral Relations with the United States  
     Spreading democracy and promoting free trade have been the main pillars of U.S. 
foreign policy from the early 20th century. The United States has played a crucial role in 
the industrialization of Northeast Asian countries. During the era of imperialism in the 
late 1800s, the U.S. compelled Japan to open up, leading to the transformation of Japan 
through the Meiji restoration in 1868. During the post-war period after WWII, the U.S. 
temporarily ruled, managed, and provided developmental aid to the devastated Japan 
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when it surrendered to the allied forces in 1945. The U.S. also provided aid to the 
poverty-stricken South Korea after the Korean War from 1950 to 1953. The underlying 
objective for U.S. engagement in these two countries in the post-war years was obvious: 
to halt the spread of communism. The main reason for U.S. involvement in and alliance 
with these two countries had been containing Soviet-led Marxism and Leninism in Asia.  
     Subsequently, in the interests of further market expansion and building economic ties, 
the U.S. encouraged the market opening of Japan. South Korea and Taiwan followed suit. 
But the reversal of trade dynamics in all three markets could not have been predicted by 
the U.S. Indeed, these countries were very much hard hit during the wartime. Never did 
the U.S. imagine that a shift would occur in the economic upheavals of the post-war 
recoveries. Japan outperformed U.S. expectations and heavily engaged in trade with the 
U.S. South Korea and Taiwan, albeit to a lesser extent in absolute scale compared to 
Japan, performed extremely well and created economic miracles labeled as the ‘Asian 
Tigers’ in parallel with Hong Kong and Singapore. When trade dynamics were reversed 
by these countries one by one, the U.S. found itself bound by the economic opportunities 
that it had created for its interests by engaging in trade with its Northeast Asian security 
allies.  
     The U.S. bilateral engagement with China also began with a national security interest 
in the early 1970s. China’s border conflicts with the Soviet Union escalated in 1969. The 
camaraderie between the two primary communist powers was on shaky ground. China 
had also been placed in a very difficult economic situation after the subsequent failures of 
Mao’s attempt at economic development in the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural 
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Revolution in the 1960s. It did not help that the Sino-Soviet competition in Vietnam after 
the French withdrawal from Indochina was growing more intense. The Soviet Union and 
North Vietnam relations were developing in terms of Soviet aid, trade relations, and 
communist bonding. China’s motivation for involvement with  the U.S. was based on 
security calculations of avoiding encirclement by the Soviet influence. In 1968, the U.S. 
announced it would stay neutral regarding a possible Sino-Soviet war, but expressed its 
concerns and displeasure at the prospect of a Soviet strike against China.1 The U.S. was 
signaling that it would be ready to lend subtle help in the event of a Soviet attack on 
China. In the Sino-U.S. rapprochement, Pakistan and Romania acted as intermediaries. 
Sino-U.S. talks began at the secret level with Special Envoy Henry Kissinger in 1971, 
and eventually led to former U.S. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.  
     But China was already communist from day one when Mao’s CCP won the civil war 
against the KMT which fled to Taiwan in 1949. This was in stark contrast to the 
characteristics of the U.S relationship with China from its relations with Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, in which the U.S. successfully blocked the spread of communism. 
This meant that the U.S. and China could not always be on the same page in their 
relationship in the years to come – China’s leadership stood on its own communist 
ideological roots despite its intent and eagerness to engage in international trade, and 
labeled their outcome of reform ‘market socialism with Chinese characteristics’. This 
meant that the U.S. would not have the same kind of brotherhood with China that was 
built over the years with Japan and South Korea, who established strong alliances and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Garver, 1982. pp.77-79. 
2 Lindner, 1992. 
3 The U.S. Treasury approached both countries in order to request for an appreciation of their currencies. 
They were both listed in the exchange rate manipulators list from to. 
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partnerships with the provision of a nuclear umbrella against Soviet and North Korean 
threats. 
Export-oriented Industrialization: Northeast Asia Takes Off  
Japan 
     During the initial phases of economic buildup in Japan and South Korea, both 
received aid from the United States and the international society for postwar 
reconstruction and economic development. Japan took off and led the industrialization 
process in the postwar period in the 1950s and 60s. During the SCAP (Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, 1945-1951) period, Japan was under American rule 
and management, and Japan’s international trade was controlled by the United States. By 
the time the Americans had left and the MITI had embarked on its economic 
development strategies in 1954, its economy had overcome the s post war setbacks via its 
role as an export platform and a military procurement base for the United States during 
the Korean War. This quickly propelled Japan’s industrialization processes. MITI’s 
success in making the Japanese miracle possible labeled Japan and its governmental 
structures ‘Japan, Inc.’. In the private sector, Japan’s keiretsu (系列) developed 
horizontal and vertical integration, which would lock out foreign competition in the 
Japanese market. The government relaxation of anti-competition laws made possible the 
birth of conglomerates called zaibatsu (財閥), which heavily dominated the domestic 
markets with a focus on certain quality products. The Development Bank of Japan 
prioritized and strategically invested in the main pillars of the economy: shipbuilding, 
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automobile, coal, and steel production. During the Golden Sixties, under former Prime 
Minister Ikeda, Japan successfully achieved its goals in the Income Doubling Plan.  
     But during the initial phase of Japan’s opening to the world economy, though  it was 
committed to international trade, the largest portion of Japan’s  foreign trade was with the 
United States. In other words, Japan was heavily reliant on the U.S. market. Other factors 
such as non-tariff barriers, heavy capital controls (until the Big Bang in the 1980s), low 
value of the Japanese yen, and government subsidization for protection of home 
industries came under American scrutiny, and became the fundamental reasons for the 
U.S. to pursue uncompromising trade strategies against Japan in the subsequent decades 
as Japan’s trade surplus with the United States soared. Japan proclaimed to the world that 
it successfully overcame postwar economic calamities with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics. 
During the GATT period, as the U.S. policy makers pushed for hardline tactics to limit 
Japan’s exports into the United States, Japan found itself continuously cornered in anti-
dumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations. Japan chose to step back at 
times, with voluntary export restrictions and elimination of some non-tariff barriers 
during the strategic dialogues with the United States, in which a series of bilateral 
consultations were convened to lessen the impact of Japan’s selling to the U.S. But these 
strategies were largely unsuccessful on the part of the U.S. Demand for high quality, low 
cost, Japanese products, had penetrated and become deeply rooted in the U.S. domestic 
market. Under the WTO system, Japan still faced these contentions in trade, but to a 
lesser extent than it did in the GATT system. In the WTO years, Japan grew legally 
capable and powerful enough to file and respond to trade disputes. Defending the 
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proactive sectors of manufacturing was vital to Japan’s interests. Domestic preferences 
remain in Japanese manufacturing, but have been threatened over the years, especially 
since with time Japan has had to offshore its manufacturing bases to developing nations 
with lower labor cost to keep prices down. From the late 1980s, after its bubble economy 
burst, Japan has had to build a reinforcing mechanism for its trade by diversifying its 
trading partners, constructing regional production networks particularly in Southeast Asia, 
and facilitating the creation of various trading routes for its proactive sectors. Meanwhile, 
due to domestic political interests, its defensive sector of agriculture and fisheries 
remained highly secluded and protected from foreign competition. Maintaining a balance 
between the proactive and defensive sectors has been the main characteristic of Japan’s 
trade policymaking, but now its agricultural sector is becoming increasingly marginalized. 
All throughout the export-led industrialization, Japan’s political stability under the ‘1955 
System’ dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party also contributed to Japan’s ability to 
focus on economic development and industrialization.  
South Korea 
     South Korea’s economic development did not take off until under the leadership of 
Park Chung-hee, when he created an economic developmental model based on that of 
Japan. In fact, in the 1960s, during the Kim Il-sung regime, South Korea’s economy 
performed far less impressively than its adversary across the 38th parallel border, North 
Korea. Educated and trained in Japan, Park planted the Japanese economic model into the 
Korean economy, and invested heavily in strategic sectors of heavy industries and 
engineering just as the Japanese had. Park initiated import substitution industrialization 
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from the 1960s, launched the Heavy-Chemical Industry (HCI) drive in order to of build a 
modern military to that could stand against North Korea in the 1970s, and ultimately 
shifted gears toward export-oriented industrialization. In the 1980s and 90s, South Korea 
and Taiwan targeted the U.S. market, and although their actions at the time were not 
perceived as a critical threat to the U.S. economy by policy makers (as compared to the 
Japanese case), their low-cost goods heavily relied on the U.S. market. In the end, South 
Korea managed to launch its steel industry with loans and technical assistance from the 
Japanese government, and the development of the steel industry became the impetus 
needed for the production of automobiles and shipbuilding. As the import surge from 
South Korea continued from the late 1980s, the U.S. consistently pressured South Korea 
to gain further market access for American products into South Korea, and also for 
appreciation of the South Korean won. South Korea responded mildly to U.S. pressures, 
and while it succeeded in temporarily deflecting U.S. pressures at times, such responses 
were not necessarily based on strategic planning. South Korea sought to grow further by 
continuing to export and keep its currency value low. Its strong presidency and 
incumbent party across different administrations heavily influenced the direction of the 
economy, and thereby also impacting government-business relations tremendously.  
     But the strong government-business bonding and relationships would cause several 
problems in the system – corruption and market distortion for the most part – that went 
unnoticed internationally until the Asian Financial Crisis spread to South Korea from 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia. Hot money flooded out of South Korea. Under 
President Kim Young-sam, South Korea faced international criticism for corruption, 
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moral hazard, and most of all, lack of strategic economic planning after the 
developmental phase. The economy was revived with an IMF rescue package under the 
Kim Dae-jung regime. Korea’s IMF loans were paid off by restructuring the public and 
private sectors, stimulating the economy by implementing lax government policies on 
credit creation, and citizenry efforts in sacrificing their personal resources, such as gold, 
for the good of the country. The South Korean public was severely shaken by the 
restructuring and changes. The plunge and fast recovery of the economy took South 
Korea to another level of liberalization. Like Japan, South Korea did not give up on what 
it was good at: its manufacturing and export-led platform. It continued to export to the 
United States, and diversified its trading partners, signing and ratifying multiple trade 
deals in the forms of FTAs and EPAs beyond the WTO framework in the 2000s and 
onwards under the Roh Moo-hyun, Lee Myung-bak, and Park Geun-hye administrations. 
China 
     Meanwhile, China’s intent for economic development began with Deng Xiaoping’s 
launch of economic reforms in 1978. China has had great potential for foreign investors 
due to an abundance of cheap labor and vast potential markets. China developed a great 
deal during this period, and started trading with the world. At the time, China was 
exporting low-cost primary goods, mainly agricultural goods and raw minerals, to some 
trading partners including the U.S.  
     In the 1990s, the government’s strategic push of certain industries via the rise of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) in major cities pushed China to another level of 
industrialization. The SOEs in China now played the roles of cai fa (财阀), equivalent to 
	  	  
18 
those by zaibatsu (財閥) in Japan, or the chaebol (재벌) in South Korea. China was now 
producing steel and metals, materials central to industrialization. After several attempts 
and struggles in negotiations, China fully entered the world economy when the CCP 
leadership successfully negotiated its way into the WTO in 2001. For the Chinese people, 
China’s entrance into the world economy was a significant transitional event in their lives, 
and is referred to as ru shi (入世), literally meaning ‘entering into the world’, or the 
global economy. Foreign direct investment flocked into China, and factories were 
offshored to China to benefit from the cheap labor provided by migrant workers from the 
Chinese countryside. In 2008, China’s economic success was demonstrated during the 
Beijing Olympic Games, amid concerns about the country’s environmental degradation.  
Since 2010, China has been producing both lightweight manufactured goods, from 
textiles and furniture, to heavy industrial goods, such as cars and airplanes. China’s 
growth during the 2000s was record-breaking, until the onset of the Global Financial 
Crisis began to slow down its economy. While its competitive advantage of cheap labor 
has slowly died out and factories have been offshored to other destinations like Vietnam, 
China still is the number one manufacturing house in the world today. But as much as it 
engages in global trade, China is heavily involved in a series of trade disputes with its 
trading partners, particularly with the U.S. The People’s Bank of China’s management of 
the renminbi value has been consistently questioned over the years, although incremental 
appreciation has come. China’s development phases are encounters of further 
liberalization, in addition to what the Japanese have encountered in the 1980s and the 
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South Koreans have encountered in the 1990s. Whether China will continue to liberalize 
with stability in its economy remains a question today. 
Playing Hardball: U.S. Protectionism and Coercion 
     Following both world wars, the U.S. had its heyday as the successful manufacturing 
center of the world. When the U.S. started to lose market competitiveness due to the rise 
of Japanese goods in the 1960s and 70s, it had to find a way to cope with a new economic 
reality. So when high quality and cheaply priced Japanese goods started to overtake the 
U.S. market, the U.S. turned to selective trade protectionism. In contrast to the U.S.-
China case, in which market access was less of a problem, U.S. firms were concerned 
about both limited access to Japanese markets and by surges of Japanese import products 
into the U.S. Still, some of the major U.S. trade policy tools involved denial of access to 
the U.S. market for Japanese firms. Regarding currency issues, exchange rate policy 
examinations were included in the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act 
(OCTA) of 1988, and were also featured regularly in the U.S. Treasury Reports to the 
Congress. In 1988, under the OCTA, Taiwan and South Korea were labeled as currency 
manipulating countries. Ultimately, the U.S. Treasury had negotiations with South Korea 
on exchange rate ‘manipulation’.2 
     For the United States, trade deficits were accumulating yearly from the early 1970s. 
Reducing trade imbalances had certainly been on the U.S. agenda, and the U.S. sought to 
do so via placing various political pressures on its trading partners, but in practice it was 
not easy for the U.S. to shrink its trade deficit. This is when currency appreciation 
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pressures came into play. Japan strategically acquiesced to U.S. currency appreciation 
pressures in the 1980s, particularly after severe trade conflicts in the 1970s and the Plaza 
Accord in 1985. Taiwan and South Korea also made efforts to make mediocre yet partial 
adjustments upon U.S. request in the late 1980s to appreciate their currencies. 
Nonetheless, U.S. efforts to reduce its trade imbalances via exchange rate adjustments 
were to no avail.3 Especially after China entered the WTO based on the U.S. Congress 
grant of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status, U.S. trade imbalances 
mounted up in record-breaking figures. The accumulation of trade deficits could be 
attributed to the overwhelming consumerism in America – consumption in the U.S. 
continued and further propelled import surges from exporting partners of East Asia. But 
they could also be result of the structure of global finance – in which the U.S. dollar has 
plays a key role. The dollar has appreciated considerably since the beginning of the 
1970s. Economists interpreted this trade balance shift as evidence that the dollar was 
overvalued.4 
U.S. Trade Wars with Northeast Asia  
     From the 1970s, the U.S. saw an upsurge of foreign competition for their industries. 
The main competitors were their German and East Asian trading partners. As industrial 
interests in the U.S. were increasingly challenged over time, the need to take action was 
reflected in the U.S. policy realm via industrial lobbying to the U.S. Congress.  
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Under the GATT system, the U.S. engaged in trade conflicts with Northeast Asian 
countries mainly via domestic decisions to file an investigation that would lead to a 
bilateral confrontation of matters in trade. The surge of investigations from the 1970s 
reflect the result of organizational changes – the transfer of the U.S. Trade Remedy 
Bureau from the Department of Treasury to the Department of Commerce, which 
solicited many industrial persons to petition cases to protect their interests.  
     During this period, bilateral trade conflicts based on its domestic decisions had been 
the norm for the U.S., because the GATT system did not embody a full-fledged dispute 
settlement system to judge on trade conflicts, and also because the U.S. enjoyed 
considerable unilateral power over trade matters. This tradition continued onto the U.S. 
leverage of power in the WTO system, when the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
WTO was established after the completion of the Uruguay Rounds. The WTO DSB 
embodied the setup of an international trade court, and became an additional platform in 
which bilateral trade disputes could be brought to at the international level. The U.S. has 
been the most active complainant in the WTO after the EU and remains one of the most 
aggressive pursuers of WTO dispute initiations to this day.5 
     The Japanese challenges to U.S. industries in the 1960s and 70s were threatening to 
U.S. producers. The sources of Japanese competitiveness derived from various factors: 
the undervalued yen, government-industry relations, enterprise organization and 
management, and the social cohesion and lifetime employment conditions that bound all 
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workers to pay allegiance to their corporate cultures.6 When the U.S. started to lose 
market shares for electronics and automobiles to Japanese products at home, and 
industrial profits started to decline considerably due to competition with Japan, U.S. 
policy makers saw that the threats from Japan needed to be addressed properly.  
     The U.S. continued to gradually lose competitive ground to Northeast Asian exporters 
as South Korean and Taiwanese goods started to flow in. Imports from China trickled in, 
but remained largely primary products during the 1980s and into the early 1990s. Chinese 
trade acts of dumping were captured by the U.S. government and were put to questions 
via anti-dumping and countervailing duty impositions as they would with the cases of 
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The USITC records show that China was under scrutiny 
for anti-dumping investigations from the year 1980, although Chinese import products at 
the time were lightweight consumer goods that did not gather political interest sufficient 
to ignite a trade war.7 
U.S. Currency Conflicts with Northeast Asia 
     Prior to the Nixon Shock in 1971, former U.S. President John F. Kennedy considered 
devaluation of the dollar impractical, as it would undercut the dollar-based exchange rate 
system since 1944 under the Bretton Woods System.8 However, following the Nixon 
Shock, as the trade imbalances mounted exponentially, it became all the more difficult 
for U.S. policy makers to avoid a currency conflict with its trading partners. The U.S. 
needed to find a way to stabilize the dollar. In December 1971, the Group of Ten – 
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Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, the U.K., and 
the U.S. – gathered at the Smithsonian Institution to sign the Smithsonian Agreement in 
which they decided to appreciate their currencies against the dollar. By this agreement, a 
new set of parities was placed that reflected revaluation against the dollar. The gold 
standard of the Bretton Woods system came to an end when the fixed rates were 
abandoned in 1973 and ratified in the IMF charter in 1976. Since then, the world 
economy has been functioning with the dollar as the main anchor. 
     Under the gold-dollar system, it was understood that the U.S. would keep on mounting 
record-level trade deficits.9 Based on the dollar under the gold-dollar system, Robert 
Triffin argued in the 1960s that a country whose currency serves as an international 
reserve currency must be willing to supply the world with an ample supply of its currency 
to fulfill the demands, and this would thus lead to a trade deficit for the country. This is a 
counter argument to the concept of ‘exorbitant privilege’, coined by Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing, former President of France, who contended that the U.S. has alleged benefit in 
international transactions that could avoid a balance of payments crisis due to its own 
currency – the dollar – being the international reserve currency.10  
     The gold-dollar system broke down as a result from the Bretton Woods system, and 
the world now functions on a multi-currency system, largely swayed by the dollar. Since 
the lapsing of the gold-dollar system, the dollar has played a major role in the multi-
currency system. Because the dollar serves as an anchor, the fluctuation of the dollar is 
critical to economies whose value of national currencies are highly influenced by the 	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dollar. Most of these national currencies are not key international currencies, and 
transactions with other currencies are made via exchange of currencies into dollars. The 
dollar still carries a lot of weight in credibility and is more easily transferable than any 
other currency in the world today. Although the dollar has weakened in the aftermath of 
the Global Financial Crisis, there is no other substitute that could replace it at the moment. 
The influential role of the dollar has been the force driving U.S. currency appreciation 
pressures. In the four decades since the Nixon Shock in 1971, time and again U.S. policy 
makers in the Department of Treasury, from different U.S. administrations – regardless of 
party politics, or trends in trade policy have approached foreign central bankers and 
finance ministers with the intent to pressure them into currency appreciation. Currency 
appreciation pressures under the multi-currency system with the dollar as an anchor have 
become a repetitive pattern of U.S. foreign economic policy. 
Japanese Yen, South Korean Won, and Chinese Yuan 
     Currency conflicts have arisen repeatedly over the decades since the Nixon Shock. 
Over much of that period, Japan was the main target of U.S. pressure. More recently, 
South Korea and China have been criticized for currency manipulation. 
Japanese Yen 
     The U.S. pressures for currency appreciation were directed mainly at the Deutsche 
mark and the Japanese yen in the 1980s. As the pressures on the appreciation of both 
currencies were enforced, Japan saw it as a threat to its economy, and as a result industry 
and policymakers became divided on the costs and benefits of the appreciation of the yen. 
But some Japanese policymakers in the Ministry of Finance and Bank of Japan also saw 
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it as a strategic opportunity: appreciating the Japanese yen would enable their currency to 
play a bigger role in the global economy, in parallel with the other major players – the 
U.S., the U.K., France, and West Germany. By the time the Plaza Accord was signed on 
September 22, 1985, Japan was already a major economic player. The mainstream view 
is that Japan and West Germany, together with the rest of the G5 members, strived to 
achieve the stability of the U.S. dollar via cooperation and dialogue in the Plaza Accord. 
Japan strategically acquiesced to the currency appreciation pressures initially imposed on 
it by the United States after rounds of negotiations toward the Accord. However, 
appreciating the Japanese yen in large increments at once also brought about some 
unwelcome consequences. The appreciation of the Japanese yen would drive Japanese 
industries to seek offshoring in foreign countries, such as Southeast Asian countries, 
where they could create production networks at a lesser cost.  
South Korean Won 
     The effect on South Korea’s policy of the U.S. pressures on KRW appreciation was 
rather minimal in comparison to Japan. This may have been partially due to the relatively 
small impact on the U.S. economy that South Korea had in comparison to Japan or 
Germany at the time of the currency appreciation pressures. In the latter part of 1986, 
South Korea began consultations with the U.S. Treasury on the matter of currency, as it 
was identified as one of the currencies not following the currency adjustments made in 
the Plaza Accord.11 In its consultations with the IMF, the South Korean government 
agreed to increase the rate of appreciation of the won and to relax foreign exchange 
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controls in April 1987. In 1988, the U.S. Department of Treasury identified currency-
manipulating countries targeting economies with external surpluses and a managed float 
with restrictive capital controls. South Korea and Taiwan were among the targets. 
Economies with external surpluses with floating exchange rate regimes (Japan, Germany, 
and Hong Kong) were not targeted at this stage.12 The U.S. Treasury reasserted its 
findings in subsequent reports to the Congress in 1989. However, economists and certain 
policy makers did not find sufficient grounds for placing pressures on South Korea, as it 
was a developmental state.13 As in the case of China in recent years, then U.S. Secretary 
of Treasury Baker did not support Congressional attempts to mandate resolutions to the 
questions of exchange rates regarding South Korea, but planned only to continue 
negotiating with South Korea. All in all, contrary to the testimonies given by the 
incumbent Ministry of Finance (now MOSF) stressing that South Korea resisted the 
pressures and carried on its practices strictly based on market mechanisms, in the 1980s 
South Korea did make some adjustments in response to U.S. pressures for appreciation of 
the Korean won.14  
Chinese yuan (renminbi) 
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appreciation pressures in the 1980s, and that appreciation of the South Korean won was purely based on 
market mechanisms. This may have been partially true in 1989 when the South Korean government had 
already gone through series of consultations with the IMF on its currency, but evidently when the 
controversy on the won’s value arose in the U.S. congress in 1986, this was not the case. The assertions of 
the current MOSF officials on South Korean position at the time is partially correct in that in late 1989 
South Korea’s Finance Minister Lee reported that the South Korean government would not artificially 
depreciate or appreciate the won against the dollar, but instead introduced plans to liberalize South Korea’s 
foreign exchange system and full convertibility of the won. 
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     U.S. pressures on Chinese currency appreciation have been by far one of the most 
daunting tasks in the history of currency conflicts that the U.S. Treasury has engaged in. 
China’s currency issues were borne in a different political atmosphere in which the 
Chinese and the Americans faced an increasing amount of distrust despite increasing 
volumes of trade and investment. The U.S. dollar has become considerably weak during 
the previous financial crisis. It was not a strategic choice for China to budge like Japan 
did in the 1985 Plaza Accord or to delay their response like the South Koreans did in the 
latter part of the 1980s. China understood this logic, and thus has been appreciating the 
renminbi, albeit in small increments. It appreciated the renminbi once in 1994, and has 
been appreciating the renminbi incrementally since 2001 when it joined the WTO. 
Because of the renminbi appreciation that is happening, it is becoming more difficult to 
argue that the renminbi is a currency at low value as opposed to the dollar. China also 
sees its stakes in internationalizing the renminbi, and the forecast of the 
internationalization is reason to believe that it will appreciate its currency further.      
     Meanwhile, China’s surpluses from trading with the U.S. have been on slight decline, 
but continue to be a crucial part of the ongoing U.S. China Strategic & Economic 
Dialogue (S&ED) in addition to the talks on currency appreciation.15 The S&ED saga 
will continue for the time being as the U.S.-China economic relationship ripens into the 
near future. As for the Chinese response to U.S. currency appreciation pressures, China 
has shown a hybrid response amongst the Japanese and Korean cases. China’s political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Because the People’s Bank of China has been appreciating the Chinese yuan over the years in the 2000s, 
albeit in incremental terms, some economists have come to shake heads on the idea that the Chinese would 
not budge at all against U.S. pressures. 
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regime and foreign economic decision-making structure enables China to say no to 
extreme demands by the United States. However, it also sees its future interests in 
internationalizing its currency, and in order to do so, appreciation of the currency is a step 
that it must take. 
Market Liberalization and Management of Financial Crises 
     In macroeconomics, the open economy policy trilemma states that any country can 
choose only two of the following three desirable options: (1) monetary policy autonomy 
to target domestic activity; (2) free capital flows; and (3) exchange rate stability. At the 
beginning of their industrialization processes, Japan, South Korea, and China sacrificed 
the second component by exercising strong capital controls to acquire monetary policy 
autonomy and exchange rate stability. Eventually, they in turn went through the common 
cycles of market liberalization and financial crisis management, but in different patterns.  
Japan 
     Japan’s liberalization of capital occurred from 1974 – following the oil crisis and the 
launch of the Japanese welfare system in 1973 – to 1989 when the Japanese bubble 
economy burst. With the expansion of the national welfare program in Japan, public 
sector borrowing increased. Under foreign pressures, which the Japanese people have 
labeled as gaiatsu (外圧), Japan conducted three rounds of capital liberalization.16 The 
first of these was the Kennedy Round Negotiations of May 1967, and subsequent efforts 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Pearl, Part II, 1972. Pearl notes that gaiatsu for Japan’s capital liberalization was coming in from two 
directions – foreign pressures by the OECD, to which Japan gained accession in 1963; and bilateral 
pressures, particularly from the United States. He also notes that Japan’s then PM Ikeda gained accession 
without a clear understanding of what it will be required to do for membership. In other words, Japan 
sought for advanced nation status without expecting potential economic burdens. 
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were made to liberalize industries in 1969 and 1970, of which industries not on the list of 
liberalized industries remained subject to individual screening. The fourth round of 
liberalization in 1971 was somewhat different, in which a list of industries open to 
foreign control and a list of industries requiring individual screening for any investment 
(the negative list) was announced.17  
     But liberalized industries did not necessarily equate to free foreign investment. 
Neither the Japanese government nor Japanese industries were prone to expose the 
market to foreign control. In fact, Japan was very reluctant to open up its industries 
entirely based on its basic attitudes toward liberalization by the government ministries 
and the industries. Economic nationalism and government objectives of monetary control 
and administrative guidance played a huge role here. For the Japanese commercial banks 
which would loan to the industries for investment projects, the ministries would provide 
“window (madoguchi) guidance”, and signal the Bank of Japan (BOJ) for monetary 
expansion.18 Foreign investors would not be subject to this tradition, and the Japanese 
government saw that they would be intractable in administrative guidance.19  
     Throughout this process, banking restrictions were the de facto capital controls in 
Japan. While capital outflows were gradually liberalized to contain upward pressure on 
the yen after 1973, capital inflows remained highly restricted in the 1970s. However, the 
second oil shock of 1973 placed downward pressure on the yen, and a more general 
relaxation of capital controls was implemented under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Pearl, Part I, 1972. 
18 Pearl, Part II, 1972. 
19 Pearl, Part II, 1972. 
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Trade Control Law in December 1980.20 Throughout the 1980s, Japan was placed under 
severe foreign pressure to further deregulate its financial market.21 To impose this 
pressure, a special committee was set up by the U.S. Treasury and the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance (MOF). New measures reduced restrictions on euroyen (Japanese yen-
denominated deposits held in Banks outside Japan, not specifically only in Europe or in 
the European Union) activities and abolished limits on forward foreign exchange 
transactions and swaps, and the purchase of foreign securities by Japanese non-bank 
institutional investors.22 In addition, there were domestic forces driven by the growth of 
the euroyen business. The twenty-year process of financial liberalization was completed 
in November of 1996, when Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto launched the 
‘Big Bang’ to finalize Japan’s financial liberalization. 
South Korea 
     South Korea duplicated Japan’s financial regime to the greatest extent amongst all 
Asian nations.23 South Korea liberalized its financial markets bit by bit in response to the 
U.S. and IMF requests in the early part of 1990s, as intended by the Ministry of Finance 
at the time. But this semi or partial opening to foreign capital without sufficient 
supervision and surveillance systems ended up hurting the South Korean economy 
severely in the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). During the crisis South Korea was not 
equipped with ample foreign reserves. Under the lax systems of financial regulation at the 
time, South Korean industries had been developing a habit of high debt-equity ratios, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Kasman and Rodrigues, 1991. 
21 Additionally, domestic market forces (i.e., market-driven growth of the euro-yen business) were 
transforming Japan in the 1980 toward financial opening to foreign economies. 
22 Kasman and Rodrigues, ibid. 
23 Cargill and Parker, 2001. 
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borrowing large sums of money to invest in high-risk projects, which in the event of a 
project failure, resulted in the inability to pay back the initial loan. During the Asian 
Financial Crisis, it was this hot money flooding out of the country that exacerbated these 
failures and broke down the South Korean economy. Sudden capital outflows created a 
domino effect of industries announcing bankruptcies, one after another. The IMF pointed 
at the negative aspects of the South Korean economy and demanded structural reforms of 
the economy as a whole, leading to tightening of public spending and corporate 
restructuring and thousands of workers being laid off.  
     Once bitten, twice shy - South Korea started amassing loads of foreign currency after 
its recovery from the AFC, and started to regulate capital flows after the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC). It was not as hard hit during the GFC, owing to the considerable amounts 
of foreign exchange reserves, but it still sought to secure extra dollars via swap 
agreements with the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of Japan, and the People’s 
Bank of China. It went further to initiate a macro-prudential levy on foreign short-term 
capital inflows in line with the IMF’s reversal of positions on capital controls, and it even 
considered the implementation of a Tobin tax.  
     In retrospect, South Korea’s policy on capital and financial liberalization from the late 
1980s could not be rated as strategic, and while the preventive mechanisms that it is 
looking into post-GFC via policy implementation for macro-prudentiality is intended in 
good will, it is still under skeptical views by foreign investors who consider the policies 
as capital controls. In a way, it may seem to the critical investors that South Korea is 
stepping back from its liberalization policies, but one thing is for certain – the capital 
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control measures are clearly different from the 1980s – that it is mainly intended to 
regulate hot money. Based on the changes in its financial system that it has made since 
then, it is also quite clear that South Korea is not retreating back to the old days of 
deploying strong capital controls. 
China 
     China’s launch of financial reforms in recent years has been minimal in comparison to 
its neighboring counterparts, Japan and South Korea. It took on a very gradual and 
incremental step to liberalization, but considering that the Shanghai Stock Exchange did 
not even exist prior to 1990, China’s financial sector development has been admittedly 
quite extensive over a short span of time. It is seeking capital liberalization via renminbi 
internationalization, starting with renminbi transactions with its Southeast Asian 
neighboring states. As for financial reforms, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leadership has come to the understanding that it cannot sustain growth solely based on the 
export-led platform on which the Chinese economy has heavily relied, and that a 
divergence in policy is necessary to keep the economy going.  
     Thus far, China has demonstrated backward ways of financial sector development that 
have fallen short of meeting international standards in terms of capital account 
liberalization, surveillance mechanisms, and transparency. Shadow banking channels 
have ballooned over the years due to the difficulty of financing for small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs); this is relevant to international finance in that foreign financial 
institutions are highly restricted in their ability to participate in shadow banking and 
domestic capital markets. The accumulation of non-performing loans (NPLs) has also 
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cast shadows on China’s financial sector. Considering the size of its economy and scale, 
China’s financial industry still remains largely unopened to the global economy, and as a 
result, China was relatively less affected by the two financial crises – the Asian Financial 
Crisis (1997-98) and the Global Financial Crisis (2008-09). But China has become aware 
of the need for financial surveillance and monitoring systems, as well as the need to make 
more loans available to not only the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but also the private 
sector, which may enable more equal footing for SMEs via opening up. In order to 
undertake these tasks, China’s current leadership under President Xi Jinping sees the 
crucial need for a financial overhaul of the economy to sustain its long-term goals of 
achieving high economic growth rates, as the growth rate has started to decline. 
Sustaining growth is also crucial for justifying the CCP’s economic statecraft. 
     Against this backdrop, toward the end of former premier Wen Jiabao’s term, the 
possibilities of further opening up China’s financial markets were envisaged via the 
launching of pilot districts designated for financial reform in Wenzhou, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen. Coupled with its efforts to internationalize the renminbi, China’s financial 
reforms, now reemphasized by the current Premier of the State Council, Li Keqiang - if 
carried out in a systematic fashion - will have a considerable impact on China’s domestic 
economy and foreign economic relations. China’s financial reform efforts come in two 
forms: ‘bottom-up’ and ‘inside-out’ reforms. ‘Bottom-up’ reforms (rather than ‘top-down’ 
reforms), as stated by Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the PBOC, are reflected in the 
designation of financial pilot reform programs, which will facilitate financing SMEs in 
China. The Financial Reform Pilot Districts of Wenzhou and Shenzhen, each launched in 
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March and April 2012, in which a set of measures including the pilot reform programs in 
bond, private equity and the Chinese yuan’s cross-border trade, were approved by the 
local authorities to boost China’s real economy. Market-oriented reforms of changing 
interest and exchange rates, and renminbi internationalization are also examples of 
‘bottom-up’ reform.  
     Much of the developments on China’s financial opening have been driven in large part 
by U.S. pressures via the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (S&ED) and other foreign 
pressures. While the Chinese have been eager to open the market to attract foreign direct 
investment for the purposes of building infrastructure and generating profit it has limited 
foreign investors’ from investing in China’s renminbi denominated capital market, 
allowing only a selection of global institutional investors under the Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investor (QFII) program. The strongly embedded economic ties between the 
two states – often times referred to as ‘Chimerica’ – makes it very difficult for the U.S. 
Treasury to unilaterally demand China of U.S. requests for renminbi appreciation, and 
thus the S&ED platform has been more of a channel for communication for cooperation 
than pressure. At the executive levels, both sides understand making extreme requests 
will cross an invisible line and would eventually undermine future attempts for further 
cooperation. At the same time, both sides retain their interests (i.e., for the U.S., currency 
appreciation or further financial opening) and seek to bring out the most  their counterpart.  
     All in all, for China to carry out the financial reforms from ‘inside out’, the first and 
foremost task would be to develop domestic financial markets that could generate credit 
from within. Accomplishing this would put the renminbi on the path to international 
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recognition and would also help decrease China’s heavy reliance on investment and 
export driven growth.   
The Responses in Theoretical Context: Institutional Variance 
Why have they responded differently? Similarities and Divergence 
     In answering why the three countries have behaved differently toward U.S. 
protectionist policies, we notice similarities in the circumstances of conflicts, and the 
divergence in the policy actions taken in response. The argument and findings in this 
dissertation lead us to the fact that institutional variance – the structure and process of 
policy decision-making - have resulted in the states’ divergent responses. We know for 
sure that all three states – Japan, South Korea, and China – were operating in export-
oriented economic structures and platforms, albeit with differing experiences. But more 
importantly, their decision-making processes and political procedures were inherently 
different, owing to the differing political capacity and industrial interests.  
     The policy responses by Northeast Asian states to each culmination of trade and 
currency conflicts with the U.S. differed, despite some commonalities. For example, 
Japan’s revenue was initially primarily derived from textiles, light manufactured goods, 
and electronics. South Korea’s case was similar in the beginning, but its exports did not 
penetrate the U.S. market to the same extent. China, on the other hand, started from 
lightweight industries but has not stopped producing lightweight products after expanding 
to include heavy industrial products like steel and petroleum.  
     Recalling the role of the state and the characteristics of its governance in the field of 
international political economy, there is abundant literature on the state’s governing role 
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of the market, and its motivations and intentions backed by linkages with the industries. 
The seminal work by Karl Polanyi, ‘The Great Transformation’ (1944), was the 
foundation in the field of IPE recognizing that the modern market economy and the 
nation state are to be understood as a single human intervention under the name ‘Market 
Society’ – a socially embedded economic system and venue in which a market economy 
is able to function.24 Susan Strange in ‘States and Markets’ pointed at four components of 
a state in constituting power – security, production, finance, and knowledge. Security was 
indeed one major factor that constituted power of a state (Nordlinger, 1977, 1981; 
Krasner, 2009; Trimberger, 1978). Strange made it very clear that a state engages in the 
market with certain intended purposes in mind. In the case of the U.S. approach to 
Northeast Asian states, as we know, certain mutual interests were met in terms of both 
security and economic benefit. Political scientists and economists have thus far explored 
the linkages between the state and its economic behavior. Marina Arbetman and Jacek 
Kugler have argued that political capacity captures the ability of political systems to carry 
out the tasks chosen by the nation’s government in the face of domestic and international 
groups with competing priorities, and that governments increase their political capacity 
by expanding reach over the population or by extracting more from groups already 
mobilized.25  
     What I seek to emphasize before delving into the concept of institutional variance, by 
comparing the cases of these three countries, is the importance of the role of the state in 
the process of policy outcome. The cases of East Asian industrialization are not an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Polanyi, 1944.  
25 Arbetman and Kugler, 1997.  
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exception - the literature on the industrialization of Japan, South Korea, and China, 
reveals the critical role of the state in the process. The institutional ways and means of 
resulting in a policy outcome is decided by the state. But each country’s case tells us that 
institutional variance lies in the different combinations of structure and process created 
by different actors – the central government, political leaders, the bureaucracy, industries, 
and the general public – having different weighted influence on the final outcome in 
foreign economic policymaking. 
     Previous literature has emphasized the role of the state in East Asian economic 
development. Alexander Gerschenkron argued that the later a country industrializes in 
chronological history, the greater the economic interventions of the government, because 
production methods become more capital-intensive, calling for a larger role of the state to 
make arrangements for required capital.26 The East Asian cases have often times been 
characterized by strong intervention of the markets by the government, as Robert Wade 
explains in ‘Governing the Market’. Wade argued that East Asian governments went far 
beyond the limits of “good” neoclassical intervention in the course of development.27 The 
government played a significant role in allocating resources and deciding on the 
directions of development in specific strategic sectors in the East Asian cases. They were 
also very systematic in carrying out the tasks on the path of development. Chalmers 
Johnson in ‘MITI and the Japanese Miracle’ focused on the Ministry of International 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Gerschenkron,1962. Later, Amsden came up with a twist on his original thought and suggested that the 
later a country industrializes in chronological history, the greater the probability that its major 
manufacturing firms will be foreign-owned (Amsden, 2001). China’s economic development was made 
possible largely via foreign direct investment, although it now possesses several SOEs that are mainly 
owned by Chinese shareholders. China’s FDI dependency is more striking when one takes into account the 
substantive investment roles by SOEs (Huang, 2003). 
27 Wade, 1990. p.342 
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Trade and Industry (what is now METI) as the leading agent among many Japanese 
bureaucratic agents in the Japanese economic system. Alice Amsden in ‘Asia’s Next 
Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization’, also pointed out that the South Korean 
government was able to avoid backwardness by government coordination of economic 
activities.28 China’s paths were somewhat different, but Deng Xiaoping’s decision to 
open up the economy to foreign direct investment was the starting point. In filling in the 
answers as to how a communist China was able to grow, Yasheng Huang notes that 
foreign direct investment was key to China’s development, and stresses that China’s 
TVEs in the 1980s that were de facto private firms (not public enterprises) which ceased 
to exist in the 1990s in the rise SOEs when national policy environment became 
inhospitable toward rural entrepreneurship (Huang, 2003; 2008).29 The TVEs in the early 
phase of Chinese development were critical in putting China on the path to development, 
but it is difficult to deny the presence of the state throughout the phases of development. 
It was the state that made the initial decisions to open up, and when local enterprises 
performed well, it took over with the SOEs. Simply put, the state in East Asian 
industrialization was indeed a facilitator and determinant of economic growth. Political 
leadership, bureaucracy, and government-business relations played a central role in 
propelling economic development in the three countries. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Amsden,1992. 
29 Huang, 2008. p.72. Truth be told, after Deng Xiaoping stepped down, Jiang Zemin’s leadership 
(including the Shanghai clique, his political faction consisting of people who have previously worked for or 
were associated with his administration in Shanghai) pushed for stronger roles by the coastal provinces to 
become the headquarters of development rather than continuing with the rural entrepreneurships. Born and 
raised in Jiangsu, adjacent to Shanghai, Jiang’s education and previous posts in Shanghai also add personal 
initiatives to develop the region. 
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     What I seek to do in this dissertation is to go beyond the previous literature on the role 
of the state and dissect the differences in institutional mechanisms of each East Asian 
state in response to U.S. protectionist policies. When each East Asian state outperformed 
U.S. expectations and U.S. protectionist measures confronted each East Asian economy, 
it was also up to the East Asian states to decide how they would respond. In the Peter 
Gourevitch explanation, this was ‘second image reversed’ for many states. International 
sources would be influencing domestic political factors, and states had to come up with 
responses that would satisfy the opponent and the home industries.  
     The crux of the argument in this dissertation is that the nexus of political capacity and 
industrial interests are the underlying factors to institutional variance – the divergence of 
pathways and responses to U.S. protectionism. They were used to explain the 
developmental models, but they remain relevant to solving the puzzle here: the 
divergence in the policy decisions that were made to respond to external pressures. 
Political capacity is the foundation for decision-making by leaderships and bureaucracies; 
industrial interests are the sources of the directions in policy, as they are what politicians 
provide directions for and must in turn defend in order to gain electoral gains. In the 
absence of these two factors, it would be difficult to explain why the states chose to 
respond differently.  
     The underlying assumption would be that in the event of an external pressure, states 
would try at the utmost of their political capacities to protect domestic industrial interests.  
Douglass North sought to explain the disparity in the performance of economies, and the 
persistence of disparate economies through time by focusing not only on economic 
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variables but institutional variables.30 I find the roots of my argument stem from North’s. 
The degree of U.S. pressures imposed on each country though obviously different, were 
not the ultimate factor that created the divergence in the responses. The divergence of 
East Asian institutional capabilities and specificities lies in the structure and process of 
policy decision-making.  
Alternative Explanations of East Asian Responses to U.S. Protectionism 
     There are alternative explanations for the varied responses to East Asian responses to 
U.S. protectionism. There is the question of scale, and the question of size – the East 
Asian states have different economies with different fundamentals, and have had different 
pathways of development, as mentioned in the China case. While these variables are 
given beyond a social scientist’s control, there are some explanations – geopolitical, 
constructivist, and socio-cultural – that deserve scholarly attention. 
Geopolitical Explanations 
     Given the nexus of security and economic interests that the U.S. had since the two 
World Wars and the Korean War, many would contest the idea that U.S. foreign policy 
on Northeast Asia was built only on economic interests. I.M. Destler writes that liberal 
U.S. trade policies were further buttressed by concerns of countering the threat of 
communism, and that military alliances with Western Europe and Japan were the sources 
of containing the USSR and the PRC.31 
     The U.S. provided massive aid to its allies and made the start of the Japanese 
economic miracle possible. The increasing demands of special procurement also sped up 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 North,1990. 
31 Destler, 2005. 
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the economic reconstruction. In the outbreak of the Korean War, Japan, which did not 
take part in the war after its surrender in the WWII, was able to take full advantage of its 
geographical proximity to convey necessities and defense products for the allied forces, 
thereby adding the revenue from the war to its economic development. South Korea had a 
similar experience of converting a part of the remittances of its soldiers who participated 
in the Vietnam War into South Korean highways construction.  
     The dynamics of geopolitical linkages between the U.S. and East Asian states have 
clearly existed, and continue on to this day. But the geopolitical explanation falls short of 
clarifying the causes of variance in the responses from each country in which the security 
situations grew less intense compared to the initial days in the Cold War in which 
security interests were top priority. Moreover, the culmination of bilateral trade and 
currency conflicts between each of the East Asian states and the U.S. was during periods 
in which Cold War security dynamics remained or security interests existed but were not 
top priority – Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, South Korea in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
China in the 2000s and 2010s. The previous decades of economic prosperity and growing 
interdependence prompted the security environment to change, partially contributing to 
the previous decades of absence of war. For instance, it is difficult to state that Japan 
adhered to the wishes of the U.S. in the Plaza Accord due to strategic interests. It is also 
difficult to say that South Korea accepted the conditions for liberalization in the IMF 
guidelines after years of U.S. pressures on its currency appreciation because of South 
Korea’s strategic security alliance with the U.S. Inevitably, North Korean nuclear threats 
still remain vital to South Korean political decision-making, but they were not strong 
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enough to compel foreign investors to pull out of South Korea. Rather, it was the South 
Korean lack of soundness in its financial systems that compelled them to pull out. It is 
thus an overstatement to say that security interests overrode economic interests in U.S.-
East Asian relationships from the 1970s and onwards.  
     In other words, we need a framework to explain the ultimate interests that contributed 
to each of the responses from the three states, and the variance in the response of these 
states was distanced from the geopolitical explanation. Because security and economic 
interests go hand in hand the geopolitical explanation may serve as the main pillar of 
understanding security dynamics in bilateral and regional relationships between the U.S. 
and each of the Northeast Asian economies – China, Japan, and South Korea. But the 
internal dynamics of industrial interests and political decision making processes are the 
fundamental sources of foreign economic policymaking. These institutional factors need 
to be elaborated upon in order for us to understand the ultimate reasons as to why 
responses have varied. 
Constructivist Explanations: Learning Processes and Legal Expertise 
     A curious examiner could question the legal capacity of states in filing counter 
lawsuits when faced with protectionist measures. Could it be the case that over time, 
Northeast Asian states have acquired the ability to defend themselves against U.S. 
accusations of wrongful trading acts and currency manipulations, but have differed in that 
legal capacity? Taking Japan’s litigant behavior in the WTO as an example, Davis shows 
that explaining Japan’s actions in the WTO with the constructivist view is fairly difficult 
– it is true that Japan has had a relatively less litigious culture and lack of low legal 
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capacity in Japan. She argues that if we assume that Japan is averse to litigation, the 
variation of Japan’s litigation over time cannot be explained; moreover, she points out 
that there is little correlation between domestic legal changes and Japanese litigation in 
the WTO.  Both South Korea and China have shown an increasing emphasis on 
expanding the legal capacity and learning process for dealing with trade disputes. It is 
only natural that a country would pursue the learning process when encountering a new 
challenge. Recognizing that there is a learning process is important, but what is more 
critical is the realization this learning process is only a fraction of the whole process of 
policy decision-making.   
     The old explanations (please see note) of Asians seeking to avoid conflict in court 
does not really give a sufficient answer here, because we have seen these states actively 
engaging in trade disputes in the WTO in order to defend their interests.32 Legal expertise 
requires time to accumulate, and as states gain experience in international courts they also 
gain legal expertise. But legal learning does not guarantee or decide a state’s defense or 
offense in response to a waged trade or currency conflict.33 Rather, legal tools are the 
means to protect industrial interests, and it is better played when political capacity is 
present to support the exercise of legal tools. In other words, the learning process is only 
a small part of the institutional toolkit for states, and cannot explain for the whole 
framework of policy decision-making.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Zhang, Qi. 2007. Zhang argues that for China, Confucian morals and traditions keep the Chinese away 
from engaging in conflict in any manner, especially in court. He explains that this is the fundamental 
explanation to why the Chinese government has been actively in pre-consultation stages of the WTO 
dispute settlement, prior to actual consultation stage and before panel establishment. 
33 Davis, 2012.  pp. 190-194. 
	  	  
44 
Socio-Cultural Explanations 
     As a student of Northeast Asian studies focusing on the three countries of Japan, 
South Korea, and China, it is very easy to compare certain behaviors and critique or even 
joke about certain mannerisms or fixed attitudes that one may encounter in the three 
states as a researcher. These three states differ a great deal in terms of culture, no matter 
how deeply the influence of Confucianism and previous past encounters are deeply 
rooted in their histories. But this knowledge does not help us to answer why the three 
states differed in their responses to U.S. protectionist measures. States construct their 
defenses not in a socio-cultural way, but based on strategic and economic thinking 
against such measures. Socio-cultural explanations may come into play when explaining 
the characteristics of bureaucrats as individuals and the construction of the bureaucracy, 
but not in terms of the goals of ultimate decision making for policy. But, just as the 
constructivist explanations are only a small part of the institutional toolkit for the states, 
the socio-cultural explanation of bureaucracy is only a portion of the institutional process 
and structure. 
     As demonstrated in Figure 1-1, there are five stages in the East Asian States’ bilateral 
economic relationships with the United States. These stages are the common 
denominators in the relationship between each state and the U.S. during the postwar 
period. These similarities provide good ground for comparison of the East Asian 
countries’ experiences and divergence of policy responses. How they differed in their 
responses in trade and currency conflict with the United States, owing to institutional 
variance, is laid out in the brief argument Table 1-1. 
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Figure 1-1. The Five Stages of  
U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Wars and Currency Conflicts  
 
Source: By author 
Table 1-1. The Argument in Brief:  
Key Variables in U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Wars and Currency Conflicts 
 
Background Independent Variable (IV) Dependent Variable (DV) 
U.S. Protectionism via  
Trade Wars and  
Currency Conflict 
Various Structures of  
Foreign Economic Policymaking 
Responses from  
Japan, South Korea, and China 
Trade Dispute Initiation 
ü Recurrence of trade imbalances 
ü U.S. losses in comparative 
advantage  
ü Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Investigations by the USITC / 
USDOC 
ü WTO Dispute Initiations by the 
USTR 
• Regime type 
• Government related actors: 
political parties, politicians, 
ministries and bureaucrats 
• Bureaucratic decision making 
structure: political and economic 
agenda-setting and actions by 
actors 
 
Responses to Trade Disputes 
Ø Japan: Strategic acquiescence due to 
strong bureaucracy led by MOF and 
METI 
Ø South Korea: Reciprocation via the 
omnipotent presidency that drives 
ministerial policy coordination 
amongst MOTIE, MOFA, and 
MAFRA 
Ø China: Retaliation under a 
hierarchical system with the Politburo 
as the influencer and MOC as the 
agent  
Currency Appreciation Pressures 
ü Appreciation of the U.S dollar, 
relative depreciation of the 
currencies of trading partners 
ü Pressures for financial opening 
coupled with currency appreciation 
pressures 
Responses to Currency Conflicts 
Ø Japan: Strategic Compliance by the 
MOF (Plaza Accord, 1985; Louvre 
Accord, 1987; Smithsonian 
Agreement) 
Ø South Korea: Lack of strategic 
behavior by the MOF (1988-1992), 
Accidental depreciation in the AFC  
Ø China: Combined strategies of 
resistance and incremental 
appreciation of the renminbi by the 
PBC (2005-2013) 
Source: By author 
Stage 1: Mutual Economic & Security Interests 
Securing Geopolitical Partnership 
Trade Liberalization and Market Opening 
Consolidating U.S. Regional Leadership 
Stage 2: Mutual Market Interests 
Economic Growth of the Trading Partner 
Trade Balance Shift 
U.S. Domestic Concerns (private) 
U.S. Political Actions (public) 
Stage 3: U.S. Coercion: Trade Wars  
and Currency Appreciation Pressures 
Bilateral Negotiations and Consultations 
Punitive Measures and Trade Remedy 
Trade Disputes (USITC, USDOC, WTO) 
Stage 4: Country Responses 
Acquiescence/Compliance (Japan) 
Reciprocation (South Korea) 
Retaliation (China) 
Stage 5: Coercion Beyond the WTO 
Framework 
Bilateral FTAs 
Regional Interests - TPP 
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Mechanisms and Plan of the Dissertation 
     This introductory chapter has laid out how I approach trade wars and currency 
conflicts between the U.S. and its Northeast Asian counterparts at different points in 
time: Japan in the 1970s and 80s, South Korea in the 1980s and 90s, and China in the 
1990s and 2000s. The following chapters unravel each bilateral conflict under a certain 
segment of the conflict in each chapter.  
     Chapter 2, ‘Theoretical Framework: Political Capacity and Industrial Interests’, 
provides an explanation of each country’s decision-making process and structure in 
responding to U.S. protectionism. Decisions made by these East Asian bureaucracies 
shared some similarities, in that all three took industrial interests very seriously, hoping 
to promote continual high-speed growth. But the ways and structure in which they made 
their policy decisions were disparate. The actors and the embedded factors in their 
decision making processes are laid out by country cases: government regime type, 
government related actors consisting of political parties, politicians, ministries and 
bureaucrats, and political and economic agendas and actions resulting in bilateral political 
interactions and diplomatic actions with the United States. Industrial interests are 
explained by country cases in terms of government-business relationships. I present my 
model of institutional variance by presenting the three different policy- making structure 
models for each country. 
     Chapter 3 and 4 are the core chapters on trade disputes. Chapter 3, ‘Trade Wars: East 
Asian Responses to U.S. Protectionist Actions, 1971-2013’ examines three bilateral 
chronologies of U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty investigations on Japan, South 
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Korea, and China. This chapter finds that with the motivations of the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC) and the United States Department of 
Commerce (USDOC), antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) investigations 
were pursued from the 1970s, with the intent to pressure U.S. trading partners generating 
U.S. trade deficits. The explanations for the varied trade remedy structures of each East 
Asian state demonstrates how each state coped with U.S. pressures based on its 
individual political capacity and industrial interests. 
     Chapter 4, ‘Trade Wars Continued: East Asian Responses to U.S. Protectionist 
Actions in the WTO, 1995-2013’ analyzes a) how the amount of trade deficit 
accumulation with a trading partner leads to a political consensus for protectionist 
measures, and ultimately, the filing of a dispute settlement case in the WTO, and b) how 
the varying domestic institutional preparations for WTO litigation in the three East Asian 
countries has resulted in different responses to U.S. WTO dispute initiations. In the first 
part, a quantitative regression model is deployed to highlight the statistical significance of 
the U.S. trade deficits/annual GDP ratio with regard to U.S. protectionist measures. In the 
second part, WTO dispute cases between U.S.-Japan, U.S.-South Korea, and U.S.-China 
bilateral trade relations provide examples to supplement explanations for the institutional 
variance in East Asian responses to U.S. WTO dispute initiations, as well as three 
countries’ own patterns of participation in the WTO dispute settlement body. I argue that 
responses to WTO dispute initiations by the U.S. have varied as a result of the differing 
bureaucratic structures for foreign economic policy making: I find that Japan has 
acquiesced due to its high delegation to the trade ministry technocrats that are not well-
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equipped in terms of financial resources or policy priority in regard to trade disputes; that 
South Korea has reciprocated owing to demand for the omnipotent presidency to be very 
conscious of public opinion on trade matters to ensure successful ministerial policy 
coordination and public-private legal partnerships; and that China has retaliated based on 
its top-down decision making structure (Politburo-State Council-Ministries) under which 
the Ministry of Commerce is enabled to prioritize trade dispute matters, and is 
empowered and provided governmental support for pursuing disputes at the discretion of 
the Vice Premier in charge of foreign economic affairs. 
     Chapter 5, ‘Currency Conflict: East Asian Responses to U.S. Currency Appreciation 
Pressures, 1971-2013’ analyzes why the three countries have responded differently to 
currency conflict with the United States at the height of their industrialization. U.S. 
bilateral trade deficits with East Asian economies have led to the imposition of political 
pressures for currency appreciation on countries with trade surpluses, which have 
maintained currency and capital controls under highly regulated financial systems. 
Simultaneously, coercive bilateral negotiations were convened to promote financial 
liberalization and deregulation. I find that Japan acquiesced in the Plaza Accord and the 
Big Bang, strategically looking to play a larger role in the global economy until their 
bubble economy burst. South Korea also acquiesced somewhat initially, but reciprocated 
without strategic planning, which resulted in an unprepared financial opening, and 
ultimately, accidental depreciation of the won during the Asian Financial Crisis. In recent 
years, China has been facing and resisting the same pressures, but has different answers 
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backed by differing motivations. China seeks to launch financial reform on its own terms, 
including capital liberalization to push for renminbi internationalization. 
     Chapter 6, ‘The Change of Tides: The Future of U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Wars and 
Currency Conflicts’ is a concluding chapter that summarizes these findings and projects 
the future of trade and currency conflicts. Such conflicts are unavoidable in our global 
economic system, and deserve particular attention as they occur daily. Intra-regionally, 
the U.S. ‘Pivot to Asia’ is fabricating a series of regional contestation and rivalry with 
China. I question whether the ongoing negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
agreement will play a role in consolidating U.S. presence in the region, and how China, 
Japan, and South Korea will continue to vie for financial and economic interests in 
Northeast Asia. I also present some avenues for additional future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Political Capacity and Industrial Interests 
In Theoretical Context 
 
 
 
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction. 
 
- Douglass North, 1991- 
 
 
Accountability without authority only brings refusal of countenance,  
and authority without accountability only brings administrative totalitarianism. 
권한없는 책임은 면피주의를 낳고 책임없는 권한은 행정독주만을 불러일으킬 뿐이다. 
 
- Horace George Frederickson -  
 
 
Confucian bureaucracy and democratic self-government  
are not only compatible with economic growth,  
but they may also be a powerful mix of economic, bureaucratic, and democratic ideas. 
 
- Francis Fukuyama, ‘Trust’, 1995 - 
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Theoretical Framework: Institutions that Matter 
     In countries around the world, institutions and bureaucracies frame and construct the 
patterns of political decision-making processes, and the particularities of institutions 
serve as the main pillars and foundations of policy formation. They are webs of 
complexities, involving the interests of the ministries as pillars of the government, and 
also individuals - politicians and bureaucrats. Institutions are established pursuant to a 
certain objective, which continues to lead and push the decision-making process toward a 
certain intended direction. This is especially applicable to trade and financial decision 
making processes. Ministries act in cooperation and conflict as they interact with one 
another and encounter their vested interests. For instance, in the case of the Ministries of 
Finance in Japan and South Korea, a ministry may have a conflict of interest with another 
governmental ministries, or with the central bank (which, strictly speaking, is not a 
government ministry in Japan or Korea, but is in China).34 The power dynamics that exist 
between institutions will also contribute to the final policy outcome.  
     Meanwhile, individuals – politicians and bureaucrats alike – also retain their own 
vested interests in building their careers while interacting with one another during over 
the course of policy formation. Their behaviors also impact the direction of policy. 
Interpersonal activities and interactions amongst political leaders and ministry officials 
influence the policy decision-making process, and must incorporate both organizational 
and individual interests. Asian bureaucracies, in particular, have been criticized for three 
shortfalls – i.e., in the South Korean case, 관치금융 (官治金融: government-controlled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 China’s Ministry of Finance has lesser leverage in policy than the PBOC in reality), or the politicians 
involved in the decision making process. 
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finance), 면피주의 (面皮主義: face covering), 복지부동 (伏地不動: to have an 
apathetic attitude) – which have hindered the improvement of government performance 
in policy agenda setting and implementation.35 These traits are commonly found 
elsewhere in the bureaucracies of Asia, including Japan and China. 
      In the previous chapter, I emphasized the concept of political capacity as the main 
factor leading to institutional variance. The existing literature on political capacity has 
approached this issue from various perspectives. Some scholars have approached the 
concept with a broad perspective on democracy or the rule of law. Feng analyzed the 
concept in terms of the three major dimensions of a political system – political freedom, 
political stability, and policy certainty – he then related to them to economic 
development.36 Meanwhile, I find my argument closely aligns with the concept of 
political capacity defined by Arbetman and Kugler in ‘Political Capacity and Economic 
Behavior’.37  They define the aggregate performance of governments, as the ability of 
political systems to carry out the tasks chosen by the nation’s government in the face of 
domestic and international groups with competing priorities, which can be approximated 
as political capacity. Building on Arbetman and Kugler’s previous work, I propose a 
framework that consists of institutional variance stemming from differing political 
capacities in Japan, South Korea, and China’s policy responses to U.S. protectionism. In 
order to compare and analyze institutional variance among the economic and financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Hanʼguk Kyŏngje Sinmunsa, 1994. Ilsŏn kyŏngje kijadŭl i pogo ssŭn Han'guk ŭi kyŏngje kwallyo. Sŏul-
si: Han'guk Kyŏngje Sinmunsa. Written by groups of economic and financial journalists in South Korea, 
the book points at the malpractices of South Korea’s economic and financial ministries in the past decades 
toward the outbreak of the Asian Financial Crisis.  
36 Feng, 2003. 
37 Arbetman, Marina and Jacek Kugler, 1997. 
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decision making processes in these three countries, the ideal framework should not only 
include political regime types and bureaucratic characteristics, but also any political 
transitions, and specific decision-making structures in the bureaucracies with 
government-business relations. 
     In each of the three countries of study – Japan, South Korea, and China – who decides, 
who follows, and who contradicts in the making of economic and financial policies can 
vary significantly depending on domestic decision-making structures and bureaucratic 
nature. Many scholars in the field of East Asian political economy have examined 
decision-making power structures and bureaucracies in depth for a particular country. 
Their findings have become strong foundations for the study of political economy in each 
of these countries. The seminal work by Grimes (2001) on Japan’s macroeconomic 
policy failure from the Plaza Accord to the bubble economy, the analysis by Schoppa 
(1997) on Japanese trade policymaking and negotiations with the United States, the 
works by Mulgan on Japan’s agricultural lobbying and agricultural policy regime (2000; 
2006), and the work by Shih (2008) on the political factions in the financial decision 
making process of China are good examples of such analyses in the literature. Analyses 
of policy formation in terms of South Korea’s economic development are widespread, but 
analyses of South Korea’s policy responses to trade and currency conflicts remain quite 
limited in comparison to those available in the Japanese and Chinese cases; Further,  
most of the literature examining the case of South Korea’s focuses on the period just 
before and after the Asian Financial Crisis, rather than the late 1980s when South Korea 
initially received U.S. pressures. Filling this gap in the South Korean case, and 
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furthermore explaining the divergence of policy responses amongst the three countries, 
would be the fundamental goals of this project. The stark differences between the three 
countries’ internal policy making structures, when it comes to who has the upper hand in 
policy making in matters of trade and finance policy, can result in divergence in the 
behavior and final actions leading up to a policy response to external factors – i.e., U.S. 
protectionist measures and pressures. 
Analytical Framework: The Pathways to Policy Formation 
Argument 
      I make a two-level argument. First, I argue that with regard to U.S. trade 
protectionism in the form of political pressures, the three industrialized East Asian 
economies under consideration have responded in very different ways. The varied 
outcomes of trade policy responses to U.S. protectionism – Japan in acquiescence, South 
Korea in reciprocation, and China in retaliation - have depended largely on respective 
policy making structures and processes (Chapters 3 and 4). Second, I argue that in 
encountering U.S. currency appreciation pressures, the three countries have again 
responded differently, because of each state’s existing policy-making structures and 
processes – Japan with strategic acquiescence, South Korea with resistance and lack of 
strategy, and China with combined strategies of resistance and acquiescence based on 
calculations of its economic interests with the United States (Chapter 5).  
Explaining Policy Variation  
      My core argument in explaining the variations of policy responses to U.S. 
protectionist policies amongst Japan, South Korea, and China, is based on varying 
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characteristics of policy-making structures, actors involved in these processes, and the 
connection to industrial interests. My argument is based on the premise that the political 
capacity of each state is critical to policy formation, and is vital in terms of creating the 
variations in policy outcomes amongst the three countries I propose a theoretical 
framework of government decision-making processes toward economic and financial 
policy implementation in each of the three countries. I seek to make comparisons beyond 
description of each country’s systems, and how this divergence determines final policy 
outcomes. In doing so, I pay very close attention to the characteristics of political 
systems, the ministries, the decision makers, and the mobilization of interests. I carefully 
trace the role of ministries and individuals – political leaders and officials – and the 
leverage that they have under their own political systems. In my explanations, the 
political organism that the ministries and the political leadership share, extends to the 
business world, thereby demonstrating how industrial interests are interlinked with the 
formation of policy. I reflect on government-business relations in the making of policy, 
which deserves careful attention in the countries of observation.  
Methodology  
     My hypothesis suggests that the structures and processes of policy formation in East 
Asian states ultimately leads to the final outcome of policy responses against U.S. 
protectionism. The political capacity of the state is an inherent factor that influences the 
structures and processes. In explaining the varieties of policy responses, I provide a 
country-by-country analysis for the each country, based on the time periods in which 
bilateral trade and currency conflicts were culminating. I analyze political systems, 
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ministries and decision-making structures, bureaucratic performance (by ministries and 
officials), and industrial interests linked to the policy making process. The subsequent 
chapters are organized by important themes and subcategorized by each country’s 
analysis and comparison.  
     I deploy qualitative methodology based on in-depth field research in the East Asian 
countries of my study, and also partial quantitative work in my methodology. My 
analysis is based on a process-tracing method involving economic data and figures. 
Therefore the analysis is easily approachable by interdisciplinary readers. The 
quantitative portion of my analysis is found in Chapter 4, in which I present the results 
from a time series, cross-sectional, data analysis of the impact of U.S. trade imbalances 
on U.S. dispute initiation in the WTO. The dissertation is grounded in three years of 
research, including pre- and post- dissertation fieldwork research and on two solid years 
of on-site fieldwork encompassing four countries – the U.S., Japan, South Korea, and 
China. The archival research and interviews I conducted were mainly in the native 
language of each of the three countries, over the course of two years. During this time I 
worked comparatively across different national settings, integrating insights derived from 
data observations in both archival research and figure-based analyses. 
     My on-site field research consisted of a series of personal interviews with important 
government officials, scholars, and policymakers; and archival research in each country. I 
started my research in Japan as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Social 
Science, at the University of Tokyo, with research guidance from Professors Nobuhiro 
Hiwatari and Keisuke Iida (2010-11), and as a Visiting Scholar at the Policy Research 
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Institute (PRI), at the Ministry of Finance, Japan (2011).38 Graduate seminars held by 
Professor Iida on Japan’s trade policy and seminars by Professor Takatoshi Ito on Asian 
financial markets were helpful in tracing Japan’s policy stance on trade and finance in 
recent decades. Seminars held by government officials turned professors – Shinichi 
Nakabayashi on fiscal policy, and Shōtaro Oshima on Japan in the WTO – and central 
bankers from the Bank of Japan sparked my interest in Japan’s policy world. I was then 
motivated to pursue a visiting research position in Kasumigaseki – Japan’s bureaucratic 
district in Tokyo – for the latter half of my stay in Japan. While at the Ministry of 
Finance in Japan, I met and interviewed numerous Japanese politicians and government 
officials in the Bank of Japan (BOJ), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF), and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). 
Regular seminars held at the PRI of MOF and the RIETI (Research Institute of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry) of METI were very informative and instrumental to adding 
knowledge and deepening my understanding of the issues concerning the current 
Japanese economy. This was especially important after the 3.11 earthquake, tsunami, and 
Fukushima nuclear plant incident, which coincided with my fieldwork in Japan. 
     I continued my fieldwork as a Senior Visiting Research Student at the School of 
International Studies at Peking University (PKU) in China, with research guidance from 
Professor Wang Yong (2011-12). At Peking University, I benefitted greatly from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Some of the most important and memorable figures I met and interviewed in Japan were Kawaguchi 
Yoriko (Former Minister of Foreign Affairs), Tanaka Hitoshi (Former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs), 
Nakao Takehiko (Former Vice Minister of Finance), Oshima Shōtaro (Former Director-General for 
Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Former Appellate Body Member of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body), Takashi Shinohara (Former Senior Vice Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries). 
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graduate seminars held by Professor Wang Yong at the School of International Studies on 
US-China trade relations, and Professor Michael Pettis at the Guanghua School of 
Management on China’s finance and business. At Tsinghua University School of 
Economics and Management, the lectures by Professor Li Daokui – one of the academic 
members of the Monetary Policy Committee under the State Council – enhanced my 
understanding of the Chinese perspective regarding both U.S-China bilateral economic 
relations and the Chinese economy as a whole. Although it was systematically difficult to 
meet and interview top Chinese government officials while residing in mainland China, 
with effort scholars at major Chinese universities and the Institute of World Economics 
and Politics (IWEP) of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) – which operates 
directly under supervision by the Chinese political party’s initiatives – were accessible.39 
As a foreign researcher, the research environment of mainland China was the most 
challenging of the three countries, mainly due to difficulty accessing data. However, 
during the course of my stay I was able to build personal networks (guanxi) that created 
opportunities to speak with bureaucratic officials, professors at PKU, and other 
universities in Beijing, who worked closely with the ministries in China. I also 
encountered government officials from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOC), the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), and the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) while on educational training in the U.S., for off-the-record conversations.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Among numerous important academics I met and interviewed in China were Professors Wang Jisi 
(Peking University), David Li Daokui (Tsinghua University), Chen Zhimin (Fudan University) and Song 
Guoyou (Fudan University). 
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     In between my fieldwork in Japan and China, I conducted additional fieldwork in 
Seoul, South Korea (2012), collecting archival data from the National Assembly Library 
and interviewing some government officials at the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance (MOSF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, formerly 
MOFAT), and the Korea International Trade Association (KITA). These ministries are 
located in different spots around Seoul, in Gwacheon (the outskirts of Seoul), and in 
Sejong City.40 On one note, I encountered some of the bureaucrats whom I made contacts 
with at different fieldwork sites in places distant from their home bases. I would meet 
Japanese and South Korean bureaucrats stationed in Beijing, or South Korean bureaucrats 
in Tokyo. Japanese and South Korean bureaucrats who are young in their profession were 
accessible while they were on educational training in the Boston or D.C. area, but many 
Chinese bureaucrats who were in the U.S. were in mid-career or senior level 
professionals. Many of my interviewees (many of whom were Chinese) asked to be off-
the-record. The ubiquity of Northeast Asian bureaucrats in my various fieldwork sites 
enabled far more multi-layered research than expected. 
Data 
      I make use of two types of systematic comparisons to analyze the causality of the 
argument. First, in reference to John Stuart Mill’s Method of Difference, I conduct an 
atemporal national comparison to analyze differences across the three countries.41 In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 After my fieldwork was completed in South Korea, many important ministries (i.e, the MOSF) have 
relocated from the Gwacheon Government Complex to the new Sejong Special Autonomous City 
Government Complex. 
41 See John Stuart Mill, ‘A System of Logic, Volume 1’, 1843. In comparative politics, Mill’s Method of 
Difference is commonly understood as Most Similar System Design (MSSD). The method of difference 
identifies the independent variable that causes the difference of the values of the dependent variables – 
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big picture, the three countries of study are countries that have commonalities in 
economic development via export-oriented growth, with similar cycles of U.S. 
protectionism imposed on them. However, they diverge greatly in terms of the 
institutional characteristics that embody political capacity.  
     Second, to prove the significance of trade deficits in propelling political action toward 
protectionism in the U.S. government, I conducted a large-N analysis of U.S. trade 
imbalances with specific trading partners as a percent of annual GDP and U.S. initiation 
of trade disputes (Chapter 4). Statistical modeling is presented using quantitative data 
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the U.S. Census Bureau, the WTO, the IMF, 
the OECD, and the World Bank, centering on countries that are main U.S. trading 
partners and/or have been involved in a trade dispute with the U.S.  
     In all three country case studies, I rely upon three main sources of data: first, my 
personal interviews with key political actors (politicians, bureaucrats, business 
representatives, financial leaders); economic and financial data issued by the four 
governments involved in the study (U.S., Japan, South Korea, China); and official reports 
issued by international economic research institutions, newspaper articles, written articles 
and speeches, and local literature from national archives. I have perused WTO and 
USITC/USDOC data and case reports for detailed quantitative analyses, and data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
which, in this case, are differed institutions (IV) and policy responses (DV). Some major works in 
comparative politics by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (The Civic Culture), Theda Skocpol (States and 
Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China), and Giovanni Sartori (Parties 
and Party Systems) have stemmed from Mill’s Method of Difference. More recently, political scientists in 
fields of comparative politics and international relations such as Yves Tiberghien (Entrepreneurial States: 
Reforming Corporate Governance in France, Japan, and Korea) and Dorothy J. Solinger (States’ Gains, 
Labor’s Losses: China, France, and Mexico Choose Global Liaisons, 1980-2000) have worked on the role 
states and the market applying Mill’s Method of Difference. 
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produced by government agencies of Japan (MOF, METI, MOFA, BOJ), South Korea 
(MOSF, MOTIE, MOFA, BOK), and China (MOF, MOC, MOFA, PBOC).  
     Lastly, I have relied heavily on the personal memoirs of politicians and technocrats in 
the three countries – all of them are official published memoirs written by either political 
leaders or elite participants in the trade and financial policy process. Some of the useful 
memoirs available on China include those by Zhu Rongji (former PBOC Governor and 
Premier), and Chen Jinhua; on Japan, by Takeshita Noboru (former Minister of Finance 
and PM), Eisuke Sakakibara (former MOF official); on South Korea, Kang Man-soo 
(former Minister of Finance) and Park Chul-un (former Blue House Policy Adviser) 
among many others. Memoirs by U.S. politicians fall relatively short of explaining the 
details of bilateral policy interactions, but I have included them in my research where 
they proved useful. Tracing the pathways of policies in the making of these three 
different bilateral relationships is a time-consuming yet intellectually stimulating process. 
I have tried to demonstrate how each policy interaction was conducted in the simplest 
way possible for future researchers to carry on from where I left off.  
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Figure 2-1. Analytical Framework of Trade Wars and Currency Conflict:  
The Formation of U.S. Policy on the Three Countries 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2. Analytical Framework of Trade Wars and Currency Conflict:  
Formation of Japan, South Korea, and China’s Policy Responses to the U.S. 
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The Logic of Policymaking and Policy Outcome 
     The effects of policymaking on policy outcomes have been steadily examined by 
many scholars in the fields of comparative politics and international relations. With 
regard to foreign economic policymaking, there is abundant literature on a single country 
case study in the field of IR, especially in the case of the U.S. government, or many 
comparative studies of the functionalities of the U.S. and European governments.42 There 
is also plentiful literature on the policy decision making patterns of Northeast Asian 
states, largely in the forms of single-country or two-country case studies. The majority of 
these studies have been on Japan, and in recent years, on China; but to date, there is not 
as much literature covering South Korea.   
Bureaucratic Capacity 
 
     In delivering the argument that institutions matter in policymaking, and that the 
pathways of institutions shape state behavior in policy actions, it is important to 
reexamine the literature on the role of states and institutions. By institutions, I refer to 
domestic institutions rather than supranational or international entities that have global 
institutional functions, because the focus of my argument is centered on the state and 
institutions that serve as operational pillars of the state in making and implementing 
policy. Of course, the states as the subjects of this study – China, Japan, and South Korea 
– have bureaucratic systems that vary and derive from the ideological roots in their 
political systems. According to Gourevitch (1986), among the five policy options of the 
state (classical liberalism, socialization and planning, protectionism, demand stimulus, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Cohen, Paul and Blecker, 2003. 
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and mercantilism), the basis of economic policy options of the state can be categorized 
mainly into two ideological roots – classical liberalism or socialization and planning – as 
policy prescriptions. Naturally, each state has had different levels of state involvement in 
the economy. Japan from the 1970s to 1980s was operating on a free market economy 
system with considerable state involvement. But so was South Korea in the 1980s and 
1990s and China in the 2000s and 2010s– although China has been maintaining stricter 
government control over its economy than other two East Asian states. While the 
proportion of state involvement in the overall economic activity may matter a great deal, 
ideological representations of the state and political systems provide us with only a small 
fraction of the explanation we are aiming for in terms of explaining policy choices.  
     In identifying the societal actors and the characteristics of their situation in the 
international economy likely to affect their policy preferences, Gourevitch (1986) also 
summarizes and categorizes the vast field of literature in social science linking policy 
outcomes to politics into five explanations: production profile, intermediate associations, 
state structure, economic ideology, and international system. Among these explanations, 
the state structure explanation relies on the logic that as societal forces and representative 
associations must act through the state to attain policy goals, the structure of the state, its 
rules and its institutions have a very substantial effect on policy outcomes. On one hand, 
Gourevitch accredits the power of the state structure explanation, as decision-making 
mechanisms have an effect on the actual outcome of the aggregation of societal 
preferences and lobbying of interest groups and parties; but on the other hand, he also 
takes note that its explanatory power is weakened by context depending on the 
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circumstances of the actors, the rules, the bureaucracies, and the changing preferences 
resources of over time.43 Instead of developing the state structure explanation further, 
Gourevitch’s work focuses more on the impact of international crises upon domestic 
policy. 
     Meanwhile, the seminal work by Douglas C. North makes the state structure-based, 
institutional explanation very powerful in the context of domestic and foreign economic 
policymaking. North, a prominent economic historian and Nobel laureate, has clarified 
the relationship between policymaking and policy output in a series of book volumes. In 
volume coauthored with Robert Paul Thomas, North emphasized institutions as the 
determinant of economic performance, and relative price changes the source of 
institutional change.44 In his subsequent research, he examined the structure of economic 
systems and outlined an economic theory of the state and ideologies that support the 
modes of economic organization, and explored dynamic forces that force institutions to 
adapt to survive.45 A decade later, in his book, ‘Institutions, Institutional Change and 
Economic Performance’, he highlighted the importance of institutions that can be ignored 
in economic analysis as they play no independent role in economic performance, and 
emphasized that institutions are designed to achieve efficient outcomes.46 In other words, 
according to North, economic performance depends heavily on institutions. It is the 
capacity of the institutions that lead to different policy choices, which vary by levels of 
strategic decision-making. Bureaucratic capacity is the key factor that leads us to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Gourevitch, 1986. 
44 North and Thomas, 1973. 
45 North, 1981. 
46 North, 1990. 
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institutional variances shown in East Asian economies. The ideological representation or 
regime type, embodied by each of the states alone, cannot explain the variance of policy 
choices. 
Coalitions 
 
     A successful policy implementation process requires the different actors – political 
parties, interest groups, and at times, bureaucratic institutions – to resolve their political 
differences. Reconciling or compromising in the interest of a policy outcome is not a 
simple task when it comes to foreign economic policymaking. The issue at stake presents 
potential consequences that vary largely amongst the domestic entities that are to be 
affected. Such interactions amongst political actors could be resolved via political 
lobbying, proposing or enacting legislations, or selecting a leader via elections. At the 
ministerial level, organizational conflict may arise via power struggles in a state’s 
budgeting, diplomatic agenda setting, mobilizing domestic interests, and conveyance of 
the public opinion to the executive level.  
     Many political scientists have grappled with building a framework that explains the 
dynamics of coalitions and political survival amongst actors, using qualitative methods or 
formal modeling. Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) shows through historical analysis and 
formal modeling how political leaders allocate resources, and how institutions 
responsible for selecting leaders create incentives for those leaders to pursue certain 
policies; thereby presenting the political pathways toward policy prescriptions. They 
define the concept of the ‘winning coalition’ as the group to which a leader provides 
answers to retain power, and the group that controls the essential features that constitute 
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political power in the system.47 According to the authors, the ‘winning coalition’ in a 
democratic system is the group that elects the leader, and in a non-democratic system, it 
is the group of people that control other instruments of power to keep the leader in the 
office. The crux of their argument is that political leaders need to be placed in the 
‘winning coalition’ to gain control of power or be in office, and that they can do so 
making three related sets of decisions. First, they can choose a tax rate to generate 
government revenue that influences labor activity; second, they can spend the revenue 
raised in a manner designed to help incumbency; and third, they can provide a mix of 
public and private goods to the people.  
     While Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) provide an argument fairly adaptable to 
political coalitions around the globe, assessing the dynamics of political coalitions in the 
context of East Asian political systems requires a detailed examination of the findings of 
scholars working specifically on East Asia and the concept of coalitions. Gerald Curtis 
(1999) has covered the evolution of Japanese political parties in the 1990s, focusing on 
the LDP’s loss of power in 1993 and forecasting the LDP’s future in Japan as the 
prominent majority party. While the volatility in Japanese politics since the 2010s makes 
it quite difficult to analyze the dynamics of the flow of power between coalitions in 
Japan, Curtis’s work shows that the dynamics of various factions and personalities within 
the ruling LDP unravel the ways in which party politics influence policy. Meanwhile, 
Christina Davis (2003), in examining the interactions among politicians, agencies, and 
interest groups in the Japanese agricultural sector facing liberalization pressures from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003. pp.7-8.  
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foreign trading partners, showed in a ‘2nd image reversed’ way that the international 
context alters the balancing of interests among domestic actors. On South Korea, 
Youngmi Kim (2011) has argued that a weak institutionalization of the ruling party and 
the party-system explains political instability and inefficient governability in post-
authoritarian South Korea. A comparative study conducted by Joseph Wong (2006) on 
the welfare politics of South Korea and Taiwan, pre- and post-authoritarian political 
change, found that in which the processes toward health care reform and policy choice 
were uncovered. In the case of China, scholars of Chinese politics have revealed that the 
highest level of decision making occurs at the Politburo level, divided into separate 
groups pertaining to a specific agenda (McGregor, 2012). Elite-level policy making 
within the party has been evolving over the past decades through consecutive reforms in 
order to prevent local officials from expanding their power (Fewsmith, 2013). While 
political reforms have been playing a role in changing the political landscape of Chinese 
politics, it is still the case that leading members of the Politburo make the final decisions 
on critical issues regarding the status of the economy, especially on matters regarding 
trade and finance (Shih, 2009). It is for certain that political coalitions are not formed in a 
uniform matter across the three countries of Japan, South Korea, and China, and thus it is 
only natural that there is variance in which the winning coalition is fragmented under 
varying circumstances.  
Agenda Setting 
     Agenda setting for political institutions vary across political regimes by various 
political actors and agencies. In comparative politics, political regimes have been 
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classified mainly into presidential and parliamentary; party systems into two- and multi-
party systems; and parliaments into unicameral and bicameral.48 Depending on the type 
of government form and procedure toward agenda setting, relevant government agencies 
play the main role of delivering agenda for several policy areas. In a legislative agenda 
setting, the type of government or the processes influence the course of agenda setting a 
great deal. According to a large-n study conducted by Rasch and Tsebelis, there are three 
different ways that government shape legislative outcomes: institutional, partisan, and 
positional.49  
     For the European Union, supranational government agencies such as the European 
Commission, the Court of Justice, and the European Parliament transcending across the 
member states of the European Union address policy issues, which are delivered by 
member state delegations.50 In the United States, where a Presidential System operates in 
coordination with the bipartisan Congress, the House and Senate members representing 
different states and districts sit on key committees and subcommittees in which important 
policy agenda is raised and carried out in order to enact legislations. The agenda-setting 
processes differ greatly in detail from country to country, but in each political system 
political agenda setting involves mobilization, balancing, and coordination of interests 
among actors that have a stake in the agenda. But as we will see in the cases of East 
Asian states, not all agendas will go through the same procedure, as the significance of 
the agenda also impacts who will have a larger say amongst the actors involved.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Lijphart and Aitkin, 1994. 
49 Rasch and Tsebelis, 2011. 
50 Pollack, 2003. 
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Policymaking Systems in East Asia 
 
Japan 
 
     In Japan’s parliamentary system a bicameral system is under operation under the 
National Diet. Under the ’55 system, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) was 
the center of policymaking. The LDP policy tribes in PARC, the special interests, and the 
bureaucracy were the iron triangles that protected vested interests in policymaking.51 The 
real deliberations took place in the Council rather than in the Diet. After the electoral 
reform in 1994, the PARC was still in existence and were still active, but changes in the 
electoral system rendered politicians generalists rather than someone covering certain 
policy fields.52 Japan’s political system also embodies a very strong bureaucracy that may 
at times exert more power in actual agenda setting and implementation of policy than the 
parties or politicians themselves. In the actual policymaking, laws of establishment of 
bureaucratic agencies, career patterns of bureaucrats, and the management of information 
serve as critical factors that shape policy outcomes.53 At the apex of U.S.-Japan economic 
frictions, the MOF had the upper hand than the BOJ in domestic policymaking, in 
addition to the political linkages it possessed; the METI found itself desperately seeking 
to balance its economic interests with security interests in the U.S.-Japan bilateral 
relationship. The MOF still plays a very prominent role in policymaking above all other 
government agencies in Japan, especially in matters of budget. In the U.S.-Japan disputes 
that culminated in the 1980s, the MOF served as the prime decision-maker. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Curtis, 1999. 
52 Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011. 
53 Grimes, 2001. 
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South Korea 
 
     Although South Korea is no longer an authoritarian regime, the supreme power of the 
Presidency can be attributed to the past practices under dictatorial presidencies. While it 
is basically a Presidential, multi-party democratic system, South Korea’s political sphere 
is run mainly by the conservative party and the progressive party, both of which have 
been changing names continuously in the past decades in the postwar period. While the 
bureaucratic system very much resembles that of the Japanese bureaucratic system, with 
the MOSF acting as the principal agency for budgetary issues that are largely linked with 
the economy, when it comes to agenda setting and policy guidelines, it often finds itself 
delivering the interests of the incumbent party and the Presidency. The peculiar security 
conditions of South Korea influences politics a great deal, if not the economy so much as 
of late. As the Korean peninsula had been the battlefield of the contest of ideologies – 
communism and democracy – South Korea’s transition into a democracy and high-paced 
economic growth was accompanied with endless tug of wars in political agenda setting 
and campaigns by political leaders. Because the presidential election occurs every five 
years without re-elections, and political parties seeking incumbency are geared towards 
agenda setting to capture the minds of voters largely depending on the political and 
economic climate, it is often the case that long-term policy goals in security and 
economic issues are sacrificed at the expense of political winning, and promises are 
unfulfilled. The overhaul of the presidential cabinet at each presidential inauguration also 
leads to incoherent directions and inefficiencies in agenda setting and policy 
implementation in concerned policy areas of taxation, defense, education, and welfare.    
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China 
     In China’s authoritarian political system, the policy decision-making process is clearly 
different from those of Japan’s and South Korea’s. Ministries compete to gain their 
interests, but because the real power derives from the small number of politicians in the 
Politburo, the bureaucracy or the military mainly plays the role of the agent of the 
principal, which is the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Over the past 
decades since Deng’s economic reform, there has been a rise of the preponderant role of 
the leadership (领导: lĭngdăo) and collectivized decision making process with checks and 
balance, presenting greater authority for the top leaders in foreign affairs at the expense 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.54 In matters pertaining to economic issues of trade and 
finance, it is the Leading Group of Economic and Financial Affairs deciding on important 
issues of the Chinese economy, and the ministries are dependent on the power that 
trickles down from vice premiers in economic and financial affairs that have close 
linkages to the specific industry or ministry. The fact that Chinese vice premiers serve as 
the head of negotiations for foreign economic policymaking (i.e., S&ED) rather than 
ministers of finance also prove that the Chinese leadership exercises its policy influence 
via people in the Politburo. Also, it is important to note that the People’s Bank of China, 
which is the Central Bank, has seen its policy influence expand over the past two 
decades, but still acts as an agent of the Chinese leadership in policy implementation or 
delivery of changes to the Chinese economy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Lu, Ning. 1997. Lu writes that while the People’s Liberation Army, or the Chinese military, is a 
significant actor in the political system, it has not become an independent force in foreign policy decision-
making and remains under the control of CCP leadership guidelines. 
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Political Systems: Postwar Government Types and Political Leadership 
Japan 
Parliamentary Representative Democratic Monarchy under One-Party Dominance 
    Japan’s political system throughout its years in conflict with the United States in terms 
of trade and finance can be best characterized as the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan 
(LDP)’s one party dominance. Japan in the postwar period has maintained its monarchy 
for symbolic purposes, which was also a consensus with the U.S. government’s intent to 
retain the monarchy for several reasons during the SCAP period from 1945 to 1952 (i.e., 
political stability, gaining public support and acknowledgement for the American 
presence). Allied occupation persisted until the Treaty of San Francisco on April 28, 
1952. Since the establishment of the Katayama Cabinet in 1947, the Japanese political 
system was in flux with various competing political parties until the year 1955 (the 
starting year of the Ishibashi Cabinet), the year in which the one-party dominance of the 
Liberal Democratic Party began and lasted until 1993.55 The Yoshida Doctrine compelled 
the system to keep a very low profile on diplomacy or security, and focused primarily on 
the goals of economic development. After the Americans left, Japan continued to focus 
on these goals under subsequent prime ministers of the LDP. The LDP’s consistent rule 
in power created both pros and cons in the process of development of the Japanese 
political economy: on one hand, it provided political stability for focus on the economic 
aims and targets to be reached, but it also became the profound roots of rigidity and 
political mannerisms that became very difficult to amend over time.  
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      The 1955 system lasted throughout the years of U.S-Japan trade and currency conflict 
from the 1960s to the 1990s. Because the MOF entry-level recruitment of career track 
officials (there are also non-career track officials who have different paths of promotions 
within the MOF), its entering bureaucrats are largely young Japanese males fresh out of 
the University of Tokyo excelling in the fields of law or economics and finance who have 
also developed bonds and networks with their university seniors, juniors, or cohorts. 
These relationships are a key source of human interactions as they climb the ladder. 
Many continue to pursue the career path of a MOF official, but some decide to 
voluntarily drop out of the line of promotion in order to join politics or to study abroad.56 
The close linkages between the MOF as one of the most powerful government entities of 
Japan are proven by the ascendancy of MOF high-ranking officials to political seats in 
the Diet.57 The linkages between the MOF and the political world were made largely 
possible due to the common practices borne out of numerous factions and their 
sustainability over the years, as the 1955 system matured into a consolidated format. The 
ongoing traditions, or practice of securing post-retirement jobs for MOF officials 
(amakudaris) also facilitates the MOF OB (old boys) to be active within the realm of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This has become more apparent amongst younger generation officials of our time who find the work at 
MOF extremely demanding. Night shifts are commonplace and the MOF even has a basement hotel for the 
officials to avoid high taxi costs to return home after a nightshift. Personal observations and interviews. 
Some of the very smart, current generation youngsters fresh out of Todai (University of Tokyo) seemed to 
believe that after working three to five years for the MOF, they will be able to accumulate work experience 
and enter the political scene with the political capital and connections accumulated within the MOF, or to 
study abroad with government sponsorship and financing, then choose other professions such as the 
academia. However, this is only a small fraction of the young officers at MOF, and most would continue on 
with their careers at MOF.  
57 Very clear examples of these are Fukuda Takeo, who served as Minister of Finance then became PM, and 
Miyazawa Kiichi. Noboru Takeshita was also a figure that served as Minister of Finance then became PM, 
but he started his career as a local elections as a politician and not as a career bureaucrat in the Ministry of 
Finance. 
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public service in Japan. Simply put, the MOF officials in large part have streamlined 
pathways of career building in public affairs or politics in Japan. On the other hand, the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) did not possess such a tool or the ladder toward political 
ascendancy.58 BOJ officials, most of them with degrees in economics in Japan’s 
prestigious universities, work for the bank for most of their career and are sent abroad to 
study economics or topics relating to finance, and end up working for financial 
institutions in the private sector after retirement. While they also have network of their 
own, their network is not geared toward climbing the ladder toward political debut.59 
     The LDP, which stood for center-right conservatism, had many political factions, one 
of which later formed another party outside the LDP under the party name DPJ, a center-
left party in 1998. The political landscape and party politics in Japan were quite different 
from today in the years of U.S.-Japan trade and currency conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s, 
as all of the ruling party was primarily the LDP. Rather than the ongoing political battles 
that we often witness today between LDP and DPJ or the coalitions between LDP and 
Komeito to gain political power, in those days, political factions within the LDP played 
the role of deciding the direction of party leadership of LDP, which remained strong as 
the major party until Miyazawa Kiichi’s serving period as prime minister until August of 
1993. 
South Korea  
From Dictatorship to ‘Semi-Parliamentarian’ Strong Presidential System 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Grimes, 2001. BOJ officials’ entry into electoral politics is rare, and a large portion of the BOJ 
amakudaris end up with positions in the private sector. 
59 Grimes, 2001. p.40. 
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     South Korea’s political system to date has been very transitional. At first glance, 
South Korea’s political system today may largely resemble Japan’s in that it is a 
democratic system. However, in actuality, it started from authoritarian leadership and 
military dictatorship, then civilian leadership since the postwar years. Top-down 
decisions and reckless behaviors by presidents who voted themselves into office were 
commonplace until the civilian government came into office in 1993. To be fair, although 
South Korea has achieved an enormous success in democratic movement, due to the 
legacies of strong presidency, South Korea’s governance finds itself at times troubled and 
affected by the practices and remnants of yesterday in the direction of unilateral 
decisions.60  
     By building a democratic system, Japan and South Korea claim to stand for the 
‘separation of powers’ in their governance system. One cannot deny that the years under 
American Occupation influenced the two countries’ path toward the system of 
‘separation of powers.’61 Despite the fundamental structural coincidences between the 
two countries, there are also fundamental differences in the nature of political leadership, 
which must be discussed as the background for a comparative analysis. 
     There are various differences in how ‘the separation of powers’ is exercised and how 
the political system operates in the two countries. However, one big commonality is in 
the process of the selection of the country’s leadership – in which Japan in its general 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 This is not to state that South Korea still lives in under authoritarianism, but is only pointed out to 
emphasize that it is still in the process of achieving full-fledged democracy. Scholarship outside South 
Korea may not pinpoint on this to a great extent, because these issues are always relative and minimal 
compared to the state and situations in North Korea, an authoritarian regime. 
61 Unfortunately, some of the borderlines between the administrative, legal, and executive branches were 
nebulous at times of political scandals and tyrannical behavior by the legal branch (which has become quite 
notorious in recent decades). 
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elections and South Korea in its presidential elections show similarities in the intent for 
direct vote. Japan’s case is a parliamentary system in which the House of Representatives 
(衆議院, shūgiin) recommends the candidate for the prime minister’s seat, which is most 
likely the leader of the majority party. This was fully established under U.S. Occupation 
after the devastation of the Pacific War, but there has been no real political opposition to 
the system itself since that time. 
     In the South Korean case, however, direct voting was earned by paying a huge price 
during the years of movement toward democracy under dictatorship and military rules 
following the Occupation years. The peculiarities of the two Koreas divided with partial 
remaining constituents (although very minimal in absolute numbers) longing for a leftist 
regime created complications within the political system. The specific conditions of 
ceasefire with North Korea following the Korean War deeply affected the initial 
presidencies and their political behaviors just after the Occupation years. During Kim Il-
sung’s reign in North Korea, South Korean politics was constantly swayed by its 
relationship with the North.62 For example, following the Occupation years, when 
Seungman Rhee placed himself in the first president’s seat, sorting out the reactionaries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 It still is affected largely by the conditions of the relationship, but as North Korea became fragile with the 
great famine from the 1990s under Kim Jong-il’s rule, North Korea’s threats on South Korean leaders were 
less life-threatening than they used to be under Kim Il-sung’s rule. The reasons behind this could be seen 
from two aspects; internally, on the competition on economic growth between the two Koreas, as initially 
the North started out as relatively more affluent than the South; externally, the degrees of China’s political 
support on North Korea has decreased over time, which weakens North Korea’s hardcore stance on South 
Korea substantially. 
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was his primary goal. Many innocent citizens were killed in this process, contributing to 
lasting enmities between the progressive and conservative camps.63 
     After Seungman Rhee and Yoon Boseon came the military governments by Park 
Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. During Park Chunghee’s regime, South Korea 
prospered greatly and went through phases of high economic growth. The political 
stability deriving from his prolonged leadership gradually vanished as it turned into 
dictatorship as he made changes in the constitution in order to stay in power.64 Much of 
the development planning under Park was linked to South Korea’s competition with the 
North as planners sought to deter or prevent a systematic collapse in the event of an 
attack from the North. Park even pursued plans for nuclear weapons development.  
     Chun Doo-hwan, one of the most beloved right arms of Park Chung-hee, took the 
initiative to fill in the power vacuum upon Park’s assassination by reinventing the 
military coup in his style in 1980 by suppressing the rebellions in Gwangju.65 During his 
term in office, he sought to differentiate his rule by claiming to stabilize the state of 
prosperity rather than emphasizing solely on growth as Park had. With immediate 
concerns of day-to-day life and hunger resolved during Park’s regime, Chun found his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Jeju Uprising (or Jeju Massacre, 제주 4·3 사건) of 1948 and Yeosu-Suncheon Rebellion (or Yeosu 
Incident, 여수-순천 사건) clearly manifest this point. In both of the events, U.S. military commanders 
played a huge role in suppressing the rebellions by the Workers Party of South Korea (Namrodang,남로당) 
in order to scrape off communist ideologies in South Korea. Regardless, thousands of civilians’ lives were 
sacrificed in the process. One interesting thing to note was that Park Chunghee, who later became president 
via a military coup, was indirectly involved. He did not participate in the rebellion directly, but was in 
charge of the military section of the Namrodang, and was eventually leniently punished by turning in the 
list of names of the rebels. 
64 Park Chunghee came into power when he succeeded in his coup-d’etat in 1961, and from 1972 until his 
assassination in 1979 the Yushin Constitution was adopted to consolidate and monopolize his highly 
centralized, authoritarian power. Yushin means "rejuvenation" or "renewal" as in the Meiji Yushin 
(restoration), in order to signify self-perpetuating significance of Park’s authoritarian rule. 
65 Gwangju Uprising (or Massacre) 
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own strategies of keeping the public happy by deploying politics emphasizing the 3S 
(sports, sex, and screen). His attempt to prolong his leadership as in the days of Park’s 
leadership went down the drain, as the public had developed a very acute awareness on 
political leadership and desired democracy. He handed his seat to Roh Taewoo, one of his 
military cohorts.66 However, due to the strong public desire for democracy manifested in 
every riots, Roh had to go through a national election via direct voting, standing against 
his rivals (the 3 Kims: Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Kim Jong-pil) who were 
primarily from the democratic movement background. The failure to agree to a single 
candidate within the 3 Kims resulted in Roh’s winning of the election. 
     The history of dictatorship in South Korea created the practice of imperial presidency, 
or omnipotent presidency in which the power of the government and the bureaucracy as a 
whole is centered in the presidency. While the militarist characteristics of the 
presidencies faded away in large part during the Chun and Roh administrations, the major 
personnel within the presidency was in large part military connections, and the 
connections between the presidency, military, and the Ministry of Defense was very 
strong during those years. When Roh stepped down as the last president from the 
military, the power that was centered in the military vanished, but the strong presidency 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Chun and Roh were both members of the ‘Group of One’ (Hanahoe, 하나회), which was an unofficial 
private group established secretly by members of the 11th class of the Korean Military in 1955. Chun ruled 
from 1980 to 1987 and Roh from 1987 to 1993, but when Kim Young-sam came into power, the legitimacy 
and ruling during their times in office was put under scrutiny by Kim Young-sam and both were trialed and 
sentenced to death, but both were freed by special pardon (amnesty) by Kim Dae-jung when he came into 
office. For the next two presidencies of Roh Moo-hyun and Lee Myungbak, both Chun and Roh enjoyed 
their social lives with loads of money collected during their regimes. Considering the public outrage, the 
Park Geun-hye’s administration began a prosecutor’s investigation on Chun’s personal funds. It is widely 
known that she found Chun’s downgrading and labeling of her father’s term in office as corruptive 
leadership discomforting. Park’s visit to Chun’s residence in 2004 was the last she had seen Chun in private 
capacity. 
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in governance and the practices of bureaucracy subservient to the presidency still 
remained.  
     Overall, the features of South Korea’s political transitions and leadership changes 
were circling around the movement of the center of power. It also involved the 
amendment of the constitution, which was rewritten nine times since the establishment of 
the Republic of Korea in 1948.67 Issues concerning the security relations with North 
Korea and U.S. military presence in South Korea persisted. During the days of trade and 
currency conflicts with the U.S. from the 1980s to the 1990s, South Korea was going 
through these transitions. Though the presidential system had lasted for a long time, the 
transitional features of the leadership from military to civilian and the remaining practice 
of a strong presidency has fundamentally shaped the policy formation process.  
China 
‘Top-Down’ Authoritarian System 
     Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China by Mao Zedong after the 
Communist Party won the war against the Kuomintang, China has maintained a top-down 
authoritarian regime, in which the Politburo Standing Committee will be fully responsible 
for their policy actions. In the pyramid-like power structure within the party, political 
leaders pursue their grand agenda with ministries supporting them in the background.68 
Ministries follow up on the political decisions of the party. Since its establishment, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Hayes, Ibid. Most of the early revisions of the constitution had to do with lengthening the presidency for 
the incumbent president to stay in power. The latter revisions are more prodemocracy oriented revisions, in 
which the people of South Korea have achieved their say against authoritarianism. 
68 Hayes, 2012. The PRC’s Constitution states that ministries exist to support the works of the party. This 
has caused problematic issues over the years, as politics may override administrative agenda. In Mao’s 
years, prioritizing administrative matters was subject to purging. 
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PRC has seen more transitions in its economy than it has in its political system. Its 
political and economic leaderships can be divided into roughly five periods since the 
1949 establishment of the PRC; the first generation by Chairman Mao Zedong and 
Premier Zhou Enlai (later also Hua Guofeng); the second generation by Chairman Deng 
Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang (later Li Peng); the third generation by Chairman Jiang Zemin 
and Premier Zhu Rongji; the fourth generation by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen 
Jiabao; and the fifth generation and the incumbent, President Xi Jinping and Premier Li 
Keqiang.  
     The CCP’s political leaders are composed of three major roots: the Princelings or the 
Crown Prince Party (Taizidang, 太子党), the Shanghai Clique or the Shanghai Gang 
(Shanghaifang，上海方), and the Populists or the Chinese Communist Youth Corps 
(Gongqingtuan, 共青团). The Princelings are descendants of former top leaders in 
Chinese politics, who have been trained in Chinese politics in their upbringing. One good 
example is Xi Jinping, son of Xi Zhongxun. Jiang Zemin had served as Shanghai Mayor 
prior to his presidency, and during Jiang Zemin’s rule, the Shanghai Clique was a group 
of CCP members who rose to prominence from their bureaucratic positions in connection 
to the Shanghai municipal administration and Jiang’s protégés. The Shanghai Clique had 
an informal operating group inside the party, but has been gradually losing power among 
the three factions as the members are aging. During Hu Jintao’s leadership, China’s inner 
party politics seemed to be constructed more or less in two coalitions: the ‘elitist faction’ 
led by Wu Bangguo and Jia Qinglin (both protégés of Jiang) and the ‘populist faction’ led 
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by Hu Jintao.69 The elitist faction represented business interests of the urban areas, 
whereas the populist faction represented the poor migrants and laborers in the rural areas. 
At the moment, China’s presidency is occupied by the elitist faction (Xi Jinping), while 
the premiership is occupied by the populist faction (Li Keqiang). 
     In the years under Mao’s regime, China’s political system inherited the Soviet Union’s 
system, but not in the exact, identical forms. The elections held in 1953 for delegates to 
the First National People’s Congress (NPC) and the constitution ratified in 1954 became 
the foundations of China’s political system, in which Mao was formally elected by the 
Congress as Chairman of the People’s Republic of China. There are two main hierarchies 
– the party and the government.70 The memberships are interlocked, which in turn create 
overlaps of power within the system. China constructed a system in which the National 
People’s Congress, which is an enormous Congress of representatives of provincial 
municipalities and townships from different regions of about 2000-3000 people, would 
delegate the power to the Standing Committee of the NPC. The NPC, also in theory, 
elects a Central Committee of voting and non-voting members, and these members in 
theory choose the members of the Politburo Standing Committee, which will direct the 
Standing Committee of the NPC. Elections within the party are basically in theoretical 
terms, as in many prior cases, it has been the incumbent party leadership that implicitly 
designates the succeeding leadership. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Cheng Li, ‘The Powerful Factions Among China’s Rulers’, BBC News, November 5, 2012. LI notes that 
the elitist faction excels in banking and economic policy formation, whereas the populist faction is 
experienced in rural administration. http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2012/11/05-china-leaders-li 
70 Dreyer, 2010. 
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     Within the party hierarchy, the Politburo Standing Committee has overriding priorities 
in all parts of the system in the country – the state, the economy, the civil service, the 
military, police, education, social organization, and the media.71 In terms of 
administrative affairs, the State Council is in charge of delegating affairs to the 
ministries. In other words, the ministries are a reflection of the State Council’s motives in 
implementing policy.72 
     China’s central ministries recruit their officials from a huge number of applicants who 
aspire to climb the bureaucratic ladder. Many graduates fresh out of China’s top ranking 
universities – Peking University and Tsinghua University – try out for the civil service 
examinations, as do many in Japan and South Korea. Probability-wise, it is extremely 
competitive to gain a seat.73 For a ministry official, supporting the guidelines of the 
leadership would lead to seizing opportunities in climbing the ladder in politics. Officials 
are bound to have both ministerial and personal incentives, but public service jobs do not 
guarantee an ample salary, and in the process of climbing the ladder, many officials fall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 McGregor, 2010. pp.18-19. 
72 Dreyer, 2010. pp.89-94. The Chinese political system may appear quite complex compared to other 
western democratic party systems and other countries’ systems largely affected by western influence like 
Japan and South Korea. Dreyer also notes that westerners are most often surprised by how the top leaders 
simultaneously are in control of several organizations that possess power, as in many western countries, 
political systems are structured in a way that different organizations would vie for political power.   
73 Personal observations and interviews with students at Peking University and Tsinghua University. While 
gaining admission to these top-ranking universities must also have been a severe competition in the gaokao 
(高考), students toward the end of their college years throw themselves into another competition for public 
service examinations. Students’ number-wise, the competitions for the number of entry-level public service 
jobs available in the main ministries of China are far severe than competitions in Japan and South Korea. 
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into the temptations of corruption.74 Factional conflicts also exist within this top-down 
system, which in turn complicates the process toward the outcome of policy. 
     To this day, the Chinese people regard Chairman Mao’s achievements greatly, for he 
has unified contemporary China. However, whereas Mao may have had success in 
consolidating his power in the political system, the system that he created, while 
superficially geared towards egalitarianism, in reality caused people to seek measures of 
personal connections (guanxi) outside the system to get ahead. Corruption has become 
commonplace. Mao also did not possess the skills of an economic planner, and many of 
his economic plans in his ideas of taking the country forward ended in failure (the 
Hundred Flowers Movement, the Great Leap Forward, the Socialist Education and the 
Cultural Revolution). Because Mao failed to establish economic goals toward the end of 
his term, Deng’s return to power in the post-Mao era embodied a strong emphasis on 
reestablishing economic goals. Eventually, Deng’s leadership paved the way toward 
China’s economic opening. 
Table 2-1. Political System Structures in Japan, South Korea, and China 
 
 Japan South Korea China 
Political System in 
the Postwar Years  
(1945-present) 
Parliamentary Representative 
Democratic Monarchy under One-
Party Dominance 
Transitional system 
from Dictatorship to ‘Semi-
Parliamentarian’ Strong Presidential 
System 
‘Top-Down’ Quasi-
Authoritarian System under 
One-Party rule (The Chinese 
Communist Party) 
Executive 
(Administrative) 
Branch 
Prime Minister 
Cabinet – heads of national 
ministries 
President (5 year term) 
Prime Minister 
Three Deputy PMs 
Cabinet (State Council) – heads of 
national ministries 
-Board of Audit and Inspection 
The State Council 
-Premier 
-Vice Premier 
-Heads of national ministries 
and commissions 
-Audit Agency 
Legislative Branch National Diet 
Elections and Proportional 
Representations 
-House of Councillors  
(3 year terms) 
National Assembly 
Elections and Proportional 
Representations 
(Unicameral, 4 year terms) 
Committees 
National People’s Congress 
The Politburo Standing 
Committee 
-Local Elections 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 This has become more prevalent during the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao years. The new president, Xi Jinping, 
has declared a war on government official corruptions and the use of luxurious goods by bureaucrats, and 
has been seeking to implement cost-saving policies in the public service arena. 
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-House of Representatives  
(4 year terms) 
Committees 
Judicial Branch Constitution 
Supreme Court (最高裁) 
(Chief and 14 additional Judges, 
appointed by the Cabinet from the 
list provided by the Court) 
The Court is the "Grand Bench" (
大法廷 Daihōtei), subdivided into 
three "Petty Benches" (小法廷 
Shōhōtei) of five justices each 
Constitution 
Supreme Court 
(Chief and 13 additional Justices, 6 
year terms) 
Constitutional Court 
Lesser Courts 
(9 justices, 3 each appointed by the 
president, the National Assembly and 
the Chief Justice) 
Supreme Court 
High People’s Court 
Intermediate People’s Court 
Basic People’s Court 
Political Parties 1. Liberal Democratic Party 
(majority) 
2. Democratic Party of Japan 
(minority) 
3. Komeito 
4. Yushinnokai 
1. Saenuridang (incumbent, 
majority) 
2. Minjudang (minority) 
The Chinese Communist Party 
(Other parties suppressed by 
the CCP) 
Bureaucracy Constitution before the PM, but 
bureaucracy is highly influential, 
often times overriding political 
decisions 
Constitution before Presidential Power 
Bureaucracy subordinate to 
Presidential Power 
Constitution serves for the 
party 
Government institutions are 
designed to serve the 
Communist Party 
Source: Compiled by author based on readings on Hayes (2012) and respective government agency 
websites 
 
The Logic of Policy Formation in Japan, South Korea, and China 
     Political capacity in the three countries with regard to policy-making process is 
vividly manifested in the ways the ministries of economic and financial policies function. 
Often times, one can easily witness which institution possesses the upper hand in 
economic and/or financial policy formation by analyzing the interactions between central 
banks, ministries of finance, ministries of commerce or industries, ministries of foreign 
affairs, and the political parties and leaders involved. In responding to foreign pressures 
on trade and finance, a firm agenda is necessary for defending cases with logical 
arguments. In the absence of such an agenda, a successful defense cannot be made, or 
even in the presence of a clear agenda, difficulties may arise in the execution of the 
agenda due to organizational conflict of interests. Who drives and executes the agenda in 
this process largely influences the direction of policy and the outcomes. 
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Japan 
Bureaucratic Performance 
     Amongst all industrialized nations, Japan is very well known for its strong and solid 
bureaucracy comprised of dedicated, loyal technocrats. While bureaucratic flexibility 
could be called into question, the high efficiency and drive of ordinary bureaucratic 
officials of the system in the rebuilding of Japan were clearly one of the biggest 
contributing factors to establishing the Japanese economy. With regard to the 
organizational interest conflicts that have occurred in the postwar years, the effects of 
capital liberalization and the Plaza Accord, the revision of the Bank of Japan law which 
gave more autonomy to the BOJ in 1998, and bureaucratic reforms by Koizumi could be 
regarded as the major events that caused Japan’s biggest changes in bureaucracy. The 
most salient example of bureaucratic change was manifested in the budget-making 
process in Japan. As Koizumi undertook major reforms in the bureaucracy, setting and 
approving the budget would be differ before, while, and after Koizumi took office. In 
budgeting, while the MOF served a critical role before Koizumi, during his term the 
executive was strengthened via the establishment of Council on Economic and Fiscal 
Policy (CEFP), which become responsible for overseeing budget and economic policy in 
2001 for Koizumi to pursue his agenda against opposition from his own party. After 
Koizumi and three other subsequent LDP prime ministers whose leaderships did not last 
very long, the DPJ came in and established the Government Revitalization Unit (GRU) 
for specific budget requests and the National Policy Unit to guide economic and fiscal 
policy, replacing the CEFP. During the two budgeting process reforms, transparency was 
	  	  
87 
increased, and the MOF experienced a modest decline and regain of its power in Japanese 
bureaucracy.75  
Figure 2-3. Japan’s Macroeconomic Formation Structure 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Japan’s Trade and Foreign Economic Policy Formation Structure 
 
Note: Without an exception, the three Japanese ministries under the Cabinet participate in a trade 
negotiation. However, there are different levels of policy strengths and stances by the ministries, in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Park, Gene. 2010. "The Politics of Budgeting in Japan: How Much Do Institutions Matter?" Asian 
Survey. 50 (5): 965-989. 
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MAFF has a narrow constituency in a declining agricultural sector, the MOFA seeks to keep pace with the 
global trend of trade policies, and the METI pushes for a wide range of Japan’s highly competitive 
industries. Unlike the South Korean Presidency or the Chinese President and Premier, the Japanese Prime 
Minister lacks the power to push for the policy drive on his own. 
 
Table 2-2. Japan’s Postwar Political and Bureaucratic Transitions 
 
Leadership Prime Minister Political 
Party 
MOF BOJ METI MOFA 
Allied 
Occupation 
until the 
Treaty of San 
Francisco on 
28 April 1952 
 
US Occupation  
Tetsu Katayama (1947-48) 
JSP 
Nihon 
Shakaitō 
 Established under 
the Bank of Japan 
Act (promulgated in 
June 1882) 
Reorganized under 
the Bank of Japan 
Act (1942) 
Amendments 
(1949) to establish 
the BOJ Policy 
Board 
 Established 
under the 
1947 
Constitution  
Hitoshi Ashida (1948) 
DP 
Minshutō 
Shigeru Yoshida (1948-1954)  
 
DLP 
Minshu 
Jiyūtō 
Ichirō Hatoyama (1954-1956) 
 
JDP 
Nihon 
Minshutō 
LDP 
Jimintō 
1955 System Tanzan Ishibashi (1956-1957) 
Nobusuke Kishi(1957-1960) 
Hayato Kishi (1960-1964) 
Eisaku Satō (1964-1972) 
Kakuei Tanaka (1972-1974) 
Takeo Miki (1974-1976) 
Takeo Fukuda (1976-1978) 
Masayoshi Ōhira (1978-1980) 
Zenkō Suzuki (1980-1982) 
Yasuhiro Nakasone (1982-1987) 
Noboru Takeshita (1987-1989) 
Sōsuke Uno (1989) 
Toshiki Kaifu (1989-1991) 
Kiichi Miyazawa (1991-1993) 
LDP 
Jimintō 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lost power 
over banking 
supervision to 
the FSA 
Lost control 
over monetary 
policy to the 
BOJ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Act of 1942 
was revised 
completely in June 
1997 under the two 
principles of 
"independence" and 
"transparency."  
 
The revised act (the 
Act) came into 
effect on April 1, 
1998. 
In 1979 MITI lost its 
primary instrument of 
control over 
Japanese firms — 
allocation of foreign 
currency. MITI lost 
some influence when 
the switch was made 
to a floating 
exchange rate 
between the United 
States dollar and yen 
in 1971.  
 
 
Morihiro Hosokawa (1993-1994) JNP 
Nihon 
Shintō 
Tsutomu Hata (1994) 
 
JRP 
Shinseitō 
Tomiichi Murayama (1994-1996) JSP Nihon 
Shakaitō 
Ryutaro Hashimoto (1996-1998) 
Keizō Obuchi (1998-2000) 
Yoshirō Mori (2000-01) 
LDP 
Jimintō 
 Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) Renamed  
 
 
 
 
 
Adopts 
consumption 
tax legislation 
 Renamed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPA bureau 
established 
(2004) 
 Shinzō Abe (2006-2007) 
 Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008) 
 Tarō Asō (2008-2009) 
 Yukio Hatoyama (2009-2010) DPJ 
Minshutō  Naoto Kan (2010-2011) 
 Yoshihiko Noda (2011-2012) 
 Shinzō Abe (2012-present) LDP 
Jimintō 
Source: Compiled by author with references to the official homepages of Japanese government ministries 
and the Bank of Japan 
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Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) 
     In the course of postwar reconstruction of Japan, the role of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (formerly 通商産業省, Tsūshō-sangyō-shō or MITI; 
now the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry or METI, renamed in the 2001 
Central Government Reform, 経済産業省, Keizai-sangyō-shō) has spearheaded the 
country’s efforts towards industrialization and acted as a critical player in establishing its 
foreign trade policy. Established in 1949, the MITI served as the architect of Japanese 
industrial policy and planning, acting as one of the most powerful government agencies 
in postwar Japan. It was also responsible for keeping the Japanese yen fairly low in order 
to maintain comparative prices for exports, and it lost some influence on policy when the 
yen was appreciated as a result of the Plaza Accord. Nevertheless, the METI still 
possesses decision-making powers on domestic industrial issues as well as trade 
negotiations and disputes at the international level. The drive for the METI has not 
changed – it is still on strengthening the industrial capacity and base of the country. 
     In the 1980s and 1990s, Japan succumbed to continuous foreign pressures of 
liberalization, and the MITI was then responsible for aiding foreign companies establish 
branches within Japan. As Japan progressed further into the integrated global trade 
framework, there have been gradual shifts in its policy direction in parallel with the shift 
of global policy trends and Japan’s competitiveness, in which some trends were 
witnessed in its trade policy. The first noticeable trend is Japan’s relatively increasing 
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degree of litigious behavior in its trade policymaking.76 During the GATT years, Japan’s 
activities and activities in trade disputes were largely in the position of a defendant rather 
than complainant, whereas during the WTO years, its activities as a third party participant 
has increased exponentially.  
     While traditionally Japan has been regarded a society in which litigation is not the 
preferred method to resolve disputes, the rigorous activities in trade disputes by Japan’s 
trading partners (especially the United States) under the WTO regime and Japan’s need to 
protect certain industries have prompted Japan to eagerly participate. Although its cases 
as complainant are still quite minimal, the widespread understanding in Japanese 
ministries is that litigation is not necessarily a bad thing in the age of globalization. With 
a trade remedy bureau established within (China has a similar bureau with the same 
functions that are much more pursuant of disputes, but South Korea and Taiwan have 
external institutions for trade remedy), METI has been acting as the main arbiter of 
domestic industrial and trade policy. The Trade Remedy Bureau established under METI 
also provides legal counseling for domestic industries free of charge up to the initiation of 
dispute stage, but lawsuits are pursued at the industries’ own expenses.77 Given the 
changing environment and perception toward trade litigation in Japan, the ministerial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Pekkanen, 2006. pp. 18-19.  
77 Pekkanen notes that while Japan’s METI has a trade remedy bureau established under its jurisdictions, 
other WTO members including South Korea and Taiwan tend to have independent bodies for safeguard 
investigations (Pekkanen, 2006, p.148). While it is true that Japan has an inside trade remedy bureau within 
the METI (China has one also established under the Ministry of Commerce), strictly speaking, South Korea 
and Taiwan’s trade remedy institutions are not completely independent and are placed under their home 
ministries. South Korea has the Korea Trade Commission established under the MOTIE and Taiwan has 
the International Trade Commission established under the Ministry of Economic Affairs.   
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support toward pursuit of trade remedy or disputes at the international level still remains 
relatively minimal in comparison to its neighboring South Korea or China.  
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
     In the area of fiscal policy and planning, the Ministry of Finance (formerly 大藏省、
Ōkura-shō; name change to 財務省, Zaimu-shō in 2001, but the English name remains 
unchanged) is by far the most influential player in Japanese bureaucracy. The MOF has 
possessed the tools for yearly budget planning and taxation, and before the year 1998, it 
was also in charge of managing postal savings and national property, enforcement of 
tariffs and quotas, and regulations governing every aspect of the financial markets of 
Japan.78 During the years of foreign pressures (gaiatsu) in the 1980s and 1990s, the MOF 
was a major contributor to formulating policies in response to foreign entities. Most 
importantly, it was in charge of channeling on currency and liberalization issues in 
negotiation with the U.S. Department of Treasury.  
     The MOF did lose its power in banking supervision to the Financial Services Agency 
and its role in financial policymaking and implementation in the passing of the new Bank 
of Japan law in the Japanese Diet in 1998, but with its long tradition and strong linkages 
to the political sphere, it still remains a prominent agency of all ministries in the Japanese 
bureaucracy. To be fair, since the burst of the bubble economy, Japan saw many private 
firms and banking institutions with the issues of non-performing loans (NPLs), and there 
were also political scandals involving the MOF in terms of its bureaucratic performance. 
Against these backdrops, in 1998, there were two financial institutions that were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Grimes, 2001. p.18 
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delegated some functions regarding the MOF’s mandates in the financial markets - the 
Financial Supervision Agency (金融監督庁) or Financial Services Agency (FSA, 金融庁
) to be short; the Financial Reconstruction Commission, which was merged into the FSA 
in 2001.79 The birth of these institutions meant that implementing financial regulations of 
the private sector would be delegated to the new institutions from the MOF – it did mean 
a big loss of authority for the MOF in policy making.  
     Again, however, despite the scraping off of some functions that the MOF had had, the 
addition of financial supervisory institutions overseeing the financial market did not 
entirely strip the MOF of the activities and the leverages in foreign economic 
policymaking. It still remained the channel for outside powers to communicate with the 
Japanese economy. The MOF has also consistently played the leading role in the realm of 
international finance, with its international finance bureau (国際金融局) kept inside the 
ministry and the minister of finance engaging in active discussions of international 
finance at the global level. Powerful individuals who climbed the MOF promotion ladder 
or previously held the position of Minister of Finance despite not being a MOF 
bureaucrat would still enter power politics, some becoming PMs (from the DPJ, 
Yoshihiko Noda and Naoto Kan). The MOF’s regained influence in budgetary decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 As we will learn in the South Korean case, much of the changes and buildup of new Japanese regulatory 
bodies in finance were occurred simultaneously in both Japan and South Korea. For the Japanese, these 
institutions were needed to stabilize the financial markets after the bubble economy burst. For the South 
Koreans, there was an immediate need of such institutions in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 
1997-98. South Korea’s Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA, 금융감독원) was established in January of 
1999 pursuant to legislation on the last day of the year 1997, and Japan’s Financial Services Agency was 
also established in June 1998 pursuant to legislation earlier in the same year. During the Lee Myungbak 
Administration, South Korea’s FSA was extended pursuant to appended legislation in February 2008, by 
adding a Financial Supervisory Committee to the institution, and placing foreign branches in New York, 
Washington, DC, London, Frankfurt, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Beijing.  
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making also provides it with stronger stance in the bureaucracy. In terms of budget 
planning, other ministries in the Japanese bureaucracy are still subject to the MOF 
decisions in terms of securing their budgets. Other than the budgetary role that the MOF 
plays, it retains the reputation from the years in the postwar years when it provided 
window guidance with other relevant ministries such as the MITI, thereby facilitating the 
process of delivering and allocating the capital and funds needed through overseeing the 
process of loaning from the Bank of Japan (BOJ).  
Bank of Japan (BOJ) 
     It is important to mention the BOJ’s divergence from the MOF and the background as 
to how conflicting stances in macroeconomic policy making arose between the two. In a 
sense, the conflict between the MOF and the BOJ was foreseen in that both organizations 
have overlapping goals in the areas of macroeconomic policy making, but with some 
differences in each of their mandates and organizational interests. With the priorities on 
budgeting and financial planning that the MOF had, the MOF and the BOJ would have 
different opinions in framing the policies.  
     The fact that the BOJ is not a Cabinet ministry but would have overlapping areas in 
the field of macroeconomic policy-making was a clear sign for potential organizational 
conflicts with the MOF. Until the revision of the Bank of Japan Law in 1997, which was 
by far the most pivotal change in the macroeconomic policy making structure in all of 
Japan’s postwar years, the BOJ remained very constrained in its levels of central bank 
independence – both in ‘goal’ and ‘instrument’ independence. It was placed under a 
situation in which its own interpretations of the state of economy (e.g., price stability, 
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economic growth, and financial sector stability) was difficult to make, and in which it did 
not have control in the instruments of monetary policy implementation (e.g., decision 
making authority on interest rates, financial market intervention, and freedom from 
responsibility to fund government deficits).80  
     The MOF had possessed and enjoyed considerable policy-making power and 
connections to the political world that the BOJ did not. Whereas the MOF stayed 
powerful and closely aligned with politicians with the knowledge in economic and 
financial issues in the committees under the Japanese Diet, the BOJ has had a relatively 
weaker political say with regard to formation and execution of policy before 1997. The 
macroeconomic policy-making structure would begin with discussions between high-
ranking MOF and Treasury officials, kept as a close secret within MOF, even from the 
Minister and the PM, then-political leaders would be brought in for a face-to-face 
meeting. BOJ officials would be informed afterwards.81  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
     The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA: 外務省, Gaimushō) in Japan has been the 
main actor in engaging in trade negotiations toward several rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations toward the Doha Round under the WTO framework, and the signing of free 
trade agreements (FTA) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) as the Doha 
Round in stalemate prompted WTO member countries to seek for economic opportunities 
via preferential trade agreements. While Japan has been quite actively engaged in the 
proliferation of trade agreements, much of the policy drive behind it was to keep up with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Grimes, 2001. p.7-8. 
81 Grimes, 2001. P.128. 
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the global pace with good branding for Japan, which was from MOFA.82 While the 
METI’s mandates were directly linked to serving for domestic industrial interests, 
MOFA’s position as a foreign ministry is more sensitive and delicate in that it is not only 
engaged in foreign economic policy making, but also in overall diplomatic matters 
including security and history issues. It had other important issues in parallel with foreign 
economic policymaking.  
     In this respect, while the MOFA was deeply engaged in the negotiations toward 
striking trade deals and establishing trade goals to keep up with the rest of the world in 
terms of proliferating free trade, after thorough examinations of the after-effects, it was 
not directly serving for the details of trade remedies as the METI was, nor was it 
responsible for setting policy agendas for industries (e.g., agriculture, fisheries) that 
would be hurt as a result of the deals as the MAFF was.83 Simply put, it could spread out 
all its pretty cards at the negotiation table, but it was not directly involved in or 
responsible for cleaning up the mess afterwards. For this reason, MOFA’s positions on 
getting on the last train for free trade agreements would often times bring about protests 
from Japan’s agricultural industries, which has shrunk to about 1.3% of the country’s 
GDP. To be fair, backdropped with a relatively lower trade dependency ratio in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 MOFA is also involved in facilitating Japanese business operations in foreign countries, for better returns 
for the Japanese economy and country branding. However, its delicate position as a foreign ministry 
constrains them from resolving matters beyond their capacity. See MOFA’s support of Japanese industries 
abroad here: http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/zaigai/kigyo/ichiran_i.html 
83 MOFA officials appear to have certain levels of criticisms toward policies by MAFF, mainly pointing out 
that it has not done much in policy making either to aid strengthen Japan’s agricultural sectors or to 
actively push them into competition with foreign agricultural goods by opening the market. In a 
conversation I had with a former MOFA official, ‘What in the world have they done (or have been doing)? 
(Karerawa ittai naniwo shitanoka)’ was the strong sentence used to imply the helplessness of MAFF 
policies. Personal interviews with Tanaka Hitoshi, former Japan's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
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comparison to its neighbors, China and South Korea, and a large domestic market, 
Japan’s signing of preferential agreements was relatively slow-paced, and yet, alarming 
to the public each time by abrupt changes in the domestic market owing to change of 
prices or safety of goods. Japanese agricultural industries and the public protective of the 
Japanese domestic produce are gradually losing stance, and their voices are not as strong 
and aggressive as their counterparts in South Korea, in which a similar trend of 
marginalization in policymaking and aging of farmers is rapidly occurring. In the midst 
of interest divide with the agricultural industry, the MOFA still plays a vital role in 
paving the way for free trade in the trade negotiations, and it will continue to be so in the 
TPP negotiations as well, since Japan has agreed to participate in the negotiations.  
MAFF (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries) 
     As the agricultural industries in Japan has declined considerably in the postwar years, 
the power of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (MAFF, 農林水産省,	 
Nōrinsuisanshō) has also decreased in parallel with the power transition. The Japanese 
economy no longer relies solely on its production of agricultural goods, yet, due to the 
traumas of food shortage crisis that the Japanese went through in the wartime, the MAFF 
has advocated the need for food self-sufficiency and food safety in Japan.84 This policy 
stance has been strongly supported by agricultural industries involved and the politicians 
of the diet who built their political foundations in their country towns of their origin, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 Based on conversations in a group meeting with Takashi Shinohara, DPJ politician, former Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry. Shinohara was scornful at his own party’s then top leadership, Kan 
Naoto, for considering participation in the TPP negotiations. Fond and reminiscent of the days in which 
Japanese agriculture flourished in the Edo period, he was also building rare edible plants in Japan outside 
the ministry building. He also circulated his featured article in the Economist to demonstrate his advocacy 
for Japanese agriculture. http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2010/11/japans_farming_ministry 
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which production of certain agricultural goods would be critical for the survival of the 
villages.85  
     However, due to the shrinking size of the Japanese farming industry and the pressures 
for further agricultural opening, the MAFF has been losing ground in the competitive 
fight with ministries in advocating for food self-sufficiency and protecting the Japanese 
agricultural market.86 At the negotiation table, METI and MOFA have a stronger say than 
the MAFF, and the official documents from negotiations are also archived by the 
MOFA.87 
South Korea 
Bureaucratic Performance      
     South Korea’s fundamental structures of macroeconomic decision-making around 
ministries is in large part similar to Japan’s, as South Korea in the postwar years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Kim, Hyun-chong, 2011. As the former negotiator for the Japan-South Korea FTA (later also chief 
architect of the KOR-US FTA), Kim notes in his memoir that In 2003, after the five years of joint study on 
the possible FTA, Japan suggested opening of markets for manufactured goods and agricultural goods at a 
very high level of openness, but South Korea was in doubt, as the Japanese Diet was full with politicians 
representing agricultural constituents. As the negotiation progressed, it became very clear to the South 
Korean negotiators that Japan was solely interested in opening the manufactured goods market at a high 
level, and was not very responsive with regard to opening up its agricultural goods and fisheries market. 
One of the main reasons why the Japan-South Korea free trade negotiations were halted was the fact that 
South Korea demanded that Japan fully opens its agricultural market in its entirety, and Japan simply could 
not accept this request. 
86 Mulgan, 1997. MAFF has also been battling not only against the ministries but also against domestic 
pressure (naiatsu) for agricultural liberalization that emerged from the Federation of Economic 
Organizations in Japan, better known as Keidanren.  
87 Mulgan, ibid. Ironically, Mulgan writes that several government leaders sought to use gaiatsu for 
agricultural trade liberalization for a broader agricultural policy reform in Japan, and even MAFF has been 
accused of doing so for its own policy purposes. Mulgan mentions examples of intra-ministerial 
manipulation and power contest through a rumored anecdote from the early 1980s that the MOFA had 
briefed the American side what to say to Japanese farm politicians during their U.S. visit on the beef and 
citrus liberalization issue, and another in 1982 in which a letter by former USTR William Brock to the 
MITI, EPA, and MOF had been suspected of being first drafted by a pro-liberalization government official 
in MITI. 
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duplicated Japan’s financial system a great deal amongst all Asian nations.88 However, 
the central decision-making power derives from the presidency. This is a big distinction 
from the Japanese bureaucratic system – whereas the Japanese PM does not possess the 
power to decide on a policy direction in the event of conflict of interests amongst the 
cabinet ministries, the South Korean President can have the final say on policy matters 
when its ministries stand divided.89 This creates a lot of policy space and flexibility in 
comparison to the Japanese system, but there are also big downsides to this system 
including policy errors, abrupt changes in policy, and lack of communication with the 
general public regarding intent of policymaking prior to legislation and implementation 
of policy.  
     The biggest issue in the South Korean policy making system is that the strong 
emphasis on the presidential intent and direction of policy is by practice and one of the 
remnants of the dictatorial regimes. In this respect, the South Korean democracy is still a 
democracy undergoing the process of consolidation. Many economic and financial policy 
decisions were directed or at least hinted by an incumbent president, and this was more 
the case during the initial civilian governments of Kim Youngsam and Kim Daejung 
periods – transitional phases from military to democratic regimes in which political 
power deriving from the military forces and leadership were essentially wiped out. Also, 
at a glance, government procedures are conducted in a fast-paced manner to increase 
efficiency, but the problem is that step-by-step, methodical and careful examinations of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 With Park Chung hee and his background in the Japanese Military Academy, many of his associates and 
economic policy makers of his time were trained in Japan. As overseas training became available for the 
bureaucrats, many technocrats now have their higher educational backgrounds in the United States.  
89 Kim, ibid. 
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the effects of policy and the reviews of the responses of the public are sometimes 
sacrificed or ignored for the sake of rapidity and efficiency in achieving bureaucratic 
goals. In addition to these issues, the traditionally strong linkages of government-business 
relations embody corruption, and the practices of accepting bribery by former presidents 
and former high-ranked officials, which headline national news each time a prosecution 
begins under a new presidency. Often times, it is labeled as ‘political backstabbing’ in the 
media and among the public.  
     The South Korean policymaking process is very sensitive to the general public during 
the periods toward presidential election, because it relies on direct voting. However, 
ordinarily, in the processes of legislation, the South Korean ministries are authorized with 
the policy tools to propose and implement, but in the cases of delicate policy proposals 
facing debates and potential clashes of opinions in the general public and the industries, 
the ministries stay closely aligned with politicians in the National Assembly through 
committees that are led by them, thereby prompting them to announce the proposals 
through the media. The practice of policy coordination that occurs behind closed doors 
amongst high-level ministry officials (especially MOSF) and national assemblymen is not 
very welcomed by the public nor the media in South Korea. 
     The fact that South Korea experienced several transitions in the political regimes also 
has affected the ways in which policies would be formulated and implemented. South 
Korean political parties went through an overhaul following each presidential election, 
and name changes of political parties, factions, government ministries, and the shifting of 
bureaus at each administration setup were commonplace.  
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Figure 2-5. South Korea’s Macroeconomic Policy Formation Structure 
 
 
Figure 2-6. South Korea’s Trade Policy Formation Structure 
 
Source: By author 
     While it is indeed the norm that at the beginning of each administration, the 
reshuffling of the core policy makers is more than expected, this inconsistency would 
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later cause turmoil at times of economic crises, and ultimately decrease the level of 
efficacy in policymaking. The years escalating to  the Asian Financial Crisis, and the 
years of recovery after the crisis serve as testimonies to the repercussions of South 
Korea’s bureaucratic deficiencies that often times arise from inconsistency.  
Table 2-3. South Korea’s Postwar Political and Bureaucratic Transitions 
 
Republic 
according to 
constitution 
revisions 
Political 
Regime Type 
Presidency/ 
Administrati
on 
Political  
Party 
MOSF 
 
BOK MOTIE MOFA 
(T) 
1948  U.S. 
Occupation 
 재무부 
(財務部, 
Ministry of 
Finance) 
기획처 
(企劃處, 
Ministry of 
Planning) 
 상공부 
(商工部, 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
and Industry) 
외무부 
(外務部, 
Ministry 
of Foreign 
Affairs) 
1st  
Republic  
Parliamentary 
System 
(1952-1960) 
and 
Rhee  
Seungman 
(이승만) 
 BOK Law  
(1950) 
2nd  
Republic 
Transitional 
Cabinet/ 
Bicameral 
System 
Jang  
Myun (장면)  
 경제기획원 
(經濟企劃院, 
Economic 
Planning 
Board) 
(1961) 
Civilian 
Government 
Yun  
Boseon 
(윤보선) 
 
3rd Republic  
 
Military Coup  
Presidential 
System 
(1962-1971) 
Park 
Chunghee 
(박정희) 
Coup 1st Revision 
(1962); 2nd 
Revision 
(1963); 3rd 
Revision 
(1968) 
상공부 
(商工部, 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
and Industry) 
/ 동력자원부 
(動力資源部
, Ministry of 
Energy and 
Resources) 
외무공무
원교육원 
à 
외교연구
원 à 
외교안보
연구원 4
th  
Republic 
 
‘Yushin’  
Presidential 
System 
91972-1979) 
 
 4th Revision 
(1977) 
 
4th  
Republic 
 
Interim 
Government 
(1979-1980) 
Choi  
Gyuha  
(최규하) 
  
5th  
Republic 
 
Military Coup  
Presidential 
System 
(1980-1987) 
Chun  
Doowhan 
(전두환) 
Coup  5th Revision 
(1982) 
6th Republic 
 
Military 
Leadership 
Handover 
Presidential  
System 
(1987-1992) 
Roh  
Taewoo 
(노태우) 
민주정의당 
민주자유당 
6th Revision 
(1997) 
‘Civilian 
Government’ 
Presidential  
System 
(1992-1997) 
Kim  
Youngsam 
(김영삼) 
신한국당 
한나라당 
재정경제원(財政經濟院, 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economy) (1994) 
 상공자원부 
(商工資源部
,Ministry of 
Commerce, 
Industry, and 
Resources) 
통상산업부 
((通商産業
部, Ministry 
of Trade and 
Industry) 
‘Government 
of the People’ 
Presidential 
System 
Kim  
Daejung 
(김대중) 
새정치 
국민회의 
새천년 
재정경제부 
(財政經濟部
, Ministry of 
기획예산처 
(企劃豫算處, 
Ministry of 
산업자원부 
(産業資源部
, Ministry of 
외교통상
부 
(外交通
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(1997-2002) 민주당 Finance and 
Economy) 
Planning and 
Budget) 
Commerce 
Industry and 
Energy) 
商, 
Ministry 
of Foreign 
Affairs 
and 
Trade) 
(통상교
섭본부 
신설) 
‘Participatory 
Government’ 
Presidential 
System 
(2002-2007) 
Roh  
Moohyun 
(노무현) 
새천년 
민주당 
열린우리당 
7th Revision 
(2003) 
‘Pragmatic 
Government’ 
Presidential 
System 
(2008-2013) 
Lee  
Myungback 
(이명박) 
한나라당 
새누리당 
기획재정부 (企劃財政部, 
Ministry of Strategy and 
Finance)  
(2008년 금융위원회에 
금융정책기능 이관) 
2013년 부총리 부처로 승격 
8th Revision 
(2011) 
9th Revision  
(2012) 
지식경제부 
(知識經濟部
, Ministry of 
Knowledge 
Economy, 
Presidential 
System 
(2013-present) 
Park  
Geunhye 
(박근혜) 
새누리당  산업통상자
원부(産業通
商資源部. 
Ministry of 
Trade, 
Industry, and 
Energy 
외교부 
(外交部, 
Ministry 
of Foreign 
Affairs) 
(통상분
야 이관) 
Source: Compiled by author with references to the official homepages of South Korean government 
ministries and the Bank of Korea. As much as South Korea has seen political transitions, ministries and 
their tasks have been subject moving and shifting around at upon each inauguration of a new presidential 
administration. This task also involves an entire overhaul of the cabinet members replaced by the 
President’s close aides, and bureaucrats of high and low ranks alike are also reshuffled, leaving gaps in 
the flows of policy formation. 
 
The Omnipotent Presidency  
     South Korea’s macroeconomic policy directions have been traditionally largely 
formulated by the presidency in the postwar years. It could be simply a remnant of the 
authoritarian regimes in which presidents possessed strong power, but there are several 
factors to why the presidential power is supreme in South Korea even after the 
authoritarian rule. While the political landscape has changed toward building a 
democratic society and political regime and has established an electoral system of direct 
voting in the presidential elections, the structures of political interest mobilization, raising 
money for electoral campaigns (in which a lot of government-business attachment is 
involved), and voting behavior by constituencies have not changed greatly.  
     The omnipotence of the presidency may deserve credit with regard to policies that are 
with clear directions during the span of five years in office, but it has often times 
overridden macroeconomic policies made in good faith. The most tumultuous 
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manifestation of this was before and after the Asian Financial Crisis. Kim Young-sam 
had promised the public of economic goals that could not be realized before the crisis 
struck. After his term, he would blame his succeeding opponent and another progressive 
leader, President Kim Dae-jung, for the economic calamities that the public had to go 
through.  
Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) and the ‘MOFia’ 
    The Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF) has been one of the very fundamental 
pillars of South Korea’s reconstruction and industrialization. But while the MOSF is a 
giant ministry overseeing all matters of macroeconomic policy planning, in the initial 
postwar years, two institutions – the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB), were the nascent forms of the MOSF. The two government 
institutions were filled with officials of different backgrounds, who would often times 
have conflicting views and engage in power struggle.90 The MOF has traditionally been 
stronger than any other ministry in economic and financial affairs through the Park 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 See memoirs by Kang Man-soo, 2005. Through the years of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-whan, Kim 
Jae-ik (金在益, 1938-1983), former Chief of Economy, was a favored top ranking bureaucrat in the 
implementation of macroeconomic policies. A neo-classical economist by training at Stanford, Kim served 
in the Blue House and pushed for several big chunks of market-oriented policy implementation (e.g., the 
real-name financial transaction system, OECD membership, free trade, and inflation control). Kim’s 
practices of excluding people from the Ministry of Finance and recommending only those from the 
Economic Planning Board for important positions, would later create factions of economic officials labeled 
as ‘originally from MOF, EPB, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, etc’. Upon his recommendations, 
Chun Doo-whan would appoint an official with an EPB background for the Minister of Finance seat. In 
1982, the ‘Jang Young-ja Fraud Incident’ prompted the EPB to embark on a policy drive to implement real-
name financial transaction system in South Korea. In pushing for this strategy, Kim filled the top positions 
of MOF with EPB officials. The year after, Kim along with several other ministers under Chun Doo-whan 
died in the Myanmar Aungsan National Cemetery Bombing allegedly planned and conducted by North 
Korea. However, the exclusivism amongst the ministries has been carried on and persists to this day, and 
has been manifested most recently in the cabinet set-ups by Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye. 
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Chung-hee years, and such practices had given the name ‘MOFia (모피아)’, a 
combination of the words ‘MOF’ and ‘mafia’ to its officials.  
     Under Chun Doo-whan and Roh Tae-woo, the factional clashes were surfacing, and 
upon Kim Young-sam’s inauguration, the MOF and EPB were combined into a dinosaur-
like humongous Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) on December 3, 1994, but 
with a degrading of class from ‘부 (部)’ to ‘원 (院)’.91 Kim Young-sam, blindfolded by 
his aides who did not sense any signs of macroeconomic instability, ordered that the 
MOF be combined with the EPB – two government institutions which had been in 
organizational conflict and competition since 1961. He then labeled it Ministry of 
Finance and Economy with a demotion of the institution. The disappearance of the 
former International Finance Bureau at MOF in the phase of ministerial combination of 
the MOF and EPB would later serve as a fatal factor in the Asian Financial Crisis. 
Personal testimonies by South Korean bureaucrats in the management of the Asian 
Financial Crisis reveal that it was a problematic top-down decision to strip South Korea’s 
ministries bare of its tools to control international capital flows.92 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Kang, ibid. Kang noting Kim Young-sam as ‘YS’, states that his lobbied proposals to maintain the class 
of the ministry went down the drain, as YS dictated that no changed would be accepted to the arrangement. 
The opposition party, which had then become a majority, also opposed to the proposed changes. Kang 
criticizes that the MOFE was an unconstitutional institution, as the degrading of the ministry rendered all of 
the previous 91 enforcement regulations of MOF unconstitutional. Under the Constitution of South Korea, 
only cabinet ministries retained the policy tools for approval regarding finance, foreign currency, security, 
and insurance. The 91 enforcement regulations had to be changed into orders by the Prime Minister, but 
after Kim Young-sam left office, the MOF staff worked through changing it back to the MOF’s own 
enforcement regulations.  
92 Kang, ibid. This is also a backdrop of South Korea’s recent deployment of macro-prudential levy, or 
capital controls in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. (I will cover more on this in Chapter 6.) 
However, South Korea’s policy changes have been based on a global understanding, or standard of policy 
shifts and changes. The IMF’s reversal on capital controls was critical in pushing the MOSF toward 
seeking macro-prudentiality, and the adoption of Tobin Tax. I will return to this point in Chapter 6. 
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     When Kim Dae-jung came into office, MOFE was able to regain the status as부 (部) 
as in the MOF years, but this time the MOFE was divided into the MOF and the Ministry 
of Planning and Budget (MPB), which managed economic planning. This divided system 
continued throughout the Roh Moo-hyun administration, which inherited the political 
stances and systems from Kim Dae-jung. However, it did not persist for long – the two 
branches were combined once more as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance under Lee 
Myung-bak, a former CEO and Seoul Mayor, who had a big stake and drive in economic 
policy and planning. Today, the MOSF carries on its form from the Lee Myung-bak’s 
years under Park Geun-hye, but with promotion in grading of the minister as the Vice 
Prime Minister.      
Bank of Korea (BOK) 
     The Bank of Korea was born in the aftermath of the Korean War, when the officials of 
the Chosun Bank sought to restore the presence of a national bank following Japanese 
occupation. After the Korean War, adjustment in financial structure was badly needed, 
and thus with American advising the Bank of Korea (BOK) was established. The local 
currency value plunged, and in retrospect, many unexpected behaviors of the Japanese 
officials who fled with their assets in Korea upon the Japanese emperor’s announcement 
of defeat. When the first Bank of Korea Law was written, advisory commission from the 
U.S. was involved, but the main scripters of the law were primarily from the Chosun 
Bank. The Chosun Bank had reserved their areas of foreign exchange, bank supervision 
under their own administrative body, which would enable checks and balances on 
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monetary policy amongst ministries.93 Many had disappeared in fear that they would be 
prosecuted for being pro-Japanese (친일파 (親日派): chinilpa).  
     Based on this background, when Park Chung-hee came in, he stripped the main power 
from the Bank of Korea. From this point on, the MOF enjoyed the power that the Bank of 
Korea once enjoyed. Under Park Chung-hee, the BOK focused on facilitating the 
continued industrialization and the establishment of growth-focused financial system. 
While the BOK adopted realistic interest rates from September 1965, throughout Park’s 
drive for industrialization, interest rates were kept fairly low to promote investment while 
keeping companies’ funding costs low. Interest rates on policy lending were set lower 
than the general lending rate, and the burdens on financial institutions were compensated 
by refinancing through the BOK’s rediscount system at low interest rates.94  
     The power struggle between the MOF (now MOSF) and the BOK has been ongoing 
for decades. The Bank of Korea has not been at the forefront of policymaking but has 
served rather as an agent of the MOF. In the 1980s, under Chun Doo-hwan and Roh 
Taewoo, the BOK strived to stabilize prices due to inflation following two decades of 
fast-paced industrialization. While the BOK’s mandates and objectives at a broad range 
were not a big divergence from the MOF in terms of national development strategies on 
the growth path, the inner political dynamics reveal the cleavages in policy making and 
power rivalry between the two institutions.95 Stemmed from the conflicts from the power 
restructuring of the MOF and the BOK during the industrialization era, the debates on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Kang, ibid. 
94 Bank of Korea, 2000, pp.130-131. 
95 Kang, 2005, pp. 209-212. 
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Bank of Korea Law revision was not solely one for ‘central bank independence’, but 
more for the BOK’s strife and goals to retrieve the authority that they once possessed 
before Park Chunghee, and to be placed on equal grounds with the MOF in terms of 
policy agenda setting. The democratic movement of 1987 was strategically used as the 
backdrop for the BOK’s fight for independence.96 Going with the tide, the BOK sought to 
have the public on their back to retrieve their rights, and beyond that, expand their 
authority across monetary policy making.97 The decade-long fight between the MOF and 
the BOK ended with the establishment of an independent body for bank supervision 
placed outside the MOF and the BOK. The organizational conflict between the MOF and 
BOK continues on today. 
     The change of global political dynamics by the end of the Cold War and the U.S. 
pushes in spearheading free trade and globalization prompted South Korea to seek further 
financial deregulation and liberalization efforts throughout the 1990s. This was done 
under the name of Kim Young-sam’s globalization (세계화: 世界化, segyehwa), albeit 
incompletely. In the process, the BOK’s efforts in the 1990s were centered on stabilizing 
the economy and financial deregulation, and the diversification of financial structure. 
While the Bank of Korea Law revision of 1997 is considered the biggest change in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Unfortunately, the political dynamics of what happened during the BOK’s struggle for independence 
from the 1980s-90s are not really made up front and clear by the BOK in public documents. It clearly was a 
messy political fight that the BOK was engaged in, piggybacking on political populism as well. One can 
only read through other sources in order to figure out why the BOK fought so fiercely and desperately 
during that era. However, the practices of downgrading BOK officials by MOF officials in everyday tasks 
certainly was not appropriate – the political attacks on the MOF by the BOK during this time therefore was 
rooted in how the MOF treated the BOK on both organizational and personal levels. 
97 The contents of the debates between the MOF and the BOK are detailed in Kang’s memoir; however, 
much of these political debates are not found in the BOK’s official statements or published materials. In the 
official language, much of the statements are focused on what the BOK achieved through each of the 
revisions. 
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financial policy making structure in postwar South Korea, the backgrounds and the actual 
events that culminated in the revision diverge from the Japanese case of the BOJ law 
revision in 1997. First off, the BOJ law had not been revised multiple times, but the BOK 
law had. At times of each political transition, BOK law was revised to reflect the changes 
in the state of the economy. However, the conflict between the MOF and the BOK since 
1987 which escalated to a political and emotional warfare had in fact stemmed from a) 
long-dated practices of MOF’s oppressive behavior on the BOK and b) the BOK’s desire 
to expand its policy interests that were without much logical backing.  
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Economy (MOTIE)  
     The MOTIE has gone through by far the most turbulent changes in its name and 
functions each time a new administration set in. From the early postwar years to 1977, it 
was functioning as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, taking care of all matters in 
commerce, trade, and industrialization in the initial setup. As the industrialization 
progressed, the Ministry of Energy and Resources was established and functioned in 
parallel with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry until 1993, when Kim Young-sam’s 
reshuffling of the ministry occurred. Both ministries were absorbed by the new Ministry 
of Commerce, Industry, and Resources initially in 1993, and later the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry in 1994. The focus on trade by MOTIE would come under Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun, when it was named the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy, 
with combined mandates of trade, industry, technology, energy, and resources. However, 
trade negotiation authorities were mandated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(MOFAT, which is now MOFA) during those two administrations, in which the 
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proliferation of South Korea’s free trade agreements was highly visible. Under the Lee 
Myung-bak’s administration, the MOTIE was named the Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy, but had similar functions as in previous administrations. The Park Geun-hye 
administration assigned trade negotiation authority to the MOTIE from the MOFAT - in 
other words, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs no longer have a stake in trade negotiations. 
The bureaucratic transformation and reshuffling that has been commonplace at each 
administration’s setup in South Korea has affected MOTIE considerably, and has 
continuously created complexities and inconsistency in policymaking 
KTC (Korea Trade Commission) 
     The Korea Trade Commission is in charge of handling trade remedy issues of South 
Korea. It is comprised of members who come from various backgrounds regarding trade 
(technocrats from the tariffs bureau at MOSF, lawyers, economists, and KIEP, the Korea 
Institute of Economic Policy). Currently, it is placed under the MOTIE by the new Park 
administration, but it first started out as a bureau under the Ministry of Commerce in July 
1987 pursuant to the Korea Foreign Trade Act. It was not until December 1993 under the 
Kim Young-sam administration that antidumping investigation authority was delegated to 
the KTC from the MOF (currently the MOSF). This structural change is also relevant to 
the formation of the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE), severely downgrading 
the previous policy agenda setting powers of the MOF in matters of trade. Before Kim 
Young-sam, the MOF was also in charge of setting tariffs for various tradable goods 
across the South Korean borders, which also meant that it had considerable leverage on 
various sectors of the economy including trade. Since then, trade remedy issues have 
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never been reassigned to the MOF. Under the Lee Myung-bak administration, it was 
placed under the Ministry of Knowledge Economy, which is now the MOTIE. Despite 
having been shifted around different ministries, the KTC now functions as a full-fledged 
trade remedy investigation authority, which levies antidumping and countervailing duties. 
This is a divergence from the cases of China and Japan, in which the trade remedy 
bureaus are placed within Ministry of Commerce (MOC) of China and METI of Japan, 
respectively. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 
     The MOFA of South Korea, formerly the MOFAT, had not been traditionally 
involved with trade policies. During the Kim Young-sam period, as trade policies were 
set by then the Ministry of Commerce – it was a predecessor of the MOTIE that had been 
divided into two, one pillar for industries and another for trade. The MOFAT has had a 
say in trade policy formation only from the Kim Dae-jung period, in which many joint 
free trade study groups were convened with South Korea’s potential FTA trading partners, 
but its role in trade policymaking did not last long, as in 2013 the trade policy bureau has 
been moved back to MOTIE, leaving it with a changed name from the MOFAT to MOFA. 
During the trade negotiation bureau’s operation within the MOFAT from 1997 to 2012, 
South Korea’s free trade agreements, comprehensive economic partnership agreements 
had expanded rapidly. South Korea’s annual GDP relied more heavily on trade than 
anything else. Today, the delegation of trade policies and trade negotiations to the 
MOTIE from the MOFAT upon the inauguration of Park Geun-hye, causing additional 
concerns due to the physical relocation of MOTIE to Sejong Municipality, a city to which 
	  	  
111 
many government bureaus would be relocated to in order to decentralize government 
administration and to keep the Seoul area from being over populated and focused in the 
country.98 Testimonies of officials from the MOFAT revealed their uneasiness about 
having to move to another ministry, and the MOTIE was reported to have dialed each of 
the deputy chief-level bureaucrats (gwajang) of each trade sections of the MOFAT in 
order to assure them that they would be welcomed wholeheartedly. Such an anecdote 
reveals how high the level of concern is during times of bureaucratic reshuffling of 
ministries following each presidential inauguration. There are also potentials in 
alternative agenda setting and carrying out policy agendas each time the reshuffling 
occurs. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food, and Rural Affairs (MAFRA)    
     The South Korean agricultural industry is not any different from Japan’s in the trends 
of decline. While it has not been able to exercise a strong leverage over trade policy in 
the past decades, it has had participatory role in the formation of trade policy via its info-
sharing role with regard to the specifics of the South Korean agricultural industry. The 
MAFRA carries more policy weight than Japan’s MAFF does, as the South Korean 
agricultural sectors are more fierce and visible than Japan’s against trade liberalization. 
The MAFRA operated a task force on the KORUS FTA under the Bureau of International 
Agriculture from March 2006 to June 2008.99 This was under the presidential executive 
order of the Roh Moo-hyun administration before the Obama Administration requested 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 The idea of Sejong-shi came up from the Roh Moo-hyun administration, and acquiring the conditions of 
government administration and management via buildings, creating livable village towns for the officials, 
etc, took some years before this idea was pushed thorough the bills in the National Assembly. Previously, 
Kwachun, in the suburbs of Seoul, was home to many ministries including the MOSF, MKE, and the MOJ. 
99 Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs, Republic of Korea 
	  	  
112 
re-negotiation on automobiles in 2010. The interests of the agricultural industry had to be 
conveyed in an official format since the initial KORUS FTA negotiations were highly 
centered on the import of U.S. beef amongst other agricultural goods, with questions 
surrounding the quality of the beef to be consumed by South Koreans. 
     Unlike the MAFF in Japan in which agriculture and fisheries are dealt with in the 
same ministry, the South Korean Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries oversees all matters 
regarding the fishery industry. Under Roh Moo-hyun, an FTA task force had also in 
operation from 2006 in preparation for the KORUS-FTA.100 When Lee Myung-bak came 
into office, his administration established a new bureau called MIFAFF 
(농림수산식품부, Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries), combining 
agriculture with fisheries. The Park Geun-hye administration divided it once more by 
reestablishing separate ministries each on fisheries (Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries) 
and food safety (Korea Food & Drug Administration). The common South Korean 
bureaucratic change of ministries is also manifested in the case of the MAFRA.  
China 
Bureaucratic Performance  
     While the Chinese government has adopted ways of market socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, but the bureaucracy remains strictly authoritarian under a communist 
rule.101 There are two major divergences from most western democracies in terms of 
bureaucracy; one is the top-down decision making drive, which derives from CCP party 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 The Presidential Executive Order No.19421 (March 29, 2006) enabled a task force of 4 specialists in the 
field of fisheries negotiation in the KORUS FTA. 
101 Confucian bureaucracy is not difficult to find in other parts of Asia; however, China’s top-down 
political system makes the traits of Confucian bureaucracy far more apparent than in other cases. 
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discipline and power, transmitted through the ministries; lack of supervision for checks 
and balances.102 It is difficult to expect efficiency in the enormous bureaucratic structure. 
Table 2-4. China’s Postwar Political Transitions and Financial Reforms 
 
Leadership 
Generation 
Chairman Premier Political 
Factions 
Governance Financial 
Reforms 
PBC NDRC MOC 
1st  
Generation 
(1945-1969) 
Mao 
Zedong 
Zhou 
Enlai 
 Decentralization   State 
Planning 
Commission 
(1952) – 
Centrally 
planned 
economy 
 
2nd  
Generation 
(1978-1984) 
Deng 
Xiaoping 
Zhao 
Ziyang 
Decentralization 1st Reform 
Era   
(1978-1992)  
Established 
financial 
institutions 
(1978-1984) 
Central Bank 
Status confirmed 
(1983) 
 
3rd  
Generation 
(1985-2002) 
Jiang 
Zemin 
Zhu 
Rongji 
Shanghaifang 
(Shanghai 
Clique) 
Centralization 
Technocrats 
2nd Reform 
Era (1990s) 
Initial 
Changes 
(1985-1996) 
Adjustments  
(1997-2005) 
 
RMB 
Revaluation 
(1994) 
Zhu Rongji  
(1993-95) 
Central Bank 
Law (1995) 
Non-
Devaluation 
Strategy (1996) 
Renamed as 
the State 
Development 
Planning 
Commission 
(SDPC, 
1998) 
 
MOFTE
C (1995) 
4th 
Generation 
(2003-2012) 
Hu Jintao Wen 
Jiabao 
Gongqingtuan 
(Populist) 
 PBC’s 
Financial 
Reforms  
(2003-
present) 
Global 
Financial 
Crisis  
(2006-2010) 
Zhou Xiaochuan 
Exchange Rate 
Liberalization 
(2005 & 2010) 
Reborn as 
NDRC 
(2003) – 
socialist 
market 
economy 
Merged with 
the State 
Council 
Office for 
Restructuring 
the Economic 
System 
(SCORES, 
2003) 
MOC 
(2003) 
5th 
Generation 
(2013-
present) 
Xi Jinping Li 
Keqiang 
Taizidang 
(Princelings) 
 
 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) 
     The Central Politburo Standing Committee (PSC, 中国共产党中央政治局常务委员
会) is by far the most powerful decision making political committee consisting of the top 
leadership. Historically, though, the PSC was not strong from the beginning of the PRC’s 
establishment. Under Mao’s Cultural Revolution, the Cultural Revolutionary Group 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Due to the size of the bureaucracy and the CCP membership, this top-down system may be inevitable 
for China, as long as it seeks to maintain the political system that has originated from Mao’s leadership. 
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dominated political power, and upon his death, the then new leader, Deng Xiaoping, 
sought to strengthen the party. In handling the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, the PSC voted 
to support Deng’s decision by military intervention – it is well known that Zhao Ziyang, 
who opposed to declaring martial law, was removed from the PSC and incarcerated for 
life. Currently, the PSC is chosen from a 25 member Politburo, elected by the CCP 
Central Committee. Through the years, the membership has had varying numbers ranging 
from 5 to 9, and currently it consists of 7 top leaders of China including Xi Jinping and Li 
Keqiang. It is presumed that the members meet regularly on a weekly basis to discuss all 
matters relating to state affairs, and each member has a special policy area of expertise in 
the committee. Although professionalism is a priority, seniority and family ties are 
extremely important to rise to the PSC from the CCP membership.103  
State Council 
     The PRC’s State Council (国务院), which is the chief administrative authority in 
China, is comprised of the top leadership (Premier) and the heads of each government 
ministry, department and agency of the Chinese bureaucracy. The State Council is the 
chief administrative authority in the Chinese political system, and is led by the Premier of 
the PRC (currently Li Keqiang), who is the 2nd or 3rd ranking member of the PSC. The 
State Council meets every six months, with guidance and directions by the PBSC from its 
outcomes of regular weekly meetings on policy agendas. The State Council is very 
closely interlinked with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with the top State 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Li, Cheng (Winter 2012). ‘The Battle for China’s Top Nine Leadership Posts’, The Washington 
Quarterly, 35 (1): 131–145. 
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Councillors also being top leaders within the CCP.104 This kind of system amalgamates 
China’s communist party with the state. Currently, the principal officers in the State 
Council are Premier Li Keqiang, four vice premiers, five state councilors, a secretary 
general that tends to day to day affairs of the State Council, and all ministers of China’s 
administrative branches, including MOF, MOC, MOFA, and the Governor of the PBC, 
Zhou Xiaochuan. 
Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs 
     The Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs	 (中共中央财经领导小组：
Zhōnggòngzhōngyāng Cáijīng Lǐngdǎo Xiǎozǔ) is an inner group of policymakers in the 
Central Committee of the CCP and is a dependent group of the PSC that is in charge of 
leading and supervising economic work of the CCP and the State Council. It is currently 
lead by Xi Jinping, the Chinese President, and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang serves as 
deputy leader of the group. It was established by the PSC on March 17, 1980 to replace 
the State Commission for Economy and Finance in order to meet the demands of Deng 
Xiaoping’s reform and opening up of the Chinese economy. The group is the main driver 
of China’s economic and financial policies. Currently, other members include Zhang 
Gaoli (张高丽), Wang Yang (汪洋), and Ma Kai (马凯), who are all vice premiers; 
Wang Yong (王勇), Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC); and Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川), the PBC Governor. 
People’s Bank of China (PBC) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Under former premier Zhao Ziyang, there were attempts to separate the CCP and the State Council, the 
former as a policy implementing actor and the latter as an executor. Had But these initiatives were 
abandoned by the early 1990s with the ousting of Zhao Ziyang by Deng Xiaoping.  
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     At a glance, the People’s Bank of China (PBC, 中国人民银行) as a central bank 
placed under the State Council and the CCP, it may appear to be only an executor of the 
State Council’s decisions on macroeconomic policy. It certainly is not independent from 
the central state leadership. However, over the years of China’s economic reforms, it has 
gained policy authority to the level that it is not a puppet agency. In present-day reformist 
China, the PBC is by far the most important institution to pay attention to with regard to 
China’s macroeconomic policy making. Under the guidance of the State Council, the 
PBC formulates and implements monetary policy, prevents and resolves financial risks, 
and safeguards financial stability.105 Many emerging economies and industrialized 
economies alike tend to have previous history of central banks with low level of 
independence. The PBC was not an exception.  
     Established in 1948, the PBC was merely subordinate to the MOF, financing the 
Chinese state’s decisions under the planned economy system until 1978. It was also the 
only bank in Mainland China – which therefore had to be in charge of both commercial 
and central banking.106 In the 1980s, commercial banking was split into four main state-
owned banks (the BOC, the ABC, the ICBC, and the CCB), and PBC was able to act 
solely as a central bank. Since then, the PBC has seen an expansion in its strengths of 
policy making via close interlocks with the party. As the CCP top leadership through its 
generational transitions started to focus on more liberal than conservative to the economy 
(this is labeled as ‘hawkish’ in the Monetary Policy Committee), the PBC was able to act 
in line with the policy shifts. It gained more policy authority with the passing of the Law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 People’s Bank of China, ‘People’s Bank of China’, 2012. 
106 Bell and Feng, 2013, p.7. 
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of People’s Bank of China by the NPC, on March 18, 1995. According to this law, the 
mandate of the PBC is keeping the currency value stable and maintaining economic 
growth are the two goals of the monetary policy.107 The PBC manages three 
macroeconomic policy tools – interest rates, reserve requirement ratio, and open market 
operations. Exchange rate policy, however, cannot be set by the PBC or the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) alone, and involves more contest and 
rivalry amongst other ministries. 
     Currently, China’s monetary policy-making process is convened by the Monetary 
Policy Committee placed under the PBC governorship, with heads of different ministries 
coming to address their concerns in a meeting. While it is a consultative body rather than 
a decision making body, the contents of the meetings are communicated to the State 
Council, but do not create binding impact on the PBC’s decisions.108 Usually, the PBC 
draws up proposals for circulation to other relevant ministries under the State Council. 
Decisions are formally improved in executive meetings of the State Council, and upon 
approval, are announced and implemented at the PBC’s discretion. Simply put, the PBC 
is engaged in the agenda setting and also implementation of China’s monetary policy-
making process, but it does its work based on the guidance from the decisions of top 
leadership. As it gathers international attention as a compass of the Chinese economy, the 
institution is gaining more authority in the policies they propose and implement.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 People’s Bank of China Law, 1995. 
108 Bell and Fung, pp.53-54. 
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Table 2-5. Monetary Policy Committee (1997.7 - 2003.3) 
  1997.7 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
PBOC Gnr Dai Xianglong Zhou Xiaochuan 
NECC Chen Qingtai Zhang Zhigang 
NDRC Wang Chunzheng 
MOF Xie Xuren Zhang YC Jin Liqun 
PBOC D.Gnr Chen Yuan Liu Mingkang Liu Tinghuan 
PBOC D.Gnr Shang Fulin Xiao Gang 
SAFE Zhou Xiaochuan Wu Xiaoling Li Fuxiang Wu Xiaoling Guo Shuqing 
NBS Not existent Zhu Zhixin 
CSRC Chen Yaoxian Zhou Xiaochuan Shang Fulin 
CIRC Not existent Ma Yongwei Wu Dingfu 
Banker Liu Tinghuan (ICBC) Wang Xuebing (CCB) 
EZ.Zhang 
(CCB) 
Shang 
Fulin(ABC) 
Yang Ming 
sheng (ABC) 
Banker Shi Jiliang (ABC) He Linxiang (ABC) Liu Mingkang (BOC) Jiang Jianqing (ICBC) 
Academia Huang Da Wu Jinglian Li Yang 
Source: Chen Long, ‘How does China’s Monetary Policy Committee influence monetary policies?’ Institute 
for New Economic Thinking, 2012. 
Table 2-6.  Monetary Policy Committee (2003.4 - current) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
PBOC Gnr Zhou Xiaochuan 
State Council You Quan Zhang Ping You Quan 
NDRC Zhu Zhixin 
MOF Jin Liqun Li Yong 
PBOC D.Gnr Wu Xiaoling Yi Gang Hu Xiaolian 
PBOC D.Gnr Li Ruogu Su Ning Du Jinfu 
SAFE Guo Shuqing Hu Xiaolian Yi Gang 
NBS Li Deshui QXH Xie Fuzhan Ma Jiantang 
CBRC Liu Mingkang Shang Fulin 
CSRC Shang Fulin Guo Shuqing 
CIRC Wu Dingfu Xiang Junbo 
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CBA Xiao Gang Guo Shuqing Jiang Chaoliang Jiang Jianqing 
Academia Li Yang Yu Yongding Fan Gang Zhou Qiren Song Guoqing 
Academia N/E Li Daokui Qian Yingyi 
Academia N/E Xiabin Chen Yulu 
Source: Chen Long, ‘How does China’s Monetary Policy Committee influence monetary policies?’ Institute 
for New Economic Thinking, 2012. 
Figure 2-7. China’s Trade & Macroeconomic Policy Formation Structure 
 
 
 
Source: By author  
 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
     Formerly the State Planning Commission (SPC, 国家计划委员会) - which managed 
China’s central planned economy from Mao’s years, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC, 国家发展和改革委员会) is still the most prominent 
agency under the State Council. While with the change of leadership and policy trends 
for development has compelled the NDRC to change from directing a centrally planned 
economy to making growth adjustments in a socialist market economy, thereby losing 
PBSC	  State	  Council	  	  	  
Ministry	  of	  Finance	  (MOF) 
	  PBOC	  Monetary	  Policy	  Committee	  NDRC	 Ministry	  	  of	  Commerce	  (MOC) 
	  	  
120 
some of its once-held influence, it still has direct authority with regard to distribution of 
fiscal and credit resources.109 It also regulates prices in China’s strategic sectors. Because 
it also has a stake in price control, it has been a major bureaucratic rival of the PBC.      
While the PBC cares more about inflation with regard to price stability, the NDRC cares 
more about growth. While the PBC favors the market-based approach, the NDRC 
prioritizes its administrative role in monitoring and forecasting the macroeconomy. On 
the other hand, the NDRC consults with the PBC with regard to many aspects in the 
monetary policy making spectrum because the PBC is the principal proposal originator of 
policies and holds exclusive expertise in the area.110 While their power has diminished 
with regard to overall planning of the economy, the former top officials of the NDRC are 
now high-ranking members of the CCP (e.g., Ma Kai, who served as Chairman of the 
NDRC from 2003 to 2008, is now the 4th vice premier). The political connection with the 
CCP provides the NDRC the rationale and the foundation for retaining their foothold in 
the decision making process. 
Ministry of Commerce (MOC) 
     A reorganization of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation 
(MOFTEC, 对外贸易经济合作部) resulted in the formation of the Ministry of 
Commerce (MOC, 商务部) in the spring of 2003. While in Japan and South Korea, trade 
policies have been partially delegated to MOFA (although this is only the case in Japan 
from 2013), China’s MOFA primarily concentrates on diplomatic affairs, with a strong 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Bell and Fung, p.51. 
110 Ibid, pp.119-120. This is the horizontal bargaining and coordination process within the Chinese 
bureaucracy. China and South Korea seem to share this core aspect of bureaucracy, while Japan shows 
deficiency of such processes. 
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concentration on security issues, and trade issues are completely at the MOC’s discretion. 
Because MOC’s constituencies are China’s export industries, the MOC has advocated for 
a fixed exchange rate of the RMB to the USD. As China still depends heavily on trade, 
the MOC is quite desperate in defending the industries’ interests and advocating such 
exchange rate policy. This builds confrontations with the PBC, which from 2003 has 
advocated for internationalization of the RMB, and further liberalization initiatives. The 
MOC continues to have conflict of interest with the PBC in this regard.  
     Instead, the MOC has been seeking to strengthen the foundations of its policymaking 
tools by focusing on trade remedy of AD, CVD, and safeguards. With a trade remedy 
bureau established internally, the MOC has sought to strengthen its presence and its 
foundations of political power in the Chinese bureaucracy by actively engaging in trade 
disputes at the international level. Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China is one 
of the most actively involved member states in trade dispute settlement cases in the WTO, 
as complaint, respondent, and third party. In this respect, the MOF has been relatively 
less powerful than the MOC with regard to exchange rate policy making, because the 
MOC’s coverage of policy agenda setting in the field has been built on stronger industrial 
interests. 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
     China’s Ministry of Finance (MOF, 财政部), also a pillar executing party guidelines, 
has been relatively on the decline in terms of its policy making power in the reform 
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decades – it has formal authority but it is in bureaucratic rivalry with the PBC.111 Given 
this power contest, the MOF still has presence in the financial sector, as it controls the 
four main state-owned banks – the Bank of China (BOC), the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and China Construction 
Bank (CCB) – and as it controls Central Huijin Investment Company (CHIC), which is 
the biggest shareholder of the banks. It has influence over the stock market via the 
National Social Security Fund and the China Investment Corporation (CIC), which is 
China’s sovereign wealth fund managing body. It makes the accounting rules and 
taxation policy in China.112           
     The backgrounds behind how the PBC has been able to rise up in policy making is 
found in its relationship of growing mutual dependency with the party leadership. The 
PBC has been increasing its policy weight in the past decades.113 This is a big divergence 
from other ‘Confucian’ bureaucracies of China’s neighbors – South Korea and Japan – in 
which both countries have witnessed the central bank’s struggle for independence 
through major reform periods just after the Asian Financial Crisis, after suffering for 
years suffocating under powerful MOFs. In China, the MOF and the PBC have also 
undergone rivalries since 2003, especially in the field of exchange rate policymaking and 
financial sector reforms. The PBC is at the center of policy execution, and operates under 
the guidance and policy formulation of the Leading Group for Financial and Economic 
Affairs.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 2008 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, U.S-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, D.C. 
112 Ibid, p.52 
113 Ibid, 2013. 
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     China’s MOF is fairly weaker than other MOFs in other countries. In contrast to 
China’s MOF, in South Korea and Japan, MOFs still enjoy a considerable level of 
authority, albeit the delegation of separated functions of banking supervision to an 
agency of that purpose at the end of the 1990s. The relatively weak MOF stance in policy 
making in China is due to the delegation of policy making and management to other 
government agencies. For instance, macroeconomic management is primarily handled by 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); the State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) manages state-owned industries; 
and there are separate regulators for banking, insurance and securities (the CBRC, the 
CSRC, and the CIRC). Moreover, regulation of open market operations and management 
of interest rates are primarily handled by the PBC. In actuality, the MOF even has a 
weaker say than the MOC in exchange rate policy, as the MOC strongly pushes for its 
mandates of advocating China’s export industries with low value of the RMB. 
Figure 2-8. China’s Financial Regulatory System 
 
 
Source: By author  
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Conclusion: Policy Variation in the Responses to U.S. Protectionism 
     By examining the political capacities through political transitions, leaderships, and the 
government bureaucracies and actors involved in macroeconomic and trade policy 
agenda setting, we are able to witness differences amongst the three countries. Japan has 
seen decades of consistency in pursuing a responsive format in terms of policy under 
continued support for the LDP except for a few years when the DPJ was in power. South 
Korea has had multiple transitions in its political leadership, in which its bureaucratic 
functions were also reshuffled so many times, but all the while it has managed to retain 
bureaucratic that revolves around a very strong presidency. China managed to maintain a 
top-down political mechanism and bureaucracy despite its transition to a market-oriented 
economy after Deng Xiaoping’s launch of economic reforms, but with a strong central 
bank setting macroeconomic policy agendas that are set by the Leading Group for 
Financial and Economic Affairs and executed by the PBC – these are bureaucratic 
characteristics that are difficult to find in Japan or South Korea.  
     We now understand that the three countries have shown different patterns of policy 
formation based on the inherent differences in the political structures in the government 
and the bureaucracy. So how do the different conditions of political climate and 
bureaucracy translate into the variance in the three countries’ responses to U.S. 
protectionism? The following chapters (Chapter 3 and 4) will examine the specific cases 
of U.S.-Northeast Asian trade wars, in which an analysis on how the three countries have 
engaged differently in trade remedy in response to antidumping or countervailing duty 
impositions by the USITC or the USDOC and in response to WTO disputes initiated by 
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the U.S. in the WTO. Afterwards, the different responses to U.S. currency appreciation 
pressures via monetary policy mechanisms in the three countries will be explained via 
their exchange rate policies (Chapter 5). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
East Asian Responses to U.S. Protectionist Actions,  
1971-2013 
 
 
 
 
 
“The U.S. Commerce Department disregarded the defense of the Chinese government and Chinese enterprises, and 
imposed unfair duties against China’s solar cell exports to the U.S. China is strongly dissatisfied with the ruling.” 
 
-Shen Danyang, MOFCOM Spokesman on 
U.S. Final Ruling of AD and CVD Investigations against Imports of Chinese Solar Cells, October 10, 2012- 
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Examining the Recurring Cycle of Trade Protectionism 
    Why do U.S. trade frictions with export-led economies occur, and why do the 
responses from U.S. trading partners vary? The WTO dispute settlement system has 
evolved into an effective ruling body for trade disputes concerning its member states. 
Before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) came into being, however, the GATT 
system lacked effective mechanisms to adjudicate trade disputes. Accordingly, prior to 
the existence of WTO DSB, countries were left to build trade remedies on their own. The 
U.S. stands as one of the pioneering countries in developing its trade remedy framework 
during and after the GATT years. The U.S. use of trade remedies has been a crucial tool 
in circumventing potential impacts from import surges since the postwar period. From the 
1970s onward, trade remedies have been used to curb threats from trading partners to the 
main pillars of the U.S. economy, especially manufacturing.  
     As explained in Chapter 1, U.S. current account deficits may only be a natural 
manifestation of being the key currency issuing country. The U.S. economy remains the 
largest economy in the world in terms of aggregate GDP, is the second largest trading 
economy after China’s in terms of total GDP, and has the broadest range of trading 
partners. The more a country trades, the greater the chances are that it will have a trade 
dispute or experience a trade disruption. However, trade volumes may not be the sole 
cause of the high frequencies of U.S. trade disputes. It is more likely that there are several 
factors involved in the cyclical patterns of U.S. trade frictions with its trading partners. In 
the big picture, there is the common denominator of all trade disputes – import surges of 
tradable goods across the main industries of an economy, which result in the 
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accumulation of trade deficits. Thus far, political lobbying through the networked 
channels of U.S. trade policy making has made punitive measures possible where U.S. 
industries incur losses due to perceived unfair trading patterns of a U.S. trading partner. 
Second, the structure of the U.S. economy could contribute to the frequency of trade 
disputes. Looking into the dimensions of U.S. trade dynamics, we can easily find one 
crucial factor that adds to the frequency of U.S. trade disputes – manufacturing, is on the 
decline yet still significant in the U.S. economy and politics.  
     Although the U.S. economy performs very well in services, manufacturing accounts 
for about 15 percent of the share of GDP generated by the private sector in the U.S.114 
The rising wage in the U.S. has led to the loss of comparative advantage, and 
employment in U.S. manufacturing industries has been steadily declining. Consequently, 
the loss of comparative advantage has led to continuous offshoring to other countries for 
cheap labor in the face of competition from foreign products of lower price and 
comparable quality in the U.S. market. The manufacturing sector is closely linked with 
the employment rate in the U.S. and thus remains a very significant part of the U.S. 
economy. One in every five jobs in U.S. manufacturing is supported by exports of 
manufactured goods.115 Political lobbying by the manufacturing sector in the U.S. is 
critical. Large U.S. manufacturing enterprises have played a vital role in supporting 
presidential election campaigns; in order to exert influence on policy making and actions 
on trade remedy. Declining industries and their local economic effects in certain states in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 ‘Expanding Trade Through Services’, The Official Blog of ITA, USDOC 
(http://blog.trade.gov/tag/supply-chain-competitiveness/) 
115 Manufacturing and Construction Division, U.S. Census Bureau, 2009. 
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the U.S. that are politically powerful in trade politics have also contributed to U.S. trade 
policy. Such declining yet surviving traits of the U.S. manufacturing sector have 
continuously kept the doors open widely for policy discussions for decades with regard to 
how U.S. political leaders should react with regard to record high import surges and trade 
deficits.  
     As noted previously in Chapter 1, a focus on the manufacturing sector is critical in the 
analysis, as all three countries of Japan, South Korea, and China have vested interests in 
selling manufactured goods. The U.S. trades with a number of different countries, but 
trading with countries that are more competitive in manufacturing has been a visible and 
cyclical pattern over time. In addition, U.S. trade protectionism toward countries – 
especially those in East Asia - that rely considerably on manufacturing has been quite 
significant, and has accompanied strong political reactions. Nonetheless, cases of trade 
disputes in sectors other than manufacturing (i.e., agriculture, services) will also be 
closely examined throughout the chapter, as they continue to play an integral part of the 
U.S. economy and trade negotiation.  
     The main motivation for this chapter stems from seeking to understand U.S. trade 
policy in the context of trade remedy mechanisms. In addition to the understanding of 
how the U.S. sets its policy and legal grounds for trade remedy, the chapter will explain 
how procedures toward a trade dispute are carried out at home and abroad. For this 
purpose, I will examine cases of trade remedies set out by the USITC, a U.S. 
administrative bureau. In Chapter 4, I will go on to examine cases of disputes at the 
international level, in the WTO dispute settlement system. The goal of this chapter is to 
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build a typology of differing responses from the governments of U.S. trading partners in 
Northeast Asia – Japan, South Korea, and China, in the historical order in which U.S. 
bilateral trade disputes have emerged and unfolded.116  
     In anticipation of possible critiques that a cross-temporal analysis is not appropriate 
for addressing current trade trends, I justify my approach on the basis that a comparative 
analysis of consecutive periods captures the patterns of institutional behavior at the state 
level in response to the changes in the global economy, and thus deserves scholarly and 
policy-oriented attention. In addition, I also argue that an atemporal, three-country 
comparative analysis of decision making patterns in trade disputes can uncover 
implications for how bilateral trade disputes may unfold in the years to come, based on 
the precedents of the past. At the end of the day, the analysis will show that each 
country’s response to U.S. protectionism is predictably different from the others’. This 
owes mainly to institutional differences in tackling trade remedy issues and taking legal 
actions, albeit the states share some similar features of policy actions over issues 
regarding overlapping industrial interests of manufacturing and other sensitive economic 
sectors. Embedded in the institutional stances would be the detailed characteristics of the 
trading sector at stake (i.e., size and influence), and bilateral political relationships at the 
time of the dispute that influences decision making at government levels.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 Regionally, due to geographic proximity under the framework of NAFTA, Canada and Mexico take up a 
huge chunk of U.S. exports and imports. Excluding these countries in the top 15 trading partners list of the 
U.S. are a list of export-oriented countries focusing on manufacturing such as China, Japan, Germany, 
South Korea, India, and Taiwan. Countries that can offer raw commodities and energy supply such as 
Brazil, Venezuela, and Saudi Arabia, the Netherlands, and countries with a strong services sector such as 
Switzerland are also on the list, but have not stirred up trade conflicts to the extent that the aforementioned 
manufacturing-focused countries have with the U.S. 
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     In this chapter, I investigate the varieties of responses to U.S. trade protectionism by 
analyzing two phenomena. First, I examine the cases of U.S. anti-dumping, 
countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations on Japan, South Korea, and China, and 
analyze each of their responses. Second, I compare and contrast the patterns of Japan, 
South Korea, and China’s antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard investigations 
and actual levying of duties following the investigations to clearly trace the patterns of 
institutional decision-making procedures with regard to a trade remedy action at bilateral 
levels. The point of the argument here is that legal foundations and institutional processes 
involving tasks of trade remedy ultimately lead to the discrepancies in the number of 
investigations and punitive levies sought, and the nature of trade remedy systems – be it 
defensive, offensive, or neutral. 
     By explicitly laying out how each government has reacted with regard to each of the 
U.S. trade remedy measures, and by clarifying how each of the governments have 
constructed their own trade remedy mechanisms, this chapter will provide us with lenses 
to contrast why Japan, South Korea, and China are different in coping with the challenges 
of U.S. trade protectionism that is thrown at them. The evidence demonstrated in this 
chapter leads us to understand that while each of the bilateral trade relationship tend to 
appear similar in the discussions regarding mounting U.S. trade deficits, in actuality, 
trade remedy patterns vary a great deal due to the differences in developing the trade 
remedy mechanisms and in the degrees of effective utilization of the trade remedy system. 
In the end, this chapter will conclude with policy implications for the U.S. and the three 
countries – ramifications with regard to the endless, recurring cycles of U.S. trade 
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protectionism, and careful projections of how each of the bilateral trade remedy patterns 
might look in the future. 
Revisiting the Analytical Framework  
     In uncovering the different patterns of policy responses and approaches of each 
country toward U.S. AD and CVD investigations, I argue that the variations of policy 
actions derive from the structures of decision-making and procedures of policy execution 
and administering. As argued in Chapter 2, each country will differ with regard to 
political capacity in carrying out the disputes (both as a respondent and an initiator), and 
government institutions that deal with the cases will act based on existent domestic law 
and on considerations of its industrial interests throughout the process. The empirical 
findings on Japan, South Korea, and China will demonstrate in what specific ways the 
differences among the countries arise – in the aspects of legal provisions, and the policies 
that have been shaped by each ministry and/or bureau in charge of trade remedy. Based 
on my institutional framework presented in Chapter 2, the empirical findings in this 
chapter suggest that the variance amongst the three countries in their responses to U.S. 
protectionism results from different trade policies, strategies, and execution of policies. 
Thus, the goal of the chapter is to demonstrate the effects of the political decision making 
processes in trade policy making for each country.  
     In carrying out my case analyses, I place my emphasis on the ‘recurring cycles’ of U.S. 
protectionism. Ceteris paribus, the mechanisms of U.S. protectionism in the postwar 
years have been consistent in each of the cases that I present. While it is difficult to deny 
that the degree of U.S. pressures may have varied from case to case, and that such 
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pressures may have an effect on how a country decides to respond, the degree of U.S. 
pressure alone certainly cannot account for what the responding country would actually 
decide to do or what policy tools it would use. The atemporal comparative analysis in this 
chapter aims at capturing the conditions in each country for fighting trade wars that 
persist to this day and demonstrate continuing policy relevance. 
Case Analysis and Methodology 
Country Responses to USITC AD/CVD Cases and WTO Cases 
     Painting a bigger picture of the recurring cycles of U.S. protectionism helps us to 
better understand the cyclicality of U.S. pressures. The first and foremost reason for 
selecting Japan, South Korea, and China for this research is the existence of cyclical 
patterns of U.S. trade wars that were apparent in the bilateral economic relationships. The 
stages of U.S. trade conflicts on each of the countries have had similar patterns. (See 
Figure 1 in Chapter 1.) All in all, the recurring cycles of U.S. protectionism and the 
common stages of trade wars between the U.S. and the Northeast Asian economies of 
study – lead us to believe that there is a case for comparing the differing responses of the 
states.   
     Of primary interest in the case analysis is the role of institutions and political decision-
making on the basis of industrial interests toward AD/CVD investigations and dispute 
initiations. The focus and objective of the analytical task is to capture the different 
patterns of behavior by country throughout the chronological flow of AD/CVD cases. 
The goal of the analysis is to investigate the pathways of decision-making and the roles 
of agencies associated with the AD/CVD investigations and dispute initiation at both 
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domestic and international levels. In order to test my hypothesis of institutional effects on 
the variance of responses to U.S. protectionism, I conduct analyses of three components 
of bilateral trade remedies – 1) USITC initiation of AD/CVD investigations against the 
three countries, 2) the responses to those investigations by the three East Asian 
economies, and 3) AD/CVD initiations by trade remedy bureaus in Japan, South Korea, 
and China – in purpose of understanding the characteristics of each country’s trade 
remedy system. All three components of the analysis will involve understanding the legal 
foundations and government procedures of filing AD/CVD cases in each country, which 
involves economic sectors, strategic industries, and products that contribute to the final 
decisions made in each investigation. The cases will be analyzed in chronological order 
by country and by industrial sector. The analysis focuses on cases that represent 
businesses that have faced fierce competitions.117  
U.S. Legal Foundations for Trade Remedy  
The Sources for Wielding Power at Home and Abroad 
     There is no question that the U.S. has been actively pursuing trade liberalization under 
globalization to this day. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that policy measures to 
protect several important sectors of the U.S. economy have concurrently been a vital and 
consistent tool in U.S. trade policy in the past decades. Given the pluralistic nature of the 
U.S. political decision- making process, the U.S. trade policy revolves around four major 
actors: the Congress, the President, the Administration (USDOC), and the industries that 
lobby the Congress. Partnership and rivalry among the executive, administrative, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 All of the three countries have commonly traded goods with the U.S. – automobiles (whole and parts), 
semi-conductors, and electronics, and have faced trade remedy measures. 
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legislative branches have played a crucial role in trade policymaking processes, on which 
the U.S. has built its expertise based on evidence and precedence.118 The Congress has 
the authority over trade policy with foreign countries, and the President has authority 
over diplomatic affairs with foreign countries, but in the case of a conflict between the 
two actors over trade matters, the Supreme Court has thus far upheld the position of the 
U.S. Congress.119 
     The tools for wielding power in U.S. trade policy can be simply categorized into two 
levels: domestic and international. Domestic procedures involve accommodating the 
interests of industries, congressional decisions, and unilateral initiation of investigations 
for trade remedy at the state level. The domestic procedures are not identical to WTO 
dispute initiations, though they may be convened for the same purpose of trade remedy. 
As we will see in Chapter 4, procedures of trade dispute initiation at the international 
level are also convened in a bilateral, state-to-state format in the beginning stage prior to 
a WTO panel setup; however, once the panel is set, the WTO dispute settlement body 
acts as the arbiter and cases often include the additional presence of third party observer 
countries that also have a stake in the trade dispute issue at stake. It is important to note 
that under the current procedures of the WTO dispute initiations, a panel for the dispute 
settlement in the WTO is established only when the two parties (sovereign states that are 
both WTO members) involved cannot reach an agreement to mitigate the trade conflict at 
issue during the consultation stage prior to panel establishment.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Cohen, Pauel, and Becker, 1996. 
119 Feller, Peter B. and Wilson, Ann C., 1976. ‘United States Tariff and Trade Law: Constitutional Sources 
and Constraints’, Law & Policy in International Business, Vol.8, No.1. p. 111. The authors write that the 
Supreme Court has on only two occasions, both in 1935, held an act of Congress invalid because of an 
unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President. Richard Baldwin (1985) reemphasizes this point. 
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     In the domestic procedures, in which a petition by a company of a certain industry is 
brought to initiate an antidumping or countervailing duty investigation, the United States 
International Trade Commission (USITC), a quasi-judicial, independent agency, plays the 
central role and reports to the President, the United States Trade Representative (USTR), 
and the United States Congress. Administratively, the United States Department of 
Commerce (USDOC) has been relegated the institutional authority regarding 
antidumping investigations from the United States Department of Treasury in 1980, 
which brought an exponential surge in the number of cases filed, because the USDOC 
took a broader approach to accepting petitions from firms than the Department of 
Treasury previously did.120 In the cases taken to the international level, industrial interests 
are aggregated and assessed by the USTR, a part of the Executive Office of the President, 
and cases are filed in the WTO for litigation. Prior to the establishment of the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body, trade disputes under the GATT system were mostly handled by 
bilateral negotiations and unilateral trade remedies. 
     The U.S. government is equipped with the legal mechanisms and means to initiate 
investigations, with the legal texts stipulating sufficient grounds for investigations. These 
laws are jointly administered by the USITC and the USDOC.121 If one were to trace back 
in U.S. trade policy history, the root of protectionism can be found in the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930, which raised U.S. tariffs to record levels at the time to protect U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 Irwin, 2005. 
121 Carpenter, 2008. 
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farmers from foreign agricultural producers.122 While tariff levels have dropped far below 
Depression-era levels, Smoot-Hawley is a source of protectionist measures U.S. trade 
policy. Section 1677 of the statute explicitly states the grounds for punitive measures on 
dumping and countervailing duty.123  
     Currently, the Smoot-Hawley Act has been revoked and while the Act is still in the 
books, it is only applied to imports from very few countries like Cuba and North Korea, 
countries to which MFN (PNTR) status do not apply.124 (The case for Cuba may change 
should the U.S. normalize its relations with Cuba, as the issue is being discussed in U.S. 
policy.) After years of criticisms and blames on the Act for contributing to the Great 
Depression, the U.S. has shifted its gears to trade liberalization. However, it is quite 
evident that the origins of protectionism can be found in the Smoot-Hawley Act, and that 
it had indeed been a cornerstone in the history of U.S. trade policy, and the remnants of 
the Act are apparent in the legal texts for antidumping and countervailing duty 
investigations. 
Antidumping  
     Economist Douglas Irwin contends that U.S. antidumping law as we see today was 
established by the Antidumping Act of 1921.125 It basically contains four main parts: 1) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Economists tend to argue that the Smoot-Hawley Act aggravated the U.S. economy under the Great 
Depression at the time. For details see Irwin, 2012. 
123 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1677 
124 Hornbeck and Cooper, 2014. http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33743.pdf 
125 Irwin, 2005. The preexisting Antidumping Act of 1916 was challenged by the EU and Japan in 2000 
based on the notions it does not have a material injury test as required by the Uruguay Round’s 
Antidumping agreement, through the DSB in the WTO, in which the panel ruled that it is inconsistent with 
GATT 1994. See cases on the U.S. Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 filed each by the EU in 1998 (DS136, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds136_e.htm) and by Japan in 1999 (DS162, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds162_e.htm). 
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that duties may be imposed if the exporter’s sale price is less than the foreign market 
value, 2) that foreign costs of production may be calculated if the foreign market value is 
not ascertainable, and 3) that dumping must be related to injury suffered by the domestic 
industry, and 4) that higher import duties are the appropriate remedy. U.S. antidumping 
law was substantively changed when this act was replaced by Title I of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 and a new Title VII to the Tariff Act of 1930 was appended, 
ultimately adding more speed and efficiency to the administering of the antidumping 
law.126 
     ‘Dumping’ is defined as selling at ‘less than fair value’ (LTFV), or more specifically 
the act of selling a product in the U.S. market at a price that is lower than the price for 
which it is sold in the home market (the “normal value”), after adjustments for 
differences in the merchandise, quantities purchased, and circumstances of sale. In the 
absence of sufficient data on home market sales, investigators may refer to the price for 
which the product is sold in a surrogate ‘third country,’ and in the absence of third 
country sales, a cost-plus-benefit approach to arrive at a normative value labeled as 
‘constructed value’ is used to assess the act of dumping.127  
    A total of 287 days minimum to 427 days maximum is required toward the final 
decision on the levy of antidumping duties, as seen in the flowchart in Figure 3-1. 
Nonetheless, once a positive preliminary decision has been reached for antidumping duty 
levy, provisional measures halting tariff calculations or deposit requirements of cash or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Irwin, ibid. 
127 Carpenter, ibid. 
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collateral may take place. These provisional measures allow for the effects of 
antidumping decisions to be apparent from an early stage. 
Figure 3-1. United States Antidumping Investigation Procedures  
by the USDOC and the USITC 
 
 
Source: By author based on the AD investigation procedures of the USDOC and the USITC 
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Figure 3-2. United States Countervailing Duty Investigation Procedures  
by the USDOC and the USITC 
 
 
Source: By author based on the AD investigation procedures of the USDOC and the USITC 
 
Countervailing Duty  
     ‘Countervailing Duty’ is defined in the statute as ‘a duty levied on an imported good 
to offset subsidies to producers or exporters of that good in the export country’. In simple 
terms, when a government or any public entity within the territory of the country 
provides 1) a financial contribution, 2) any form of income or price support within the 
meaning of Article XVI of the GATT 1994, or 3) a payment to a funding mechanism to 
provide a financial contribution to a person and thereby a benefit is conferred, a subsidy 
is deemed to have occurred. The current U.S. laws on countervailing duty are based on 
Section 701 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, with most recent revisions done in 
June 1997 to reflect updates from the Marrakesh Agreement concluding the Uruguay 
Round. Because the WTO has come to place stricter rules on government subsidies, the 
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number of countervailing duty investigations by WTO members at their domestic 
institutions have been generally on the decline. The procedures of countervailing duty 
investigations follow a similar format to antidumping investigations by the USDOC and 
the USITC.  
Safeguard  
     There are two sections that serve as the legal ground for Safeguard investigations in 
U.S. trade remedy. First, Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Global Safeguard 
Investigations), Import Relief for Domestic Industries - or Section 201, as referred to in 
shorthand, is a section of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618) that permits the President 
to grant temporary import relief, by raising import duties or imposing nontariff barriers 
on goods entering the United States that injure or threaten to injure domestic industries 
producing like goods. This provision is the analog of GATT Article XIX, which allows 
GATT contracting parties to provide relief from injurious competition when temporary 
protection will enable the domestic industry to make adjustments to meet the competition. 
     Second, there are Section 421 and 422 of the Trade Act of 1974 (China Safeguard 
Investigations). Section 421 implements the transitional safeguard contained in Section 
16 of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO. Section 422 provides the USITC the 
authority to recommend a remedy to the President and the USTR upon making an 
affirmative determination of a) an action by China to prevent or remedy market 
disruption in a WTO member country or b) an action by a WTO member to prevent or 
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remedy market disruption from imports from China that threatens to cause a significant 
diversion of trade into the U.S. domestic market.128 
Figure 3-3. United States Safeguard Investigation Procedures by the USDOC and the USITC 
 
 
 
Source: By author based on the Safeguard investigation procedures of the USDOC and the USITC 
 
Trade Disputes and Enforcement 
     U.S. trade disputes and enforcement of trade remedy policies are based on Section 301 
of the Trade Act of 1974 and Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930. Section 301 of the 
Trade Act of 1974, or better known as ‘Super 301’, provides strong rules for enforcement 
of trade rules and trade sanctions by the U.S. It provides the U.S. with the authority to 
enforce trade agreements, resolve trade disputes, and open foreign markets to U.S. goods 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 USITC, Understanding Safeguard Investigations (http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us_safeguard.htm) 
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and services.129 The U.S. imposes trade sanctions on foreign countries based on this 
statute, and files for consultation in the WTO prior to panel establishment involving a 
trade rule violation. The U.S. may take actions to raise import duties on a certain product 
based on this act. By statute, the USTR negotiates a settlement with a foreign country to 
resolve trade disputes upon initiating a Section 301 investigation. This law was the basis 
of bilateral negotiations on trade remedy regarding semiconductors between U.S. and 
Japan. During the Clinton Administration in the 1990s, Super 301 was reinstated and 
gave impetus to bilateral negotiations to resolve trade issues between the U.S. and South 
Korea.130    
     Section 337 of the Trade Act of 1930 is the basis of investigations largely involving 
infringement of U.S. copyrights (utility and design patents, registered common law 
trademarks) and intellectual property issues. The primary remedy suggested by this act is 
to issue an exclusion order for the U.S. Customs to stop infringing imports from entering 
the U.S. territory.131 Secondary remedies include temporary exclusion orders of products 
in the case that there is reason to believe Section 337 has been violated. Other remedies 
include cease and desist orders in which investigation is conducted without exclusion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 International Trade Administration, USDOC (http://www.trade.gov/mas/ian/tradedisputes-
enforcement/tg_ian_002100.asp) 
130 The original Super 301 provisions expired in 1991, and President Clinton’s executive order 12901 
reactivated Super 301 for the years 1994-95. It was extended through 1997 via executive order 12973, and 
reinstated again in 1999 for another three years through executive order 13116, but the original Super 301 
varied from the existing Section 301 in that it made imposition of trade remedies automatic if the President 
does not override the decision. 
131 USITC, Intellectual Property Infringement and Other Unfair Acts 
(http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/) 
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orders into the U.S. territory, or a civil action if the respondent fails to comply with a 
cease and desist order.132 
United States Trade Remedy Measures on Japan, South Korea, and China  
     In understanding the structure of the U.S. trade remedy system, two major actors come 
into play: the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and the U.S. International Trade 
Commission (USITC). Petitions are filed simultaneously with both institutions, but they 
play separate yet dependent roles during the course of the investigation. The USDOC is a 
government ministry that has the sole authority to initiate or not initiate the investigation, 
and to analyze sales and cost from the perspective period of investigation to determine 
whether dumping occurred.133 Detailed investigations are conducted by the Enforcement 
and Compliance Unit (formerly the Import Administration: IA), placed under the 
International Trade Administration (ITA), a subsidiary bureau of the USDOC.134 The 
Enforcement and Compliance unit is made up of three offices: Antidumping and 
Countervailing Duty Operations, Policy and Negotiations, and Foreign Trade Zones. 
During the investigation, foreign companies are asked to open up their books for 
evidence of dumping, which can result in controversy at times.  
     Composed of six Commissioners and six Administrative Law Judges nominated by 
the U.S. President, the USITC plays the role of a court responsible for determining 
whether a domestic industry is materially injured or threatened with material injury as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 ‘A Brief Overview of Practice Under Section 337’, FindLaw (http://corporate.findlaw.com/litigation-
disputes/a-brief-overview-of-practice-under-section-337.html) 
133 Differences of the DOC and the ITC (http://enforcement.trade.gov/petitioncounseling/pcp-
faq.html#A_1) 
134 About the International Trade Administration (http://trade.gov/about.asp) 
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result of the individual and cumulated impact of the allegedly dumped imports.135 Due to 
its missions of independent judgment and impartiality, the USITC is not a government 
body directly placed under the Presidency and the Administration, but rather an 
autonomous body that analyzes domestic industries of the U.S.  
     In a nutshell, the USDOC is a government body that decides whether or not an anti-
dumping or countervailing duty should be levied, and the USITC is an independent body 
that judges whether a material injury has incurred for a specific domestic industry. Once 
the two institutions start an investigation, the President has no way to forestall the 
investigation. The upside of this structure is that the U.S. is able to levy duties despite 
political difficulties – investigations are convened in a more bureaucratic way than 
political.136 The downside is the uncertainty regarding how long the levied duties can stay 
in place. They are levied for a minimum of 5 years, and can be re-imposed multiple times 
upon reassessment, through a procedure called ‘sunset review’. 
     With regard to the upsurge of trade remedy investigations in recent decades, Douglas 
Irwin has noted that it is untrue that there were no investigations at all before 1980, but it 
is true that before 1980 many investigations did not result in imposition of a duty.137 For 
this reason, many economists believe that AD/CVD measures were not enforced heavily 
before 1980. Irwin notes the transfer of authority for AD/CVD investigations from the 
Treasury Department to the Department of Commerce at the end of the 1970s, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 USITC Staff Directory (http://www.usitc.gov/documents/staff_directory.pdf); Differences of the DOC 
and the ITC (http://enforcement.trade.gov/petitioncounseling/pcp-faq.html#A_1) 
136 It is important recognize that within the United States, interests surrounding trade remain divided. 
Proponents of free trade (i.e., the Cato Institute) tend to emphasize that it is the U.S. consumers who will 
need to pay for the high prices of goods instead of buying cheap foreign goods should AD/CVD rules 
continue to be enforced. For example, Lindsey, Griswold, and Lukas (1999) of the Cato Institute find that 
137 Irwin, IMF Working Paper, 2005. 
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attributes the proliferation of AD/CVD case filings from 1980 to the USDOC’s greater 
openness to accepting petitions.  
     The database on U.S. AD/CVD investigations year-to-date under the Enforcement and 
Compliance bureau of the U.S. International Trade Administration, the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, is readily available online.138 U.S. antidumping investigation data is 
available from the year 1921, in which the Antidumping Act was enacted. Countervailing 
data dates back to the year 1897. Orders that were revoked are categorized separately as 
historical data. Orders that are still in place are divided into time periods of before the 
year 2000 and after the year 2000, as seen in Table 3-1. While it is not made clear why 
the year 2000 was chosen as the dividing year in data collection, it is possible to 
speculate that a) the USDOC sought to organize its data before and after the start of the 
new millennium after recognizing that there was a stark divide in the figures and found 
implications, and also that b) China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 and the increasing 
number of trade remedy cases involving China may have contributed to that specific year 
selection. Meanwhile, the number of safeguard investigations is fewer than AD or CVD 
investigations, because they rarely occur. 
Table 3-1. U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations (March 15, 2013 present) 
 
Country Cases filed until December 31, 1999 Cases filed from January 01, 2000 
 Antidumping Countervailing 
Duty 
Total Antidumping Countervailing 
Duty 
Total 
Japan 124 3 127 13 0 13 
South 
Korea 
60 18 78 19 6 25 
China 70 4 74 95 34 129 
Total 154 25 279 127 40 167 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Enforcement and Compliance of the United States International Trade Administration, formerly the 
Import Administration (http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/iastats1.html) 
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Source: Author’s calculations from Spreadsheet Data, International Trade Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce  
 
Table 3-2. Harmonized System Section Headings and Descriptions 
 
Section Description 
I Live Animals; Animal Products 
II Vegetable Products 
III Animal or Vegetable Fats and Oils and Their Cleavage Products; Prepared Edible Fats; Animal or Vegetable Waxes 
IV Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes 
V Mineral Products 
VI Products of the Chemical or Allied Industries 
VII Plastics and Articles Thereof; Rubber and Articles Thereof 
VIII Raw Hides and Skins, Leather, Furskins and Articles Thereof; Sadderly and Harness; Travel Goods, Handbags and 
Similar Containers; Articles of Animal Gut (Other than Silk-Worm Gut) 
IX Wood and Articles of Wood; Wood Charcoal; Cork and Articles of Cork; Manufactures of Straw, of Esparto or of Other 
Plaiting Materials; Basketware and Wickerwork 
X Pulp Of Wood or of Other Fibrous Cellulosic Material; Recovered (Waste and Scrap) Paper or Paperboard; Paper and 
Paperboard and Articles Thereof 
XI Textiles and Textile Articles 
XII Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Sun Umbrellas, Walking-Sticks, Seat-Sticks, Whips, Riding-Crops and Parts Thereof; 
Prepared Feathers and Articles Made Therewith; Artificial Flowers; Articles of Human Hair 
XIII Articles of Stone, Plaster, Cement, Asbestos, Mica or Similar Materials; Ceramic Products; Glass and Glassware 
XIV Natural or Cultured Pearls, Precious or Semi-Precious Stones, Precious Metals, Metals Clad with Precious Metal and 
Articles Thereof; Imitation Jewelry; Coin Thereof; Imitation Jewelry; Coin 
XV Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal 
XVI Machinery and Mechanical Appliances; Electrical Equipment; Parts Thereof; Sound Recorders and Reproducers, 
Television Image and Sound Recorders and Reproducers, and Parts and Accessories of Such Articles 
XVII Vehicles, Aircraft, Vessels and Associated Transport Equipment 
XVIII Optical, Photographic, Cinematographic, Measuring, Checking, Precision, Medical or Surgical Instruments and 
Apparatus; Clocks and Watches; Musical Instruments; Parts and Accessories Thereof 
XIX Arms and Ammunition; Parts and Accessories Thereof 
XX Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 
XXI Works of Art, Collectors' Pieces and Antiques 
Source: WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_statindex_e.htm) 
     Based on the WTO Harmonized Section Headings in Table 3-2, Table 3-3 and Table 
3-4 each represent sectors that have resulted in domestic initiations of antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations in China, Japan, South Korea, the U.S. and the EU. 
The data are based on each of the member reports submitted to the WTO. The tables of 
the investigations indicate that the overlapping sectors of vested interests, which mainly 
fall into the categories of chemicals, textiles, metals, steel, and electronic machinery, that 
seek trade remedy institutions at home.  
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Table 3-3. Antidumping Sectoral Distribution of Measures: By Reporting Member of the WTO 
(January 1, 1995 - December 31, 2012) 
 
Member I II IV V VI VII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XX Total 
China 1 1   4 81 36   10 3     13 1 2 4   156 
Japan         4       3               7 
ROK         18 7 4 9 5   2   6 19   2 72 
US 11 10 8 4 44 22 3 10 12   4   163 15 2 4 312 
EU 4 2 1 3 61 19 9 1 23 7 5   104 31 8 3 285 
Source: WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/AD_Sectoral_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf) 
 
Table 3-4. Countervailing Sectoral Distribution of Measures: By Reporting Member of the WTO 
(January 1, 1995 - December 31, 2012) 
 
Member I II 
 
III IV V VI VII IX X XI XIII XV XVI XVII Total 
China  1 
 
1         1  1 4 
Japan   
 
         1  1 
ROK   
 
           0 
US 1 1 
 
2 4 6 3 2 5 2 1 43 5  75 
EU 1  
 
 1 2 8  1 5  8 4  30 
Source: WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/CV_Sectoral_MeasuresByRepMem.pdf) 
 
The Responses  
     In this section, I present a comparative analysis on how Japan, South Korea, and 
China each responded to U.S. AD/CVD investigations. In particular, the analysis will 
focus on how each of the policy measures in response were based on their disparate legal 
foundations and institutional mechanisms that ultimately led to decision-making patterns 
in the ministries. In addition, in portraying how the three states have differed in 
developing their own mechanisms of AD/CVD investigations and the degree of their 
perusal of the systems, the section contends that Japan has acquiesced, South Korea has 
reciprocated, and China has retaliated against U.S. protectionist measures.  
     While the method of comparison I have chosen is based on the absolute number of 
cases that each country has initiated, the designation and labeling of patterns of 
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acquiescence, reciprocation, and retaliation are based on relative comparisons amongst 
the three countries’ responses. It is important to note that my assessment of country 
responses is based on the relative comparison amongst the three states’ trade remedy 
systems. At one glance, it is apparent that each of the countries under examination has 
some sort of a defensive mechanism – not surprisingly, as states are apt to build systems 
of defensive policies upon being attacked. However, the comparative tool will enable us 
to see the details of each state’s response relative to the others. The degrees and 
dimensions of the policy responses by the three countries have clearly been different; and 
for the most part, differing institutional mechanisms of trade remedy have resulted in the 
different trade remedy policy patterns of each country that we see today. 
Japan’s Acquiescence   
     Tracing back the AD/CVD orders that were revoked before 1980, it is easily 
recognizable that the U.S. had started antidumping investigations against Japan since 
1921, beginning with hand-hooked cotton rugs.139 140 Since then, the U.S. conducted 
antidumping investigations throughout the prewar and postwar years, but either failed to 
prove either that Japanese products were selling at lesser than fair value in U.S. markets, 
or that a material injury to the competing U.S. industry had been caused. Therefore, no 
antidumping duties had been levied.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Eckes, 1995. pp. 275-275. Eckes finds that before 1970, less than 5 percent of dumping complaints led 
to antidumping orders. It was with the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 that the U.S. saw a golden era of AD 
enforcement. The success rate of AD orders were highest against Asian dumpers like Japan, China, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, and lowest against Canada and Western Europe. 
140 Michael Moore writes that among the pre-1980 cases, almost 70% (13 out of 19 cases) were revoked 
due to lack of domestic interest in their continuation. See Michael Moore’s manuscript, ‘An Econometric 
Analysis of US Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions’ (http://home.gwu.edu/~mom/sunsetpred.pdf). 
	  	  
150 
     Nevertheless, from the early 1960s, trade frictions emerged that centered on cheap 
Japanese natural and synthetic textile products that were sold in the U.S. market. During 
the U.S.-Japan textile negotiations, which lasted from 1960 to 1972, the U.S. demanded 
not only Japan, but also South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong voluntarily restrain their 
exports of woolen and chemical/synthetic textiles to the U.S., and suggested that a 
conference be held on textiles at the GATT. Facing vehement anti-regulation 
demonstrations in the textiles industries at home, the Japanese Diet, together with its 
ministries spearheaded by the MITI (what is now METI), was initially in line with the 
anti-regulation campaign, but as the negotiations unfolded, the MITI turned to the textile 
industry for cooperation to meet U.S. demands. After a groundbreaking all-around VER 
statement offer from the Japanese side had been declined by President Nixon, a 
memorandum of understanding on voluntary export restraints of textiles was signed 
between the U.S. and Japan, and MITI made no further efforts to persuade the industry in 
1971.141 The contents of the memorandum largely reflected the original demands of the 
United States. Japan had acquiesced to U.S. pressures, and went on to participate in the 
signing of the Multifiber Agreement (MFA) of 1974, adopted by the GATT Council. The 
U.S.-Japan textile negotiations and its outcome was a reflection of relative power 
positions of the two countries at the time. 
     Japan also faced contention with the U.S. and was pressured to restrict its exports of 
steel from the 1970s and into the 1980s. AD investigations were initiated on steel 
products (i.e., steel pipes and tubes, stainless clad steel plate, steel wire nails, stainless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141 Sumiya, 2000. pp. 465-467. 
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steel pipes and seamless tubes). They did not lead to the actual levying of AD duties, but 
rather exacerbated contentious bilateral negotiations on VER. Among the many 
categories of Japanese exports during the era, the very first case that led to a U.S. levy of 
antidumping duties on Japanese goods was on Japanese TV sets (A-588-015). The 
antidumping investigation started in March of 1968 and as an outcome of the 
investigation, the case for Japanese TV sets selling at LTFV in the U.S. market was 
proved, in addition to a decision on March 9, 1971 that material injury had been caused to 
U.S. industries.142 Industry petitions and antidumping investigations since that year and 
onwards were centered on electronics (whole and parts), heavy engineering parts, steel, 
chemical products, and semi-conductors.  
     As globalization progressed and the Japanese economy grew more open to the world, 
U.S. antidumping investigations on Japan have decreased considerably since the year 
2000. The investigations of Japanese goods fall in the same industrial categories today as 
in earlier years, but as shown in Table 3-1, the number of U.S. AD/CVD investigations 
on Japan after the year 2000 decreased by almost 90 percent of the number of cases 
before 2000. It is also notable that no countervailing duty investigations were initiated 
against Japanese companies since 2000. With regard to anticipated findings of Japanese 
responses to these figures, the significant decrease in the numbers of investigations lead 
us to believe that the import surge that used to come mainly from Japan started to come 
from China from 2000 and onwards. Due to China’s low labor cost, Japanese exporters 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 This case (A-588-015) appears in the Historical Information (Orders Revoked Before 1980) data, as well 
as in the AD/CVD investigations (Federal Register History) data before 2000. After sunset reviews, the 
order for this case was revoked on November 23, 1998, which went into effect on January 1, 2000. 
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had lost price advantage. Moreover, it had become increasingly difficult for the U.S. to 
detect or prove Japanese dumping cases. The Japanese trade surplus has been on the rise 
in the late 1990s, but on a gradual decline from the year 2000 until it rebounded in the 
late 2000s (see Figure 4-4 in Chapter 4 for exact figure with timeline.)  
     In looking back at how the Japanese acquiescence to U.S. demands and pressures in 
the 1960s and 1970s came about, some notable bureaucratic factors come into 
consideration. The Japanese bureaucrats appear to have a constructive mindset that 
pressures from the outside can prompt changes in the Japanese state and society.143 The 
political discouragement due to low likelihood of success in trade litigation in addition to 
the lack of bureaucratic resources and venues in the highly bureaucratic system of trade 
relief contributed to shaping the mindset of the Japanese trade bureaucrats. Under the 
Japanese bureaucratic system, suing as a final outcome is not strongly encouraged, and 
the existence of trade remedy tools at home ministries are not widely promoted to the 
industries that may face unfair trading acts at their home market by foreign 
competitors.144 Instead, the ministries retain very close contact with the industries that it 
has traditionally maintained relationships with – mainly industries that contribute in large 
part to Japan’s overall GDP – and stays up-to-date on industrial performance. As will be 
further explained in Chapter 4, should the necessity of a trade remedy case arise in Japan, 
it is preferable that the industry resolves the issue by bilateral consultations prior to a 
trade remedy case. This way, Japan reduces its bureaucratic burdens of filing a case and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 Furukawa, 2001. p.33. A former MOFA official, Furukawa states that the so-called ‘Japan Bashing’ by 
the United States is beneficial for Japan in undertaking new reforms into the future. A personal interview 
with Tanaka Hitoshi, also a former MOFA official agrees to this point.   
144 A METI official testifies to this point. Personal interview. December 5, 2013. 
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avoids diplomatic clashes, while all the while at work on trade remedy. This is a notable 
divergence from the recent argument that contends that Japan has been pursuing 
‘aggressive legalism’ within the WTO dispute settlement system (Pekkanen, 2008). An 
examination of Japan’s trade disputes at home and abroad may highlight Japan’s active 
participation mainly as a third party in the WTO dispute settlement system - that is, when 
we are only looking at Japan - but a comparison of Japan with neighbors South Korea and 
China proves that it may not necessarily be the case Japan has come to pursue ‘aggressive 
legalism’. The following section on the trade remedy structures of each country will 
further explain how the strategic acquiescence in Japanese trade remedy mechanisms 
came about.  
South Korea’s Reciprocation 
     The data on orders revoked before 1980 shows that the U.S. began to have AD/CVD 
investigations on South Korea since 1973, the first case being investigations on South 
Korea’s liquid sprayers. Countervailing duty investigations started in 1978, the first case 
being one on South Korean bicycle tires and tubes. In terms of industries that were of 
central concern in the investigations, the patterns of U.S. antidumping cases involving 
South Korean firms showed patterns similar to Japan’s, particularly involving sectors 
such as electronics, heavy industrial parts, steel, chemicals, semiconductors.145 In 
addition, South Korea faced AD investigations in the areas of other assorted consumer 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145 Bark argues that it was in the high price of the domestic market, and not the low price in the foreign 
market, that led to the imposition of U.S. antidumping restrictions on South Korean electronics. For South 
Korea’s consumer electronics industry, two characteristics of the industry make price discrepancies 
between domestic and international markets inevitable – an oligopolistic structure in the domestic market, 
and protection from imports. He contends that under such a circumstance of segmented markets, South 
Korean companies would naturally charge a higher markup at home than abroad to maximize profits (this 
still happens in South Korea today – e.g., Samsung Galaxy phones labeled with the highest prices at home).  
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products, such as bicycles (A-580-004), grand and upright pianos (A-580-405), and photo 
albums (A-580-501).  
     As much as South Korea continued to be a targeted country for AD investigations and 
imposition of duties, South Korea started to actively utilize its legal tools for launching 
AD investigations at home. Table 3-3, which shows the comparative number of cases 
that were initiated at home in China, Japan, South Korea, the U.S., and the European 
Union, since the establishment of the WTO, is clear evidence that South Korea’s use of 
trade remedy measures shot up remarkably under the WTO system. As will be explained 
further in the following case study on South Korea, the use of trade remedy has been 
shaping the South Korean policy stance on trade remedy by reciprocation. 
    A notable diverging trend from the Japanese case of AD/CVD investigations would be 
that South Korea’s assorted consumer products as well as heavy industrial goods were 
frequently under countervailing duty investigations. As demonstrated in Table 3-1, the 
total number of AD/CVD cases before the year 2000 are not as sizable in figures in 
comparison to Japan, but relatively high in the number of cases for CVD. For South 
Korea, the trend for CVD investigations continues after the 2000s, and whereas Japan has 
scored zero cases for CVDs after 2000, South Korea has faced six CVD investigations 
between 2000 and 2013.  
     The continuation of CVD investigations on South Korea after 2000 means that the U.S. 
found evidence that possible government subsidies continued to be distributed to certain 
South Korean industries in an effort to protect the industries. In this respect, while the 
data on orders revoked before 1980 do not tell us much due to the small number of cases, 
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the data on AD/CVD orders from the 1970s and onwards show that South Korea had 
followed similar paths of Japan with regard to antidumping cases, albeit in smaller 
numbers of cases, but not necessarily so in countervailing duty cases. Even after the 
establishment of the WTO system, targeted countries under CVD investigations were 
largely developing countries that had export-oriented structures of the economy that had 
strong state emphasis on fostering industries in general.146 
China’s Retaliation 
     The very first antidumping investigation on imports from China was on food 
seasoning products from Ajinomoto China, a branch of the Japanese food company 
Ajinomoto in 1940. During the postwar years, the China branch of Ajinomoto was 
established in Shanghai in 1918 along with an office in Korea in 1931.147 Other cases on 
China were on tung oil, or China wood oil (no case number given) in the years 1947 and 
1948, which is drying oil obtained by pressing the seed from the nut of the tung tree. 
However, these cases failed to prove that they were selling at LTFV prices in the U.S. 
market. Countervailing duty investigations on China at the time were on feathers and 
other various products, but also did not result in levy of penalty tariffs. There was 
virtually no trade between China and the U.S. between 1949 and 1978. 
     As China gradually opened up its economy since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform 
in 1978, the frequencies of investigations on China increased. The initial antidumping 
investigation case is on natural menthol (A-570-100), which began in July of 1980. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Ko, Chun-sŏng, Hyŏk-ki Min, and Che-ho Yi. 2009. While South Korea is not necessarily categorized 
as a developing country by the IMF or the World Bank as of 2013, at the time of this writing, prior to the 
Lehman Shock of 2008, South Korea had yet to firmly establish itself as a strong exporting country. 
147 Corporate Guidance Ajinomoto, Inc. (http://www.ajinomoto.com/guidance/business/china.html) 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China continued to be on the U.S. radar for trade 
remedy investigations for many categories of agricultural goods, light consumer goods, 
from fresh garlic (A-570-831) to shopping carts (A-570-810), and stationery such as 
paper clips (A-570-826) and cased pencils (A-570-827).  
     One important aspect to consider is the growth of offshoring of Japanese and Korean 
companies to China from the late 1980s to the 1990s, after the bubble economy burst in 
Japan and the yen and won appreciated significantly, as firms sought to save production 
costs by taking advantage of cheap labor in China.148 Production networks across East 
Asia were created and deepened by this effect. The effects of foreign companies’ 
offshoring to China resulted in the production of cheap goods, and led to Chinese exports 
being subject to more antidumping investigations than South Korea even before 2000. 
Another trait of antidumping investigations on China is that the goods have continued to 
cover a wide range of exports, from agricultural goods such as frozen and canned warm 
water shrimp (A-570-893), to electronic goods such as desktop note counters and 
scanners (A-570-861), color television receivers (A-570-884), and heavy industrial 
products like carbon and alloy steel wire rod (A-570-902). 
     From the 2000s, China’s official entry into the World Trade Organization brought 
about significant increases in the number of U.S. AD/CVD investigations on China. As 
noted in Table 3-1, China has faced a total of 129 U.S. AD/CVD investigations, of which 
95 cases are on antidumping and 34 cases are on countervailing duty investigations. This 
total number is close to the number of cases that Japan had received prior to 2000, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 The trend continues today despite many Chinese SOEs that have come into the spotlight with their 
performance in the world economy after the WTO accession. 
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although the proportion of countervailing duty and antidumping cases differ. Unlike 
Japan, which did not face multiple countervailing duty investigations by the U.S., China 
continued to score high numbers in countervailing duty investigations, largely owing to 
the state’s strategic support of certain industries. The products investigated ranged 
broadly, from frozen warm water shrimp (C-570-988) to hardwood and decorative 
plywood (C-570-986, C-570-987), coated sheet paper (C-570-906, also placed under AD) 
and steel products (C-570-974). As will be shown in the case study section of this chapter 
and Chapter 4, China has developed its own institutional mechanism and policy stance of 
retaliation in dealing with wide scale trade remedy investigations by the United States, 
both in terms of domestic trade remedy and also trade disputes at the international level 
in the WTO DSB. 
Japan (1955-Present) 
Japan’s Legal Foundations for Trade Remedy 
     The legal foundations for Japan’s trade remedies are based on three components: the 
Customs Tariff Law, Cabinet Orders relating to AD/CVD and Safeguards, and 
Regulations /Guidelines relating to AD/CVD and Safeguards. The legal foundations for 
Japanese trade remedy of antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguards are embodied 
in the GATT Article VI, the Antidumping Agreement of 1998, and domestic laws.149 The 
domestic laws are mainly Cabinet Orders (国内関係法令), and specific guidelines on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 関連国際協定・国内法令等
(http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/external_economy/trade_control/boekikanri/trade-remedy/ad.html)  
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antidumping (関税及び貿易に関する一般協定及びダンピング防止協定150), 
emergency duty for safeguards (貨物の輸入の増加に際しての緊急の措置に関する手
続等についてのガイドラインの制定), and domestic law on countervailing duty (関税
定率法第７条、相殺関税に関する政令). In contrast with the cases of South Korea or 
China, Japan does not have a specific law with the objective of scrutinizing unfair trade 
acts, and the domestic laws that provide the legal grounds for trade remedy are placed 
within and not beyond the legal concepts and borderlines of the WTO agreements and 
rules. As opposed to Japan, both China and South Korea have become one of very few 
jurisdictions in the world after the U.S. and the EU to implement retaliatory measures in 
trade remedy. Japan does not see a need for such strong measures through domestic 
legislation. The difference between China and South Korea is in the degree of 
implementation – while South Korea tends to utilize it as a reciprocating tool, China has 
the domestic law strongly enforced against trade remedy actions from its trading partners 
to the level of retaliation.   
Table 3-5. Japanese Legal Structure for Trade Remedies 
 
 Antidumping Countervailing Duty Safeguard 
Duty Import Quotas 
Law Customs Tariff Law 
(Article 8) 
Customs Tariff Law 
(Article 7) 
Customs Tariff Law 
(Article 9) 
Foreign Exchange 
and Foreign Trade 
Control Law (Article 
52) 
Cabinet Order Cabinet Order relating 
to Antidumping Duty 
Cabinet Order relating 
to Countervailing Duty 
Cabinet Order concerning 
Emergency Duty 
Import Trade 
Control Order 
(Article 3) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 Guidelines for Petitioning for Antidumping Tariff Levy (不当廉売関税に関する手続等に着いてのガ
イドライン), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
(METI), and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLITT), April 2011. 
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Regulations / 
Guidelines 
Guidelines for 
Procedures Relating 
to Antidumping Duty 
Guidelines for 
Procedures Relating to 
Countervailing Duty 
Guidelines for Procedures 
Relating to Emergency 
Duty, etc. 
Regulations to 
Govern Emergency 
Measures to be taken 
in Response to an 
Increase in the 
Importation of 
Goods 
Guidelines for 
Procedures, etc. 
Relating to 
Emergency 
Measures to be taken 
in Response to an 
increase in the 
Importation of 
Goods 
Source: Office for Trade Remedy Investigations, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Japan, 2011 
 
Japan’s Trade Remedy Structure: The Difficulties of Petitioning 
     The Japanese AD/CVD Investigating Authority is not assigned to a specific institution. 
The tasks are divided among the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI) – for example, if and when an agricultural product is of 
concern, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) or another ministry 
directly relevant to the petitioned product area investigates the claim. Within the METI 
and the MOF, METI’s Office for Trade Remedy Investigations and MOF’s Office for 
Trade Remedy Affairs are in charge of the investigations. METI serves as the 
headquarters and database for Japan’s AD/CVD investigation, with the Trade Remedy 
Investigation Bureau (Keizaisangōshō bōeki kyūsai sochi) placed directly under METI. 
For AD/CVD duty levy, the heads of MOF, METI, and the relevant ministry consult with 
one another, and the METI Trade Bureau (貿易局貿易調査課) and MOF Customs Tariff 
Bureau (関税局企画課) also get involved. For safeguards, since the case may culminate 
in a trade conflict at the national level, the Minister of Finance cautiously decides on 
policy actions through consultations with other heads of METI or relevant ministries via 
the Customs Tariff Council. Industries that are facing material injury due to unfair trade 
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practices by competing foreign firms can bring their petitions to the METI and the MOF, 
and the first step is to address the concerns by starting with a legal consultation with the 
ministry prior to the investigation. However, unlike in the cases of China and South 
Korea, litigation costs that are borne beyond the consultation stage are primarily the 
industries’ responsibility. 
     While the legal foundations create a framework for the use of trade remedy measures 
in Japan, despite the fair amount of petitions and cases brought to the home ministries, 
the number of actual AD/CVD orders issued after investigations toward the final stage 
that is actively pursued by the ministries of Japan is very minimal compared to the cases 
of South Korea and China. This trend could be largely attributed to several institutional 
factors: first, the Japanese ministries are not equipped with the financial resources for 
legal backup to support all petitions, and thus do not place priority on trade remedy tasks 
amongst their other tasks and missions, nor do they put efforts into promoting the 
existence of trade remedy mechanisms; second, from the industry perspective, the 
administrative procedures involving consensus of two highly bureaucratic different 
ministries in order to process a petition toward investigation is certainly not an easy task. 
Having both the METI and MOF on board for trade remedy investigations require intra-
ministerial coordination.  
     The lack of ministerial backup for trade remedy is what really explains the Japanese 
case from the Chinese and South Korean cases. The institutional initiatives and 
bureaucratic motivations for trade remedy are not as strong in Japan as in China or South 
Korea. Beyond the consultation stage prior to initiation of investigation in which legal 
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advising is provided by the ministries, but beyond preliminary investigations, there are 
also burdens of high legal fees that will incur which will fall on the shoulders of the 
petitioner because they are not supported by the government.151 The cost for litigation 
may not be a big burden for large, main enterprises that drive Japanese economic growth, 
but it is an overwhelming burden for small and medium-sized industries that are 
grappling with losses due to unfair trade rule violations by their competing foreign firms. 
Figure 3-4. Japanese Trade Remedy Procedures & Time Frames Flowcharts 
 
 
Source: Office for Trade Remedy Investigations, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Japan 
 
     The length of the procedure is at the average level in comparison to the cases of South 
Korea and China. But within the Japanese bureaucracy, in the absence of priority and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 Amongst the frequently asked questions on the METI Trade Remedy Bureau page are on expected fees 
of petitions and investigations. The METI answers that in general, fees for hiring a lawyer and conducting 
investigations will result in fees that the industry will be expected to prepare. [Is this unusual? I have the 
impression that US law firms that do trade law are hideously expensive.] However, the petition itself and 
the consultation stages will not cause any financial burden on the petitioning industry. 
(http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/external_economy/trade_control/boekikanri/trade-remedy/qa.html) 
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emphasis on a certain case at the ministerial level that supports and pushes for the 
petition toward investigation, the procedure could be subject to delays or rejection. In 
general, a Japanese petition for an antidumping duty investigation takes 2 months to be 
processed, and once the investigation authority decides to initiate an investigation, the 
process takes about 12 months to reach final determination on whether or not to impose 
antidumping duty.152 Prior to applications for investigations, a consultation process is 
required, coupled with the examination of products under investigation and of target 
countries. Once the investigation is initiated by the MOF and the METI, it is reported to 
the Customs Tariff Council, and the Cabinet ultimately approves the preliminary and 
final determinations deriving from investigation results.153 
Table 3-6. Japanese Decision Making Process of AD/CVD Cases 
 
Stages Required Actions 
Before Applications (Petitions) Consultation with industries about trade remedies and an application 
Examination of a product under investigation 
Examination of target countries 
Pre-examination of application documents (standing, Dumping margins data, injury data) 
For Initiation of Investigation Examination of application documents within the investigating authorities 
Approval for Initiation of Investigation within the MOF & METI, respectively 
Report to the Customs Tariff Council about the initiation 
For Preliminary Determination / 
Provisional Measures 
Analyzing and verifying replies to questionnaires within the investigating authority 
Approval for the Preliminary Determination / the Provisional Measure within the MOF & 
METI, respectively 
Approval for the Provisional Measure by the Customs Tariff Council 
Approval for the Provisional Measure by the Cabinet 
For Final Determination  
/ Definitive Measures 
Examination of Comments from the related parties within the investigating authority 
Approval for the Final Determination / the Definitive Measure within MOF & METI, 
respectively 
Approval for the Definitive Measure by the Customs Tariff Council  
Approval for the Definitive Measure by the Cabinet 
Source: Office for Trade Remedy Investigations, Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Japan 
 
South Korea (1986-Present) 
South Korea’s Legal Foundations for Trade Remedy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Guidelines for the Imposition of Antidumping Tariff Levy (不当廉売関税（アンチダンピング関税）
を課することを求める書面の作成の手引き), the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the Ministry of 
Economy, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), Japan, April 2011. 
153 Trade Remedy Situations in Japan, Office for Trade Remedy Investigations, Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, 2011. 
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     In South Korea, AD/CVD and Safeguard investigations are carried out based on the 
legal foundations of the Customs Tariff Law (관세법, revised in 1967) and the Foreign 
Trade Law (대외무역법, enacted in 1986). In addition to the two main pillars of laws, 
South Korea has also implemented a set of laws that not many other countries in the 
world have implemented - the Law on the Investigation of Unfair Trade and Industrial 
Injury Remedy (불공정무역행위조사 및 산업피해구제에 관한 법률), which went into 
force since February 8, 2006.154 The law on unfair trade is equivalent to Section 301 of 
the Trade Act of 1974 of the United States, which allows for retaliatory measures in trade 
remedy, and the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR) of the European Union. Prior to the 
implementation of the law, a senior board member of the Korea Trade Commission was 
quoted as saying that South Korea’s implementation would be closer to the EU’s Trade 
Barrier Regulation (TBR) in concept. South Korea was the fourth jurisdiction in the 
world to implement such a law after the U.S., the EU, and China (China implemented 
specific laws of the same sort in 2005, based on amendments of its interim rules drafted 
in 2002. The section on China later in this chapter will provide more details on how 
China implemented a similar law.)155  
     While the WTO does not provide a specific definition of ‘unfair trade’, the contents of 
the South Korean law are drafted in such a way that unfair trade does not obstruct the 
growth of domestic industries, and that international trade rules stipulated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Executive Orders and Revised Presidential Orders on the Investigation of Unfair Trade Acts and 
Remedies for Industrial Damages (불공정무역행위 조사 및 산업피해구제에 관한 법률[시행 2012.3.15] 
[대통령령 제 23339호, 2011.12.2, 일부개정] 시행령, 산업통상자원부 불공정무역조사팀)  
155 ‘한국판 301조 이달부터 시행’ (A Korean Version of Section 301 Implemented from this Month), 
Kbiz, February 13, 2006. (http://news.kbiz.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=10746)  
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Marrakesh Agreement are not violated in the domestic market. The law states three major 
patterns of unfair trade – violation of intellectual property rights, violations of rules of 
origin, and impediments to export-import order. This law expands the scope and 
definition of trade remedy actions from simply adhering to the classic cases of AD/CVD 
and safeguard to incorporate unfair trade acts that are also punishable under South 
Korean law.  
Table 3-7. South Korean Legal Structure for Trade Remedies 
 
 Antidumping Duty Countervailing Duty Safeguard Unfair International Trade 
Practices Investigation  
(Since 2006) 
Law Customs Tariff Law 
(Articles 51-56) 
Trade Remedy Law 
Customs Tariff Law 
(Articles 57-63) 
Customs Tariff Law 
Trade Remedy Law 
(Articles 15-22) 
Trade Remedy Law  
(Articles 4-14) 
Source: Korea Trade Commission Portal (http://ktc.go.kr/repage/sub_01_11.jsp?m=m11) 
 
     After experiencing turbulent decades of trade conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s, South 
Korea took the steps to put in place strong legal measures for trade remedy. Against the 
backdrop of South Korea’s increasing trade dependency ratio and proliferation of 
bilateral trade agreements, South Korea saw that it must take initiative to place additional 
legal measures to protect its industries. It is also worth noting that in South Korea, the 
laws on trade remedy are actively revised and reinforced year by year. It is quite clear in 
the directions of policy that South Korea felt the urge to firmly establish the legal and 
policy mechanisms for trade remedy. The ministerial decision to enforce the law in 2006 
was made by the former Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy, which is now the 
Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE).  
     The Korea Trade Commission (KTC) administers the implementation of the law. 
Chung Joon-seok, member of the KTC, was quoted as saying that as South Korea 
increases the number of free trade agreements with its trading partners, it has faced the 
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necessity to take legal actions to protect the domestic industrial interests from unfair or 
discriminative trading practices or policies that are customary.156 The KTC holds 
authority for South Korea’s trade remedy investigations. The KTC’s history began at the 
apex of South Korea’s trade confrontations with major trading partners including the U.S., 
Canada, and European states. The KTC was first established under the Ministry of 
Commerce in July 1987, and since then has been moved around ministries twice amid 
governmental bureau restructuring, which is a reflection of tumultuous political 
transitions that South Korea has had and has been a hindrance to establishing the system 
in an efficient manner. South Korea followed the example of the U.S. case (see p.6 of this 
chapter) in relegating the tasks for AD/CVD investigations to the Ministry of Commerce 
from the Treasury Department in December 1993, and since then, systematic preparations 
for legislation for effective trade remedy actions took place.157 With the KTC as the 
investigative authority placed under the Ministry of Commerce, which is inherently 
inclined toward policies in favor of protecting domestic industries, the AD/CVD 
investigations in South Korea started to take off.158 The relegation of trade remedy tasks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Ibid. 
157 Later on the Korea Trade Commission belonged to the Ministry of Commerce Industry and Energy in 
1998 (of which it was a restructuring of the Department of Commerce in which the commerce related tasks 
were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Ministry of Commerce Industry and 
Energy). The changing titles of ministries and transfer of tasks around ministries are prevalent upon the 
launch of new administrations upon presidential elections is prevalent in South Korea. Most recently, it has 
been transferred from the Ministry of Knowledge Economy under the Lee Myung-bak Administration to 
the newly established Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MTIE) launched on March 23, 2013 by the 
new Park Geun-hye Administration. 
158 Contrary to the rigidity that is often found in the bureaucratic system, one dynamic feature that is quite 
interesting and apparent in South Korea’s bureaucracy is the rapidity in the ways of adopting foreign 
systems. The South Korean bureaucracy frequently contrasts its policy and system with those of other 
developed nations (the U.S., EU, and Japan), and if an agenda appears to be of crucial necessity to 
improving the South Korean system, a bill is pushed forward. However, the consequences of such quick 
policy adoptions based on foreign experiences are not always appropriate for the South Korean case. 
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to the KTC, an investigative authority focusing on its main duties of trade remedy in the 
South Korean case, is a big departure from what we see the Japanese case, in which the 
MOF still bears partial responsibility and authority with the METI on decisions of 
AD/CVD investigation launches and procedures, in the absence of a separate bureaucratic 
entity as an investigative authority for trade remedy. 
     The Office of Trade Investigation at the KTC is divided into four task teams: Trade 
Remedy Policy, Industrial Damages Investigation, Dumping Investigations, and Unfair 
Trade Investigations. While the task teams are primarily managed by government 
officials, the Commission’s head members include academics, legal experts and 
economists from research institutes and major law firms, and section chiefs of relevant 
ministries of which a large number have pursued studies and degrees in law or economics 
in the U.S. and/or Europe. This means that in the process of decision-making, relevant 
expertise outside the realms of the ministry is often sought. Moreover, the KTC’s reach-
out activities of promoting trade remedy policies (i.e., academic seminars, calls for papers, 
publications, forum launches, and trade remedy case analysis contests by college students) 
are quite noticeable and approachable to the general public, which is a visible contrast 
with the Japanese case.  
     Notably, the biggest divergence from the Japanese case that may lead to larger 
numbers of petitions in the South Korean system, is in the financial support for legal 
consultation concerning trade remedy from both private and public sectors. For 
petitioning industries, the International Trade Office of the Korea Federation of SMEs 
(중소기업중앙회) provides up to 70% of total fees incurred (limit to 70,000,000 KRW, 
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which is roughly 66,000 USD) toward preparations of petitions (i.e., fees for hiring 
lawyers, patent attorneys, accountants). For industries that are charged with dumping or 
safeguard allegations, the Trade Cooperation Office of the Korea International Trade 
Association (KITA) sponsors up to 50% of fees incurred for hiring lawyers for legal 
consultations (limit to 50,000,000 KRW, which is roughly 47,000 USD).159 SME CEOs 
provide testimonies on the KTC website and promotion brochures that they were able to 
overcome their hardships in the industries when faced with dumping or other unfair trade 
activities by foreign competitors in the domestic market, and that with the administrative 
help, courage and support from the KTC were they able to successfully file in a petition 
and receive costs for damages or place restrictions on foreign imports. 
     As in Figure 3-5, in the South Korean case, the decision on whether to initiate an 
investigation is made within 2 months, and preliminary decisions take 3 months from 
launching date of investigation. Final decisions on duty levy take up to one year 
following the preliminary decisions, depending on the degree of importance of the 
industry and product being investigated. If duties are to be deployed after investigations, 
the Minister of Strategy and Finance levies the duties upon final submission of the 
request by the Commission.160 The database on South Korea’s AD/CVD domestic 
investigations are accessible via the Korea Trade Commission website (Muyeog-
Wiwonhoe).161 The data comprises of all AD/CVD, Safeguard, Unfair Trade data from 
1987 to 2012 and lists are provided by country, by product, and trading act. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 The Korea Trade Commision Brochure, June 2012. 
160 Korea Trade Commission (http://www.ktc.go.kr/sub_frame.jsp?link_menu_id=05) 
161 Details on the case investigations require Korean national identity number input for log-in. 
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Figure 3-5. South Korean Trade Remedy Procedures & Time Frames Flowcharts 
 
Source: Korea Trade Commission Promotion Data 
(http://www.ktc.go.kr/sub_frame.jsp?link_menu_id=0601) 
 
China (1994-Present) 
China’s Legal Foundations for Trade Remedy 
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trade remedy (see Table 3-10) - first, the Antidumping (反倾销条例: fǎn qīngxiāo  
tiáolì), Countervailing duty (反补贴条例: fǎn bǔtiē tiáolì), and Safeguard Regulations (
保障措施条例: bǎozhàng cuòshī tiáolì) of the PRC; second, the Foreign Trade Law, 
which is the main source of the power China wields in trade remedy mechanisms today. 
China’s legal foundations on foreign trade began in the Foreign Trade Law (对外贸易法: 
duìwài màoyì fǎ) of 1994. But the actual developments of strong legal rules for trade 
remedy did not occur until China’s accession to the WTO and onwards. Since 2005, 
China has moreover been equipped with the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules (
对外贸易壁垒调查规则: duìwài màoyì bìlěi diàochá guīzé), which has become the main 
source of retaliatory measures in China’s trade remedy system. 
     China’s WTO entry and the negotiation process toward WTO membership gave 
impetus to reinforced legal mechanisms in domestic law. In 2001, the initial laws written 
on China’s AD/CVD and Safeguard investigations and duty levy remained premature in 
terms of legal development, but were revised in 2004 for stronger enforcement.162 After 
joining the WTO, China was immediately faced with potential threats to its domestic 
industries as a result of its trading relations with other nations. Retaining a developing 
country status and enjoying a non-market economy status, China would have 15 years 
from its WTO accession in 2001 in which to defer certain requirements of the WTO. 
Nonetheless, the legal features of China’s trade remedy system are strikingly powerful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 Gao, 2012. 
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for a developing economy.163 As in the South Korean case, China’s Foreign Trade Law 
also enables retaliatory actions and provides the grounds for legal enforcement as the 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 does for the U.S and the Trade Barrier Restrictions 
of the EU. In practice, China has taken as hard a line in implementation of the law as the 
U.S. does with Section 301, while the South Korean implementation of the law on Unfair 
Trade has been closer to the case of the EU’s TBR, focusing mainly on tackling 
discriminatory treatment and combatting potential injuries arising from unfair trade, 
rather than taking retaliatory measures. 
    It is worth noting the procedure that led to the promulgation of the Foreign Trade 
Barriers Investigation Rules of 2005. At first, China relied on the Interim Rules on 
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation, which was promulgated in 2002. Faced with a surge 
of AD/CVD investigations from its trading partners after the WTO accession, the 
Ministry of Commerce prepared a preliminary draft of revision on October 28, 2004, and 
sought suggestions from the public on the draft until November 10 of the same year. The 
revised draft of the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules was announced on 
February 2, 2005 and went into effect on March 1, 2005.164 In the process, an article was 
lifted from the preliminary draft, which stated that petitioners may file an administrative 
lawsuit against the MOC should they not agree with the details of the administrative 
conclusions of the trade remedy procedure regarding their petitions drawn out by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Under the Sino-U.S. Agreement in 1999, the U.S. will not regard China as a Market Economy until the 
year 2016. India is often used as a surrogate comparative tool to analyze dumping margins, and it is also a 
rare developing economy scores high numbers of AD/CVD investigation initiations and frequently 
addresses cases of its trade disputes in the WTO dispute settlement body. 
164 The People’s Daily,‘商务部：中国将出台对外贸易壁垒调查规则’(Ministry of Commerce: China will 
introduce Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules)  
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/3203558.html 
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Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports of the MOC.165 This means that the MOC 
sought to retain full authority over its decisions and to prevent possible overturns of its 
decision on trade remedy. The final draft also made it clear that the MOC regards both 
injuries on Chinese exports and imports as subject to the Rules. 
     What empowers the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules with potential 
retaliatory measures is the content of the articles on dispute settlement system. According 
to the Rules, the MOC is entitled to first and foremost hold bilateral consultations with a 
trading partner regarding its affected industry and/or product. Second, if the consultations 
do not lead to an understanding, the MOC may seek to resolve the matter through 
multilateral tools – by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Third, in the case that the 
specific trading partner does not comply with the decisions made in bilateral 
consultations or the WTO, the MOC may impose measures that are deemed appropriate 
for resolving the dispute. This very part obliges the MOC to take further measures 
beyond its capability as a WTO member in order to protect its industries at home. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165 The initial draft is no longer available on the MOC website, and only the revised draft remains. Article 
36 of the revised draft states that the interpretation of these Rules should be vested in the Ministry of 
Commerce. http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/c/200503/20050300023641.shtml 
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Table 3-8. Chinese Legal Structure for Trade Remedies 
 
Trade Remedy AD/CVD Safeguard Unfair Trade 
Law 
Implementation in 
Chronology 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty 
Regulations promulgated (2001) 
Safeguard Regulations 
promulgated (2001) 
 
WTO Accession (December 2001) 
 
 
 
 
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty 
Regulations amended 
(2004.03.31) 
 
Promulgation of the Revised 
Foreign Trade Law (2004.04.06) 
 
 
 
      
Safeguard Regulations amended  
(2004.03.31) 
 
 
Promulgation of the Revised 
Foreign Trade Law  (2004.04.06) 
Interim Rules on Foreign 
Trade Barriers Investigation 
Promulgated (2002.09.18) 
In effect (2002.11.01)  
 
 
 
 
Foreign Trade Barriers 
Investigation Rules  
Promulgated (2005.02.02) 
In effect (2005.03.01)  
Source: By author based on documents and statements by the MOC 
 
Figure 3-6. China’s Investigating Authorities and Trade Remedy Process 
 
Source: By author 
 
China’s Trade Remedy System: Soliciting Petitions and Exercising Authority 
     In the year of 2002, the predecessor of the MOC – the Ministry of Foreign Trade & 
Economic Cooperation: 对外贸易经济合作部) – announced the Guidelines on the 
Collection of Information on Trade Barriers (贸易投资壁垒信息收集指南), listing 
common everyday patterns of trade barriers divided into tariff barriers and non-tariff 
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  (Ministry	  of	  Foreign	  Trade	  &	  Economic	  Cooperation:	  对外贸易经
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barriers and soliciting petitions. The guidelines were disseminated to provincial 
governments in China to solicit petitions from industries experiencing trade barriers. 
Today, the guideline is still used as a manual for petitions by domestic industries and the 
MOC in processing the petitions. As indicated in Table 3-8, the MOC operates two units 
- the Investigation Bureau for Industry Injury (IBII), which conducts investigations on 
industrial injury, and the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports (BOFT), which 
conducts investigations on the dumping margins. The two bureaus are the main 
instrumental organs of the MOC that work closely with each other on trade remedy 
investigations in China. 
     There are some factors that distinguish China’s procedures of petitioning for trade 
relief and its processes from those of Japan and South Korea: first, under the authoritarian 
rule, the MOC relies not only on petitions but is also entitled to start its own 
investigations of trade remedy should it find it necessary; second, the guidelines do not 
provide a clear definition on the eligibility of the petitioner as long as they are domestic 
industry persons, nor on the exact required information on the industry’s market shares. 
Rather, evidence on material injury is sought in paper, and the widespread callout by the 
MOC for petitions solicits and facilitate as many possible petitions as possible within the 
wide spectrum of China’s trade.166 Within 2 months of petitioning, the MOC decides 
whether it will start investigations or not, and the petitioner may withdraw within this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Will Turner, ‘Understanding and Preparing for Chinese Trade Remedy Cases’, China Business Review, 
Magazine of the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC), April 1, 2012. The author, who was manager of 
government affairs at the USCBC, notes that Chinese industry petitions are not publicly available when 
filed and that cases are not processed in a standard timeline. In other words, the MOC processes petitions 
on their own terms. http://www.chinabusinessreview.com/understanding-and-preparing-for-chinese-trade-
remedy-cases/ 
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period. However, once the MOC decides to start investigations, it leaves the hands of the 
petitioner completely and withdrawal of the case is not permitted. In the course of the 
investigations, the MOC upon need may seek advising from relevant bureaus of the State 
Council, experts on trade, and academics. The MOC is also entitled to use methods of 
surveys and public hearings to facilitate the understanding of the matters of the 
investigation. Finally, within 1 year of the investigation launch, final decisions are drawn 
at the sole discretion of the MOC. 
     In addition to its efforts in carrying out trade remedy investigations, the MOC has 
since 2002 been publishing the Foreign Market Access Report (国别贸易投资环境报告), 
which analyzes report on trade and investment environments by country and by year. The 
database for China’s AD/CVD cases are accessible via the China Trade Remedy 
Information Network (中国贸易救济信息网 Zhōngguó màoyì jiùjì xìnxī wǎng) under the 
Ministry of Commerce and the Department of Information Technology.167 However, the 
most reliable and approachable source is the WTO archives of investigations by country, 
to which China must also submit reports on its AD/CVD and safeguard investigations on 
a semi-annual basis. 
Responses of Japan, South Korea, and China to U.S. Trade Remedy Measures  
     In retrospect, responses to U.S. trade remedy measures have not been uniform in the 
three countries owing to 1) the legal foundations that provide the grounds for trade 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 At current stage, it is impossible to obtain data of cases through the MOC archive route, as new 
registered users to the website are not authorized to view any content even upon log-in. Because the system 
is not open to new users, in order to assess U.S.-China AD/CVD cases, one must rely on the WTO 
document archives on AD/CVD practices of China, and figure out specific details via searches of keywords 
on Chinese webpages (for example, fǎn qīng xiāo 反倾销 antidumping). 
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remedy reactions and 2) the different actions and policymaking of the ministries 
emanating from the sources of domestic laws. Japan’s entry to the GATT in 1955 and its 
high-speed industrialization brought home a surge of AD/CVD investigations by U.S. 
authorities. South Korea faced a similar course after joining the GATT in 1967. China’s 
peak of being targeted for AD/CVD investigations came after its accession to the WTO in 
2001.  
Table 3-9. Current Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in place (as of September 23, 2013) 
 
Country AD CVD Grand Total 
China 94 27 121 
India 15 7 22 
Taiwan 18 
 
18 
Korea 12 3 15 
Japan 13 
 
13 
Brazil 8 2 10 
Indonesia 7 3 10 
Mexico 9 
 
9 
Vietnam 6 2 8 
Thailand 6 1 7 
Source: WTO 
 
     In the cases of the three countries of Northeast Asia, despite having the similarities of 
the stages in economic development and undergoing the stages of AD/CVD cases at 
different time periods, the country responses with regard to U.S. AD/CVD cases and each 
country’s pathways toward developing a trade remedy mechanism were clearly different. 
In the absence of a law strictly focusing on trade remedy, Japan has strategically 
acquiesced to foreign pressures for trade remedy by building a mechanism that prefers 
consultations prior to resorting to trade remedy measures, in the understanding that it will 
be able to focus on strategic areas. The practice has led to Japan’s decision not to fortify 
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its trade remedy mechanisms in comparison to its neighbors, but rather pushed Japan 
toward updating its standards adhering to the changes of global trade regulations and 
norms.  
     Meanwhile, with the absolute increase in free trade agreements outside the WTO 
framework since 2006, South Korea has faced the need for a stronger mechanism for 
trade remedy and has put its need into legislation and policy implementation. It has been 
reciprocating in response to foreign pressures, albeit the smaller degree of foreign 
pressures it has faced compared to Japan and China in absolute terms. It has adopted a 
trade remedy structure and the legal mechanisms that support active trade remedy 
policies by which it actively protects its industries for better performance at home and 
abroad. It reaches out to the public to promote its trade remedy mechanisms in place and 
uses the mechanism as a defensive tool.  
     Lastly, upon entering the global economy, China immediately built a strong trade 
remedy system that embarks on investigations at exponentially increasing numbers. In 
simple terms, China’s trade remedy system was built on the need to address numerous 
concerns from its trading partners, which are in large scales of complaints. Currently, 
China’s practices of dumping and government subsidy provision to industries are easily 
detected and it trades widely with countries all over the world, making China all the more 
vulnerable to AD/CVD investigations.  
     Amongst the three countries of East Asia, China’s and South Korea’s trade remedy 
systems are stronger than Japan’s, but while China implements a trade remedy system is 
both defensive and offensive in nature, South Korea mainly seeks for defensive perusal of 
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its trade remedy system. While contentions that Japan has been building aggressive 
legalism in the WTO may be feasible based on Japan’s growing participation in the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism (especially as third party), this chapter’s analysis of 
Japan’s trade remedy system shows that due to its institutional limits borne by strategic 
policy choice, Japan is less willing than South Korea or China to bolster its trade remedy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Trade Wars Continued:  
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The WTO as an International Platform for Trade Wars 
     While the three Northeast Asian countries have firmly established trade remedy 
measures under their own jurisdictions, as explained in Chapter 3, they also have another 
venue for resolving trade disputes at the international level – in the Dispute Settlement 
Body of the World Trade Organization. After the negotiations in the Uruguay Round 
were completed in 1994, the World Trade Organization was established in 1995, pursuant 
to the Marrakesh Agreement. In addition to a new set of rules in the global trade regime, 
the establishment of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) was by far the most 
significant update to the previous GATT system. Under GATT, countries could pursue 
trade remedy mechanisms in a unilateral manner, but a solid mechanism of dispute 
settlement and resolution process was absent and the methods of enforcement were not 
systematic. Today, the World Trade Organization oversees global trade with legally 
binding force.  
     Over the past twenty years, the WTO dispute settlement body has evolved into a full-
fledged institution that has the power to compel and encourages its member states to 
comply with global standards in trading goods and services. During the negotiation 
process that led to the establishment of the toward the establishment  WTO, U.S. 
policymakers expressed concerns that the legally binding force exercised by the WTO 
DSB could restrict U.S. capabilities to exercise unilateral actions and initiatives for trade 
remedy via legal provisions such as the Section 301, and also consensus on whether the 
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system would actually serve U.S. interests.168 In the startup process, advanced economies 
were in a favorable position, and in the beginning, they dominated the DSB system by 
targeting its trading partners. A large number of countries that brought cases to the WTO 
in the initial phase were mainly from the developed world, particularly the U.S. and the 
European Union. However, as time progressed, more and more developing economies 
were able to adapt to the WTO DSB mechanism and would succeed in defending their 
interests. Today, it is not difficult to notice the increasing number of cases filed by 
emerging market economies like Brazil, China, and India. Other least developed 
countries of the Americas and Africa also pursue the DSB to their advantage by actively 
engaging in the dispute settlement system as a complainant, respondent, or third party to 
dispute settlement cases at the WTO. Despite the stalemate of the Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA), the WTO DSB remains a very concrete, legally binding, and powerful 
tool for both developing and developed countries to address their issues concerning trade 
as members of the WTO. 
The Point of Investigation 
     There are two key research questions to be investigated in this chapter. The first is on 
WTO dispute initiation from the U.S. perspective, and the role of U.S. trade deficits in 
U.S. WTO dispute initiations. Many scholars in the field of IPE and WTO studies have 
sought to explain why countries sue in the WTO (Davis, 2012; Kim, 2010; Pekkanen, 
2008; Iida, 2006; Davis, 2003). Before unraveling the domestic politics of WTO dispute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 The amended U.S. legal provisions under the Section 301 came under scrutiny when the EU filed for a 
case in the DSB (DS152, United States — Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act 1974) in asserting that the 
Section 301 is inconsistent with WTO rules. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds152_e.htm 
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initiation in each of the three countries, this chapter first seeks to identify how big a role 
the accumulation of U.S. bilateral trade deficits, specifically with China, Japan, and 
South Korea, could affect its actual decisions to file a dispute in the WTO. Additionally, 
the first part of the chapter seeks to answer why of all the trade remedy cases that the 
USTR deals with, only certain cases have been taken to the WTO. 
     The second question to be investigated is the variance in the responses to U.S. dispute 
initiations by the three countries, and their behavior patterns in the WTO as complainant, 
respondent, and observer. While other scholars have provided some explanations as to 
why countries sue in the WTO in general, my analysis here seeks to find an answer to the 
differing responses by the three countries in the context of the structures of decision 
making at home with regard to country responses or dispute initiation in the WTO. To 
investigate this question, the second section of the chapter will investigate the domestic 
institutional provisions and procedures for each of the countries to initiate or respond to a 
WTO trade dispute, using case studies as examples. As a preview, some of the very 
important sub-questions to be answered in the qualitative section are the following: what 
makes China’s participation in the WTO so distinct from those of Japan’s or South 
Korea’s? What are the administrative procedures toward a case filing in each country and 
what, if at all, are the political motivations, economic costs toward trade dispute 
initiations in the three countries? For instance, are there diplomatic, budgetary, or 
industrial constraints toward a case filing or responding? On what grounds does each 
country initiate a case, and where do they obtain their legal expertise and support?  
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     In addition to the quantitative analysis in the first section, answering the qualitative 
questions in the second section will lead us to achieving the two main goals of the 
chapter, which are to understand how soaring U.S. trade deficits have resulted in U.S. 
WTO dispute initiations, and why the Northeast Asian economies’ response to U.S. 
dispute filings against them have differed. More specifically, the main objective of this 
chapter is to examine and scrutinize how the U.S. has imposed protectionist pressures on 
each of the three East Asian economies via the WTO, and to contrast each of their 
responses based on their domestic institutional mechanisms – which were readily 
available or established in response to the pressures – with regard to their WTO 
participation. The chapter will proceed as follows: first, it will lay out a brief description 
of the WTO DSB and the process of a dispute settlement in the WTO, then it will 
quantitatively investigate the role of U.S. trade deficits in U.S. dispute initiations in the 
WTO, then qualitatively investigate the varied responses from Japan, South Korea, and 
China with respect both to U.S. dispute initiation and their own methods of utilizing the 
WTO DSB system. The chapter will conclude with the ramifications as to whether the 
WTO will continue to be a venue for shaping trade policy for the countries addressed. 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
     The WTO Dispute Settlement Body operates on a system based on the effective 
enforcement of negotiated rules. This is a precondition for the trading system to work, 
and the DSB system compels each WTO member to comply with a negotiated agreement 
so as to prevent being placed in a situation that is worse than in a compliance situation.169 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009. p.85. 
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While the violation of WTO rules by a member may be certain and apparent, the rules 
and legal provisions that member states have agreed on are quite extensive and at times 
ambiguous. The discrepancy between the members’ violation or non-violation actions 
and the rules that are readily available in writing is the basis of disagreement, and the 
need for a venue to dispute for varying interpretations. Despite the shortcomings of 
ambiguity in the dispute settlement system, it is by far the most agreeable platform for 
resolving trade disputes for the WTO membership totaling 160 member states (as of June 
26, 2014) that retain different domestic laws and institutions.170 
Figure 4-1. The Main Stages of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and Adjudication 
 
 
Source: By author 
 
     The DSB system offers a thorough and technical process of resolving a trade dispute. 
The stages for the dispute settlement starts with the bilateral consultations process, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 The World Trade Organization (http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm) 
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which members are obliged and encouraged to attempt to solve their disputes via bilateral 
negotiations. However, if the parties cannot reach an agreement via bilateral 
consultations, a panel would be set up and a very tedious process toward reaching a panel 
decision and report on the case disputed, and monitoring of compliance. As seen in 
Figure 4-1, member states of the WTO may bring a case to the DSB as a complainant, to 
which a respondent country will respond and defend its position. Other members that are 
not involved in the case may participate as third parties contingent on authorization by 
the panel and the parties directly involved.  
     During the first stage of bilateral consultations, the parties may reach an informal 
settlement at any time. However, if the parties are not able to settle their agreement 
within 60 days of consultations, they may request the establishment of a dispute 
settlement panel in the DSB. In this second stage of panel establishment, third parties 
may join as observing members contingent on approval of the DSB. About three or four 
panelists are suggested by the WTO Secretariat to sit on the panel, contingent on 
approval by the two parties involved in the dispute. While at work, the Panel examines 
the facts and the two parties’ arguments, holds meetings with the parties involved and 
also with the third parties, issues interim reports and drafts recommendations on 
resolving the dispute. In the end, a panel report is issued to bring about implementation 
on the dispute. In the third stage, the panel report is either adopted by the DSB and the 
two parties reach a consensus, or a party disagrees with the panel report and appeals to 
the DSB. The Appellate Body, consisting of seven persons, judges the matter of law and 
legal consistency, and issues a report that is final and adopted by the DSB. Finally, in the 
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implementation stage, if immediate compliance is impractical, a reasonable amount of 
time is given to the offending party, and the period of time is decided based on arbitration. 
However, if the offending party fails to act within the given period of time, the parties 
negotiate compensation pending full implementation. Furthermore, if such negotiation is 
not feasible, the complainant to the dispute may retaliate – that is, it may request the DSB 
to authorize suspension of equivalent concessions against the offending party based on 
WTO rules.171 
Literature on Dispute Initiation in the WTO 
     The literature on WTO dispute initiation is very broad and includes the disciplines of 
economics, international relations, political economy, and international trade law. Over 
the past two decades since the establishment of the organization, scholars in various 
disciplines have examined a wide range of variables that could lead to a country to 
initiate a dispute in the WTO. Mainly observing the U.S. cases in the WTO, Grinols and 
Perrelli have argued that political variables are significant in the initiation of trade 
disputes and in their length of adjudication.172 Using U.S. Section 301 trade dispute data, 
their analysis emphasized the role of the U.S. trade law in the form of the Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which has the effect of increasing the number of cases 
by creating a “conveyor belt” of case initiation. They also argued that when the caseload 
of the USTR exceeded 14, initiation became less likely due to government resources 
limit, even for a large government like the United States – implying that governmental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171 For a full description of the detailed legal procedures of the WTO dispute settlement, see Hoekman and 
Kostecki, ibid. pps. 89-90. Also for a full flowchart of the panel process, see under the section ‘Settling 
Disputes’ in ‘Understanding the WTO’, published and regularly updated by the World Trade Organization. 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp2_e.htm) 
172 Grinols and Perrelli, 2002. 
	  	  
186 
factors can influence WTO dispute initiation. Shaffer (2003) has argued that a public-
private partnership in the litigation process influences WTO dispute initiation. Because 
only member states are allowed to sue in the WTO, private firms, equipped with the 
financial means to fund legal assistance for the dispute initiations, are compelled to 
partner with public entities, and vice versa. Most recently, Davis (2012) has argued that 
states use international adjudication in the WTO in order to manage domestic political 
pressure and to pursue international cooperation.173  
U.S. Trade Deficits and U.S. Dispute Initiation in the WTO 
     U.S. trade deficits are the differences between the value of U.S. exports and U.S. 
imports. The fundamental cause of the deficits is excessive spending by U.S. consumers, 
businesses, and the government, but foreign trade barriers can influence the profitability 
of U.S. exporters, bilateral trade balances, and ultimately the aggregate trade balance.174 
The U.S. trade deficits have been accumulated over the past four decades since the early 
1970s (see Figure 4-2), and is sustainable as long as foreign investors are willing to buy 
and hold U.S. assets – in most part government securities (U.S. Treasury bills) and 
financial assets. Reducing the trade deficit requires policy kits comprising direct 
measures of trade policy (i.e., imports and exports, exchange rates) and indirect measures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Davis, 2013. 
174 ‘Trade Primer: Qs and As on Trade Concepts, Performance, and Policy’ in Dena B. Torres eds., ‘U.S. 
Traade: Key Concepts, Policies and International Trends’, Series in Trade Issues, Policies and Laws, 
Novinka, 2013. pp.9-19. 
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of monetary and fiscal policy (i.e., interest rates, saving rates, budget deficits, capital 
flows).175  
     While the array of literature on dispute initiation in the WTO provide us with some 
interesting legal, institutional, and political insights on understanding the intent of states, 
businesses, and institutions, the WTO literature still leaves room for investigation into 
political and economic factors of the WTO dispute initiation dynamics. I contend that 
although the final decisions to launch an investigation may be more political than 
economic in a domestic spectrum, both political and economic factors of the trade dispute 
must be examined. Noting that changes in real exchange rate levels lead to pressures on 
politicians to provide relief from the resulting economic pressures on firms in tradable 
sectors, Copelovitch and Pevehouse (2010) have argued that countries facing exchange 
rate pressures will be more likely to placate domestic demands for protection by filing 
WTO dispute claims.176 While their dependent variable suggests that exchange rate 
pressures is an important economic variable that may be a root cause for instigating WTO 
trade disputes, I suspect that there is an additional economic factor – import surges – 
which could be a more important cause. This is because without an actual import surge, it 
is very difficult to gain complaints from the industries and also political momentum 
toward actual dispute filing bureaucratically. In this section, I investigate the role of trade 
imbalances that the U.S. has had with its trading partners in WTO dispute initiation. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 Torres, ibid. p.13. While monetary and fiscal policy is the most effective method to reduce trade deficits, 
the primary target of the two policies is the conditions of the U.S. macroeconomy and trade deficit is a 
secondary target.  
176 Copelovitch and Pevehouse, 2010. 
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seen in Figure 4-2, the U.S. has been mounting trade deficits against the world overall, 
and in particular with its major trading partners of Europe and Asia. 
Figure 4-2. U.S. Trade Deficits against the World 
 
 
Source: U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Contributions to the WTO Dispute Initiation Literature and the Role of Trade 
Imbalances 
     The discussion on trade balances and trade policy has been most prevalent – and 
considered most relevant – in the policy realm rather than in academia, where economists 
have not been able to agree on the significance of the trade balances variable. 
Nevertheless, as the trade deficits issue resurfaced in the face of China’s economic 
expansion, it became a major issue in the U.S. domestic policy sphere. Since China 
entered the world economy via WTO accession in 2001 and started accumulating huge 
trade surpluses, China has become a main target of WTO dispute initiation by the United 
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can we link descriptive analysis in the media or policy reports emphasizing the rise of 
trade deficits to actual policymaking? After all, it still remains a question whether the U.S. 
WTO dispute initiations on China or other countries actually stem from concerns 
regarding trade deficit accumulation.177 This research gap is the basic starting point of 
this chapter, and where the ultimate goal of the chapter falls in.   
     Looking into the literature in various fields, one may be surprised to find how little 
attention has been given to the linkage between trade deficits and policy change.178 First 
and foremost, in the field of macroeconomics, many economists have refrained from 
supporting the significance of bilateral trade deficits based on the fact that trade deficits 
may be offset by the accumulation of current account surpluses.179 However, despite the 
‘natural’ characteristics of trade imbalances in macroeconomic theory, other economists 
were able to identify and link the importance of trade deficits in terms of policymaking. 
In the coauthored report for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Bown, Crowley, 
McCulloch and Nakajima (2005) assert that although the occurrence of trade deficits may 
be a natural phenomenon, bilateral and sectoral imbalances in certain industries do 
become a focus of attention when they are large and trigger changes in policy. They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Han Liyu and Henry Gao refer to Reference News (January 26, 2008) to support the linkages between 
mounting U.S. bilateral trade deficits with China and actual U.S. dispute initiation in the WTO. In January 
of 2008, then USTR Susan Schwab noted that the U.S. trade deficit with China was ‘unsustainable’, 
suggesting further WTO complaints would follow. See Han Liyu and Henry Gao’s chapter in Schaffer and 
Meléndez-Ortiz ed., 2010. p.157. 
178 Hoeffner ed., 2010. Nonetheless, there have indeed been scholarly efforts to identify the sources of huge 
U.S. trade deficits by economists and policy analysts. For example, scholars have been keen on identifying 
the linkages between the price of oil and the impact of such price changes on economies around the globe, 
thereby identifying a causal relationship between the dollar and the price of oil and providing an 
assessment on the impact a range of prices of imported oil could have on the U.S. trade deficit.  
179 Cooper, 2005. In his policy brief for the Institute for International Economics, Cooper contended that 
U.S. current account deficit accumulation is sustainable and natural in today’s highly globalized economy. 
He attributed the continuance of trade deficits to America’s production of attractive financial assets. 
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explain these policy changes as giving rise to policies that focus on specific trading 
partners or traded products rather than on the macroeconomic conditions that underline 
the overall imbalance.180 The main argument in this chapter adheres to Bown et al 
(2005)’s assertion that sectoral trade imbalances give rise to policy changes, but does not 
neglect the significance of overall trade imbalance on trade policy setting. In this chapter, 
I contend that both overall and sectoral imbalances contribute to a policy action, 
explaining the effect of overall trade imbalances in the quantitative analysis section and 
sectoral imbalances through case studies. 
     In the field of international political economy, the scholarly attention on trade 
imbalances has been quite minimal, and more prevalent in the field of trade or economic 
policy. One of the seminal works by Davis on WTO adjudication (Davis, 2012) uses 
trade balances, but not trade deficits, as a control variable in measuring the states’ intent 
for dispute initiation. Before delving into her analysis further, it is important to point out 
that the focus of Davis’s argument is not on the importance of trade imbalances, but 
rather on how regime type influences WTO dispute initiation behavior of states. In 
answering why states adjudicate, Davis argues that states use international adjudication in 
order to manage domestic political pressure and pursue international cooperation. In her 
analysis, she controls for the structure of trade relations – trade balance and share of 
exports. Although not central to her analysis, she uses the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators trade data to explain that countries that run surpluses tend to file 
more dispute initiations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Bown et al, ‘The U.S. Trade Deficit: Made in China?’, Economic Perspectives, The Federal Bank of 
Chicago, 2005.  
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     Methodologically, Davis’s analysis presents an overall perspective of trade 
adjudication because it incorporates years in which data are available throughout both the 
GATT and WTO periods, and the subjects of her study are 81 countries in total. Her 
findings cover overall dispute initiation of states worldwide, not just the United States, in 
a long timeline. The statistical significance supporting her thesis that trade balance 
corresponds with greater adjudication activity is only salient in the models that are for the 
full periods from 1975-2004.181 For the model run for the WTO cases from 1995-2004, 
the coefficient is minimal and statistically insignificant. Davis’s analysis leaves room for 
additional and updated research on the impact of trade balance and WTO dispute 
initiation. 
     The analysis in this chapter is focused mainly on U.S. bilateral trade policymaking via 
WTO adjudication. My contribution to the trade imbalances literature is two-fold: to 
identify the intersections between trade deficit accumulation and policy action in the 
United States, and to update the literature on WTO dispute cases by extending the periods 
of investigation to 1995-2013 with the goals of identifying the linkages between trade 
deficits and dispute initiation. In other words, the ultimate contribution of this chapter to 
the literature on trade imbalances and dispute initiation is on how we should expect trade 
deficit to trigger WTO dispute initiation by the United States. My findings suggest an 
updated analysis of U.S. dispute initiations in the WTO, and how trade deficits have 
influenced U.S. dispute initiations. Through my case studies, I explain how the three East 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Davis, 2012. p.82. 
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Asian economies have in turn responded to U.S. dispute initiations, and how they have in 
time each developed ways to file investigations against the United States. 
Patterns of U.S. Dispute Initiation in the WTO 
 
     It is very important to note that not all trade related issues are taken to the WTO for 
dispute initiation. Some cases are resolved at the level of domestic trade remedy, and 
pursuing a trade dispute case in the WTO involves potential for diplomatic or political 
conflict. Politics is heavily involved in the process toward a USTR decision, as seen in 
the highly selective way in which the U.S. has pursued cases in the WTO. That said, the 
U.S. is inevitably an aggressive player in the WTO. As a complainant, of the total of its 
112 complaints (103 original, 9 compliance), 74 (including 2 that are partially concluded) 
have been concluded. 8 cases were merged with other complaints, 8 are in the litigation 
stage, and 24 cases are either in the pre-litigation bilateral consultation stage or currently 
inactive (including 2 cases that are partially concluded).182 Meanwhile, as a respondent, 
of the total of 148 complaints issued against the U.S. (129 original, 19 compliance), 90 
have been concluded, 27 were merged with other complaints, 10 are in the litigation stage, 
and 21 are either in the pre-litigation consultation stage or currently inactive.183  
     Note that the number of WTO cases initiated by the USTR slightly varies from what 
the WTO website offers, due to the point in time in which the number of cases was 
calculated, and taking into account the different stages of cases that evolve over time. For 
example, the USTR website dated May 22, 2014 states the number of U.S. cases as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), ‘Snapshot of WTO cases involving the United States’, May 22, 
2014.  
183 The USTR, ibid. 
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complainant as 112 cases and U.S. cases as a respondent as 148, whereas the WTO shows 
107 cases and 121 cases (See Table 4-1). This discrepancy amongst USTR and WTO 
case counts can also derive from setting different criteria for cases actually filed, because 
unless a panel is set up in the WTO for a dispute settlement case beyond the consultation 
stage, the WTO website does not reflect the new case filed. In other words, the USTR 
data takes into account pre-litigation stages and count them as cases, whereas the WTO 
data does not and counts cases of which panels were set up for dispute settlement. Here, I 
use the WTO data series because it is more up-to-date and detailed with specific details. 
Table 4-1. WTO Dispute Settlement Cases (as of August 12, 2014) 
 
Country 
X 
WTO 
Membership 
As 
Complainant 
As 
Respondent 
As  
Third Party 
U.S. against 
Country X 
amongst all 
Country X’s 
responses (%) 
Country X 
against the U.S. 
amongst all 
Country X 
complaints (%) 
Country X as 
Third Party in 
U.S. cases (%) 
United 
States 
1 January 
1995  
107 cases 121 cases 116 cases NA NA NA 
Japan 1 January 
1995  
19 cases 15 cases 146 cases 6 of 15 
(40%) 
8 of 19 
(42%) 
95 of 146 
(65%) 
South 
Korea 
1 January 
1995  
16 cases 14 cases 87 cases 6 of 14 
(42%)  
10 of 16 
(62%) 
55 of 87 
(63%) 
China 11 December 
2001  
12 cases 31 cases 112 cases 15 of 31 
(48%) 
9 of 12 
(75%) 
56 of 112 
(50%) 
Source: www.wto.org (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm) 
 
         The patterns of U.S. participation in the WTO DSB have been changing over time, 
demonstrating different magnitudes at different time periods. In the beginning, the DSB 
was actively used as a test drive, and the U.S. filed in many cases in the same purpose of 
testing the DSB. The very first cases against Japan and South Korea were filed during 
this phase. The number of U.S. complaints dropped considerably in 2001 and 2005, but in 
other years it has maintained a modest number of complaints. As much as it trades with 
the rest of the world, the U.S. has been targeted continuously at the same time. In the year 
of 2002, cases against the U.S. skyrocketed, reaching a total of 19 cases. Japan, South 
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Korea, China, and even Chinese Taipei raised a case on U.S. safeguard measures on 
imports of certain steel products that year, and the U.S. was also targeted by its major 
trading partners such as Canada, the EC, and Brazil on cases ranging from lumber, fruits, 
and cotton. U.S. third party participation has peaked in recent years as well. 
Figure 4-3. U.S. Participation in the WTO (1995-2014) 
 
 
Source: www.wto.org  
Theoretical Discussion on Variables Leading to WTO Dispute Initiation  
     Scholars in the field of IPE have explored the variables leading to dispute initiations in 
the WTO in various ways. There could be several variables impacting the policy decision 
for launching a dispute case in the WTO. Chad Bown, a leading scholar on WTO 
disputes and domestic trade remedy (AD/CVD), has looked at the linkages between trade 
remedy and WTO case filing, and has argued that not only the size of the economy and 
capacity to retaliate under WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding authorized sanctions 
but the original capacity to directly retaliate via AD/CVD measures impacts the 
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government’s decision whether to file a WTO case.184 Using a negative binomial 
regression model, Christina Davis (2012) has examined the role of different political 
regime types and economic status of states - democracies and authoritarian regimes, 
developed and developing economies - influencing WTO dispute initiations.185 Using a 
zero-inflated count data model, Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer have investigated 
the effects of economic power, trade dependence, and domestic politics toward WTO 
dispute initiation, and argued that bilateral trade volume is necessary for dispute initiation, 
but does not have a substantive effect on the number of initiations. Rather, they argue 
domestic politics is more important than economic power (in terms of bilateral trade 
volume) and trade dependence in explaining WTO dispute initiation.186 Copelovitch and 
Pevehouse have investigated the effects of currency appreciation on WTO dispute 
initiations.187 Using probit models, Busch, Reinhardt, and Shaffer have argued that legal 
capacity of a state is a substantive factor that leads to a WTO dispute initiation.188 
     When it comes solely to U.S. WTO dispute initiation patterns, there are still new 
venues to explore, including the impacts of bipartisanship or party politics on U.S. WTO 
dispute initiation (i.e., whether the U.S. initiates more cases under a certain political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Chad P. Bown, ‘Trade Remedy and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why So Few 
Challenged?’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3540, March 2005. 
185 Davis, 2012. 
186 Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer, ‘Dispute Initiation in the World Trade Organization’, draft 
research paper (http://wp.peio.me/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Conf1_Bernauer.Sattler’_Dispute.Initiation.WTO_.pdf). 
187 Mark S. Copelovitch and Jon C. Pevehouse, ‘“Currency Wars” By Other Means? Exchange Rates and 
GATT/WTO Dispute Initiations’, draft research paper 
(https://ncgg.princeton.edu/IPES/2010/papers/F220_paper3.pdf). 
188  Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt, and Gregory Shaffer, ‘Does Legal Capacity Matter? Explaining Dispute 
Initiation and Antidumping Actions in the WTO’, Issue Paper No. 4, ICTSD Dispute Settlement and Legal 
Aspects of International Trade, December 2008 
(http://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2009/02/legal_capacity.pdf) 
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party’s dominance in the Congress), or other factors such as the leadership change of the 
USTR on deciding which cases to pursue in the WTO, although typically the nature of 
the USTR has not depended entirely on the head of the organization. But the point of 
investigation in this chapter is that amongst all of the interesting variables to explore on 
WTO dispute initiation, there is a need for research focusing on the economic aspect of 
U.S. trade that influences its decision toward WTO dispute initiation, there is a research 
gap on the impact of U.S. bilateral trade imbalances on WTO dispute initiation.   
Contribution to the Literature 
     I propose an events count model analysis that focuses solely on U.S. bilateral trade 
imbalances and its impact on dispute initiation in the WTO. There is every need for 
research focusing mainly on U.S. bilateral trade imbalances that lead to U.S. dispute 
initiation in the WTO in order to figure out if there is a yearly, bilateral economic 
component that contributes to the dispute initiations by the U.S. By doing so, we would 
be able to find out whether the augmentation of U.S. bilateral trade imbalances with each 
of its trading partners actually results in the rise of WTO dispute initiations by the U.S. is 
true. But most of the studies that have been conducted are either focusing on all WTO 
members, due to the strong dependence on large-n data in analyzing WTO disputes, most 
of the previous research has focused on WTO membership as a whole, or core members 
of the WTO. In previous studies, the U.S. is only a part of the whole when it comes to 
analyzing WTO dispute initiation patterns. Previous studies have also focused mainly on 
the role of political variables (i.e., regime type) that lead to dispute initiation, and there is 
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room for research that underlines the impact of economic factors rather than political 
ones. 
Variables and Hypothesis 
Dispute Initiation Measures - Dependent Variable 
     The dependent variable to be measured is the number of WTO trade dispute initiation 
filed by the U.S. against a country X from 1995 to 2013. Currently, the WTO 
membership is 160 members, and a considerable portion of these countries (i.e., least 
developed countries) have never been involved in a WTO dispute with the U.S. The U.S. 
and the EU are the most active users of the WTO DSB system, and their counterparts are 
usually countries that trade with them extensively. Thus, it would be irrational to include 
all of the 160 countries in the dataset, because then it would be difficult to capture the 
relationship between trade deficits and actual dispute behavior. I set the following criteria 
for selection of country observation. Because the list of U.S. top trading partners varies 
over time, I rely on the WTO dispute settlement records to identify any countries with 
which the U.S. has been involved in a trade dispute in the WTO, either as a complainant, 
respondent, or a third party. The fact that the U.S. was involved in an actual dispute with 
a country X proves that there is sufficient trade activity or indirect trade interest from the 
U.S. side concerning that country X. Thus, I narrow down my observations to the main 
trading partners of the United States that have faced a WTO dispute with the U.S. at least 
once since joining the WTO.  
     The following 27 countries have been involved in a WTO dispute case filed by the 
U.S.: Republic of Korea, Japan, European Union, Australia, Canada, Hungary, Pakistan, 
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Portugal, Turkey, India, Brazil, Argentina, Indonesia, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Philippines, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Mexico, Chile, Greece, Netherlands, France, 
Romania, Egypt, and China. Countries that have filed a WTO dispute case against the 
U.S. include the 27 countries and another list of 11 countries, which are: Venezuela, 
Costa Rica, Colombia, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway, Chinese Taipei, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Thailand, Ecuador, and Vietnam. There are countries that have never been 
directly involved in a case against the U.S. but have been involved in cases in which the  
U.S. took part as a third party are the following 12 countries: Peru, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Panama, Honduras, El Salvador, Moldova, Ukraine, Cuba, 
and Russia. Because these countries were not directly involved in a trade dispute with the 
U.S. in the WTO DSB, they only represent zero cases of U.S. dispute initiation. For this 
reason, I have not included them in the dataset and have only included countries that were 
directly involved with the U.S. in cases that the U.S. served as a complainant or a 
respondent, a total of 38 countries.  
Trade Deficits/annual US GDP Measures - Independent Variable 
     The independent variable to be measured in Hypothesis 1 is the yearly U.S. trade 
deficit with a specific bilateral trading partner X as a percentage of U.S. GDP of that year 
from 1995 to 2013. For the analysis in this chapter, the calculation for the trade deficits 
variable derives from subtracting imports of goods and services and income payments 
from exports of goods and services and income receipts, of which both figures are 
included in the current account. Simply put,  
U.S. Trade Imbalances = ( X – M ) 
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     The U.S. annual gross domestic product (GDP) data (unit: GDP in billions of current 
dollars), which is used to give weight to the trade deficit variable, is from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of State (dated July 30, 2014).189 By dividing 
the trade deficit per year with the U.S. GDP per year, the independent variable specifies 
the proportion of the trade deficit as a percentage of U.S. GDP of a specific year. 
Control Variables 
     Toward the USTR’s decision to launch a dispute initiation, there may be multiple 
factors to take into consideration. It is understood that while the U.S. receives numerous 
petitions for trade remedy as explained in Chapter 3, only a handful of cases can be 
addressed via the USTR due to the administrative capacity and political, diplomatic 
relationships that must be maintained with the trading partner. The following are some 
critical factors that must be controlled for in the regression analysis in order to make sure 
that the relationship between the independent variable (U.S. trade deficit/GDP per year) 
and dependent variable (number of dispute initiation per year). All of the control 
variables present possibilities of impacting the USTR’s decision either directly or 
indirectly in filing a dispute initiation, or contributing to the political atmosphere that 
pushes the USTR to a position to file a dispute initiation. 
1) Log of Foreign Exchange Reserves of the Trading Partner X 
The amount of foreign exchange reserves the trading partner accumulates may stir 
controversies in the U.S. Congress when related to trade deficit discussions, and 
media reports often address the issue of foreign exchange reserves accumulation of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Current-dollar and “real” GDP, National Economic Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. 
Department of Commerce (http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp) 
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the trading partner to magnify the trade imbalances aspect of the bilateral trade 
relationship. The justification for deploying the log of foreign exchange reserves of 
trading partner X as a control variable is to control for frictions that may arise due to 
the political pressures under speculations that currency manipulation is ongoing based 
solely on the size of a trading partner’s foreign exchange reserve. 
2) U.S. Unemployment Rate per year 
As in the context of foreign exchange reserves accumulation, unemployment rate also 
catches the attention of the general public, and can also be used by the media and 
lobbyists to pressure politicians and policymakers to take an action on a certain 
bilateral trade deficit at issue.  
Hypothesis 
     H1: The accumulation of trade deficit with a trading partner per annual U.S. GDP 
increases the probability of the U.S. initiating a WTO trade dispute (filing a complaint) 
with the trading partner. 
     The hypothesis that I posit here for my argument is straightforward: the relationship 
that I am seeking to unravel between the two variables is that the U.S. trade deficit 
generated by another trading partner as a percent of U.S. GDP that particular year, can 
actually lead to U.S. trade dispute initiation in the WTO. This is based on the expectation 
that the goal of U.S. trade policy is in large part intended to improve the capacity of 
Americans to compete in the global economy, and in achieving that goal, improving trade 
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statistics is a vital task for U.S. trade policymakers.190 There could also be alternative 
variables, such as trade surges in a particular sector, which could serve as an independent 
variable. However, collecting and tracking trade surge data for each particular industry 
could be tricky and also unreliable.  
The Model  
     The dependent variable is count data, and for count data, a negative binomial model is 
deemed appropriate. However, as seen in Tables 4-2 and 4-3, because the vast majority 
of observations of the dependent variable are 0s and 1s, it is useful to deploy a logit 
model, as it treats any 2s or 3s as 1s (the dependent variable is either 0, 1, 2, or 3). The 
dependent variable is essentially binary, with only less than 2 percent of the observations 
being greater than 1, I have opted for a logit model. Nonetheless, results of the negative 
binomial regression are provided to show that both models yield basically the same 
results. For future research purposes, a zero-inflated poisson model would be useful to 
further scrutinize the effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable. 
Table 4-2. Distribution of the Dependent Variable 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Complaint 950 .1136842 .4024714 0 3 
 
Table 4-3. Proportion of the Dependent Variable (Number of Obs = 950) 
Variable 
Complaint 
Proportion Standard Error [95% Conf. Interval] 
0 .9105263 .0092653 .8923434 .9287092 
1 .0715789 .0083682 .0551566 .0880013 
2 .0115789 .0034727 .0047638 .0183941 
3 .0063158 .0025716 .0012691 .0113625 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 ‘U.S. Trade and Investment Policy’, Independent Task Force Report No.67, Council on Foreign 
Relations, 2011.  
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     The intent of pursuing both models is in demonstrating that changes in trade 
imbalance levels provide political pressures and domestic demands on policy makers to 
resolve the trade imbalance by resorting to a trade dispute in an international institution. 
The country fixed effects on both models enable the statistical program Stata to drop any 
country of which there were no complaints by the U.S. filed against any trading partner in 
the WTO in a certain year. Moreover, the country fixed effects go beyond eliminating 
countries that U.S. didn’t file disputes against – they control for any non-time varying 
country characteristics that are observed or unobserved. By placing country fixed effects 
in the model, each country in the observation samples would have a different baseline 
probability and level of dispute initiation. Thus, the model is empowered by fixed effects 
toward focusing on the forces that cause variation in dispute initiation patterns with each 
country over time in the given period. In addition, the year effects are included to help 
account for the temporal trend in overall U.S. WTO dispute initiations. 
Model Specification 
     Before the model is presented, it should be noted that the current model is rather 
under-specified, and future research should improve the model by including more 
variables. The main issue of concern for the current model is the existence of omitted 
variable bias (OVB), which occurs only when factors correlated with both the dependent 
variable and the independent variable are omitted from the model. For instance, while 
factors like the partisan balance of power in the U.S. Congress may be potentially 
important predictors of general propensity to initiate trade disputes, it is unlikely to be a 
source of OVB because it is not correlated with trade balances with different countries of 
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observation. I include the log of foreign exchange reserves of the trading partner X as a 
control variable, because it could be a factor that is correlated with both the trade 
balances and the propensity to initiate dispute initiation. I also include the unemployment 
rate, not because it could be a potential source of OVB, but because it is existent in the 
political discourse in the media that could sway public opinion. The country fixed effects 
play a significant role in the model, underspecified as is, but future update on the model 
will focus on identifying and including other variables that could potentially result in 
OVB. 
Pr(y) = USWTO complaintit = β0 + β1Trade Imbalancesit/USGDPit 
                                                         + β2 ForeignExchangeReservesAccumulationit  
                                                         + β3 USUnemploymentRatet 
                                                         + Country Fixed Effects 
                                                         + Year Fixed Effects 
                                                         + εit 
 
where 
 
USWTO complaintit = the expected value of the likelihood of the U.S. (to be specific, the USTR)  
                                    filing a request for the establishment of a WTO panel to express its    
                                    economic interest (WTO dispute initiation) 
 
and 
 
Trade Imbalances/USGDPit = bilateral trade imbalances (Exports-Imports) of each U.S. trading  
                                                 partner who is a party to the WTO divided by U.S. GDP per year  
                                                 (current US dollars)     
 
ForeignExchangeReservesAccumulationit  = the amount of foreign exchange reserves   
                                                                        accumulation by each U.S. trading partner who is a  
                                                                        party to the WTO  
 
USUnemploymentRatet = the unemployment year of the U.S. in that given year 
 
Data Sources 
Dispute Initiation Data (DV) 
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     For the data on WTO dispute settlement, I combine manually collected data with the 
World Bank WTO Dispute Settlement Data (2011). While there are other avenues to 
collect WTO dispute settlement data outside the WTO website portal, most of them are 
not up to date. The most comprehensive dataset on WTO Dispute Settlement is the World 
Bank WTO Dispute Settlement Data by Henrik Horn and Petros C. Mavroidis, which 
covers various aspects of the WTO dispute settlement system, only covers WTO disputes 
initiated through the official filing of a request for consultations at the WTO from 1 
January 1995 to November 3, 2011.191 In order to conduct an updated analysis to the year 
2014, I have manually added counts of dispute initiations by referencing dispute records 
displayed on the WTO website.  
Trade Deficits Data (IV) 
     The international transactions (balance of payments) accounts data collected by the 
United States Census Bureau include all transactions between U.S. and foreign entities.192 
The current account includes exports and imports of goods, services, income, and net 
unilateral current transfers. The capital account includes mainly capital transfers, such as 
U.S. government debt forgiveness. The financial account includes transactions in 
financial assets, such as U.S. purchases and sales of foreign securities, foreign purchases 
and sales of U.S. securities, U.S. direct investment abroad, foreign direct investment in 
the United States, U.S. bank lending to foreigners, and U.S. bank borrowing from 
foreigners. The U.S. Census Bureau’s trade balances data covers the time periods ranging 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 WTO Dispute Settlement Database (http://go.worldbank.org/X5EZPHXJY0) 
192 Foreign Trade data, United States Census Bureau. (https://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/balance/c5700.html) 
	  	  
205 
from 1985 to 2014 (year-to-date). However, in consideration of the duration of the WTO 
dispute settlement data available, the model will only deploy trade imbalances data from 
1995 to 2013. 
Foreign Exchange Reserves Accumulation Data (CV) 
     Comprised of data files from the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics, the World Development Indicators dataset of the World Bank has a section on 
foreign reserves data (unit: total reserves including gold in current US$). Total reserves 
comprise holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves of IMF members 
held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of monetary 
authorities. The gold component of these reserves is valued at year-end (December 31) 
London prices.193 
U.S. Unemployment Rate Data (CV) 
     The data for yearly U.S. unemployment rate can be retrieved from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, of the U.S. Department of Labor.194  
Results  
 
     For both logit and negative binomial regressions, I have used both random and fixed- 
effects models in order to show comparisons between them – through the country fixed-
effects, any country for which there were no complaints in the designated period is 
dropped, as seen in the number of observations decrease from 950 to 532 (Model 1 and 
Model 2). In Models 3 and 4, the log of foreign exchange reserves is missing 19 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Foreign reserves data, the World Bank, World Development Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FI.RES.TOTL.CD) 
194 Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor (http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000) 
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observations, and the total number of observations is therefore 513. Year effects were 
added in order to check that there are no variations within years in terms of U.S. 
complaints, but both regression results did show that the earlier years from 1995 to 2000 
(and 2001 for the negative binomial regression model) had higher propensities of U.S. 
complaints in the WTO.  
Table 4-4 . Estimated Coefficients of Logit Analysis for  
U.S. Dispute Initiation in the WTO (1995-2013) 
 
Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 
 
Model 4 
 
Trade Balance/US GDP -.1149438* 
(.0742858) 
-.4015488*** 
(.0742858)  
-.3517652*** 
(.1071647) 
-.5008527*** 
(.1387809) 
     
Log FX Reserves    -.5294112** 
(.2661305) 
.175976 
(.374373) 
     
US Unemployment Rate    -.2349565**  
(.1168758) 
.9259182 
(1.67184) 
     
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Effects No Yes No Yes 
     
Number of 
Observations 
532 532 513 513 
Note: Models 2-5 are fixed-effects models. All models are for the period from 1995 to 2013. * Significant at 
the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. The 
regressions were run on Stata 11.2. 
 
Both regression results show that for the years 1995-2013, U.S. participation patterns in 
the WTO DSB with its trading partners have been influenced by U.S. trade balances with 
the trading partner, and the amount of foreign exchange reserves held by the trading 
partner, and U.S. unemployment rate also showed minimal impact in comparison to the 
log of foreign exchange reserves variable, but only in Model 3 in which year effects are 
absent. While an explanation is needed for the varying results with or without the year 
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effects, in both the logit and negative binomial regression models (Tables 4-4 and 4-5), 
the sign of the coefficient for the independent variable of interest is consistent with 
expectations and statistically significant across Models 1-4. 
Table 4-5 . Estimated Coefficients of Negative Binomial Regression Models for  
U.S. Dispute Initiation in the WTO (1995-2013) 
 
Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 3 Model 4 
Trade Balance/US GDP -.1014043** 
(.0522719) 
-.4015488*** 
(.0978062) 
-.3517652*** 
(.1071647) 
-.5008527*** 
(.1387809) 
     
Log FX Reserves   -.5294112** 
(.2661305) 
.175976 
(.374373) 
     
US Unemployment Rate   -.2349565* 
(.1168758) 
.9259182 
(1.67184) 
     
Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year Effects No Yes No Yes 
     
Number of 
Observations 
532 532 513 513 
     
Constant .1030205 
(.6887554) 
   
     
Note: Model 1 is random-effects model, whereas Models 2-5 are fixed-effects models. All models are for 
the period from 1995 to 2013. * Significant at the 10 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *** 
Significant at the 1 percent level. The regressions were run on Stata 11.2. 
 
 Case Studies: Institutional Variation in WTO DSB Participation 
          Although member states may go through the same designated procedures in a 
WTO dispute settlement, the ways in which they go about it are different based on 
individual country practices. The case studies on the three countries reveal stark 
institutional variation. 
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Japan 
     The most notable discourse on Japan’s WTO DSB participation in recent years 
characterizes Japan’s trade strategy as “aggressive legalism”, defined by Pekkanen as 
“the active use of the legal rules in the treaties and agreements overseen by the WTO to 
stake out positions, to advance and rebut claims, and to embroil all concerned in an 
intricate legal game.”195 Despite some disagreements on this analysis by Japanese MOFA 
bureaucrats, some Western and Japanese scholars have agreed with the basis of her 
analysis while adding new evaluations of Japan’s trade policy.196 But while the argument 
on Japan’s “aggressive legalism” stands and does explain a salient aspect of Japan’s trade 
policy in recent years, it carries lesser weight if compared to South Korea’s or China’s 
participation in the WTO DSB. Amongst the three East Asian countries, Japan 
demonstrates the most reserved positions in WTO disputes (Table 4-1), but shows the 
most active participation as third party in the dispute settlement system. In relative 
comparison to its East Asian neighbors, Japan has positioned itself more as a bystander 
than a contender or a target since the launching of the WTO DSB in 1995. Japan 
acquiesces even in the WTO. 
Japan’s Trade Imbalances with the U.S. and WTO cases  
     One explanation for Japan’s reserved attitude that can be dated to Japan’s participation 
in the GATT dispute settlement mechanism is that Japan’s current account balance was a 
major factor in Japan’s reluctance toward the active use of the GATT dispute settlement 
mechanism. Its permanent trade surplus put the government in an awkward position in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Pekkanen, 2001. 
196 Steger, 2010; Araki, 2004.  
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aggressively demanding foreign market access.197 Japan’s large trade surplus also made it 
vulnerable to foreign threats of market closure, and weakened its own threat to close off 
its markets (Figure 4-4).198 While the argument on Japan’s reluctance for litigation based 
on Japan’s trade surplus may partially explain for Japan’s insistence on having a reserved 
position in the international arena, the claim is not very new, and Japan’s steady trade 
surplus has definitely played a role in shaping Japan’s stance in the global economy. The 
limitations of the explanation based on Japan’s trade surplus can be complemented with 
the institutional factors that shaped Japan’s patterns of participation in the WTO. 
Figure 4-4. U.S.-Japan Trade Imbalances (1985-2013) 
 
 
Source: U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
          Japan was most targeted by the United States in the initial years of the WTO DSB 
setup – 1995, 1996, and 1997. The cases in which Japan was targeted were on alcoholic 
beverages, photographic film, copyright sound recordings, and later on, agricultural 
goods. While Japan kept a steady surplus in trading with the U.S., Japan’s trade surplus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Yamane, 1998. 
198 Davis, 2012. p.191 
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with the U.S. had been on the rise since the year 1990 for five consecutive years toward 
the launch of the WTO. It fell slightly in 1996, but rose again in 1997. 
Japan’s Institutionalism in WTO Dispute Participation 
    From the GATT days, Japan has not been an active pursuer of disputes. It avoided the 
GATT dispute settlement process altogether and sought bilateral settlement instead if a 
panel were to be established in the GATT.199 The trend for Japan’s preference of bilateral 
consultations prior to a panel setup in the WTO dispute filing continues to this day. 
According to a set of surveys conducted on a number of developing or developed 
economies (who are WTO members) on the present practice of the delegations with 
regard to consultations in WTO dispute settlement, in the surveys, Japan and China have 
answered that consultations prior to litigation may be useful toward successful litigation, 
albeit depending on different situations.200  
     On the contrary, South Korea answered that bilateral consultations are not necessarily 
the catalyst for resolving trade disputes, but useful at information exchange, view 
exchange and the efficiency of the panel process.201 Consultations do play a large part in 
clarification, mutual understanding of the trade conflict issue at stake, and also sending 
strong political signals.202 Because they play such an important role, it is very reasonable 
that Japan relies heavily on resolving the issues at the consultation stage prior to an actual 
panel setup. Having settled issues prior to an actual launching of a dispute, Japan’s actual 
case numbers could be far lower than those of its counterparts. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 Pekkanen, 2008. p.17. 
200 Zhang, 2007. p.105. 
201 Zhang, ibid. 
202 Zhang, ibid. 
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     Does Japan intend to play a low-key when it comes to disputes in the WTO due to its 
cultural reluctance for litigation? Do they prefer consultations to actual disputes because 
of their reluctance to contend? The answer is partially yes – as we will see in actual case 
studies, many of Japan’s WTO dispute initiations were resolved in amicable manners 
through a mutually agreed solution (MAS).203 In the case of Japan, perhaps the lack of 
litigious culture and low legal capacity also could be a factor leading to reluctant and 
reserved characteristics in Japanese trade policy actions.204 After all, cultures do 
influence the human behavior (even bureaucrats) and beliefs, and activity toward 
strategic planning and responses and thus cannot be overlooked. But cultural factors are 
not the central decisive factors that shape Japan’s behavior in the WTO. 
     Leaving all of the above listed factors and arguments aside – Japan’s consistent trade 
surplus, Japan’s preferences for consultations, or cultural reluctance to litigation – there 
are more deeply rooted domestic institutional factors that lead to Japan’s relative 
reluctance in comparison to its Chinese or Korean counterparts in the WTO. What this 
boils down to is the structure of Japan’s policymaking with regard to its participation in 
the WTO, or Japan’s institutional behavior toward WTO disputes. In order to investigate 
Japan’s institutional patterns on WTO participation further, we must look into how an 
actual WTO dispute participation by the Japanese government is decided, or framed 
within the ministries, in what strategic methods and policy coordination amongst the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203 Alschner, Wolfgang, “Amicable Settlements of WTO Disputes: Bilateral Solutions in a Multilateral 
System’, World Trade Review, 13:1, March 2014, pp.65-102. 
204 Davis, 2012. p.191. 
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ministries, and also how the industries and the government bureaus interact toward a 
dispute filing or response to a dispute. 
     In Japan, matters regarding WTO dispute initiation or WTO participation is in large 
part managed by the METI, MOFA, and to a lesser extent, the MAFF. The Multilateral 
Trade System Department of the Trade Policy Bureau of the METI plays the key role in 
defending its interests for export industries, while the MOFA plays the role of the 
intermediary between the METI and MAFF, and MAFF tries its best to reflect the 
interests of the relatively weak agricultural sector.205 MAFF has the dual mandate to 
provide welfare for those in farming, fishing, and forestry, as well as to provide secure 
supply of food to the general population of Japan.206 Because METI and MOFA generally 
favor agricultural liberalization, even MOFA at times has pressures for market opening 
and cannot accommodate the interests of MAFF.207 While METI is mandated to fulfill the 
interests of its domestic industries, it is able to exercise its authority on case selections to 
pursue owing to Japan’s fragmented political authority, and high delegation to the trade 
ministry in the Japanese political and bureaucratic system. In other words, METI officials 
that deal with trade disputes are able to make decisions on their own internally, without 
monitoring pressures by the Cabinet, or external individual requests from the individual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/wto/funso/funsou.html 
206 Davis, 2003. pp.125-126. It is true that MAFF gains political influence from Japan’s main political party, 
the LDP, owing to the strong political ties that LDP politicians have with their countryside constituencies. 
However, given the importance and high proportion of Japan’s export sectors in manufacturing and hi-tech 
industries as a percentage of GDP, and the frail circumstances of Japan’s agricultural sector, METI’s 
strategic planning for Japan’s exports are given more weight in policy practice than MAFF’s policy 
interests.  
207 Personal interviews with former high-ranking officials of the MOFA and MAFF reveal irreconcilable 
differences in approaching the issue of the Japanese agricultural sector and its competitiveness on the 
global market. MOFA sees that there is a need for the Japanese agricultural sector to be more competitive 
without significant reliance on safeguards and protection.  
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ministries. The high delegation without much political pressure involved makes a stark 
contrast between the functionalities of METI and those of the USTR, which is 
continuously pressured by the Congress and also the industries to fulfill their demands 
and requests via petitions and political lobbying.208 Japanese Cabinet members may not 
be equipped with the ample knowledge on trade remedy, let alone the procedures toward 
a WTO dispute filing or response. 
     Japan’s policy toward WTO disputes and its behavior throughout the WTO panel 
process is technocratic. In consultations prior to panel setup, there are other factors 
outside the dispute for judging whether to escalate or withdraw from the dispute. In Japan, 
neither media impact, nor NGOs, nor the civil society appear to have impact on the 
outcome of the consultations. Rather, Japanese officials believe that deliberation on a 
WTO case should be done solely on the basis of evidence and submissions.209 This is a 
big divergence from the cases of China and South Korea, where the media have an 
impact on the cases. Among the three, only in South Korea has the impact of the civil 
society been an important factor (more elaborations in the following Korea section). 
Japan acquiesces in the WTO, but owing to its own structural reasons of policymaking. It 
acquiesces in relative terms when compared to its East Asian neighbors, but this does not 
mean that Japan is disinterested. Japan accumulates legal expertise rigorously via third 
party participations, but it is simply systematically disinclined to pursue trade disputes 
the way China does. Instead, it resolves trade issues bilaterally via consultations and 
negotiations. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Davis, 2012. p.193. 
209 Zhang, ibid. pp.113-115. 
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Figure 4-5. Japan’s Participation in the WTO (1995-2014) 
 
 
Source: www.wto.org 
 
Table 4-6. U.S.-Japan Cases in the WTO DSB (1995-2013) 
 
Case # U.S. Complaint against 
Japan 
Case # U.S. Responses to Japan Case # U.S. as Third Party in 
cases involving Japan 
DS11 Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages  
(July 1995) 
DS6 Imposition of Import Duties on 
Automobiles from Japan under 
Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade 
act of 1974  
(May 1995) 
DS55 Indonesia - Certain 
Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry 
(Complainant: Japan) 
DS28 Measures concerning 
Sound Recordings 
(February 1996) 
DS95 Measure Affecting Government 
Procurement (July 1997) 
DS64 Indonesia - Certain 
Measures Affecting the 
Automobile Industry 
(Complainant: Japan) 
DS44 Measures affecting 
consumer photographic 
film and paper (June 
1996) 
DS162 Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 
(February 1999) 
DS139 Canada - Certain Measures 
Affecting the Automotive 
Industry (Complainant: 
Japan) 
DS45  Measures affecting 
distribution services 
(June 1996) 
DS184 Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products 
from Japan (November 1999) 
DS323 Japan - Import Quotas on 
Dried Laver and Seasoned 
Laver (Complainant: 
Korea, Republic of) 
DS76 Measures affecting 
agricultural products 
(April 1997) 
DS217 Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 (December 
2000) 
DS336 Japan - Countervailing 
Duties on Dynamic 
Random Access Memories 
from Korea (Complainant: 
Korea, Republic of) 
DS245 Measures affecting the 
importation of apples 
(March 2002) 
DS244 Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping 
Duties on Corrosion-Resistant 
Carbon Steel Flat Products from 
Japan (January 2002) 
DS376 European Communities - 
Tariff Treatment of 
Certain Information 
Technology Products 
(Complainant: Japan) 
  DS249 Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Products 
(March 2002) 
DS412 Canada - Certain Measures 
Affecting the Renewable 
Energy Generation Sector 
(Complainant: Japan) 
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  DS322 Measures Relating to Zeroing and 
Sunset Reviews (November 2004) 
DS433 China - Measures Related 
to the Exportation of Rare 
Earths, Tungsten and 
Molybdenum 
(Complainant: Japan) 
    DS445 Argentina - Measures 
Affecting the Importation 
of Goods (Complainant: 
Japan) 
    DS454 China - Measures 
Imposing Anti-Dumping 
Duties on High-
Performance Stainless 
Steel Seamless Tubes from 
Japan (Complainant: 
Japan) 
    DS468 Ukraine - Definitive 
Safeguard Measures on 
Certain Passenger Cars 
(Complainant: Japan) 
Source: WTO  
Japan’s WTO Cases with the United States 
     Looking at the past decades of Japan’s participation in the GATT and the WTO, 
Japan’s litigant actions in the WTO show that Japan has indeed evolved into a more 
active litigant than it had been in the GATT years. Japan’s gradual transformation into a 
litigant, albeit a reluctant one, is indeed in correspondence with Japan’s ‘aggressive 
legalism’ literature. However, in the purposes of the analysis in the chapter, it matters 
most whether Japan is an active pursuer of WTO litigation in comparison with its East 
Asian competitors, South Korea and China. As much as the Japanese delegation favored 
resolving dispute matters via consultations, some of Japan’s bilateral cases in the WTO 
DSB with the U.S. were resolved via mutually agreed solutions via bilateral consultations. 
These cases include the U.S. complaint on Japanese measures concerning sound 
recordings (DS28) and the Japanese complaint on the imposition of import duties on 
automobiles from Japan under Sections 301 and 304 of the Trade Act of 1974 (DS56). 
Even after a pre-consultation stage, Japan pursued the method of mutual agreement 
during the formal consultation stage prior to actual panel setup. Note again that the METI 
	  	  
216 
does not favor unnecessary conflicts in the WTO DSB if it can resolve the disputes 
bilaterally via negotiation. The method of acquiescence is Japan’s number one preference. 
     Then what type of cases did Japan decide to pursue? Given that the METI has almost 
complete authority with high delegation from the central government over which cases it 
will pursue in the WTO, the question on which Japanese cases in the WTO to look into 
becomes quite obvious. The answer is in steel. As much as steel production is a 
fundamental pillar that leads to all sectoral developments in the economy, the Japanese 
steel industry had been consistently the single most favored industry by the Japanese 
government. Under no circumstances would the METI leave the Japanese steel industry 
under market forces.210  
     METI’s strong support for the Japanese steel industry is manifested in Japan’s two 
important dispute initiations against the U.S.211 In the Japanese complaint on U.S. anti-
dumping measures on certain hot-rolled steel products from Japan (DS184), Japan sued 
the U.S. in the WTO DSB regarding the USITC and the USDOC’s investigations on 
Japan’s hot rolled steel products, which led to U.S. imposition of antidumping duties that 
Japan thought was erroneous. Just after the Asian Financial Crisis, major U.S. steel 
companies and the United Steelworkers of America launched a major campaign to ask 
the Clinton Administration to protect the U.S. steel industry from illegal dumping by 
Brazil, Russia, and Japan.212 In simple terms, the need to protect the U.S. domestic steel 
industry prompted legal actions by the USTR via political support by the Congress and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Pekkanen, 2006. p.63. 
211 Another important case is Japan’s complaint against U.S. definitive safeguard measures on imports of 
certain steel products (DS248), but this case was pursued not only by Japan but by several other member 
states as a group (i.e., Brazil, EC, China, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and South Korea).  
212 Pekkanen, ibid, pp.65-67. 
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the Administration reliant on steel industry workers. Albeit in mixed legal outcomes due 
to strong U.S. appeals to the DSB in the aftermath of the Panel rulings, Japan in the end 
succeeded in compelling the U.S. to make small administrative changes in the method of 
its antidumping margins calculations.213 Similarly, in Japan’s complaint against the U.S. 
sunset review of anti-dumping duties on corrosion-resistant carbon steel flat products 
from Japan (DS244), Japan claimed that the USITC and the USDOC’s determinations in 
the full sunset review were erroneous.214 When the panel rejected Japan’s argument that 
the USDOC’s determination was not WTO-inconsistent and thus made no 
recommendations, Japan appealed and had four of the Panel’s initial findings reversed. 
Nonetheless, the Appellate Body of the DSB did not make any finding that the US acted 
inconsistently with its obligations of the anti-dumping agreement or the WTO 
agreement.215 
     One exceptional case in which the Japanese mainly prevailed in a U.S. complaint on 
Japan was the U.S. complaint on Japan’s measures affecting consumer photographic film 
and paper (DS44).216 In May of 1995, the Eastman Kodak Company filed a petition with 
the USTR alleging that Japanese market practices prevent foreign film from access to the 
Japanese domestic market.217 Again, industrial concerns from the U.S. domestic economy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Pekkanen, ibid. p.106. Also see WTO Dispute Settlement Case DS184. 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds184_e.htm 
214 Kim, 2007. In August 193, the USDOC levied 36.41% of antidumping duties on Japanese corrosion-
resistant carbon steel flat products. In September 1999, the USDOC decided to continue antidumping 
measures to prevent domestic injuries or recurrence of injuries based on its sunset reviews, a process in 
which within a 5-year-term since levying AD duties, the USDOC makes a decision on whether to continue 
or discontinue the levy of AD duties.  
215 WTO Dispute Settlement Case DS244. http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds244_e.htm 
216 WTO Dispute Settlement Case DS44. http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds44_e.htm 
217 See ‘The Kodak-Fuji Film Case at the WTO and the Openness of Japan’s Film Market’, by Dick K. 
Nanto, Specialist in Industry and Trade, Economics Division, CRS Report for Congress, May 8, 1998. 
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would find political means to bring a case to the WTO. At first, the U.S. sought to deploy 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1988 to impose punitive measures on a foreign 
government that overlooks private industries’ practices against domestic antitrust laws. 
Japan defended the interests of its photographic film industry by contending that it has 
not violated its antitrust laws and narrowly escaped the Section 301 measures, thereby 
compelling the USTR to file the case in the WTO. Because the WTO has no agreement 
on competition policy, it was very difficult for the U.S. to win the case in the WTO by 
making a case out of competition issues. Additionally, on the same day of case filing for 
DS44, the U.S. alleged through its complaint on Japan’s measures affecting distribution 
services (DS45) that Japan’s measures affecting distribution services (not limited to 
photographic film and paper sector) through the operation of large-scale retail store law 
which regulates floor space, business hours and holidays of supermarkets and department 
stores nullify or impair benefits accruing to the U.S. and thus argued that Japan has 
violated GATS Article III (transparency) and Article XVI (market access).218  
     Overall, Japan’s bilateral cases with the U.S. in the WTO involved U.S. domestic 
industries claiming for either more foreign market access or protection of its interests, 
actions that were primarily based on the fear of losing industrial profit. In other words, 
sectoral trade shifts prompted the U.S. industries or U.S. authorities to make the move, 
and in response, Japan has resisted the pressures via seeking its legal rights in the WTO 
DSB, albeit leading to small successes on the Japanese side. While it is not an exception 
when it comes to defending its proactive sectors aggressively, Japan, due to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 WT/DS45/1/Add.1; also see WTO Dispute Settlement Case DS45. 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds45_e.htm 
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institutional reasons and strategic purposes, seeks bilateral consultations than a dispute 
initiation, and has often ended the dispute under mutually agreed solutions before the 
dispute expanded in full scale. Japan is also more active as a third party than South Korea 
or China. 
South Korea 
South Korea’s Trade Imbalances with the U.S. and WTO cases  
     Albeit smaller in absolute figures than Japan, South Korea has steadily generated trade 
surpluses in trading with the U.S., excluding the years 1995-1997 (see Figure 4-6). The 
South Korean trade deficits during these years were attributed to the unified tariff rates at 
8% and the won-dollar rate (for details, see Chapter 2). In recent years, during the 
previous Lee Myung-bak Administration and the current Administration under President 
Park Geun-hye, the South Korean trade surplus from trading with the U.S. has been on 
the rise. This trend could be attributed to the effects of the KORUS FTA, which went into 
effect on March 15, 2012. However, as tariffs will be eliminated within a 10-year span, it 
remains a question whether South Korea ultimately will benefit in terms of bilateral trade 
surplus – whether it gains or loses from the trade deal remains to be seen for the time 
being. In addition, the effects of the FTA reflected into bilateral trade balances with the 
U.S. could be reversed if South Korea joins the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the 
negotiations are concluded, and also if South Korea participates in the TPP.  
     Overall, the USTR’s efforts in striking a trade deal with South Korea were mainly 
centered on getting further market access and paving the way for U.S. autos and 
agricultural goods (mostly beef – South Korea’s culinary culture depends a lot on beef, 
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including parts that are normally not consumed by U.S. consumers) in the South Korean 
market. Meanwhile, South Korea always seeks to expand opportunities for its export 
industries in electronics and autos. Due to the unchanging characteristics of the 
competing markets of the two countries, the sectors of concern repeatedly give impetus to 
bilateral trade disputes or WTO dispute initiations.  
South Korea’s Institutionalism in WTO Dispute Participation 
     South Korea’s stance toward WTO disputes is more reciprocal and less rigid than 
Japan’s, but not as active or proactive as China’s. As much as South Korea retains a very 
close trade relationship with the U.S., 62% of South Korea’s dispute initiations in the 
WTO DSB have been targeting the United States (Table 4-1), whereas 42% of Japan’s 
dispute initiations and 75% of China’s dispute initiations have been targeting the United 
States. The statistics show that South Korea has grown quite reciprocal to U.S. pressures 
via WTO dispute initiations. South Korea is no longer a passive onlooker when it comes 
to trade disputes at the multilateral level, and bilateral consultations prior to actual panel 
setup remain as only an option and not the first and foremost preferred method. For 
instance, other than the U.S. complaint on South Korea’s measures concerning the shelf-
life of products (DS5), South Korea has rarely resolved WTO dispute via mutually agreed 
solutions (MAS). For South Korea, reciprocation is the method that it abides by in trade 
disputes with the U.S., but it is careful not to overstretch itself to retaliate like China 
does, due to the political ramifications it may bring to the U.S-Korea relations, and it 
does not confine itself in acquiescence like Japan does, if it sees potential of winning a 
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case. It has also been very active in pursuing WTO dispute participation as a third party, 
which is a common trait among all three countries. 
     Before the Park Geun-hye Administration’s cabinet and administrative reform that 
occurred prior to her inauguration, the trade bureau stayed in the MOFAT (currently the 
MOFA), but after the reform, the trade bureau was relocated to the MOTIE.219 Hence, 
matters relating to WTO disputes from January 2013 have been entirely handed over to 
the MOTIE.220 Previously, MOFAT retained a legal experts pool (외교통상부 
통상법무과) that would serve as advisers to MOFAT’s WTO dispute case initiations or 
responses. Since the trade bureau has been moved to MOTIE, the legal experts pool now 
works in close relations with the MOTIE (산업통상자원부 통상법무과). A large 
number of these lawyers are active both in U.S. and South Korean legal spheres to be 
updated on recent info and to exchange information, or are headquartered in the U.S. In 
other words, South Korea’s delegation to WTO disputes can be described as flexible 
institutionalism via public-private partnership. While the MOTIE is involved in the actual 
processing of the cases, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) also provides legal expertise on 
WTO dispute settlement and analyses of previous cases encompassing several sectors.  
     Other than the ministerial personnel for the WTO dispute delegation in MOFAT and 
MOJ, South Korea fully utilizes and incorporates the legal personnel capacity in the 
private law firms such as Yoon & Yang, LLC (법무법인 화우); Lee & Ko, LLC 
(법무법인 광장), which specializes in trade remedy, WTO disputes, BIT or FTA 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 http://www.mofa.go.kr/trade/wto/dispute/index.jsp?menu=m_30_100_30 
220 http://www.motie.go.kr/motie/py/ce/wto/wto.jsp 
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negotiations; Bae, Kim, & Lee, LLC (법무법인 유한 태평양), which handles all areas of 
legal disputes; Kim & Chang, LLC (법무법인 김앤장), which specializes in 
international commercial practice; and Shin & Kim, LLC (법무법인 세종), that have 
bureaus of legal experts specializing in trade disputes at bilateral or multilateral levels.221 
Over time, South Korea’s pool of legal personnel has expanded and its mobilization of its 
legal personnel has grown more dynamic. South Korea’s bilateral trade bureau (the 
MOTIE as of 2013) is involved in informal consultations, and at the formal consultation 
stage, the international trade law team, the Geneva-based delegation and international 
lawyers are included. The personnel therefore are different in informal and formal 
consultation stages.222 Japan and China pursue a different method for organizing its 
personnel from South Korea’s, and the Japanese and Chinese personnel remain the same 
for both informal and formal consultations. The implication in the South Korean case is 
that it takes the formal procedures rather than informal consultation stages more seriously 
as a venue of actual dispute. Also, Japan and China’s consistency in its legal team 
members make their preparations toward cases smoother, as there is no asymmetry of 
information occurring in the process of the change of guards. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 South Korea has a large pool of legal personnel through legal education at the undergraduate and 
graduate levels, Korean graduates with legal degrees from abroad, and also domestic personnel via the 
South Korean bar examinations. It has retained the bar examination system as the Japanese have, but since 
2009 has also introduced the law school system just as the Japanese have. Personnel in private law firms 
include legal practitioners who have had extensive careers as judges or prosecutors, but also foreign 
educated law degree holders and recent law school graduates.  
222 Zhang, ibid. 
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Figure 4-6. U.S.-South Korea Trade Imbalances (1985-2013) 
 
 
Source: U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
     Sectoral trade imbalances for South Korean industries play an important role in taking 
actions, even by quarterly figures. Due to the industrial structure, which is quite similar to 
that of Japan, South Korean industries often times find themselves in the same shoes as 
Japan when involved in a trade dispute with the U.S. – conflicts arise mainly in the 
agricultural sector, the steel industry, or high-tech industry such as semi-conductors 
(DRAMs). To be fair, South Korea’s economic structure is best characterized as one with 
a strong governmental policy emphasis on manufacturing and technology and a frail 
agricultural sector. These are traits similar to the Japanese economy. However, industrial 
motivations and methods to defend their interests are more rigorous and eager than those 
of Japan’s. As in the cases of South Korean trade remedy structure, the relevant South 
Korean ministries are more eager and motivated to support its industries at the individual 
levels. South Korea also pays attention to the public eye and responses to trade disputes 
than the Japanese trade ministry does, because while the MOTIE is delegated to serve for 
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trade disputes, the strong Presidency which provides directions for the ministries is 
constantly conscious of public responses and the Presidency structurally has the upper 
hand in dictating policy choice. This is because South Korean party politics in general 
and for the most part, presidential election outcomes, can be heavily swayed by public 
responses. Therefore, the biggest difference between the delegation of trade issues to 
ministries in Japan and South Korea may be the monitoring mechanisms by the central 
cabinet. While Japan’s METI has autonomous authority over its case selections, South 
Korea’s MOTIE is more careful in selecting cases and its decisions get reported to the 
VIP level (the Presidency) if they involve sensitive issues regarding agriculture or a 
specific industry at stake, because once made public they will have political ramifications 
for the incumbent party. 
Figure 4-7. South Korea’s Participation in the WTO (1995-2014) 
 
 
Source: www.wto.org 
 
Table 4-7. U.S.-South Korea Cases in the WTO DSB (1995-2013) 
 
Case # U.S. Complaint against 
South Korea 
Case # U.S. Responses to South Korea Case # U.S. as Third Party in 
cases involving South 
Korea 
DS3 Measures Concerning 
the Testing and 
Inspection of 
Agricultural Products 
(April 1995) 
DS89 Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports 
of Colour Television Receivers 
from Korea 
(July 1997) 
DS98 Korea, Republic of - 
Definitive Safeguard 
Measure on Imports of 
Certain Dairy Products 
(Complainant: 
0	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10	  15	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   Response	   Third	  Party	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European 
Communities) 
DS5 Measures Concerning 
the Shelf-Life of 
Products 
(May 1995) 
DS99 Anti-Dumping Duty on Dynamic 
Random Access Memory 
Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One 
Megabit or Above from Korea 
(August 1997) 
DS169 Korea, Republic of - 
Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, 
Chilled and Frozen 
Beef (Complainant: 
Australia) 
DS41 Measures concerning 
Inspection of 
Agricultural Products 
(May 1996) 
DS179 Anti-Dumping measures on 
Stainless Steel Plate in Coils and 
Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip 
from Korea 
(July 1999) 
DS273 Korea, Republic of - 
Measures Affecting 
Trade in Commercial 
Vessels (Complainant: 
European 
Communities) 
DS84 Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages 
(May 1997) 
DS202 Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Line Pipe from 
Korea 
(June 2000) 
DS299 European Communities 
- Countervailing 
Measures on Dynamic 
Random Access 
Memory Chips from 
Korea (Complainant: 
Korea, Republic of) 
DS161 Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled 
and Frozen Beef 
(February 1999) 
DS217 Continued Dumping and Subsidy 
Offset Act of 2000 
(December 2000) 
DS301 European Communities 
- Measures Affecting 
Trade in Commercial 
Vessels (Complainant: 
Korea, Republic of) 
DS163 Measures Affecting 
Government 
Procurement 
(February 1999) 
DS251 Definitive Safeguard Measures on 
Imports of Certain Steel Product 
(March 2000) 
DS312 Korea, Republic of - 
Anti-Dumping Duties 
on Imports of Certain 
Paper from Indonesia 
(Complainant: 
Indonesia) 
  DS296 Countervailing Duty Investigation 
on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) from Korea 
(June 2003) 
DS323 Japan - Import Quotas 
on Dried Laver and 
Seasoned Laver 
(Complainant: Korea, 
Republic of) 
  DS402 Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping 
Measures Involving Products from 
Korea 
(November 2009) 
DS336 Japan - Countervailing 
Duties on Dynamic 
Random Access 
Memories from Korea 
(Complainant: Korea, 
Republic of) 
  DS420 Anti-dumping measures on 
corrosion-resistant carbon steel 
flat products from Korea 
(January 2011) 
DS391 Korea, Republic of - 
Measures Affecting the 
Importation of Bovine 
Meat and Meat 
Products from Canada 
(Complainant: Canada) 
  DS464 Anti-dumping and Countervailing 
Measures on large residential 
washers from Korea 
(August 2013) 
  
Source: WTO  
South Korea’s WTO Cases with the United States 
     Conflict over trade in agricultural goods has been a chronic issue in U.S.-Korea trade 
relations. The U.S. complaints on South Korea’s measures concerning the testing and 
inspection of agricultural products (DS3) in 1995 and measures concerning inspection of 
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agricultural products (DS41) in 1996 were the initial cases that the U.S. pursued right 
after the WTO DSB launch. The South Korean national sentiment on staple foods like 
rice and beef made U.S. market access into the South Korean agricultural market difficult 
(and there was safeguard on South Korean rice for a considerable time), and much of the 
trade negotiations between the two countries on beef had been rocky over the past two 
decades.223 In February 1999, the U.S. filed a complaint in the WTO regarding South 
Korea’s measures affecting imports of fresh, chilled and frozen beef (DS161).224 The 
U.S. alleged that South Korea imposes a mark-up on sales of imported beef, that it limits 
import authority to certain so-called “super-groups” and the “Livestock Producers 
Marketing Organization” (LPMO), and that South Korea provides domestic support to 
the cattle industry beyond South Korea’s aggregate measure of support reflected in its 
schedule. The U.S. contended that due to these restrictions, South Korea is denying 
national treatment to beef imports and that governmental support to the domestic cattle 
industry violate the Agreement on Agriculture. Interested members such as Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand joined as third parties and observed the case as the Panel 
initially upheld U.S. assertions. In September 2000, South Korea appealed to the WTO 
DSB Appellate Body, and had several of the Panel’s findings on recalculated amounts of 
Korea’s domestic support for beef in 1997 and 1998 reversed. However, South Korea 
reported to the DSB that it would implement DSB’s recommendations within a 
reasonable time period by September 18, 2001, which was a date mutually agreed upon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 For instance, during the second round of KORUS FTA negotiations in 2008, media reports that U.S. 
beef contain potential viruses for the mad cow disease went viral amongst the South Korean public.  
224 WT/DS161, http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds161_e.htm 
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with the U.S. However, U.S. alluded to further pressures into the future by concluding the 
case by expressing its intent to work with Korea to ensure that South Korean measures 
will result in full market access for U.S. beef. The debates on beef would continue as the 
KOR-US FTA negotiations were launched in 2006. 
    South Korea’s actions in the WTO disputes culminated in its two complaints against 
the U.S. on its antidumping duty and countervailing duty on Dynamic Random Access 
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS), which were filed by South Korea each in 1997 and 
2003, respectively. After its invention, the semiconductor industry was initially 
spearheaded by U.S. industries in the 1950s and 1960s. Crisis came when Japan’s rise in 
semiconductor production threatened U.S. industries in the 1980s (i.e., NEC, Hitachi, and 
Toshiba) and 1990s (i.e., Fujitsu and Mitsubishi in addition to the previous three), and 
South Korea’s Samsung and Hyundai Electronics (later SK Hynix) also became a major 
producer from the late 1980s, 1990s and into the 2000s.225 The chip industry has been 
pivotal to the development of South Korea’s electronic industries, and still remains a 
central contributor to South Korean exports. Petitions started to flood into the USITC and 
USDOC from 1985 from U.S. companies such as Micron Technology.226  
     The threats on the U.S. semiconductor industry pleaded the USITC and USDOC to 
continue to levy duties on DRAMs from South Korea. In the South Korean complaint 
against U.S. antidumping duty on DRAMs of 1MB or more from Korea (DS99) in 1997, 
South Korea contended that the USDOC’s decision not to revoke the antidumping duty 
on its DRAMs was made despite the finding that South Korean DRAMs had not been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Brown and Linden, 2009. p.18 
226 Malison, 1993. p.16 
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dumped on the U.S. market for more than three and a half consecutive years, and despite 
the evidence demonstrating that Korean DRAM producers would not engage in dumping 
in the future.227 While the U.S. responded to the DSB by saying that it was seeking ways 
in which it will implement DSB recommendations in 1999, the USDOC in 2000 issued a 
revised final results of redetermination concluding that the antidumping order stay in 
place because a resumption of dumping was likely. Shortly after, South Korea asked the 
DSB Panel to suspend its work until further notice and instead, came to a mutually 
satisfactory agreement with the U.S., revoking the antidumping order at issue as the result 
of a five-year sunset review by the USDOC.  
     In a subsequent complaint on U.S. countervailing duty investigation on DRAMs from 
Korea, South Korea contended that the USITC’s affirmative final injury determination 
and the USDOC’s final countervailing duty order of 11 August 2003 were inconsistent 
with the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) of the WTO.228 In 
the initial Panel report, the USDOC’s findings of the South Korean government’s 
financial contribution to Hynix, Inc. was found insufficient evidence by the DSB Panel, 
and the USITC’s injury determination was found to be in violation of the USITC’s 
obligation under Article 15.5 of the SCM agreement, for non-attribution.229 The U.S. 
appealed to certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed in the initial Panel 
report to have some areas of the report reversed, but ultimately accepted the DSB’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds99_e.htm 
228 http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds296_e.htm 
229 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the WTO. Article 15.5 of the agreement 
specifies that a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry 
shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf 
	  	  
229 
recommendations for implementation within a reasonable period of time. It was on 7 
November 2005 that South Korea and the U.S. had mutually agreed on a timeline for 
implementation by the U.S. by 8 March 2006. 
     The cases on agriculture and semiconductor chips demonstrate South Korea’s 
reciprocal approaches to WTO disputes. South Korea’s methods in pursuing a WTO case 
as a complainant and a respondent stem from both a pragmatic idea that it is important to 
fully utilize available institutions and means at hand (if it can save itself from industrial 
losses by doing so), and a political agenda that seriously considers the conglomerates of 
South Korea, by which a large part of the South Korean elite and semi-elite population is 
employed. In the face of the weakening agricultural sector, the South Korean Presidency 
and the bureaucracy understand very well that public opinion matters greatly for political 
survival.230 Such concerns by the incumbents influence the policymaking process, 
particularly in the case of South Korea’s defensive sectors.  
China 
China’s Trade Imbalances with the U.S. and WTO cases  
     U.S. trade deficits with China widened from the late 1990s and at a much faster pace 
since China’s entry to the WTO in 2001 (see Figure 4-8). When China opened its doors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 In a national experts survey conducted by the East Asia Institute in October 2004, results showed that 
South Korean perceptions toward the WTO are quite favorable (56.2 percent of the respondents replied 
favorably to the role of the WTO), and that the South Korean public adheres to the rulings by the WTO 
DSB (83.7 percent of the respondents replied that South Korea should adhere to WTO rulings even if the 
ruling is not favorable to South Korea’s economic interests). See ‘2004국제관계에 대한 여론조사’, 
동아시아연구원, http://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor_report/2009092115551241.pdf. Nonetheless, WTO 
rulings or dispute initiations that target South Korea’s defensive sectors like agriculture can provide 
negative repercussions to the incumbent ruling party, and there are reports by South Korea’s think tanks 
that openly express their concerns that adhering to the WTO ruling may call for protests by the opposition 
party and may stir public opinion. (See Korea-Canada Beef WTO Dispute Prospects, Korea International 
Trade Association 한-캐나다 쇠고기 분쟁 전망, 한국무역협회, July 2009.) 
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for foreign direct investment, many U.S. industries relocated their manufacturing bases to 
Mainland China for cheap labor cost and further opportunities. Some U.S. industries saw 
the fast accumulation of trade deficits with China as a credible threat to their interests, 
and the number of petitions to the USITC, USDOC, and the USTR skyrocketed as 
China’s economy grew over time. Within the U.S. domestic political arena, policymakers 
found it increasingly difficult to disassociate themselves with industrial concerns and 
lobbying regarding loss of jobs, and often found the root causes in China. While U.S. 
public sentiment was geared toward placing the blame on China, or bashing China, 
alternative explanations were given to suggest that despite the widening U.S. trade deficit 
with China, the value added for the Chinese economy was fairly minimal due to the its 
centralized function for final assembly rather than research and development.231 The U.S. 
International Trade Commission has also found that attributing the entire export value to 
the last exporting country can provide a misleading picture of the sources of value in U.S. 
trade, and that examinations of bilateral trade balances on a value-added basis yield 
different conclusions about the extent to which a country may generate U.S. trade deficit. 
China is a final assembler and it mainly uses components from abroad to produce its 
export goods. The U.S.-China trade deficit on a value-added basis is considerably smaller 
than on the official gross trade.232 This is a big contrast from the case of U.S.-Japan trade, 
in which Japanese companies export parts to their own assembly plants overseas and then 
export the final products to the U.S. The U.S.-Japan trade deficit on a value-added basis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Yuqing Xing and Neal Detert, ‘How the iPhone widens the U.S. Trade Deficit with the People’s 
Republic of China’, the Asian Development Bank Institute, 2010. 
232 Mason and Russell, 2013. p.75. 
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is larger than the comparable gross trade deficit. In a sense, the general public sentiment 
or political outcry against Chinese threat on the U.S. economy based on trade deficits 
could be misleading if we focus on the value-added trade figures. In conversing with 
China’s economists or political scientists, one can easily sense that the Chinese regard 
U.S. bashing against China as unjust if we only look at value-added trade, and that based 
on the figures of value-added trade, they think the degree of pressures on China is too 
harsh in comparison to the previous pressures on Japan.233    
     At a glance, China’s generation of trade surpluses with the U.S. may seem like a 
repetitive pattern. The recurring cycles of U.S. protectionist measures are indeed there, 
and it is a fact that the U.S. public and policy makers are conscious about resolving trade 
deficit issues with China. But the dimensions of the trade conflict are more complex than 
previous cases of other East Asian countries in past decades. Due to the 
interconnectedness of the two economies and the strategic rivalry and conflict concerning 
security issues (i.e., North Korea, Taiwan) that complicate the diplomatic communication 
between the two countries, it is very difficult for the U.S. to simply resort to trade 
sanction tactics only. The U.S. understands very well that in order to gain the most out of 
its relationship with China, it must use a carrot-and-stick approach to bring out the 
changes from China from within (i.e., on protection of intellectual property or on fair 
trade). The complexity of the U.S.-China relationship (i.e., economic interdependence, 
security issues) puts China in a position in bilateral negotiations with the U.S. in which 
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China can afford to say no to defend its primary interests, or give the U.S. the cold 
shoulder to U.S. requests or pressures.  
Figure 4-8. U.S.-China Trade Imbalances (1985-2013) 
 
 
Source: U.S. International Transactions Accounts Data, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
China’s Institutionalism in WTO Dispute Participation 
     In the initial years of its WTO membership, China was rather inactive as a 
complainant or a respondent, and instead focused on learning the procedures of the WTO 
DSB as a newcomer and on accumulating legal expertise via third party participations 
cases that it is not directly involved in. From the years 2003 to 2007, China acted as a 
third party to virtually every panel established during that time period, and learned the 
views of the Panel and the Appellate Body.234 The following year after gaining WTO 
membership, it sought to participate in as many cases as possible as a third party (see 
Figure 4-9). As the years progressed, China has been targeted more from other member 
states, and it found its interest in reversing its passive position to active pursuer of 
disputes in the WTO. Over the past decade, China has indeed become a primary target in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Ewing-Chow, Goh, and Patil, 2013. 
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the WTO DSB, owing to its violations of the WTO agreement, with the background of 
political concerns regarding China’s exports in its trading partner countries. Currently, 
China’s large trade surplus exacerbates the likelihood of rising tensions in trade disputes 
between China and its trading partners. In turn, China has been transforming itself into an 
active litigant. Today, China mobilizes all of its industrial and governmental efforts to 
defend its interests via the WTO dispute settlement process. 
     Currently, China’s MOFCOM is the main institution that carries out all WTO related 
matters. As it saw the increasing need to defend its interests in the WTO, China 
reorganized its bureaucratic functions on trade matters by transforming the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) into MOFCOM in 2003.235 In the 
initial stages, within the MOFCOM, the WTO Affairs Department dealt with WTO 
negotiations, complemented by the WTO Legal Affairs Division within the Department 
of Treaty and Law that handles WTO dispute cases. The MOFCOM’s mandate is 
approved by the State Council, and the Minister of MOFCOM decides whether a case is 
to be pursued or not in the WTO, while the Premier or Vice Premier in charge of foreign 
trade matters within the Politburo is ultimately responsible for exercising influence on the 
final decision.  
     In the year of 2009, China saw greater interest in expanding its legal capacity in the 
WTO, and within the MOFTEC, a second legal team was set up in addition to the WTO 
Legal Affairs Division within the Department of Treaty and Law, which previously had 
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to handle all the workload on WTO cases.236 In late 2009, the Chinese government made 
a decision to post a top international trade expert in Geneva, bolstering the legal 
capacities of the WTO mission. China does still face difficulties acquiring competent 
legal personnel for WTO disputes from its own citizens, and has had the practice of 
hiring bilingual overseas Chinese lawyers with law degrees from the U.S. and Europe.237 
Nonetheless, beefing up the legal capacity for WTO disputes enabled China to adjudicate 
in the WTO DSB with more personnel and resources, and also led to the increase of 
China’s complaints, let alone responses and third-party participations. The exponential 
increase in cases involving China in the WTO is one factor that makes it seem proactive 
in comparison to its neighbors Japan and South Korea (see Table 4-1). 
     One critical issue regarding China’s behavior patterns in WTO disputes is about its 
willingness and capacity for implementation after Panel recommendations have been 
delivered. Given the difficult environment for regulation, WTO DSB recommendations 
may not directly lead to China’s domestic policy implementation. The lack of inter-
governmental policy coordination is also a factor that contributes to the more hurdles to 
implementation.238 When conflicts arise regarding implementation of WTO 
recommendations, the Vice Premier in charge of foreign trade affairs intervenes, but 
coordination among the ministries will be viable only if the ministries in question fall 
under the Vice Premier’s responsibilities. In other words, the top-down, hierarchical 
system functions well only if the higher and subsidiary actors are within the matching 	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boundaries of power. For instance, resolution of a case on antidumping duties required 
cooperation from the customs bureau, which did not want to cooperate, and the State 
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), which used to be responsible for injury 
determination. In order to lessen the complexities in bureaucracy, the Department for 
Industrial Injury merged with the MOFCOM. Some provincial governments with 
intensive trade and investment have also established matching institutions.239 The 
fragmentation of authority among the Chinese ministries remains a big barrier to 
achieving greater efficiency toward China’s actions in the WTO.  
     Moreover, the strong national government with its hierarchical system makes it 
difficult for the industries and the civil society to be engaged with WTO issues and 
hinders business-government coordination. Contrary to the U.S. case, in which petitions 
from industries flood in and industrial lobbying is commonplace in the U.S. Congress, in 
China it is actually the government rather than the industries that has the upper hand and 
actual power in pursuing cases in the WTO. Many of China’s industries that are 
blooming with potential are strategically developed, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
are still under the auspices of the central government. As discussed in Chapter 3, China’s 
trade remedy system is driven mainly by the MOFCOM than the industries themselves. 
Once the MOFCOM decides to pursue trade remedy investigations in a certain industry, 
they leave the hands of the industry people entirely. Therefore, cases that spring from 
strong commercial pressures have not been the norm in the Chinese cases. Furthermore, 
while the Chinese public understands very well the effects of entering the world economy 
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(入世, ru shi) and may be aware of WTO cases via news reports, the public is not yet 
equipped with the political intent or power to voice their opinions or mobilize themselves 
to defend their own interests. Thus, China’s decision-making process toward WTO 
dispute participation remains strictly governmental. 
Figure 4-9. China’s Participation in the WTO (1995-2014) 
 
 
Source: www.wto.org 
 
Table 4-8. U.S.-China Cases in the WTO DSB (1995-2013) 
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China’s WTO Cases with the United States 
     The U.S. has filed cases against China on a broad range of goods and services. On 
goods, the focus has been primarily on steel, automobiles in parts and whole, and raw 
materials like rare earths. Two cases – one on China’s measures on intellectual property 
(DS362), in which China prevailed; and the other on China’s measures on publications 
and audiovisual entertainment products (DS363), in which China lost – are quite 
reminiscent of the case on Japan’s sound recording case in 1996 (DS28). Also eye-
catching were the U.S. cases on China that focused on services other than tradable goods, 
such as those involving China’s measures on financial services and electronic payment. 
     After its accession to the WTO, China had been facing tremendous bilateral pressure 
from the U.S. and the EU on its enforcement of intellectual property. The U.S. filed a 
WTO complaint on China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights (DS362) in April 2007. Filed alongside the case was a U.S. 
complaint on China - Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products. These two cases were 
salient cases in which vital interests in the U.S. economy clashed with those of China’s, 
and in which China defended itself quite well, leaving the U.S. dissatisfied with the 
results of the Panel ruling. Prior to the WTO dispute initiation, in April 2005, the USTR 
in its released out-of-cycle review on China had raised grave concerns on IPR protection 
and enforcement.240 Based on this report, China was placed back on the Priority Watch 
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List for the first time since its accession to the WTO.241 The USTR did not file a 
complaint that year, but ultimately filed two IPR relevant cases two years later. In DS362, 
the U.S. raised the following important concerns: 1) China’s Criminal Law and related 
Supreme People’s Court interpretations that establish thresholds for criminal procedures 
and penalties for infringements of IPR; 2) China’s Regulations for Customs Protection of 
Intellectual Property Rights and related Implementing measures that govern the disposal 
of infringing goods confiscated by customs authorities; and 3) Article 4 of China’s 
Copyright Law, which denies protection and enforcement to works that have not been 
authorized for publication or distribution within China.242 In DS363, the U.S. raised 
concerns regarding 1) measures that restrict trading rights with respect to imported films 
for theatrical release, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings and 
publications; and 2) measures that restrict market access for foreign suppliers of 
distribution services for publications and audiovisual services.243 China appealed against 
Panel rulings in both cases and was able to turn the Panel findings around partially, 
pleading that it needed more time as domestic implementation would be difficult in a 
short amount of time. In both cases, despite China’s reporting to the WTO DSB that it 
had taken the steps for implementing the DSB recommendations, the U.S. response was 
reluctant to acknowledge China’s implementation.244 Finding that it is difficult to acquire 
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what it seeks for China’s IPR implementations pushed the U.S. policymakers toward 
opting for a negotiation framework in the TPP that emphasizes the components of IPR. 
Thus, the U.S.-China debate on IPR will likely continue into the future. 
     China’s retaliatory approach to trade wars was most highlighted in the U.S.-China 
trade disputes on chicken and tires in 2009, the year that the two countries’ trade conflicts 
turned very intense. When the United Steel Workers of America petitioned for and was 
granted a special safeguard by the USITC in early 2009, the case received further 
attention via the USTR’s holding of hearings and submissions of recommendations to 
President Obama in September 2009. In turn, on September 11, 2009, the Obama 
Administration announced 3 years of punitive duty on Chinese tires for three years. In 
response to this measure, the MOFCOM embarked on an antidumping and countervailing 
duty investigation on U.S. automobiles and poultry.245 The cases moved stage to the 
WTO in which the two countries clashed in two cases: China’s complaint on U.S. 
Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China (DS392), and China’s complaint on 
U.S. Measures Affecting Imports of Certain Passenger Vehicle and Light Truck Tyres 
from China (DS399). In DS392, China questioned the Section 727 of the Agriculture 
Appropriations Act of 2009, which prohibited the use of funds to establish or implement 
a rule allowing Chinese poultry products to be imported into the U.S. Despite the Panel’s 
findings of several U.S. violations, it did not recommend the U.S. to bring Section 727 
into conformity with its obligations under the SPS agreement and the GATT, because 
Section 727 had already expired by the time of the Panel’s ruling. In DS399, China 
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brought the DSB’s attention to U.S. transitional product-specific safeguard measure 
applied to certain passenger vehicle and light truck tires from China under Paragraph 16 
of China’s Accession Protocol pursuant to Section 421 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. 
China did not prevail in either of the cases, and two years later, the U.S. filed a complaint 
on Chinese poultry barriers, China - Anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures on 
broiler products from the United States (DS427). The U.S. questioned MOFCOM’s 
antidumping and countervailing duty impositions on U.S. broiler products, and ultimately 
the Panel ruling provided DSB recommendations for China to implement. The U.S. won 
nearly every component that it requested for in the case.246 
      Although China has not won every case that it has brought to the WTO DSB, it has 
certainly made its presence visible in the DSB via bringing complaints and responding to 
complaints in a retaliatory and defensive manner. Retaliation by China is reflected in the 
ways that China would pursue a case in a sector different than the sector that was 
originally targeted to counter the pressures, and is seen in the cases on chicken and tires. 
Defensiveness in China’s responses to the WTO dispute initiations is most salient in the 
case of its defensive sector, as seen in the case of IPR. Its presence is marked in such a 
way that its voice would be heard by other member states and that it would draw the 
attention of other member states. With an expanded legal personnel within the MOFCOM 
and the Vice Premiership supporting and supervising the MOFCOM with regard to 
China’s WTO dispute initiations, China’s institutional mechanisms toward a WTO 	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dispute embodies a government decision-making process that enables the fiercest 
litigation possible amongst the three countries of East Asia.  
Conclusion 
     U.S. dispute initiation in the WTO has always started from industrial losses and 
concerns that led to petitions to the USITC or USDOC and ultimately, the USTR, backed 
by congressional political lobbying. Sectoral trade shifts or import surges were factors 
that would serve as catalysts to the rising concerns and heated debates on the chronic U.S. 
trade deficit issue. The overall assessment of dispute settlement cases filed under the 
WTO DSB reveals the variation among the three countries in response to U.S. 
protectionist measures via dispute initiation. First, Japan is the most reluctant and 
acquiescing litigant despite its developments of WTO adjudication over time in 
comparison to the GATT periods and increasing participation as a third-party for 
collecting info and exchanging views. Second, South Korea is the reciprocal litigant that 
seeks for opportunities to win, and pursues cases against the United States more than 
Japan does, but not as aggressively as China does. Lastly, China, on the other hand, fairly 
new to the international trade disputes compared to the two other countries, has become 
the main target in the 2000s and 2010s upon WTO accession. This is a cyclical pattern 
owing to the generation of U.S. trade deficits and concerns arising from the U.S. 
industries and governmental actions.  	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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Currency Conflict:  
East Asian Responses to U.S. Currency Appreciation Pressures, 1971-2013 
 
 
 
“The dollar would have to fall further to reduce the United States' widening trade deficit if Japan and West Germany did not lower 
their interest rates.” 
-James Baker III, Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury, 1986- 
 
“The Treasury began discussions with Korea on the matter of currency in the latter part of 1986 when it became obvious after the 
Plaza Agreement that the currency adjustments that were taking place among the major currencies were not being followed by certain 
other countries, including Korea. Our efforts met with little success.” 
-David Mulford, Former U.S. Under Secretary of International Affairs for the Department of Treasury, 1989- 
 
“If China does not allow the currency to appreciate more rapidly, it will run the risk of seeing domestic inflation accelerate and face 
greater risk of a damaging rise in asset prices, both of which will threaten future growth.” 
-Timothy Geithner, Former U.S. Secretary of Treasury, 2011- 
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The Recurring Cycles of U.S. Currency Appreciation Pressures 
     This chapter is an investigation of the institutional factors contributing to each 
country’s responses to currency appreciation pressures; another component of U.S. 
protectionist pressures following trade frictions. As reflected in the previous chapters 
(Chapters 3 and 4), the task of process-tracing the sources of U.S.-Northeast Asian trade 
conflicts in the past decades is quite meaningful in that such analyses shed light on past 
decision making behaviors by the three countries, and thus provide policy implications 
for the present. Meanwhile, analyses of responses to trade conflicts would be incomplete 
without incorporating information gleaned from the analyses on each country’s responses 
to currency conflicts.  
     In macroeconomics, exchange rates are expectations about future inflation and interest 
rates, and reflect expectations about changes in interest rates. Interest rates set by 
countries (their central banks) can influence exchange rates. When a country’s interest 
rates are raised, investors’ capital flocks to the country for better returns, and in turn the 
country’s local currency becomes more highly in demand, resulting in exchange rate 
appreciation. Raising exchange rates reduces the export demand for the country’s 
commodities as they are denominated in the local currency that became relatively 
expensive, thus resulting in a lower output in the country’s overall exports. On the other 
hand, when a country is expected to lower its interest rates, capital outflow occurs by 
investors who seek better returns elsewhere, resulting in low exchange rates. Lowering 
interest rates tends to lead to rises in a country’s export demand and higher output in 
overall exports due to the lower prices of its exports and higher price for imports. Under 
	  	  
245 
the post-Bretton Woods dollar standard, there has been an inevitable interconnectedness 
between a country’s performance in exports and the value of its local currency against the 
dollar. The cheaper (in real terms) a local currency is vis-à-vis the dollar as an anchor, the 
more competitive a country’s product will be.  
     Nonetheless, the point of the argument in this chapter is not to suggest that deliberate 
alternations in exchange rate policies could have brought solutions to the mounting U.S. 
trade deficits with the three countries in the past. Resolving the trade deficit challenge is a 
different question, requiring more than a simple twist in the exchange rates. As the 
subsequent case analyses reveal, a change in the exchange rates does not automatically 
resolve trade imbalance issues in the longer term. This has been clearly demonstrated in 
the cases of the three East Asian countries under consideration in this dissertation. The 
reason is that other factors play a critical role in trade dynamics, i.e., savings patterns, the 
structure of exports and imports by sector, and patterns of bilateral investment to the 
counterpart country. Moreover, competitiveness is not solely defined by price, but also 
quality, the structure of the intra-industrial market, and patterns of consumption. 
Although the resolving bilateral trade imbalances is a crucial policy assignment for both 
the U.S. and its trading partners, resolving U.S. trade imbalances will not be central to the 
discussions in this chapter.  
     Rather, the scope and argument of this chapter covers the three countries’ varied 
responses in their exchange rate policies. Relying on the institutional framework (Chapter 
2), it analyzes why the three export-led economies of Northeast Asia – Japan, South 
Korea, and China – have shared similar experiences of currency appreciation pressures 
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from the U.S., albeit in different magnitudes, but came up with different policy responses 
with regard to a currency conflict with the U.S. In parallel with the patterns of decision- 
making behavior on trade wars (Chapters 3 and 4), I argue in this chapter that the 
different institutional patterns of policy decision making also played a significant role in 
bilateral currency conflicts. What each country chose to do was clearly a reflection of 
their political capacity and industrial interests. What ultimately contributed to each 
country’s final policy decision was the varying institutional differences in the ways of 
decision-making, each at pivotal points in time throughout each bilateral economic 
relation with the United States. 
Flashback – ‘1971 Nixon Shock’  
     The global financial system as we see it today has evolved from several critical 
junctures in history. The gold standard, first been adopted by the British in 1918, was 
quite stable until WWI, during which nations printed money in order to back their 
defense spending and floating exchange rates were in operation. After WWI, from about 
1919, the world suffered from hyperinflation as a side effect of printing money during 
wartime. Against this backdrop, the U.S. and the U.K. reverted to the gold standard in 
1925, but the Great Depression of 1929 led states to deploy protectionist measures via 
levying high tariffs and also to begin competitive devaluation of their currencies. By 
1931, the gold standard was dysfunctional. The WWII from 1939 left the global financial 
system in disarray, and just before the war ended in 1945, the superpowers gathered in 
Bretton Woods of New Hampshire in the U.S. to peg the U.S. dollar at 35 dollars to an 
ounce of gold and to establish the International Monetary Fund, creating the Bretton 
	  	  
247 
Woods System. Until 1971, the U.S. dollar under the gold-dollar system established at 
Bretton Woods would enable the U.S. dollar to be backed by gold. It was deemed a 
plausible idea at the time. 
     The U.S. economy underwent the golden age of economic growth after WWII. Post 
WWII, the U.S. spent astronomical amounts of money on providing aid to countries 
recovering from war, in order to solidify its presence as the leading democratic nation in 
the world against the Communist bloc during the Cold War. Japan, South Korea after the 
Korean War, Taiwan, and Western Germany were among many that received U.S. 
financial support and development aid, but while the U.S. dollar was welcomed 
everywhere, the U.S. was depleting its dollars and dollars were becoming commonplace 
all over the world. During this time in the 1950s and 1960s, East Asian economies and 
countries of Western Europe succeeded in rebuilding their economies, in part owing to 
the aid received from the U.S. The post-WWII economic boom and expansion was 
clearly visible in many parts of the globe, including the U.S.  
     The period of inflation in the U.S. economy from mid- to late-1960s also contributed 
to difficulty for other currencies to fluctuate to reflect the shift in relative macroeconomic 
conditions between the U.S. and other nations.247 Furthermore, U.S. defense spending in 
the Vietnam War from 1965 to 1975 and increased spending on domestic social programs 
would serve to be detrimental to the U.S. economy at a later point in time. Economist 
Robert Triffin’s previous assertion in the 1960s that the dollar under the gold-dollar 
system would face dilemmas of liquidity and credibility proved to be true, as despite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 FedPoint ‘Currency Devaluation and Revaluation’, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, September 
2011. http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed38.html 
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demand for the dollar was on the rise, gold production was limited, and as supply of the 
dollar increased to provide liquidity, the value of the dollar would fall, thus causing it to 
lose credibility.248 
     By the late 1960s, members of the Bretton Woods system were growing skeptical of 
the dollar-gold convertibility, and declined to have their local currencies devalued in 
order to sustain the value of the dollar. In the early half of 1971, Germany, Switzerland, 
and France exchanged significant amounts of their dollars to gold, and left the Bretton 
Woods system.249 By August of 1971, the U.S. had no options left but to declare the end 
of dollar-gold convertibility. Domestic conditions were worsening - unemployment 
(6.1%) and inflation rates (5.84%) were fairly high as U.S. policymakers sought to find a 
solution to save the dollar. On August 15, 1971, then U.S. President Nixon announced 
that the U.S. would abandon the dollar’s convertibility to gold, which resulted in the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods System. In December 1971, the Group of Ten (G-10) 
signed the Smithsonian Agreement, in which they decided to appreciate their local 
currencies against the dollar and to allow a modest devaluation of the dollar to $38 per 
ounce, and thus a new set of parities that reflected revaluation of other currencies against 
the dollar was set in place.250 In 1973, fixed exchange rates at the global level were 
abandoned altogether, and the IMF Board of Governors approved modifications in the 
IMF Charter that reflected this change in 1976, making the amendments effective from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Triffin, Robert, ‘Gold and the Dollar Crisis; the Future of Convertibility’, Yale University Press, 1961. 
249 Eichengreen, 2010. 
250 The Group of Ten, or the G-10 countries was the group of countries that agreed to the General 
Agreements to Borrow (GAB), established in 1962. In addition to the eight IMF member countries – 
Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S. – Germany and Sweden also 
joined the Group of Ten. 
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1978.251 Since 1973, exchange rates for most industrialized countries have either floated 
or fluctuated against the dollar according to the supply and demand of international 
currencies in the global economy. The adoption of the floating exchange rate system by 
economies around the world did not end currency conflicts, however; indeed, it the 
monetary history of the ensuing decades has been marked by repeated conflicts over 
exchange rates and currency policies. 
      Subsequent events after the Nixon Shock would render the U.S. economy very 
fragile. The Nixon Shock was the beginning of speculative patterns against the dollar 
around the world. The Oil Shocks of 1973 and 1976 added fuel to the fire. Without a 
doubt, the dollar standard had been a fundamental element of the structure of post-WWII 
exchange rates and international currency transactions in the global economy. Under the 
non-fixed, floating exchange rate system, nobody was in charge.252 The process of 
globalization did so much more than just simple currency exchanges. The U.S. 
spearheaded the direction of globalization, pushing for market access overseas, first via 
trade liberalization, and as time passed, financial liberalization. In this process, the U.S. 
kept a keen eye on the developing states of East Asia. Each major trading partner at the 
height of its economic development would come under scrutiny by the U.S. authorities 
with regard to its trading patterns and exchange rate policies.  
U.S. Currency Appreciation Pressures 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 ‘Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund’, the International Monetary Fund. 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#a19s7 
252 Paul Volcker, then Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, was quoted as saying that “Nobody is 
in charge.” CITATION?? 
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     Following the Nixon Shock and its impacts on the U.S. economy throughout the 1970s, 
the increase in U.S. trade deficits prompted U.S. officials to take policy actions on its 
trading partners not solely via the policy tools of trade remedy, but also via demanding its 
trading partners carry out currency appreciation, domestic demand expansion, and 
financial liberalization. With a large and growing bilateral trade surplus with the U.S., 
Japan became the primary target of criticism from the 1970s and 1980s. South Korea 
became a central concern along with Taiwan for similar reasons in trade dynamics from 
the latter half of the 1980s, and China has become the major target in the past decade 
since its 2001 WTO accession. The crucial points in the similarities of U.S. pressures 
imposed on the three countries lie in the U.S. concerns for its domestic industry interests. 
U.S. protectionist pressures would be imposed initially in the forms of trade pressures 
(i.e., further market access, levy of tariffs, trade remedies consisting of USITC 
investigations or WTO dispute initiations), but pressures on trade were often times not 
accompanied by immediate effects in decreasing U.S. trade deficits. Scrutinizing 
undervalued currencies would naturally become a serious task for the U.S. Treasury, and 
thus the U.S. Treasury actively approached and held bilateral talks concerning its request 
for currency appreciation with all of the three countries at different time periods (Table 
5-1).  
Table 5-1. Major U.S.-Northeast Asia Currency Conflicts and Country Responses 
 
Respon
ses 
Japan South Korea China 
1970s 1971 
August 15 
Nixon Shock 
December 
‘G10’ Smithsonian Agreement 
  
1980s 1983 
Reagan-Nakasone Summit 
1986  
U.S. Treasury holds discussions with 
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Meeting, Tokyo 
November 9-12 
1984 
Yen-Dollar Committee Meetings 
1st: February 23-24, Tokyo 
2nd: March 22-23, Tokyo 
3rd: April 16-17, Washington 
4th: May 6, Honolulu 
5th: May 12-13, Tokyo 
6th: May 20-22, Rome 
 
September 22, 1985  
‘G5’ The Plaza Accord 
Japan revaluates the yen against 
the dollar. 
 
1986 
April 3 
Japan intervenes in the FX 
market 
April 8 
Takeshita-Baker Meeting 
May 13 
Baker Statement 
September 6 
1st Miyazawa-Baker Meeting 
September 26 
2nd Miyazawa-Baker Meeting 
October 31 
Miyazawa-Baker Statement 
 
1987  
January 21 
Miyazawa-Baker Emergency 
Meeting 
January 28 
U.S. Intervention in the FX 
market 
February 22 
‘G5’ Louvre Accord 
 
1988 
January 4 
Yen reaches peak after Plaza 
January 13 
Takeshita-Reagan Meeting 
Joint FX interventions 
South Korea (MOF) on the matter of 
currency after the Plaza Accord 
 
1988 
Currency Appreciation Pressures on the 
South Korean won by the U.S. Treasury 
and the IMF 
February 1988 
March 1988  
 
1987  
IMF Pressures on financial 
liberalization 
July 1987  
Korea announces no further revaluation 
but declares plans for further 
liberalization. 
 
 
1990s  
There was also pressure on 
Japan in the 1990s – you can 
probably find some news reports 
on Larry Summers’ pressure on 
Japan in spring 1993, as well as 
public complaints about the 
weak yen in 1998. 
1995 
Accession to the WTO 
1996 
Accession to the OECD 
1997  
Asian Financial Crisis 
IMF Stand-By Arrangement 
Korea faces accidental depreciation in 
the midst of financial crisis. 
1994 
China revaluates the renminbi. 
2000s   2001 
ACCESSION TO THE WTO 
 
2003 
China revaluates the renminbi. 
 
2006-Present  
U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue 
September 21, 2006 
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December 15, 2006 
May 23, 2007 
December 13, 2007 
June 18, 2008 
December 5, 2008 
July 28, 2009 
2010s   May 24, 2010 
May 9, 2011 
May 3, 2012 
July 10-11, 2013 
Note: By author based on government records of bilateral dialogues and on selected publications – Takita 
(2005), Grimes (2001), Flath (2005), and McKinnon (2013) 
 
     After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, the three countries shared 
similar experiences of streamlining their economies with the rest of the world at different 
time periods. In order to become a full-fledged economic actor in the global economy, 
countries were required to accept the global rules and norms, such as the obligations of 
Article VIII of the IMF Charter, under which a country would be obligated to eliminate 
its remaining restrictions on payments and transfers for current account transactions, and 
to refrain from engaging in discriminatory currency arrangements or multiple currency 
practices without the IMF’s approval.253 Japan accepted Article VIII of the IMF in 1964 
and further joined the OECD the same year. South Korea accepted Article VIII of the 
IMF in 1988, and joined the OECD in 1996. China accepted Article VIII of the IMF in 
1996, and has yet to join the OECD but has remained in close partnership with the 
international organization since 1995. Thinking in different time frames is required in the 
analysis to be presented in this chapter, but the focus is on the paralleled policy choices 
of each country at those different time periods. How and why each country embraced the 
pressure from abroad toward economic opening and acceptance of global economic 
norms will help us to understand under what domestic circumstances and objectives the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 Section (2) Avoidance of restrictions on current payments and Section (3) Avoidance of discriminatory 
currency practices, ‘Article VIII: General Obligations of Members’, IMF Charter. Current modified version 
adopted April 28, 2008. http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/AA/index.htm#art4 
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domestic policy makers of each country made their decisions in response. Aside from the 
institutional factors that remain the main pillars of the analysis in this chapter, process-
tracing the country actions taken toward exchange rate policies will involve a careful 
examination on the countries’ policies on interest rates, which directly affect exchange 
rates. 
Revisiting Institutional Variance – Japan, South Korea, and China 
     A closer examination at the bureaucratic and decision-making structures in each of the 
countries is the key to the analysis of institutional variance and its effect on policy 
responses (Chapter 2). At each event of currency appreciation pressures, it was up to the 
bureaucracies of each country to decide on how to cope with the pressures from outside. 
After specific negotiations with the U.S. Treasury, the bureaucrats of the three countries 
would also be responsible for coming up with strategies to deal with each of the concerns 
that were addressed to them. The institutional variance among the three countries arose 
from the differing degrees of policy coordination amongst the ministries, and also the 
sources of power in a specific area of the bureaucracy. In other words, who had the 
stronger say in macroeconomic politics in each of the financial bureaucracies of Japan, 
South Korea, and China, would present their positions in the most diplomatic yet 
strategic manner possible.  
     In this chapter, I first take the cases and time periods of the most relevant and 
appropriate that fall into the categories of the most severe U.S.-Northeast Asian clashes 
on currency – Japan from 1985 to 1993, South Korea from 1988 to 1989, and China from 
2003 to 2013. The objective in the comparative analysis of later time periods is to derive 
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implications for policies today and to project into the immediate and longer-run future. 
While the U.S. pressures to liberalize each of the three countries’ financial and capital 
markets occurred in parallel with pressures to appreciate the local currencies, the 
differing policy choices in the face of U.S. pressures for financial liberalization are laid 
out separately in Chapter 6. Although currency and finance are interrelated, and the 
issues were by and large concurrent, the negotiations on each issue occurred in separate 
dialogues. Therefore, I divide the issues of negotiations on currency appreciation and 
financial liberalization to closely examine the actions of policy makers and relevant 
ministries in the three countries. In the case of Japan and South Korea, financial opening 
negotiations or pressures occurred prior to currency negotiations. 
     The point of argument in this chapter is that the varying pathways of policy responses 
were generated by different decision makers - politicians and government officials who 
belong to different settings of policy decision making in each country. In the case of 
Japan, the negotiations on Japanese yen appreciation during the Plaza Accord occurred 
when the Ministry of Finance was its most powerful within the bureaucratic system 
(more powerful than the Diet and the Bank of Japan before the revision of the Bank of 
Japan Law in 1998). In the case of South Korea, the powerful presidency was the 
principal and the Ministry of Finance (currently the MOSF) was the agent in the series of 
trial-and-errors in macroeconomic strategy, which escalated to sudden depreciation of the 
KRW in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Lastly, but as the most recent and hotly 
debated, the Chinese case presents a very top-down, hierarchical decision-making process 
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involving the State Council and the Leading Group of Financial and Economic Affairs, a 
selected number of politicians in the Politburo.  
Japan – Policy Dominance by the Ministry of Finance  
    The trade frictions that were ongoing between the U.S. and Japan from the late 1960s 
served as the grounds for U.S. pressures on Japanese currency appreciation in the early 
part of 1980s. Japan had already gone through a series of voluntary export restrictions 
(VER) on its textiles, automobiles, and machinery, but limiting the amount of exports did 
not solve the issues of trade balance. The effects of VERs bounced back. In the case of 
automobiles, because the export restraints compelled METI (then MITI) to assign each 
manufacturer a maximum allowable number of vehicles to export, the companies 
naturally tended to export vehicles on which the profit margin was as great as possible, 
meaning higher quality cars. Moreover, the export restraints raised the American prices 
of Japanese cars, thereby increasing the demand for American and European cars in 
America, and inducing rises in their prices.254 The uproar by U.S. auto producers against 
the Reagan Administration’s March 1985 announcement not to seek renewal of the VERs 
based on the burdens of rising auto prices on the consumers was a clear reflection of 
divided interests between manufacturers and consumers in the U.S.255 In July 1985, the 
Japanese government made efforts to grant market access to foreign trading partners via 
adoption of an “action program for improvement of access to Japanese market”, based on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Flath, 2005. 
255 However, the VER was renewed in 1984 at a cap of 1.85 million units, and was imposed again in 1985 
at a raised cap of 2.3 million units. The VER on Japanese automobiles was only finally removed in 1994. 
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the new basic precept of “Free in principle, restriction for the exceptional case”.256 
Despite the efforts, the trade imbalance persisted. 
     As the U.S.-Japan trade frictions culminated in serious political debates in the U.S. 
Congress in the year of 1985, the real appreciation of the US dollar against the Japanese 
yen also reached its peak in the same year. The trade frictions in the 1970s provided 
ample political reason for ‘Japan bashing’ in Washington.257 A catalyst toward the rise of 
political debate in Washington can be attributed to the Murchison-Solomon Report, 
which was presented to Washington officials by the former Chairman of Caterpillar 
Tractor Company, Lee Morgan. Commissioned by Caterpillar, a main competitor for 
Japanese tractor company Komatsu, and drafted by attorney for Caterpillar, David 
Murchison, and Stanford professor Ezra Solomon, the report argued that Japan was 
generating a large part of U.S. trade imbalances, and that the yen-dollar rate was at the 
crux of the problem.258 The U.S. was not only pressured by its domestic industries, but 
also from abroad – other G5 members were complaining about the overvalued dollar.259  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 ‘White Papers of Japan, 1985-86: Annual Abstract of Official Reports and Statistics of the Japanese 
Government’, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1987. 
257 Nevertheless, Flath addresses an important point that it was the strong dollar, and not the closed 
Japanese market or unfair Japanese trading practices that resulted in rise of Japanese goods sales in the U.S. 
market, and inhibited U.S. goods sales in the Japanese market. While the political rhetoric at the time in the 
U.S. strongly focused on Japanese malpractices in trade, Flath stresses that Japanese yen appreciation in the 
Plaza Accord of 1985 was a part of global effort to keep the dollar from appreciating so much against other 
currencies – the British Pound, the French Franc, the German Deutsche Mark. Today, U.S.-Japan trade 
imbalances persist. 
258 Thorn, 1987. pp.29-30. The Murchison-Solomon report, specified and ordered eleven key factors to be 
addressed with regard to the yen-dollar rate, and argued that Caterpillar’s efforts to bring production costs 
under control have been diminished by the weak Japanese yen, which made Caterpillar’s price competition 
with Japanese products impossible. The report was also later published: ‘The Misalignment of the United 
States Dollar and the Japanese Yen: The Problem and Its Solution’, California Management Review; Fall 
1984, Vol. 27 Issue 1, p.42. 
259 Grimes, 2001. p.111. 
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     To fully understand the Japanese policy intent behind bilateral dialogues and 
interactions with the U.S. at the time, a dissection of the political interests of each of the 
bureaucratic actors is required (See Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2). The main players within 
the Japanese bureaucracy - the PM and his Cabinet (politically appointed), the Diet, MOF, 
METI, and BOJ could be considered as actors with a political interest within the 
institutional power struggle. MOFA, which usually engages in diplomatic affairs and 
security related matters, was mainly involved in trade and energy related discussions with 
the U.S. (i.e., Abe-Schultz bilateral meeting), intensifying U.S.-Japan relations and giving 
impetus to currency related negotiations.260 METI was engaged in providing guidelines 
with regard to any directions on domestic industries with regard to exports to the U.S.  
     But of all bilateral issues, MOF would not let the policy agenda on yen-dollar rates 
fall on the laps of other ministries. MOF officials worked to ensure that matters regarding 
international finance would be left solely to their discretion prior to intra-ministerial 
consultations. In the informal MOF-US Treasury bilateral discussions between Beryl 
Sprinkel, Secretary of Treasury and Makoto Utsumi, Vice-Minister of Finance, Utsumi 
requested that the negotiations be centralized only between the two ministries – the U.S. 
Treasury and the MOF; otherwise, MOF would not be interested in a town hall meeting 
involving all other ministries from both sides that may achieve very little outcome. At a 
glance, the request by Utsumi for exclusive channeling may seem like an extraordinary 
step taken by Japan, but behind MOF’s action was the intent for power balance, in 
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purpose of elevating the MOF’s negotiation and policymaking levels equivalent to those 
of the U.S. Treasury.261 
     Hence, the bilateral negotiations toward the Plaza Accord would inevitably manifest 
characteristics of a “behind closed doors” negotiation. It was from this point that the BOJ 
was left out in the start-up process. On December 17, 1984, the BOJ Governor position 
changed hands from Haruo Maekawa (前川春雄) – who would in 1986 lead the 
Maekawa Commission to draft the Maekawa Report – to Satoshi Sumita, a former MOF 
administrative vice-minister. Sumita would be informed about the Plaza plans only a little 
more than a week before the Plaza meeting. In addition to Oba, Minister of Finance 
Noboru Takeshita, PM Yasuhiro Nakasone were the small group of people aware of the 
Plaza plans.262 In contrast with the MOF leadership that tends to his political bases and 
factional party politics in the parliament in addition to ministerial duties, the BOJ 
leadership is highly centralized at the Governor level and lasts typically for 5 years.263 
The MOF had shaped the policy decision-making structure in such a way that it would 
have full control in establishing their policy goals and orientations, and to avoid any 
conflict with or disturbance by other institutions in the bureaucracy. With the U.S. 
Treasury – MOF at the center of the currency negotiations, the MOF was easily able to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Takita, ibid. pp.30-32. Utsumi’s strategy on negotiating with the U.S. Treasury involved his institutional 
motivations to strengthen the MOF through dialogues on financial liberalization and yen 
internationalization. He saw that MOF would benefit from negotiating with a high-level ministry in the 
U.S., and carefully demanded that the bilateral working group to be established on such delicate issues 
would mainly include MOF bureaucrats in charge of relevant tasks, disallowing ministries other than MOF 
to participate in the group. At his request, U.S. concerns that a grand ministry like MOF would not even 
budge disappeared, and Sprinkel agreed to the exclusive bilateral channels for negotiation.  
262 Grimes, 2001. p.113. 
263 Grimes, ibid. pp. 97-98. 
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turn the process toward negotiation as an opportunity to their bureaucratic interests, 
toward further empowerment and exclusivity as a ministry in the Japanese bureaucracy.  
     In the beginning, an initial approach from the U.S. side to the Japanese policy makers 
was via Robert McNamara’s bilateral contact with Japanese Vice Minister for Finance 
Tomomitsu Oba in a phone call, soliciting Oba to join him in a conference for U.S. 
banking industries held in Hawaii in October 1983. Oba agreed to meet him in Hawaii, 
but admits to not having anticipated a specific agenda in mind for their proposed 
meeting.264 In other words, Japan was aware of the political debate within the U.S. 
regarding the yen-dollar rate, but was not in expectation of the U.S. political pressures 
that would be imposed on Japan. At the meeting, McNamara requested for Japan’s efforts 
in internationalizing the Japanese yen, lax regulations, and liberalization of Japanese 
financial and capital markets.265  
     Oba and McNamara met again in San Francisco, and were joined by four additional 
Japanese bureaucrats from the MOF (then 大蔵省): Makoto Utsumi, Japanese Finance 
Minister to the United States (外務省在米国大使館財務公使); Toyoo Gyoten (行天豊
雄) Deputy-Director General for Banking Affairs (銀行局審議官); Mitsuo Sato (佐藤光
夫), Deputy-Department Head for International Finance (国際金融局次長); Shigemitsu 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 Takita, ibid. p.21. Oba jokingly recalls that because October 10th was Health and Sports Day (体育の日) 
in Japan, he thought of going to Hawaii just to go for a swim. Instead, he faced McNamara and Paul 
Volcker, then Chairman of the FRB in serious conversations over a meal regarding serious U.S. requests. 
He notes that Volcker stayed silent, while McNamara did all the talking. 
265 A controversial figure in U.S. history, Robert S. McNamara served as Secretary of Defense during the 
Kennedy Administration, but had also been offered the position of Secretary of Treasury, which he 
declined over the Secretary of Defense position. Following his service as Secretary of Defense, he served 
as the President of the World Bank. 
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Sugisaki (杉崎重光), Vice Finance Officer (副財務官).266 The second time around, Oba 
sensed that there must have been significant levels of discussions within the U.S. 
policymakers that took place from the end of September to early October of 1983. These 
prior meetings and preparations with regard to yen-dollar rate issues were convened in 
secrecy under the objective of achieving smooth bilateral talks during President Reagan’s 
visit to Japan from November 9 to 12, 1983. During the meeting, the two countries 
agreed to establish an ad hoc Yen-Dollar Working Group (the Yen-Dollar Committee). 
From February to May of 1984, the two sides held six secret Committee meetings to 
discuss the value of the Japanese yen (See Table 5-1 for dates and venues of the 
meetings), and came up with a report on the past meetings on May 30, 1984. The 
contents of the report focused mainly on the issues of opening Japan’s financial and 
capital markets, with aims to persuade the Japanese to seek efforts to internationalize the 
Japanese yen.267 However, the U.S. goals to strengthen the yen were met with very little 
success, and the U.S. embarked on an initiative to impose alternative measures. 
Japan’s Acquiescence in the Plaza Accord (1985) 
     It was not until James Baker replaced Donald T. Regan as U.S. Secretary of Treasury 
that U.S. assertions on Japanese yen appreciation was clearly manifested into policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Takita, ibid. Oba also recalls that during this bilateral meeting when the subject of yen-dollar rate was 
raised, U.S. Treasury officials asserted that the matter is at their discretion (Oba alludes to the possibility of 
U.S. Secretary of Treasury, Donald T. Regan being fully assigned for the matter, as President Reagan, with 
an acting career background prior to presidency would not be knowledgeable in details of finance). 
267 ‘Report of the Yen-Dollar Committee’(日米円＊ドル委員会報告書); ‘The Present Status and Outlook 
on Financial Liberalization and Yen International Liberalization’ (金融の自由化および円の国際化につ
いての現状と展望)、大蔵省、May 30, 1984. 
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pressures.268 Oba also notes that the Regan-Sprinkel line was more ‘free-market’ 
oriented, resisting the options of direct intervention in the market. However, under the 
Baker-Mulford line, the approaches to the issues of currency would change 
completely.269 On March 28, 1985, a resolution by the U.S. Senate to request actions on 
Japan set the stage for further U.S. pressures on Japan. Shortly after in April of 1985, the 
Committee on Finance of the U.S. Senate released a report recommending the U.S. 
President to seek action on Japan’s unfair trade practices.270 Prior to the G10 Finance 
Ministers meeting in Tokyo on June 21, 1985, Under Secretary for International Affairs 
for the Department of Treasury David Mulford and Tomomitsu Oba of the MOF held an 
informal meeting on June 19, at the request by the U.S. At the meeting, Japan offered to 
consider the option of market intervention.271 At the G10 meeting in Tokyo, finance 
ministers saw that a complete return to the fixed exchange rate system would be difficult, 
and thus agreed on strengthening the surveillance system to stabilize foreign exchange 
rates.272 U.S.-Japan bilateral meetings continued in the summer of 1985 toward the Plaza 
Accord. Minister of Finance Takeshita and U.S. Secretary of Treasury James Baker held 
a meeting on June 22, 1985, to the intent of both sides to discuss macroeconomic policies 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Noguchi, 2001. p.10. Donald Regan, Secretary of Treasury (1981-85) before James Baker, stepped 
down and took Baker’s position as Chief of Staff (1985-87). Baker served as Secretary of Treasury from 
February 3, 1985 and remained in the position throughout the negotiation periods for the Plaza Accord and 
the Louvre Accord (1985-88). Noguchi notes on the change of hands of the U.S. Secretary of Treasury 
position as surprising for most policymakers at the time of announcement, at a G5 meeting reception hosted 
by the FRB 9 months prior to the Plaza Accord.  
269 Takita, ibid, p.158. 
270 The 99th U.S. Congress, Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate,‘Requiring the President to Respond to 
Unfair Trade Practices of Japan’ (submitted by Bob Packwood, Chairman of the Committee on Finance), 
July 9, 1985. http://www.finance.senate.gov/library/reports/committee/download/?id=35891368-9edb-
44f8-a530-3eb3205068e4 
271 Takita, ibid. p.416. 
272 Policy Bluebook, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. 1987. 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1987/1987-4-4.htm 
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that may influence the foreign exchange market. The second-tier officials, Mulford and 
Oba also met in Paris on June 23 and in Hawaii on August 21 that year, and framed the 
basic idea of the Plaza Accord, based on two pillars: policy coordination and market 
intervention.273 Japan received the first draft of the Plaza Agreement statement on 
September 6. The negotiations were near finalization. On September 15, G5 members 
met in London to discuss the Plaza Accord statement and the methods of intervention, 
and on September 22, at the Plaza Hotel in New York, the agreement on the statement 
was reached, calling for members to directly intervene in the foreign exchange market by 
buying U.S. dollars and selling currencies – the Japanese yen and Deutschmark. Just 
before the agreement, the yen’s value was 242 yen against the dollar. 
Post-Plaza Accord and Implications of Japanese Acquiescence 
     Following the Plaza Agreement in 1985, the Japanese economy in 1986 showed slow 
but steady growth in consumption and high rates of investment in the housing sector. Due 
to the yen’s rise, external demand fell to the minus level for the first time in seven 
years.274 It was not until May 13, 1986 that the U.S. Treasury officials would say there 
would be no further need for the yen to appreciate against the dollar – the yen had entered 
the range of 160 yen against the dollar.275 Nonetheless, post-Plaza Accord arrangements 
did not solely involve foreign exchange market intervention, but also further requests by 
the U.S. to higher the value of the Japanese yen. The U.S. policymakers felt the need for 
the U.S. dollar to fall further in order to lessen the U.S. trade deficit with its major trading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Takita, ibid. p.414. 
274 White Papers of Japan, 1986-87. pp.85-89. The Japan Institute of International Affairs. 
275 Takita, ibid. p. 416.  
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partners.276 At the Louvre Accord on February 22, 1987 following the Plaza Accord on 
September 22, 1985, in order to stabilize international currency value, the 10 countries’ 
finance ministers conference meeting, the IMF Temporary Committee, and the Tokyo 
Summit agreed to establish multilateral surveillance procedures and Japan would 
positively engage in this surveillance.277 
    With hindsight, Japan’s acquiescence, or compliance to the U.S. request to appreciate 
the Japanese yen, was a policy answer to the U.S. in its own way. Japan’s strategy 
involved both the initiative to respond to the U.S. as well as to the international 
community (involving mainly the G5-G10) that it will take the actions required if 
necessary. In the process of formulating its policy, the negotiators at the Ministry of 
Finance sought to dominate the access to information in order to increase its leverage 
within the Japanese bureaucracy. While the Prime Minister was informed about the 
policy framework before the BOJ was, the Prime Minister was not as equipped with the 
technical knowledge and means to give directions. After the Tokyo Summit of May 1986, 
after the yen had appreciated considerably against the dollar, Prime Minister Yasuhiro 
Nakasone’s focus was solely on defending his party interests to win both the Lower 
House and the Upper House election that would be held in June 1986 - he ordered MOF 
vice minister for international affairs Toyoo Gyoten that the yen’s value be restored to 
170 yen against the dollar.278  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 James Sterngold, ‘Dollar Low Against Yen; Gold Hits a 3-Year High’, the New York Times, September 
20, 1986. Secretary of Treasury James Baker was quoted as saying that the dollar needs to fall further if 
Japan and Germany did not raise their interest rates, and Beryl W. Sprinkel was quoted saying that the 
dollar will need to fall further in order to reduce U.S. trade deficits. 
277 JIIA White Paper, 1986. The Managing Director of the IMF also participated in the Louvre Accord. 
278 Grimes, 2001. p. 119 
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     The Diet also was not part of the process – because the Plaza Accord was in the form 
of a ‘fait accompli’, no voice from the Japanese Diet, nor the public, would be reflected 
or taken into consideration toward policy formulation. Governor Sumita of the Bank of 
Japan, participated in the actual signing of the Plaza Accord, the BOJ did not exert much 
influence in the course of policymaking. Rather, its role was one of policy 
implementation post-Plaza Accord, with regard to market intervention and interest rate 
arrangements.  
      Overall, the asymmetric access to information toward the Plaza Accord resulted in 
MOF’s policy dominance. In essence, Japan’s acquiescence to U.S. currency appreciation 
pressures was born out of economic reasons – how best to deal with or deflect the 
protectionist response in the US to expanded Japanese exports; and the MOF was to gain 
in institutional advantage. On the MOF’s institutional advantage, previous study has 
argued that the MOF was willing to accept yen appreciation as long as its primary 
objective for budget consolidation would not be compromised.279 The fact that the MOF 
was seeking to maintain its control of fiscal policy is very true for a ministry that has 
reigned over the Japanese bureaucracy by allocating budgets for ministries since the 
postwar period, but my point of argument here is that in addition to the domestic 
initiatives in fiscal policy, the MOF sought to reinforce its bureaucratic dominance by 
gaining negotiating leverage with a foreign entity on monetary affairs as well. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Grimes, 2001. p.226. Grimes emphasizes the organizational supremacy of the MOF’s Budget Bureau as 
the source of the organization’s pursuit of fiscal stability and control over fiscal policy. 
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Figure 5-1. JPY-USD Exchange Rates (1960-2013) 
 
 
Source: By author based on exchange rate data from the Federal Reserve Board foreign exchange rates 
 
Table 5-2. JPY Appreciation against the USD (1949-1995) 
 
Date JPY-USD Rate Notes 
April 25, 1949 360.00 Fixed Exchange Rate 
December 18, 1971 308.00 Nixon Shock (August 15, 1971) 
February 12, 1973  Smithsonian Agreement; Floating Exchange Rate  
October 31, 1978 175.50 Peak since 1949 
October 29, 1982 278.50 Peak since adopting the floating exchange rate system 
September 22, 1985 240.00 G5, Plaza Accord, New York  
February 22, 1987 150.00 G7, Louvre Accord, Paris 
September 24, 1992 119.83 Breaks 120.00 line for the first time 
April 21, 1993 109.90 Breaks 110.00 line for the first time 
June 27, 1994 99.50 Breaks 100.00 line for the first time 
March 8, 1995 88.75 Breaks 90.00 line for the first time 
April 19, 1995 79.75 Breaks 80.00 line for the first time 
Source: By author based on Ishikawa, 1985, p.173. 
 
South Korea – Strong Presidency and the MOF’s Lack of Stratification 
    Similar to the Japanese case, the channel between the U.S. and South Korea regarding 
currency matters was centered at the levels of financial ministries – the U.S. Treasury and 
the South Korean Ministry of Finance. South Korea’s Ministry of Finance is a powerful 
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ministry that has continuously battled with the Bank of Korea throughout the political 
transitions in the postwar era (See Figure 2-5 in Chapter 2). For South Korea, U.S. 
pressures were existent from the late 1980s, but South Korean policy actions to deflect 
the pressures resulted in steady appreciation and half-hearted market opening. The 
currency appreciation pressures from the U.S. came in the late 1980s, as South Korea’s 
trade balance surplus with the U.S. was on the rise. Initially, the South Korean 
bureaucrats sought to resist the pressures. As South Korea’s worldwide exports took off, 
the chaebols heavily benefited from the government export strategies, and borrowed 
continuously to expand their revenues. In the absence of a sound supervision of the 
chaebols, corruption, cronyism, and market distortion by the chaebols became 
commonplace. To a certain extent, this is still the case for South Korea today. The big 
capitulation to U.S. pressures would come indirectly via the form of IMF pressures in the 
Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, in which the South Korean economy was crippled and the 
South Korean government adopted the demands of the U.S. and IMF wholesale. While 
the external pressures to restructure the corporate world in South Korea was included in 
the demands by the IMF, studies have noted that IMF guidelines were in many ways 
inappropriate in managing the Asian Financial Crisis, and that South Korea recovered 
fast by not following all of the standard IMF guidelines.280  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Stiglitz, 2002. p. 117. Stiglitz has argued that the IMF lacked understanding of financial markets and 
that the IMF guidelines on Indonesia were disastrous. He notes that in the South Korean case, the 
government took an active role rather than just listening to outside advice from the IMF. For example, it 
did not follow the IMF advice and recapitalized its two largest banks instead of closing them down. In 
corporate restructuring, the government took on a fast-paced method of financial restructuring of firms in 
distress within two years. 
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     South Korea’s bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. had begun in 1986. When it 
surpassed that of Taiwan’s in 1988, it began to cause deep domestic concerns in the  
United States. Among the Asian NICs (newly industrialized countries), South Korea 
alongside Hong Kong and Taiwan had run trade surpluses with the U.S. in the 1980s. The 
Asian NICs maintained low-valued currencies relative both to the U.S. dollar and the 
Japanese yen, were export-driven with high saving rates and protected domestic markets, 
except for Hong Kong. Since 1986, the U.S. government trade policy on Taiwan and 
South Korea emphasized currency appreciation and import liberalization. The U.S. dollar 
had been depreciating against the currencies of Taiwan and South Korea, and the 
depreciation of the dollar was generating concerns in Washington.281 However, the U.S. 
political pressures for Asian NICs currency appreciation were manifested with lesser 
teeth, as the U.S. Congress and U.S. Treasury officials did not stand side by side on the 
degree of pressure to be deployed to tackle the issues of bilateral trade deficits with 
Taiwan and South Korea.282  
     The fact that the two countries were making some progress in response to the U.S. 
requests toward market opening, albeit in incremental terms, also made simply arguing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Baker, 1995. p. 44. In his autobiography, Baker states that at the U.S. Treasury, trade and currency 
discussions with Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. In actuality, Singapore and Hong Kong got off the 
hook with only a warning. Baker, Robert Zoellick, Bob Fauver came up with the development of the idea 
of a pacific organization. This became the startup for the APEC. 
282 In a congressional hearing, Secretary James Baker is pushed to the edge by Chairman Lloyd Bentsen of 
Texas, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Finance with regard to the actual methods of imposing 
pressures on the Asian NICs for currency appreciation. Baker suggests engaging in a bilateral negotiation 
with each country, noting that the Taiwan dollar has shown some movement. The Chairman refutes by 
saying that on the South Korean won, not much has changed. Baker refutes by saying South Korea is not a 
major problem as it is the first time scoring trade surplus with the U.S., and that it is on the on the front 
lines in terms of U.S. national security interests, and therefore dismisses the idea of mandating legislative 
solutions to the question of exchange rates. Bentsen takes Baker’s response as diplomatic and asks Baker to 
push further on the two countries. ‘Mastering the World Economy: Hearings before the Committee on 
Finance’, United States Senate, 100th Congress, Pt.4, p.36, 1987 (Also quoted by Lindner, 1992. p.24).  
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for imposing public pressures fairly difficult. More importantly, there were threats of 
potential harm that may undermine the budding diplomatic relationship that the U.S. had 
built over the years with the two countries on the security and military front.283 The 
variance in the degree of pressures was also attributable to the small sizes of the 
economies that the Asian NICs had.284 This was all the more the case for the South 
Korean economy, as South Korea was still viewed by the U.S. as a debtor nation that had 
just graduated from the calamities of the Korean War. Seen from a relative perspective, 
all of the factors involved – incremental progress by the two countries, security ties and 
partnerships, scale of economy and impact – contributed to creating an atmosphere for 
divided opinions in Washington on whether to impose strong pressures on the two 
countries. The divided policy sphere resulted in a relatively lower degree of pressures as 
a policy outcome, and ultimately, much less debated and put into policy action in the U.S. 
Congress than as was in the cases of Japan in the 1980s and China in the 2000s.285 To 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Henning, 2008. p. 24. Henning notes that C. Fred Bergsten and then Assistant Secretary of Treasury for 
International Affairs David C. Mulford had advocated appreciation of Taiwan and South Korea’s 
currencies in 1986 and 1987, supported by analysis by Bela Balassa and John Williamson (1987, 1990). 
Ironically, in Mary 1987 Bergsten is quoted as saying that the focus of exchange rate realignment should be 
on Japan and Europe, not on developing countries, including Korea. (See Lindner, 1992. p. 13) 
284 U.S. General Accounting Office Report No. 138600, ‘U.S. Trade Deficit: Impact of Currency 
Appreciations in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong’, Statement of Allan I. Mendowitz, Director of 
Trade, Energy, and Financial Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, Before the 
Subcommittee on International Trade, Committee on Finance, United States Senate. May 12, 1989. The 
statement reveals the simulated results on a possible appreciation of Asian NICs currencies by a Data 
Resources, Inc., a consulting agency established in 1986 that provides data analysis services that GAO 
contracted with for analysis on Asian NIC currencies. The results showed that Taiwan and South Korea 
have acted to prevent their currencies’ values from reflecting their economic strengths, and that although 
both countries allowed significant appreciation of their currencies against the dollar, the efforts did not 
satisfy U.S. objectives. The results also showed that appreciation of the Asian NICs’ currencies may 
modestly reduce U.S. trade deficits with them, but with minor impacts on the overall U.S. trade deficit, and 
concluded that exchange rate adjustments alone will not resolve the mounting U.S.-NIC trade imbalances.  
285 ‘A “Super 301” Trade Ruling: Too Early for Seoul and Taipei’, Backgrounder, No.91, Asian Studies 
Center, The Heritage Foundation, May 25, 1989. While the policy brief refrains from reflecting the views 
of the Heritage Foundation, a fairly conservative think-tank in D.C., as an attempt to aid or hinder passage 
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that extent, the U.S.-Korea currency conflict was never really under the spotlight in the 
two countries’ policy spheres, before and after the appreciation. The ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
stories were told only via memoirs, internal official records, rarely via public documents 
or newspapers in the early 1990s, and thus were not heavily publicized.  
     South Korea had implemented the manage float exchange rate system in March 1980, 
and by the end of the 1985, the year that the Plaza Accord was signed, the won had 
depreciated 35 percent in nominal terms against the dollar. The appreciation of G10 
currencies against the dollar in 1986-1987 was not matched by the appreciation of the 
won, as the won rose about 12 percent against the dollar during those two years. The won 
depreciated against the Japanese yen over 60 percent by end of 1987. Partly owing to the 
results of these exchange rate changes, South Korea’s current account had turned from 
deficit to surplus in the 1980s.286  
South Korea’s Currency Negotiation with the United States (1987-88) 
     It was at this time that the South Korean government would face severe U.S. currency 
appreciation pressures. The U.S. Treasury approached the South Korean Ministry of 
Finance (now the MOSF) during the transitional phase from the Chun Doo-whan and 
Roh Tae-woo Administrations in 1986-1987. Within the two-year span from April 1987 
to August 1989, the U.S. Treasury persistently requested appreciation of the South 
Korean won, and the KRW rose from 881 won to the dollar in 1986 to 671 won in 1989. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of relevant bills before Congress, it explicitly states that in the interests of the peculiar bilateral 
relationships the U.S. has with the countries and generating anti-Americanism, it should avoid further 
conflict by solving the issues of bilateral trade imbalances at the international level via soliciting them to 
international economic organizations (i.e., OECD, GATT) rather than relying on the Super 301 for the U.S. 
to gain further market access to Taiwan and South Korea.  
286 Lindner, 1992. p.8 
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South Korea’s capital account that had scored a surplus in 1986 for the first time turned 
into a deficit in 1990.287 Policymakers of the time recount that this happened mainly 
because South Korea’s current account surplus from the years 1986-1988 was generated 
from the external factors of exchange rate changes in the Plaza Accord. In other words, 
South Korea benefitted mainly from price competitiveness via external factors, without 
essential improvements being made on economic fundamentals. Such improvements were 
largely owing to the rapid rise of wages amid labor movements following South Korea’s 
democratization. Naturally, when the Japanese yen value rebounded in early 1990, the 
South Korean won’s competitiveness disappeared, and South Korea’s current account 
turned into a deficit.288 Additionally, another critical factor that led to the deficit was 
soaring oil prices in the first Gulf War of 1990. 
     In the morning of August 4, 1986, Richard L. Walker, then U.S. Ambassador to South 
Korea, was summoned to the Ministry of Finance by finance minister Chung In-yong 
(鄭寅用), in response to U.S. Secretary of Treasury James Baker’s request via the 
ambassador to seek consultation with the South Korean officials on the matter of the 
South Korean won’s exchange rate. At the time, it was a rare case that a U.S. Treasury 
Secretary would call on an U.S. Ambassador, instead of Secretary of State. Should the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Hanguggyeongje byeog-eul neom-eoseo:2014 gyeongje hoebog-ui bunsulyeong (한국경제 벽을 넘어서: 
2014 경제 회복의 분수령), NEAR (North East Asia Research) Foundation, 2014. Established in 2007, the 
NEAR Foundation is a conservative think-tank led by Chung Duk-koo, who served as Deputy Finance 
Minister under the Kim Young-sam administration. The report warns against any potential currency 
conflict with the U.S. post-Global Financial Crisis, based on the lessons South Korea learned in the 
currency appreciation negotiations in the late 1980s. 
288 Roh, 2011. In his memoir, former president Roh Tae-woo stresses the external variables that led to the 
current account changes, and rejects claims that his administration ruined the economy after what his 
predecessor, Chun Doo-whan’s administration had achieved. His main argument is that due to the 
appreciation pressures, the exchange rates were not up to par to match the rising wages, household 
spending, and government expenditures.  
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issue of official levels became an issue in channeling, the South Korean Finance Minister 
was to also communicate via the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea as a protocol and 
agreement with the U.S.289 The following day, a newspaper reported that Chung 
explained to Walker about the South Korean floating exchange rate system in detail and 
that since the won-dollar exchange rate was evaluated to be at an appropriate level, there 
was no South Korean intent for artificial appreciation of the currency and that retaining 
the existent floating exchange rate system would be enough to reflect on the actual prices. 
It was also reported that South Korea regretted the inappropriate action by the U.S. to 
allow press releases prior to the two-sides’ reaching of an agreement.290 In the beginning, 
South Korea would not budge. 
     From April 27 to 29 in 1987, the Asian Development Bank Annual Meeting was held 
in Osaka, Japan. At the event, U.S. Treasury officials David Mulford and Charles Dallara 
approached South Korean delegates via requesting an informal hotel room visit in 
addition to soliciting finance minister Chung In-yong to personally meet Treasury 
Secretary James Baker.291 Upon meeting bilaterally in August 1987, Baker requested the 
appreciation of the South Korean won, asserting that the won (6.45% appreciation) had 
not appreciated as much as the Taiwanese dollar (15.3% appreciation) or the Japanese 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 Chung, 2002. pp.164-165. 
290 Chung mentions that Walker recounted the event in his memoir. 
291 Chung, ibid. p.163 notes that he responded that he would try to meet Baker during the upcoming IMF 
Temporary Committee meeting in August that year to avoid appearing as if he as a minister of finance of a 
country were being bossed around (by the U.S.). Attending the meeting was an excuse to meet Baker. As 
the architect of the South Korean currency reform under Park Chunghee, Chung was the most appropriate 
and fit delegate from South Korea for negotiation. Without a memo, Chung held hours of lengthy 
discussions with Baker and his aides. Baker was quite adamant about his position on won-dollar exchange 
rates, saying that he would consider incorporating all measures possible (alluding to the application of 
Super 301) until he felt it was ‘satisfactory enough’ to address the concerns of the U.S. Congress.  
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yen (10.3% appreciation) during January to September in 1986 (for exchange rate 
movements, see Table 5-2).292 At the time, both countries had upcoming elections 
scheduled, and incumbent political parties on both sides felt pressured by domestic 
political motives. U.S. Treasury officials demanded that the won rise to the 600 level. 
South Korea reluctantly agreed to raise the exchange rates to the 800 level before the 
South Korean presidential election scheduled for December 16, 1987 – still, South Korea 
argued, the action would suggest a modest rate of 7% appreciation of the won.293 The 
South Korean defense was that while Taiwan held almost no external debt and had 
maintained current account surpluses throughout the 1980s, South Korea scored a current 
account surplus for the first time in 1986, and that it held large sums of external debt, 
with wages and prices rapidly rising. Chung delivered the South Korean position to Baker 
that a drastic lowering of the exchange rate would be difficult, and that South Korea 
would gradually appreciate the Korean won under the floating exchange rate as it had 
done since 1980.294 At the end of the talks, Baker said exchange rate issues were ‘a pain 
in the neck’, and suggested resolving it at the international level via the IMF. Chung 
agreed enthusiastically, thinking that South Korea would be able to avoid direct 
confrontations with the U.S. if the matter were to be handed over to the IMF, an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Korea Development Institute, ‘South Korea’s Improvement of Financial and Exchange Rate policies in 
the process of financial globalization’ (Geum-yung-gugjehwagwajeong-eseoui hangug-ui geum-
yung·oehwanjeongchaeg-ui gaeseon), Vol.014, January 1991. 
293 Chung, ibid. p.63. Baker is described as fairly goal-minded when he asked back, “What about after the 
election?”, meaning “what will happen to the negotiation and currency appreciation (and government 
leadership)” after the government change. Chung retorted by saying, “I will be leaving, and that will be a 
new game set up according to the election results.” Chung was offered a high-level government position as 
vice prime minister under Roh Taewoo from May 1987 to February 1988. 
294 ‘Finance Minister Chung In-yong announces intent for gradual won appreciation’ (Jeong-in-yong 
jaemubujang-gwan, wonhwajeolsang jeomjinjeog silsi eonmyeon), archive records, National Museum of 
Korean Contemporary Archives, 1987. 
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international organization with some impartiality and credibility. The results of the talks 
were conveyed directly to former vice prime minister Kim Man-je upon Chung’s return 
to South Korea, that currency issues and maintenance of the won-dollar exchange rate at 
the appropriate level would be handled in consultation with the IMF.295 However, this 
policy choice resulted in South Korea’s postponing the homework in response to U.S. 
currency appreciation pressures, or further market opening pressures at a later period.         
     Consequently, in 1987, South Korea appreciated the won 6.7% (year on average) 
against the dollar: in 1988, 11.1%, and in 1989, 8.1%. From September 1985 to June 
1989, the won appreciation rate in nominal terms was clearly lower than those of 
Japanese yen and Taiwanese dollar, but in real terms, matched that of the Taiwanese 
dollar (see Table 5-3). From February 1980 to March 1990, South Korea operated on a 
crawling peg, multicurrency basket system for calculation of its exchange rate. The 
multicurrency basket system would, enable the Bank of Korea to calculate the range of 
the crawling peg based on a certain weight decided by the fluctuations of major 
currencies in the world, with reflections of South Korea’s current account balance, and 
the differentials of South Korea’s interest rates and inflation rates with other countries. 
The Bank of Korea would officially announce the rate each day. Regardless of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
295 Chung’s anecdote reveals how he sought to deflect direct U.S. pressures. After the consultations, Baker 
asked Chung to join him for a round of golf in Hawaii with the Taiwanese finance minister. Baker sought 
to send Mulford over to Taiwan for consultations on currency appreciation, but the problem was that due to 
the U.S.-China joint agreement in the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, high-ranked U.S. officials would not 
be able to visit Taiwan. Chung quickly declined the offer to join them, fearing that South Korea’s interests 
could be damaged if the Taiwanese and Korean situations became enmeshed in a three-party talks on 
currency appreciation. Regardless, the task was handed over to Lee Yong-sung, Deputy Secretary General 
for Planning and Management of the Ministry of Finance, who attended a bilateral meeting with the U.S. 
on international finance right after Roh’s inauguration, and in March 1990, South Korea adopted the market 
average exchange rate system.   
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exchange rate changes, the U.S. Treasury listed South Korea as a currency manipulator in 
its October 1989 report. South Korea feared the possibilities of U.S. retaliation via 
implementation of ‘Super 301’. The background of South Korea’s qualms was as follows. 
Pursuant to the Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination Act 
under the Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act that was signed by President 
Ronald Reagan in 1988, the U.S. Treasury was required to submit to the Committee on 
Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate before October 15 of each year, an 
annual (semiannual from 2001) written report on international economic policy, 
including exchange rate policy.296 The South Korean won and the Taiwanese dollar were 
mentioned in the Treasury reports from 1988, mainly because they had external surpluses 
and a managed float system with restrictive capital controls.297  Japan and Germany at the 
time also had external surpluses, but maintained floating exchange rates, and thus were 
not mentioned in the report. States that were designated as ‘currency manipulating 
countries’ in the reports would be subject to U.S. political pressures to realign their 
currency values. The Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act contained another 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 Section 3004 of the bill requires the Treasury to “consider whether countries manipulate the rate of 
exchange between their currency and the U.S. dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of 
payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” The bill was 
submitted by Senators Max S. Baucus of Montana, Daniel P. Moynihan of New York, and Mark Sanford of 
South Carolina. In particular, Moynihan’s submission of the bill entitled ‘Exchange Rate Adjustment Act 
of 1987’ mandates the U.S. Treasury to start a currency negotiation (http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HOB-
1987/html/HOB-1987.htm). Senators Lloyd Bentsen and Dan Rostenkowski also submitted a revised trade 
bill in 1988 for similar purposes. (See article: http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/business/70-senators-
sponsor-new-trade-bill.html)  
297 Subtitle A. Exchange Rates and International Economic Policy Coordination Act, Title III. International 
Financial Policy, Omnibus Foreign Trade and Competitiveness Act 1988 of the United States (Pub.L. 100-
418). For full text, see United States Code, Office of the Law Revision Counsel 
(http://law2.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title22/chapter62/subchapter1&edition=prelim). 
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section, the ‘Section 301’, which was used as a powerful tool for the U.S. in pressing 
trade partners for market access.298 Both the Exchange Rates and International Economic 
Policy Coordination Act and the Section 301 were used by the U.S. as a comprehensive 
and strategic tools to bring about Asian NICs’ cooperation as a response to U.S. political 
pressures. 
Table 5-3. Monthly Exchange Rates – October 1986 (Currency Units per USD) 
 
 Oct. 1986 Feb. 1985 July 1980 % Change 
Since Feb. 
1985 
% Change 
Since July 
1980 
German Mark 2.01 3.30 1.75 -39 +15 
Canadian 
Dollar 
1.39 1.35 1.15 +3 +21 
Japanese Yen 156 261 221 -40 -29 
Italian Lire 1,388 2,041 832 -32 +67 
Taiwanese 
Dollar 
36.65 39.23 --- -7 --- 
Korean Won 879 839 607 +5 +45 
Source: Mastering the World Economy, Pt.2, p.44 
 
Table 5-4. U.S. Requests for KRW Appreciation, 1987-1989 
 
Negotiation Date U.S. Requests: Appreciation Rate  
(End of Month, W/$, %) 
Actual Appreciation Rate  
(End of Month, W/$, %) 
April 1987, September 1987 
Bilateral meetings during the 
ADB Annual Meeting & 
IMF Temporary Committee Period 
March-June 1987 
846.9 à 780 (7.9%) 
June 1987 
808.9 (4.5%) 
April 1988 
Baker-Dallara 
March-June 1988 
746.2 à 700 (6.2%) 
June 1988 
728.3 (2.4%) 
December 1988 
Deputy Finance Ministers Meeting 
Continued appreciation  
February 1989 
Finance Ministers Meeting 
Continued appreciation up to 
appropriate level 
 
March 1989 
Deputy Finance Ministers Meeting 
March-May 1989 
671.9 à 650 (3.3%) 
May 1989 
666.7 (0.8%) 
April 1989 
Deputy Finance Ministers Meeting 
671.9 à 657 (2.2%) June 1989 
667.2 (0.7%) 
August 1989 
Secretary Brady’s Letter  
a) Continued appreciation 
b) Regular meetings on Financial, 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 For full text of the Section 301, see U.S. Code Title 19, Chapter 12. Trade Act of 1974, Subchapter III. 
Enforcement of United States Rights Under Trade Agreements and Response to Certain Foreign Trade 
Practices, sections 2144-2420. For full text, see United States Code, Office of the Law Revision Counsel 
(http://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title19/chapter12/subchapter3&edition=prelim). 
	  	  
276 
Foreign Exchange, and Capital 
Markets 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea.   
 
Table 5-5. KRW Appreciation against the USD (1986-1991) (Unit: KRW/USD, %) 
 
 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter 4th Quarter  
1986 885.2 (0.56) 886.6 (0.4) 877.0 (1.48) 861.4 (3.24) 
1987 846.9 (1.68) 808.9 (6.09) 805.8 (6.45) 792.3 (8.02) 
1988 746.2 (5.82) 728.3 (8.08) 719.0 (9.25) 684.1 (13.66) 
1989 671.9 (1.78) 667.2 (2.47) 670.0 (2.06) 679.6 (0.66) 
1990 702.1 (-3.31) 716.0 (-5.36) 712.9 (-4.90) 716.4 (-5.41) 
1991 724.7 (-1.16) 723.1 (-0.95) 741.5 (-3.50) NA 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea.   
Note: Numbers are exchange rates at the end of each quarter. Numbers within parentheses are changes in 
percentages from end of previous year. Minuses indicate depreciation. 
 
Table 5-6. Asian Currency Appreciation against the USD after the Plaza Accord 
 
Appreciation Rate Korean won Japanese yen Taiwanese Dollar 
Nominal 32.4% 72.8% 53.3% 
Real 18.6% 21.2% 18.4% 
Source: Korea International Trade Association, ‘South Korean Exchange Rate Policy’. September 1989. 
 
     Toward 1988, under continued U.S. pressures, South Korea was going through a 
political leadership change from former presidents Chun Doo-whan to Roh Tae-woo. 
While both shared the same profiles as military cadres under Park Chung-hee, they held 
differing political interests, as Chun was reluctantly stepping down from presidency after 
a series of political demonstrations, and Roh was the next one down the line to be 
president. The Chun and Roh political camps were engaged in a war of nerves over who 
should have the upper hand in candidate nomination for the upcoming general election in 
April 1988. Coincidentally, the U.S. also had an upcoming presidential election 
scheduled for November 1988. Naturally, against the backdrop of South Korea’s trade 
surpluses in 1987, the incumbent Republican Party of the United States, would pressure 
South Korea with the objectives of market access and currency appreciation – all with the 
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intent of remaining in power with the political agenda of George Bush becoming the next 
president.  
      The U.S. pressures on currency appreciation were coupled with the pressures on trade 
liberalization. The South Korean response to the U.S. pressures was a manifestation of its 
strong presidency that drives the bureaucracy – the omnipotent presidency that exerts 
excessive policy influence at the expense of a good policy outcome. The ramifications of 
the democratization movement in South Korea made the presidency all the more sensitive 
about public opinion. It was understood that 1987 presidential election would be held 
under a direct voting system. The South Korean presidency that was very weary of the 
public opinion played a huge role in fragmenting the policy approaches toward U.S. 
pressures in the late 1980s. Public opinion in South Korea responded frantically to market 
opening, especially in the agriculture sector, and the outcome of a presidential election 
could be heavily influenced by the policy decision on agricultural market opening. The 
major issues at stake were on opening South Korean markets for U.S. beef, tobacco, and 
insurance.  
     In May 1986, then USTR Clayton K. Yeutter flew to Korea demanding beef market 
opening based on Super 301. In response, then vice prime minister Kim Man-je (金滿堤) 
under the Chun Doowhan administration had visited Washington on February 26, 1987 
and met with Yeutter and Baker individually for discussions on the issues of won 
appreciation, market access, and beef import.299 At the meeting, Baker explained to Kim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 ‘U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker requests South Korea for won appreciation’, Digital Archives, 
National Museum of Korean Contemporary History, February 26, 1987 
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about why the G7 Finance Ministers Joint Statement included a statement calling for 
NICs to appreciate their currencies, and requested for a considerable appreciation of the 
South Korean won against the U.S. dollar. Later, Kim signed a pact with the U.S. on 
opening the South Korean beef market, based on the expected timeline that the 
presidential election and the general election in South Korea would be held at the end of 
1987. Before the election, Chun called on Chung In-yong (who had met Baker as 
Minister of Finance to announce South Korean intent for gradual won appreciation), who 
succeeded Kim Man-je as vice prime minister, to pay the U.S. a visit to keep his word as 
his legacy.300 Chung was also approached by the Republican camp of the U.S. Having 
close ties with the U.S. presidential candidate George Bush, James R. Lilley, then U.S. 
Ambassador to South Korea (who succeeded Richard L. Walker), pressured Chung to 
meet Bush on his visit to the U.S. to show that the two countries are settled on the beef 
issue. However, Roh was against opening the Korean beef market to the U.S. in fear of 
losing votes from the agricultural sector in the election.301 The public opinion in South 
Korea did not allow for further market opening.  
     Chung sought advice from his old friend and then Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Kwang-su Choi (崔侊洙) on the matter. Choi advised Chung that opening the South 
Korean beef market is only a matter of time, and that Chung should write the U.S. a 
memorandum that South Korea will allow beef market opening after the general election. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(http://www.much.go.kr/story/story.do?_method=detailUserStory&page=1&mts_idx=10719&mts_day=02
26) 
300 It is a continued custom in South Korea that the minister of finance would be promoted to the level of 
vice prime minister. 
301 Chung, ibid. pp.184-185. 
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Chung’s scheduled exit as a government official to step down soon made the case of 
Chung finalizing the issue all the more appropriate – keeping the previous 
administration’s word. On January 4, Chung met USTR Yeutter to say that if the U.S. 
requires, South Korea is willing to write a memorandum, on the condition that opening 
the beef market can be delayed until the general election, and on the basis that the content 
of the memorandum would remain confidential until then. However, Yeutter admitted in 
all honesty that under the U.S. domestic circumstances, he does not have means to keep it 
confidential, so an agreement to delay beef market opening in South Korea was reached 
without writing a memo. In the absence of a memo, it would become increasingly 
difficult for the Chun administration to avoid national criticism. Chung’s defense for not 
writing a memorandum to the U.S. to his MOFA colleague Choi was that ‘should the 
secret pact be broken, things can get more problematic.’302  
     Meanwhile, on the same trip to the U.S., Chung was approached once again by 
Secretary of Treasury Baker, seeking further consultations on the South Korean won. At 
the time, he was reported to have been unsuccessful in securing a meeting with Baker, 
but Chung notes that he had avoided Baker during his trip to the U.S. to prevent further 
pressures on the South Korean won. Such individual actions by Chung reveal that the 
MOF’s stratification and pathways toward establishing a clear policy response to U.S. 
currency appreciation pressures were fairly weak and far from thorough. As a clear policy 
response was not delivered from the South Korean MOF to the U.S. Treasury, throughout 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Chung, ibid. pp.186-187. The case on beef was later expanded in the USTR’s filing a dispute to the 
GATT on South Korean beef. The incident also caused uproars in the South Korean domestic political 
scene, in which Chung was put to testify at the National Assembly hearings regarding the secret pact from 
opposition party assemblymen during the transition period from the Chun Doo-whan administration to the 
Roh Tae-woo administration.  
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the year of 1988, even after the elections and the set of the 6th Republic under Roh, the 
U.S. Treasury continuously demanded further lowering of the exchange rate.  
     While the most severe U.S. Treasury pressures on South Korea’s exchange rate policy 
has ended, South Korea still remains under the radar of the U.S. Treasury for currency 
manipulation.303 South Korea has been listed as a currency manipulating country multiple 
times in the U.S. Treasury report. At the time of currency appreciation pressures from the 
U.S., a clear strategy in the South Korean response was missing, and the MOF’s solution 
to the pressures was a continuous ministerial referencing that the policies chosen are 
based on market fluctuations. South Korean finance ministry officials deny that there are 
artificial changes made to the exchange rate in response to U.S. pressures.304 
Figure 5-2. KRW-USD Exchange Rates (1960-2013) 
 
Source: By author based on exchange rate data from the Federal Reserve Board foreign exchange rates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303  
304 Personal interviews. According to MOSF officials, South Korea’s exchange rates at the time of U.S. 
currency appreciation pressures were only a reflection of market dynamics, and while adjustments may be 
made for stability of the won, exchange rates were not a result of voluntary or deliberate arrangements by 
the South Korean government.  
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China  
     U.S. currency issues with China and Sino-U.S. negotiations on renminbi appreciation 
are ongoing as of this writing. U.S. interests on China had been largely military in the 
postwar years, but since China took on economic reforms from the late 1970s, U.S. 
economic interests on China started to grow.305 Currency issues regarding China had 
been mentioned in the Treasury reports in the early 1990s, but the tensions on the subject 
did not surface so much as a significant political agenda until the 2000s. By end of 2001 
when China entered the world economy via accession to the World Trade Organization, 
its presence in the global economy had become highly visible. As China’s current 
account surplus began to increase exponentially, and with U.S. domestic markets 
increasingly dominated by Chinese manufactured goods, U.S. domestic concerns and 
political debates on the China threat became quite serious. At the same time, due to the 
interconnectedness of the two economies, the U.S. felt a strong urge to begin a series of 
talks. At the time, there had been previous setups that the U.S. and China held together, 
i.e., the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) established in 1983 and 
operated by the U.S. Department of Commerce and relevant Chinese ministries in the 
field of commerce, and the Joint Economic Committee between the U.S. Treasury and the 
Chinese Ministry of Finance; but full-fledged, strategic and economic dialogues had yet 
to begin. Meanwhile, the U.S. political sphere already had the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission set up and running through a congressional mandate from 
October 2000, to monitor and investigate national security and trade issues between the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Lardy, 1987. As Lardy put it, China’s importance had been defined primarily as military rather than 
economic until the late 1980s. 
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two countries. Simply put, since China’s economic growth took off, the U.S. was already 
prepared, motivated, and geared toward gaining control of the bilateral relationship. 
     In the year of 2006, the Bush Administration in agreement with the CCP Leadership 
under former President Hu Jintao launched the first U.S.-China Strategic and Economic 
Dialogue (this point forward, S&ED), which have been semi-annually held every year.306 
While the Strategic Dialogue mainly dealt with security issues, led by heads of defense 
ministries and senior officials, the economic dialogues were predominantly led by the 
U.S. Treasury and Chinese ministries associated with the economic and financial 
functionalities and tasks in the Chinese government. In the initial launching statement of 
the U.S.-China S&ED, it is made explicit that issues in the bilateral dialogues will receive 
full attention, including pressing China for floating exchange rates among several other 
relevant policy issues.307 In the initial phase, Henry Paulson, then Treasury Secretary, 
would lead the economic track, and Madame Wu Yi (吴仪), then Vice Premier.308 At the 
time of Wu Yi’s appointment to lead the Chinese delegation, questions on China’s intent 
in the talks arose, as Madame Wu held the vice premiership, which was a higher position 
than that of the finance minister, and was not exactly Henry Paulson’s counterpart in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306 The Strategic Track of the dialogue was led by Condoleeza Rice, former Secretary of State under the 
Bush Administration. Paulson and Rice had built acquaintance prior to joining the administration through 
former Secretary of State and Treasury George Schulz. See Paulson, 2010, p.53. 
307 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Center, ‘Fact Sheet Creation of the U.S.-China Strategic 
Economic Dialogue’, HP-107, September 20, 2006. On currency issues, the existing economic dialogues 
included the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) between the U.S. Department of 
Commerce, the USTR, and the Chinese Vice Premier responsible for Trade, and the Joint Economic 
Committee between the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Chinese Ministry of Finance. 
308 The vice premier position in China are held by multiple people at once (up to four vice premiers at one 
period), but the order and degree of power varies by individuals. 
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terms of government hierarchy.309 In terms of the hierarchy of economic policymaking in 
China, the Leading Group for Financial and Economic Affairs, led by former President 
Hu Jintao, would include vice premiers like Madame Wu in charge of financial and 
economic issues. Paulson’s equivalent would be finance minister of China, but China had 
chosen Madame Wu to lead the negotiations with the U.S. The U.S. saw this not as a 
problem but an open attitude from the Chinese to take the dialogues very seriously, and 
Paulson highly appreciated Wu’s pragmatism and aggressiveness to go push the process 
forward. 
     Under Paulson’s leadership, issues on currency in the economic dialogues were not as 
highlighted in the initial phase of the dialogues, although the U.S. media at the time of 
S&ED launch was keenly interested in how the U.S. would resolve the issues of trade 
deficits with China using the tools of currency appreciation pressures.310 The greatest 
divergence from the case of U.S.-Japan conflict was that the U.S. sought to focus on the 
bilateral strategic relationship through the S&ED (which would help a great deal in 
maintaining confidence in the U.S. system during the global financial crisis) rather than 
simply deploying pressure tactics, given the vast amount of Chinese holdings of U.S. debt 
in the form of U.S. Treasury bills. Paulson notes that in the S&ED negotiations, he was 
candid about the difficulties of the U.S. but mindful that China was one of the top holders 
of U.S. debt, including hundreds of billions of GSE (government-sponsored enterprise) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
309 The Minister of Finance at the time was Jin Renqing (金人庆), who served as finance minister from 
2003 to 2007. He resigned due to his role in a sex scandal in 2007. 
310 U.S. Department of the Treasury Press Center, ‘Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Press Briefing 
Following the Announcement of The US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue’, HP-108, September 21, 
2006. 
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debt – he stressed that the U.S. understood its responsibilities.311 Nevertheless, the U.S. 
agenda of pressuring China to appreciate its currency was inherent since the inception of 
the dialogues. At the forefront of the U.S. delegation, Paulson was also the right fit for a 
leading position in the negotiations.312 Under the Obama Administration, the leadership 
was handed over to the new Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner in 2009. Representing 
the Chinese side from the year 2008 was former Vice Premier Wang Qishan (王岐山). 
While Paulson’s delegation was comprised of smaller numbers of chief ministers in the 
Obama Administration cabinet, the size of the Treasury delegation to the economic 
dialogue led by Geithner to China was significantly larger, reaching a total of 29 
government official participants maximum in the May 2011 dialogue.  
     Domestically, U.S. policy moves on dealing with China had reached its peak in the 
years from 2004 to 2006. After the Global Financial Crisis that broke out in 2008 which 
served as a critical point in the U.S. economy, the Obama administration took office, and 
U.S. pressures on China’s renminbi issues declined slowly. While the USTR 
continuously charged China with unfair trading acts and took USITC and USDOC trade 
remedy cases to the WTO, and certain congressmen (i.e., Dave Camp, R-MI 4th District) 
steadily pushed the U.S. Treasury to take actions on the renminbi, the U.S. Treasury 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
311 Paulson, 2010. p.52 and p.128. Japan still also holds a considerable amount of U.S. debt, and is the 
second major foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities. However, China topped over Japan in 2007 in 
terms of absolute amount of U.S. debt holdings, which incentivized the U.S. to place policy emphasis on 
talks with China. For a complete list of major foreign holders of treasury securities from the year 2000, see 
http://www.treasury.gov/ticdata/Publish/mfhhis01.txt. 
312 Paulson, ibid. p.32-33. Paulson, with previous years of work experience in China during his time at 
Goldman Sachs, had built a range of close relationships and contacts with the most senior Chinese leaders, 
and the investment bank grew to be the leading banking adviser in China at the height of its economic 
growth. By 2006, Paulson had made about 70 trips to China. His networks (i.e., 15-year bonding with 
Wang Qishan) in China helped him considerably while he was at U.S. Treasury during the financial crisis. 
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sought not to overdo the pressure on China’s currency policy.313 The U.S. Congress had 
China’s currency issue on its policy agenda from at least 2003. Although whether the low 
value of the renminbi was a direct contributing factor to mounting U.S. trade deficits was 
still debatable, the U.S. Congress carried on a highly politicized debate, as representatives 
and senators desired to have a solution to respond to the concerns of their constituencies 
and businesses about the China threat.314 The U.S. congressional initiatives to pressure 
China on the issue were magnified and manifested in the dialogues as the process 
unfolded. However, the U.S. domestic policymaking arena showed incoherence in the 
process. This policy divide was clearly manifested in the positions of the U.S. Congress 
and the U.S. Treasury. The U.S. Congress continuously pushed for U.S. Treasury to 
pressure China by enacting legislations on oversight of exchange rate regimes in 2011 
and 2013. On the other hand, U.S. Treasury understood the significance of the agenda of 
renminbi appreciation, but simultaneously held goals to maintain a sound economic and 
financial relationship with China as an institution. By declining to name China a currency 
manipulator, the Treasury took a diverging path from its previous patterns of pressuring 
Japan, South Korea, or Taiwan.315 In simple terms, the U.S. Treasury could not afford to 
be adamant in its demands of renminbi appreciation due to the strong economic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Ways and Means Committee Hearing on China Exchange Rate Policy, ‘Treasury Secretary Timothy 
Geithner testified about Chinese fiscal policy and progress in talks to revalue the Chinese currency, the 
Yuan’, September 16, 2010 (http://www.c-span.org/video/?295508-1/china-exchange-rate-policy). While 
Geithner’s presentation indicated the U.S. Treasury’s intent to keep on pressuring China for renminbi 
appreciation, the congressmen demanded more actions from the U.S. Treasury. 
314 Paulson, ibid. p.82. As Secretary of Treasury, Paulson saw the lack of savings by Americans as a bigger 
factor (than China’s cheap exports and huge capital reserves) that caused U.S.-China trade imbalances. 
315 Xinhua News, ‘U.S. Treasury declines to name China as currency manipulator’, April 3, 2013. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-04/13/c_124575654.htm 
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interconnectedness between the U.S. and China.316 In a CRS Report for Congress on 
China’s currency, Morrison and Labonte also note that while an appreciation of the 
renminbi against the dollar could help boost U.S. exports to China, it could also entail 
costs to the U.S. economy in the near term, as China would not need to buy as many U.S. 
Treasury bills, which could cause real U.S. interest rates to rise. They add that further 
renminbi appreciation could mean higher costs for U.S. consumers and firms that use 
Chinese parts for their final products.317 For the U.S. Treasury, appeasing the Chinese 
would be in the interest of the U.S. economy and U.S. investors in China in the near term, 
since the U.S-China economic relations were interconnected. In the longer term, the U.S. 
sought to establish and maintain its relationship with China in such a way that a win-win 
situation would exist between the two, and avoid possibilities of confrontation with China 
or retaliation from China as much as it could, as the U.S. saw that the centralized Chinese 
political system embodied less vulnerability to U.S. pressures as the Japanese and South 
Korean ones did due to their economic and security dependence on the U.S.318 
Table 5-7. Developments in the U.S.-China Currency Dispute Timeline, 1994-2013 
 
Year U.S. Actions Chinese Actions Exchange Rate System 
1994  January 1, 1994 
China devalues official rate – unifies 
dual exchange rate system 
 
1996  December 1, 1996 1995-2005 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
316 In the Ways and Means Committee Hearing on China Exchange Rate Policy on September 16, 2010, 
Geithner’s response on the committee’s requests to take firmer actions against China entails the economic 
logic that the U.S. should pursue a strategy that is effective in practice, and that an increased pressure may 
only take away the tools that are present.  
317 Wayne M. Morrison and Marc Labonte, ‘China’s Currency Policy: An Analysis of the Economic Issues’, 
Congressional Research Service, RS21625, Library of Congress, July 22, 2013.  
318 See Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, ‘How China Sees America’, Foreign Affairs, 91:5, September 
2012. The authors argue that while a small group of mostly younger Chinese analysts have positive views 
on U.S.-China cooperation, such views are outnumbered by confrontational ideas of Chinese strategists 
about how China should respond to the U.S. Their emphasis on how China sees America in turn influences 
the ways in which the U.S. policy is shaped. 
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China reaches full RMB 
convertibility 
China keeps the RMB 
pegged to the U.S. dollar 
at 8.28¥/1$. 1997-1999  China keeps RMB fixed while 
neighbors devalue their currencies in 
the Asian Financial Crisis 
2003-2004 October 2003 
Treasury Secretary Snow 
pressures China to allow RMB 
appreciation through the U.S. 
Treasury Report 
 
2005-2006 February 2005 
Congressional Legislations 
pre s s ur ing China  
1) Schumer & Graham319 
2) Baucus-Grassley320 
October 2006 
IMF finds RMB ‘undervalued’ 
July 2005 
Immediate 2.1% revaluation of the 
RMB at 8.11¥/1$  
Renminbi appreciates against the 
dollar. 
 
 
2005 
China shifts from peg to 
managed float. 
The PBOC sterilizes 
reserve inflows, 
preventing excessive 
money growth and 
inflation. 
2007-2008 U.S. Treasury temporarily 
passes the RMB-USD debate to 
the IMF, mandated for exchange 
rate surveillance 
Chinese exporters facing price 
competition raise complaints 
regarding export difficulties. 
PBOC sterilization falters, 
money becomes 
excessive, and inflation 
becomes a serious issue. 
Shanghai stock market 
experiences a bubble. 
2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis 
temporarily raises demand for 
U.S. dollars 
 China loses exports, 
growth slows, and danger 
of overheating disappears. 
2008-2010 President Obama and Secretary 
Geithner reassure the Chinese on 
the stability of the USD.321 
 
As the financial crisis unfolds, 
international pressure heightens 
on RMB appreciation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
April 2010 
U.S. Congress biannual report 
(due April 15 2010) finds China 
guilty of currency manipulation.  
U.S. Treasury postpones the 
issuance of the report. 
 
September 2010 
Mid 2008-April 2010 
RMB re-pegged at 6.84¥/1$ 
(estimated to be 20% stronger than 
in 2005) 
March 2009 
PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan 
proposes replacing the USD as 
international currency with SDR 
(Special Drawing Rights). 
November 10, 2009 
Premier Wen Jiabao urges the U.S. 
to keep its deficits at an appropriate 
level lest that the USD may lose its 
stability (and U.S. T bills that China 
holds may lose value). 
April 2010 
China states it will never bow to 
pressures from U.S. congressional 
pressures. 
China announces to switch to some 
currency flexibility from June 2010.  
China resumes growth. 
Overheating danger 
reappears. 
China returns to fixed 
exchange rate system. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 In February 2005, Senators Schumer and Graham proposed the first of bills to impose tariffs of 27.5% 
against all Chinese goods if China does not substantially revalue its currency. 
320 Senators Baucus and Grassley also proposed bills substituting the phrase ‘currency misalignment’ in 
place of ‘unfair manipulation’. 
321 Reuters, ‘Geithner tells China its dollar assets are safe’, June 1, 2009. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/06/01/usa-china-idUSPEK14475620090601 
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“Currency Wars” by Brazil 
Minister Mantega warning 
before G20 
November 2010 
China criticizes the U.S. Fed’s QE2 
as an example of currency wars at 
the G20 Summit in Seoul 
2011 January 2011 
Obama-Hu Summit 
Geithner says RMB is 
appreciating at 10% per year on 
real terms. 
October 2011 
U.S. Senate pas s e s  the  
Currency Exchange Rate 
Oversight Reform Act of 2011. 
 February 4, 2011 
China returns to 
managed float. 
2012 U.S. Treasury continues not to 
name China a currency 
manipulator. 
  
2013 June 2013 
U.S. Senate introduces the 
Currency Exchange Rate 
Oversight Reform Act of 2013. 
  
Source: Compiled by author based on U.S. Treasury reports and U.S. Congressional Hearings.   
 
China’s Top-Down Decision-making and Exchange Rate Policy on ‘Their Own Terms’ 
      China’s experience in policymaking in currency matters fared more hierarchical than 
in the cases of Japan or South Korea’s. While the Japanese technocrats dominated the 
policymaking sphere, and the South Korean presidency conscious of public opinion 
influenced policymaking, China’s senior leaders in the top-down political decision-
making system would direct the ways in which currency issues would be managed.  One 
of the most prominent Chinese decision makers since Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform 
era was Zhu Rongji, who served as premier of China from March 17, 1998 to March 16, 
2003. During his time in office, he also served simultaneously as the Governor of the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), the central bank, from July 1993 to June 1995. Zhu 
exerted strong leadership during his time, and he would occasionally provide opinions on 
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economic and financial matters after leaving office.322 China had readjusted the value of 
the renminbi by depreciation in 1994, but kept it mostly pegged to the dollar until 2005 
when it shifted from peg to managed float (see Table 5-6).323 However, it is notable that 
China’s currency is not fully convertible and capital controls have remained in place.324 
     In response to the U.S. pressures, Chinese policy makers have shown their 
hierarchical patterns of decision-making, which are different ways compared to the cases 
of Japan and South Korea. Indeed, there were stark differences, which are mainly 
circumstantial variances between the cases of U.S.-Japan or U.S.-South Korea trade and 
currency conflict and the U.S-China case.325 But what really made the Chinese case 
diverge from the two other cases was the way in which decisions are made in the Chinese 
political system. Indeed, governance and leadership in Chinese politics have evolved over 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322 Zhu Rongji, 2013. In an interview dated September 27, 2001 entitled ‘The Impact of 9/11 on Our 
Economy, and Our Countermeasures’, Zhu comments on the possible effects of 9/11 on China’s foreign 
exchange reserves, and states that for the moment, it is better to keep the renminbi steady by following the 
dollar instead of opting for linkage of the renminbi to a basket of currencies including the dollar, yen, and 
euro. Eventually, China shifted from peg to managed float in 2005.  
323 Rickards, 2011. pp.101-102. Up until 1993, China had engaged in a series of six devaluations from 1983 
to support its booming exports. On January 1, 2014, China announced a reform of foreign exchange system 
and devalued the renminbi at 8.7 to the U.S. dollar, which prompted the U.S. Treasury to label China as a 
currency manipulator. 
324 Patrick Hess, ‘China’s Financial System: Past Reforms, Future Ambitions and Current State’, in F. 
Rövekamp and H. G. Hilpert eds., Currency Cooperation in East Asia, Financial and Monetary Policy 
Studies, Springer, 2014. 
325 The Chinese viewpoint on the differences were made quite transparent when former Chinese Vice 
Premier Wang Qishan described the differences and argued that the comparison is in appropriate on a U.S. 
talk show hosted by Charlie Rose, in a session he attended with Secretary Geithner that was nationally 
televised in the U.S. on May 15, 2011. He identified five differences between the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-
China conflicts, the first two of which were mentioned to him by Larry Summers and the third by a 
Japanese central bank governor (unidentified): first, that Japan’s technology at the time was at or above that 
of the U.S., while China’s technology lags behind; second, that brand recognition by U.S. consumers of 
Chinese firms is scarce; third, that generators of trade surplus on the Japanese side were mainly Japanese 
firms, but multinational corporations and foreign investors from developed countries in the case of Chinese 
surpluses; fourth, that the U.S. had not deployed export controls on Japan while it has on China based on 
security reasons; and fifth, that the U.S. does not recognize China as a market economy. Although Wang’s 
intention behind pointing out the differences were not made explicit, mentioning the factors made the Rose 
and Geithner nod in agreement and at least appeared as an gesture to imply that China is not a culprit of the 
conflicts that have risen between the U.S. and China, whereas Japan may have been in the U.S.-Japan case. 
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time, impacting the policy decision-making process. After Deng Xiaoping’s reform era, 
China has developed a developed a responsive authoritarianism through representation at 
the highest reaches of the CCP, which balances geographic, functional factional, and 
policy interests.326 The pluralism seen in Chinese bureaucracy is geared toward 
accommodating as many interests as possible, albeit through the ultimate projection of 
power at the highest level of the decision making process, which is the Politburo. The 
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), led by the Chinese President, is composed of 
several vice premiers, and it serves as China’s highest leadership body and ultimate 
economic and financial decision-maker. Party authority over the financial system is 
exercised via the Central Organization Department that appoints the heads of all major 
institutions and also via the Leading Group for Financial & Economic Affairs (中共中央
财经领导⼩小组：hōnggòngzhōngyāng cáijīng lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ).327 As mentioned in 
previously in Chapter 2, for domestic and foreign economic policy making, the Leading 
Group for Financial & Economic Affairs leads the policy formulation.328 The battlefield 
of interests in the bureaucracy has become apparent in the form of “small leading groups” 
(lǐngdǎo xiǎozǔ). Currency and exchange rate policies are no exception to the current 
patterns of top-down bureaucratic policy formulation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
326 Lampton, 2014. p.70. 
327 Hess, ibid. 
328 The Leading Group for Financial & Economic Affairs was led by Zhao Ziyang (1980-1989), Jiang 
Zemin (1989-1998), Zhu Rongji (1998-2003), Wen Jiabao (2003-2013), and is currently led by Premier Li 
Keqiang (2013-present). Other than the leader Li Keqiang, current composition of the group include 
policymakers such as Zhang Gaoli (First-Ranked Vice Premier) as the Deputy leader, and members 
including Wang Yang (Third-Ranked Vice Premier), Ma Kai (4th Ranked Vice Premier), Wang Yong 
(Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, SASAC), and Zhou 
Xiaochuan (Governor, People’s Bank of China). 
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     While little is known about how policy decisions are made in the small leading group, 
but it is evident that decisions made in the group are sent down to the policy practitioners, 
e.g., the finance ministry and the central bank. It is worth noting that the Chinese state’s 
control over matters pertaining to currency and finance derives from the traits of the 
Chinese financial system, which is still predominantly state-owned, with the state 
completely owning most banks or holding majority of stakes in the banks. In addition, 
according to Hess (2012), the CCP relies heavily on government performance and not 
ideology for political support by its people as it did in the past, and the CCP leadership 
understands very well that the lack of government performance may undermine the 
party’s position in governance. Exchange rates that influence China’s economic output in 
exports matter a great deal, and thus currency issues are crucial matters for the leadership. 
     On political terms, China firmly refused to change its exchange rate policy solely 
owing to U.S. demands and conditions – it denied any sort of currency manipulation, and 
it maintained its agenda of continuing economic growth. Fundamentally, the Chinese 
approach would be that currency issues would be at the Chinese discretion under their 
own terms, but that they would be willing to carry on talks with the U.S. to seek mutual 
interests and further economic partnership. China’s ultimate policy choice was to keep 
identifying new bargaining chips as its negotiation with the U.S. unfolded, by 
simultaneously redefining their interests at each point of negotiation, depending on the 
economic and financial circumstances.329 For instance, at the S&ED in May 2007, Wu Yi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
329 These traits in Chinese negotiation style was clearly manifested in April 2010 when the U.S. Congress 
urged the U.S. Treasury to identify China guilty of currency manipulation but the Treasury chose to 
postpone the issuance of the report (See Table 5-6.) At the time, China announced that it would not bow to 
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would refuse Paulson’s request to raise the equity caps that limited the percentage of 
foreign ownership in Chinese financial institutions, but would consent to Paulson’s 
persuasion on syncing the renminbi with the dollar, backed by the supporting argument 
that holding a currency that reflected market reality would be a key to China’s continued 
economic reform and progress, and to alleviate mounting inflationary pressures in 
China.330 In some occasions, in the escalation to the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, the 
U.S. would find itself asking the Chinese for understanding and help. In the preparatory 
meeting for the June 2008 S&ED, the focus of the conversation between Paulson and 
Wang Qishan was on U.S.-China energy cooperation, but Wang’s primary interest was in 
the problems surrounding the U.S. capital markets, and Paulson reassured him that the 
U.S. understood its responsibilities.331 On September 17, 2008, when the U.S. market was 
in panic and Morgan Stanley was under siege, Paulson would be asked by Morgan 
Stanley to contact Wang Qishan to see if the Chinese would be willing to invest to save 
the company from failing.332      
     Overall, in the Chinese political system, a hierarchical system dominated by a small 
number of senior leaders – as opposed to the technocrat-dominated system in Japan and 
the system driven by the presidency in South Korea – was in operation at the time of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the pressures but both the U.S. and China saved faces by the U.S. postponement of the report and Chinese 
acceptance of allowing currency flexibility from June 2010, and transitioning back to managed float in 
February 2011. 
330 Paulson, ibid. p.82. 
331 Paulson, ibid. p.128. 
332 Paulson, ibid. p.245. At the time, the Chinese Investment Corporation, China’s sovereign wealth fund, 
already owned 9.9 percent of Morgan Stanley. Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group was also a potential 
strategic investor, but Paulson was skeptical that a Japanese bank could move quickly enough for Morgan 
Stanley’s pressured situation. As it turned out, Morgan Stanley ended up having to talk directly with then 
Chinese president Hu Jintao. (See Paulson, p.271) 
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U.S.-China currency conflict. In the Chinese system, the small leading group of senior 
political leaders in charge of economic and financial policies at the top of the decision 
making system exert immense amounts of power that trickles down to the relevant 
ministries and agencies. In the case of currency related negotiations, the negotiators of 
the Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier Madame Wu would act as the mouthpiece of 
the leadership, and the central bank would be the agent that implements policy choice 
with regard to exchange rates.  
Figure 5-3. RMB-USD Exchange Rates (1960-2013) 
 
 
Source: By author based on exchange rate data from the Federal Reserve Board foreign exchange rates 
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     The chapter mainly investigated the factors to the varying patterns of policy 
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U.S. policy intent was to place currency appreciation pressures on East Asian countries 
with current account surpluses, particularly those that maintained currency and capital 
controls under highly regulated financial systems. In the case with Japan, policy decisions 
were made discreetly with the MOF acting as the chief bureaucratic actor; in South 
Korea, the strong presidency would direct the ways in which the bureaucratic actors 
would make policy decisions for the responses; and in China, a small group of leaders in 
charge of economic and financial matters would discuss the currency issues and their 
decisions would be reflected in the bilateral negotiations with the U.S. via the delegation. 
Often times, each of the East Asian currency negotiations with the U.S. involved U.S. 
requests and coercions toward the promotion of financial liberalization and further 
deregulation. In evaluating each of the East Asian responses to U.S. currency 
appreciation pressures, there were distinct patterns of decision-making. Japan’s MOF 
strategically acquiesced to U.S. pressures in appreciating the Japanese yen for multiple 
bureaucratic reasons, to retain their budgetary power within the bureaucracy and to 
become the principal negotiator in matters relating to currency; South Korea’s decision 
making process was predominantly at the hands of the presidency significantly weary of 
the public eye with the MOF acting as the agent, at times reciprocating to U.S. demands 
without a thorough strategic planning; and Chinese economic leaders, holding their cards, 
was in utter denial of any currency manipulation in the beginning, which did allow 
incremental currency appreciation but only under their own terms, bargaining with the 
U.S. at each point. 
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     The three countries carried out their policy making process as responses to U.S. 
currency appreciation pressures in distinctive patterns of calculations and actions. Of all 
of the three countries, Japan’s acquiescence in the 1985 Plaza Accord was not only a 
product of Japan being coerced into U.S. requests, but also Japan’s strategic calculations 
to position itself amongst the world’s major economies at the time via currency 
realignment.333 Internally, the MOF’s interests in becoming the main channel for 
negotiation and streamlining the participants into two entities – the MOF and the U.S. 
Treasury – was intended to strengthen its institutional role and authority within the 
Japanese bureaucracy via policy dominance. In comparison, Japan received by far the 
strongest pressures from the U.S. amongst the three East Asian states both by the U.S. 
Congress and the U.S. Treasury, while China received stronger pressures from the U.S. 
Congress than the actual negotiator – the U.S. Treasury. U.S. pressures on South Korea 
were relatively lower in degree in comparison to those imposed on Japan and China.  
     Japan’s behavior in currency negotiations with the U.S. could be summarized as 
strategic acquiescence – once it perceived U.S. pressures, Japan’s MOF acknowledged 
the difficulty of deflecting from the pressures, and sought to gain the most out of a 
negotiation via cooperation, thereby showing patterns of strategic acquiescence. South 
Korea’s responses to the U.S. pressures could be characterized as reluctant reciprocation 
in lack of strategic choice, mostly because it was swayed by political decision-making by 
the presidency – like Japan, South Korea knew for certain the slim chances of deflecting 
from U.S. pressures, but it was very ill-prepared for negotiations and simply resorted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 Personal interviews with a former MOFA official, 2010. 
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defensive responses without opting for alternative options, thus resulting in obscurity of 
objectives, lack of strategic thinking and accountability. In many ways, China’s case 
diverged from the cases of Japan and South Korea. China was in a very different situation 
compared to the previous cases of Japan and South Korea – it was able to behave very 
flexibly on the fundamental understanding that U.S.-China economic relations are 
symbiotic.334 On the charges of currency manipulation, China has been very adamant 
about its position to plead innocent, but the Chinese leadership has come to terms with 
the U.S. via incremental appreciation, based on the realization and understanding of the 
necessity of developing the Chinese domestic economy in tandem with the export 
economy, and only in the presence of its strategic planning for policy direction at each 
point of negotiation. 	  	    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
334 Paulson, ibid. p.422. Former President Hu Jintao’s remarks at the concluding meeting of the S&ED in 
December 2008 is a clear reflection of China’s flexibility and understanding of the U.S.-China economic 
interdependence, in which he said, “We didn’t move as fast in a number of areas as you wanted us to, but 
we don’t vacillate, and we will continue with reform and opening up.” 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
The Change of Tides:  
The Future of U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Wars and Currency Conflicts 
 
 
"95% of the world’s potential customers live outside our borders.  
Many of them live in the Asia-Pacific—the world’s fastest-growing region.  
And as we speak, China is trying to write the rules for trade in the 21st century.  
That would put our workers and our businesses at a massive disadvantage.  
We can’t let that happen. WE should write those rules." 
 
-President Barack Obama,  
‘Weekly Address: We Should Make Sure the Future Is Written by Us’ 
February 21, 2015- 
 
“I want us to ask ourselves every day,  
how are we using technology to make a real difference in people’s lives.” 
 
                                                                                                                    -President Barack Obama, 
‘On Digital Government, The White House’ 
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The Future of U.S.-Northeast Asian Economic Relations 
     As we head towards the year 2020 as of this writing, there are movements in the 
global political economy that counter the movements by China – namely, further 
expansion of its economy that impacts the rest of the world in all parts of the globe. The 
year 2020 is the year in which experts and analysts have forecasted that China is expected 
to surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy.335 While it is highly probable that 
China may not be equipped with the ample science and technology to surpass the U.S. by 
then, the question of size – the impact of the Chinese economy on the global economy at 
a greater scale – poses threats and concerns to many in the U.S. policymaking world. 
Losing the lead to China would be the last thing the U.S. wants. For the United States, it 
is a critical point in time to realize that trade wars and currency conflict with China 
cannot be overlooked. From the perspective of U.S. policymakers, it is crucial to 
understand that China today is different from any other. 
     Throughout the previous chapters, I have argued that each of the U.S.-Northeast Asian 
trade wars and currency conflicts are inherently different, stemming from institutional 
variance amongst the countries. As repeatedly argued, political capacity and industrial 
interests, which are the main pillars that create institutional variance, and the historical 
development of political systems and economic structure of each country is the very root 
of a country’s institutions. What I am seeking to arrive at is not whether a country’s 
system or institutional mechanism is perfect or appropriate, and furthermore, I am not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335 ‘By 2020, China No. 1, US No. 2’, Forbes, May 26, 2011. Predictions that China will surpass the U.S. by 
2020 are by Standard Chartered Bank economists and other analysts at the International Monetary Fund. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2011/05/26/by-2020-china-no-1-us-no-2/ 
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seeking to argue that a country’s case is superior to another. Nonetheless, acknowledging 
the differences among systems matter, because it helps us to better understand the causes 
of the differences. Beyond the question of good and bad, the real takeaway from this 
research is that when we ask how countries make decisions, it is important to find the 
roots of a country’s decisions based on the characteristics of their institutions. Thus, 
institutional variance provides the key answer as to why countries make decisions 
differently, and why country responses vary. 
Revisiting the Themes Visited – Trade Wars and Currency Conflict 
     Albeit in different time periods, this research provided an overview of how each East 
Asian state behaved at a critical time point in their development phases with regard to 
economic clashes with the United States. Through the case study analyses on U.S.-
Northeast Asian trade wars – bilateral trade negotiations between the U.S. and each of the 
East Asian states, antidumping and countervailing duty measures by the USDOC and 
USITC, and U.S.-initiated WTO dispute settlement cases by the USTR at the WTO DSB 
– we learn that despite the conventional wisdom that security interests override economic 
interests; or simply that as U.S. allies, Japan and South Korea will succumb to U.S. 
pressures while China is expected to behave otherwise; there is a more compelling 
driving force that leads to each of their final policy decision-making or behavioral 
patterns. The point of the argument is more about how institutions – based on what 
grounds of political systems and nexus of government-business relations – make 
decisions. On currency conflict, each of the bilateral negotiations that were convened to 
appreciate the value of local currencies in Northeast Asian states also tell us that the 
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responses by each state stem from their institutional decision-making – the 
interconnectedness, internal and external interactions, conflict and cooperation among 
political actors, bureaucracies, and industries in the political and economic environment 
in a certain time frame in history. 
     My model of institutional variance is noteworthy in the regard that it provides a 
simplification of intertwined interests that can often mislead observers of U.S.-Northeast 
Asian relations, especially that of economic relations. Admittedly, in the policy world, 
the focus on U.S.-Northeast Asian relations today is still on military or security issues, 
and the continued focus on security makes it fairly difficult to segregate the political 
economy portion of the dynamics from the security logic, or discussing political economy 
at all without engaging in issues of national defense and security alliance. My model, 
intended to provide a concise explanation for institutional behavior in each country in 
foreign economic decision-making, is certainly not intended for oversimplification, let 
alone false perceptions. Rather, it is a breakdown of what we actually perceive in foreign-
economic policymaking by the three countries, from both macro and microscopic 
viewpoints focusing on the institutions.  
     While the minutiae of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean decision-making 
platforms may not seem applicable to other such platforms, the model I have presented 
depicting institutional variance with regard to a certain objective in the policymaking 
process among multiple countries may be applicable to different cases around the globe. 
In the longer run, such cases may arise for Southeast Asian or Latin American nations in 
trade negotiations with the U.S. Moving forward, my model may be applicable to 
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different regions of the world – i.e., the institutional variances that may occur in shaping 
different policy responses in the developed world such as Europe, or among the 
developing economies of BRICs. 
     In our complex and constantly changing world, the model of institutional variance that 
I have demonstrated in this research is a guiding light and method of observation for any 
that seek to read the policy intent behind statecraft and policy decisions made by nation 
states. Today, however globalized the world may be, decisions of a state’s external 
relations are, in the end, made by institutions of the state, and diplomacy is shaped by 
political actors at the summit levels. Therefore, my model of institutional variance is 
attested by the ubiquitous and numerous actions by nation states in the global political 
economy that shape the world that we live in around the clock, and the growing necessity 
in the real world to dissect and interpret each of their actions. What is more, it helps us to 
get to the fundamental characteristics of each state behavior and prevents us from being 
swayed by stereotypical thinking or observations of a certain country.  
     Institutions, like living organisms, evolve over time, but they are also strongly 
embedded to a political mindset and rooted by their history of economic development. 
Therefore, when institutions evolve, societies also evolve to adapt to the changes, and 
vice versa. Some thrive, and some die out. Some remain influential or gain more power, 
and some lose the ability to make impactful policies. But the core of the institutional 
mechanisms remains, and each institutional mechanism is both reflective of the state and 
distinguishable from others.  
The Change of Tides 
	  	  
302 
     Twenty years have passed since the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 as a result of the 
Uruguay Round, and the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1995. In 
between that time period of two decades, the accession of China to the WTO in 2001 
based on the U.S. Congressional granting of PNTR status to China has made all the 
difference in the global political economy. Whether the Chinese will take over the 
American economy is still uncertain, but China has undoubtedly made a clear impact on 
the global political economy, and will continue to do so. Over the past 15 years, since its 
entry to the global economy, although China has not been able to change or break the 
rules, it has changed the dynamics of the game. But now it wants to make its own rules, 
or change the current rules to its interest, starting from domestically.  China’s intent is not 
solely about overcoming the so-called ‘century of shame’, but more in aspiration and 
restoration of power. China understands that in today’s world, economic power is the 
source of real power and hegemony.  
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations 
  
     While the structure and norms of trade in the global political economy are still set at 
1994, so much has changed over the past two decades. The rise of the Chinese economy 
is one, and the continued soaring of U.S. trade deficits is another, as underlined in this 
research. But there are additional factors that are creating a shift in the global economy 
today. One is the proliferation of regional or bilateral free trade agreements (RTAs, 
FTAs), and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). These agreements are negotiated, signed, 
and ratified by parties outside of the WTO framework, and have taken trade agreements 
to a different level in the past twenty years. While the WTO DSB system is surely here to 
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stay in ruling for violations or non-violation claims by WTO members, it is not certain 
whether the current WTO system will be able to effectively address and accommodate 
the changes in the global economy in the coming years. 
     The proliferation of RTAs and FTAs have indeed set the background for the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, a cross-regional framework for trade in which the 
U.S. and Japan are parties to. What started off as a small group in the name of Pacific 
Three Closer Economic Partnership (P3 CEP) is now the TPP membership, driven mainly 
by the United States, consisting of twelve member states situated along the Pacific Rim – 
the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Brunei, 
Vietnam, and Malaysia. South Korea and Taiwan have expressed interest in joining the 
TPP in 2013, but was told to join at a later time frame after the negotiations have been 
finalized. With both geopolitical and economic interests met, the TPP, if concluded and 
taken into effect, could reshape the dynamics of U.S.-Northeast Asian economic relations.  
      There are two additional factors – geopolitical and economic – that have led to the 
U.S. drive for the TPP negotiations. The geopolitical factor is the U.S. willingness to 
counter further expansion of the Chinese economy by forming a regional partnership 
excluding China, thereby exerting continued influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The 
economic factor derives from the changes in the U.S. economic structure toward a 
services sector-oriented economy and its urgent need to protect the intellectual property 
of U.S. businesses abroad, especially in China. By inserting provisions concerning trade, 
investment, and intellectual property that are beyond China’s capacities to follow at the 
moment, the U.S. is seeking to mobilize its interests in the Asia-Pacific first, then compel 
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China to follow the rules. It has been reported that China also has speculated its options 
of joining the TPP, but such reports has not come into policy action. Meanwhile, China’s 
geopolitical and economic interests, particularly those concerning Southeast Asia, are 
manifested by its initiatives taken in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) – which is a trade agreement encompassing China and ASEAN countries; and 
most recently, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) – an entity equivalent to 
the World Bank for the Asian region. 
Changing Global Economic Structures and Trade Negotiations 
 
     There have been big changes in the global economic structures in the past two 
decades. The most salient structural change is the growing emphasis on the services 
sector in the developing world. To elaborate further, in the U.S. and the EU, the services 
sector is now a crucial driving source that sustains economic growth. As much as the 
services sectors are in the spotlight, the importance of intellectual property (IP) has 
emerged. The global economy has faced difficult situations in establishing a firmer 
regulatory regime on intellectual property – one that is more reinforcing global consensus 
on IP since the Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). At this 
backdrop, the current TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations include debates on intellectual property chapters that go beyond the current 
global norms on IP as stipulated in TRIPS.  
     We now live in the world in which we upload information to be shared online, As the 
global economy goes through power shifts in the digital revolution era, issues involving 
cloud convergence, online and offline IP, e-commerce, cross-border transactions will 
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become all the more important. What seems very apparent at this point is that there is no 
way a global consensus could be made as in the Uruguay round on such issues, because 
there is a big policy implementation gap among the developed world and the developing 
world. The U.S. is addressing trade issues in response to the changes in global economic 
structures via two different directions – through the TPP and the TTIP negotiations. 
While the IP chapter in the TTIP embodies several issues on copyright (i.e., performance 
rights) and trademark (i.e., geographic indication) to level the playing field between the 
U.S. and Europe, the IP chapter in the TPP is intended by the U.S. to bolster the 
enforcement of IP in TPP member countries in which IP regulations are more lax, 
particularly in Southeast Asia, and to persuade countries that are currently not 
participating to join. In the longer run, the U.S. is very likely to envision incorporating 
the two regional partnerships for negotiation at the global level. Although the failure of 
the Doha Round is proof that the division of interests between the developed world and 
the developing world will continue, it is very plausible that the developed world – led by 
the U.S. – will continuously attempt at combining regional initiatives for a full-fledged 
global initiative in the coming decades. 
Currency Conflict after the Global Financial Crisis 
 
     The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and quantitative easing in the developed world in 
response to the crisis ignited a series of competitive devaluation. The questions remain as 
to how far the U.S. will go for currency appreciation pressures against China, as China 
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has been keeping its currency artificially strong in recent years.336 While there are 
speculations and expectations on China’s reversal of its current policy of maintaining a 
strong currency, it is undoubtedly for certain that China’s monetary policies are not 
subservient to U.S. pressures, but rather, more faithful to its political logic and economic 
conditions at home. In the Asian region, countries have shied away from engaging in a 
full-scale currency war after the GFC, but it is quite clear that Japan is very anxious and 
sensitive to the changing of tides with the rise of the Chinese economy. Japan’s long-
contemplated decision to join the TPP negotiations was made in large part for its 
economic and geopolitical survival via balancing against China and siding with the 
United States. Meanwhile, South Korea seeks a balance between the U.S. and China in 
both economic and security relations. 
     As China continues its journey for renminbi internationalization and pursues exuding 
greater influence over the global political economy, its Northeast Asian neighbors will 
strive to choose their paths between conflict and cooperation with China, and also with 
the U.S., which will continue to restore its influence in the region economically and 
militarily. It remains a question as to how much China will be able to incorporate the rest 
of the East Asian region other than its neighbors; namely, the ASEAN countries. While 
China presents an economic challenge as well as opportunity for them, China’s continued 
expansion into the Southeast Asian economies bring about standoffish responses amid 
maritime tensions that create geopolitical conflict. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
336 ‘China’s Exchange-Rate Policy: Currency peace – Devaluing the yuan would do China more harm than 
good’, The Economist, February 21, 2015 (http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-
economics/21644205-devaluing-yuan-would-do-china-more-harm-good-currency-
peace?fsrc=scn/tw_ec/currency_peace) 
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Avenues for Future Research  
Trade Negotiations in the Digital Revolution Era 
     In relevance to my research, the most pressing area for research is on the changing 
dynamics of trade negotiations in the digital era. There are several areas regarding the 
transition from analog to digital in which further research must be convened to uncover 
the negotiation patterns in the 21st century. How trade negotiation platforms, methods, 
and interactions amongst parties in the negotiation evolve in the growing presence of 
NGOs, activists, interest groups, and open information. Although the current TPP and 
TTIP negotiations, and most FTA or BIT negotiations occur behind closed doors, citizens 
and interest groups around the world have learned to express their opinions regarding 
trade negotiations that are conducted in a fait accompli manner. For instance, the revealed 
IP chapters and country positions on each of the provisions and chapters of the TPP 
negotiations were uploaded and distributed via the WikiLeaks website by an informer. 
Such an example clearly demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining confidentiality in 
trade negotiations the 21st century.337 The widespread presence of social media such as 
Twitter and Facebook that mobilize certain types of interests, report on updates on 
ongoing trade negotiations, and bring about citizenry responses to the revealed 
information from around the globe make trade negotiations led by government 
institutions very tough deals to strike. While it is indeed the case that the format of 
negotiations and diplomatic relations today still carry on and stem from those of 
yesterday, how trade negotiation dynamics will change in the 21st century in the midst of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 Updated Secret Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) - IP Chapter (second publication), 
WikiLeaks. https://wikileaks.org/tpp-ip2/ 
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online and offline information space would be of critical interest for observers of 
international political economy. 
Evolution of Institutions in the Age of Science and Technology  
 
     Lastly, another important avenue for future research is on how institutions, both in 
East Asia and the United States, will evolve in the in the era of digital revolution. The 
U.S. has already launched an initiative for digital government in purpose of building a 
21st century government platform that mobilizes nationwide information and participation 
by its citizens.338 South Korea has been also testing the waters for e-government from the 
Roh Moo-hyun administration. The Japanese and Chinese governments are lagging in 
terms of developing and perusing the e-government system, but are slowly following the 
trend, although China’s still lacks transparency and efficiency. The proliferation of e-
government in many different countries will change the forms of decision-making 
processes, affect the manner in which bureaucratic procedures are held, more so by 
expediting the processes. However, the constant battle between reveal of information and 
citizen participation will pose both challenges and opportunities for institutions in the 
coming decades. 
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International Studies, for proposed project, ‘Will a Trade Deal Change U.S.-Northeast Asian 
Relations? The Promise and Pitfalls of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’ (2014) 
• Research Travel Grant for Short-Term Archival Research at the U.S. Trade Representative, Washington, 
D.C., Graduate Student Organization, Boston University (2014) 
• Tuition Waiver for Dissertation Writing, Department of Political Science, Boston University (2013-14) 
• Research Fellowship for proposed project, ‘Echoes of the Asian Financial Crisis in Reverse: Capital 
Controls and Currency Conflict in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis - Perspectives from EMEs 
with Comparative Cases of South Korea and China’ Democracy & Markets Fellowship, The Tobin 
Project (2013-2014) 
• Research Fellowship for proposed project, ‘The Global Financial Crisis as a Critical Juncture to China’s 
Financial Reform: A Case Study of the Financial Reform Pilot Districts in Wenzhou, Shanghai, and 
Shenzhen’, Boston University Center for Finance, Law, and Policy (2014) 
• OYCF-Gregory C. and Paula K. Chow Teaching Fellowship, Overseas Young Chinese Forum (2013-
2014) (declined) 
• Korean Studies Dissertation Workshop Fellowship, Social Science Research Council (2013) 
• Global Political Economy Workshop Fellowship, Balsillie School of International Affairs (2013) 
• Dean’s Award Tuition Waiver for Dissertation Writing, Department of Political Science, Boston 
University (2012-13) 
• ‘Study in Asia’ Senior Visiting Research Student Fellowship, China Scholarship Council, Ministry of 
Education, People’s Republic of China (2011-12) 
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• KEI ‘Emerging Voices’ Publication and Presentation Competition, Korea Economic Institute of America 
(2011) 
• Foreign Students Research Grant, Fuji Xerox Setsutaro Kobayashi Memorial Fund, Japan (2011-12) 
• Atsumi International Research Fellowship, The Atsumi International Foundation, Japan (2011-12) 
• Matsushita International Research Fellowship, The Matsushita International Foundation, Japan (2010-11) 
• Traveling Scholar Tuition Waiver for Dissertation Fieldwork, Department of Political Science, Boston 
University (2010-12) 
• Travel Grants for Academic Conference Presentations, Graduate Student Organization, Boston University 
(2011-13) 
• Travel Grants for Academic Conference Presentation, Department of Political Science, Boston University 
(2010-13) 
• Travel Grants for ISA Annual Convention Presentations, The International Studies Association (2010-14) 
• Tuition and Stipend Grant for ICPSR Training, Department of Political Science, Boston University 
(2011) 
• Pardee Center Summer Research Fellowship, Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range Future, 
Boston University (2010) 
• Young Leaders Training and Research Program Fellowship, Northeast Asia Economic Forum (2008) 
• Fulbright Graduate Study Award, Korean-American Educational Commission (2007-09) 
• Rotary Ambassadorial Scholarship, Rotary Foundation Korea (declined) (2007) 
• Specialized UN Internship Fellowship for International Women, Ministry of Gender Equality, Republic 
of Korea (2005) 
• Research Fellowship, Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University (2006) 
• Brain Korea 21 Fellowship, Education and Research Corps for East Asian Studies, Korea University 
(2005) 
• International Summer Campus Scholarship in Political Science / Public Administration, Korea University 
(2004) 
 
AFFILIATIONS 
• American Political Science Association (APSA) • Association for Asian Studies (AAS) 
• Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) • Association of Chinese Political Studies (ACPS) 
• International Studies Association (ISA) • American Association for Chinese Studies (AACS) 
• International Political Economy Society (IPES) • Washington International Trade Association (WITA) 
• Massachusetts Fulbright Association • Atsumi International Foundation (AISF)  
• Harvard Contemporary Japanese Politics Study 
Group 
• Harvard-BU-MIT Chinese Politics Study Group 
 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Journal Articles 
• [Forthcoming] ‘Shifting Away from the WTO? Intellectual Property in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement and the Case of China’, with Susan Sell, for Special Issue on ‘Developing Countries in the 
WTO Negotiations’, International Negotiation (TBD, 2015) 
 
• [Forthcoming] ‘Striking the ‘21st Century’ Trade Agreement: The Case of Intellectual Property 
Rights in the TPP Negotiations and U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Relations’ (research project sponsored 
by the East-West Center in Washington and the Center for International Business Education and 
Research, School of Business, George Washington University) 
 
• [Forthcoming] ‘Will a Trade Deal Change U.S.-Northeast Asian Relations? The Promise and Pitfalls 
of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement’ (research project sponsored by the Korea Foundation and 
the Pacific Forum of the Center for Strategic and International Studies) 
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• [Published] ‘From Cardinal Sin to Policy Agenda? The Role of Capital Controls in Emerging Market 
Economies: A Study of the Korean Case, 1997-2011’, 2011 Korea Economic Institute of America 
Emerging Scholars Special Edition of the Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies, March 2012. 
 
• [Published] ‘Resorting to International Institutions to Resolve Trade Imbalances? U.S. Protectionism 
via GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation’, Online Publication, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, 
Japan, December 2011.  
 
• [Published] ‘Implications of the Bilateral Swap Agreements in Northeast Asia: Korea’s Role in 
Regional Financial Cooperation in the era of a New Critical Juncture’, Korea Policy Review, John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, July 2009. 
 
Book Chapters 
•  [Published] ‘Bargaining for More: China’s Initiatives for Regional Free Trade in East Asia’, Chapter 
7 in Mingjiang Li eds., China Joins Global Governance: Cooperation and Contentions, Rowman & 
Littlefield, Lexington Books, October 2012. 
 
Book Reviews 
•  [Published] Book Review of Kevin Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, ‘Dragon in the Room: China 
and the Future of Latin American Industrialization’《在房间⾥里龙：中国和拉丁美洲⼯工业化的未
来》(Stanford University Press: 2010), Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (复旦⼈人
⽂文社会科学论丛), Fudan University, Vol.8, No.2, May 2012. 
 
• [Published] Book Review of Yasheng Huang, ‘Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics: 
Entrepreneurship and the State’《有中国特⾊色的资本主义》(Cambridge University Press: 2008), 
Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences (复旦⼈人⽂文社会科学论丛), Fudan University, 
Vol.8, No.1, March 2012.  
 
• [Published] Book Review for Emilian Kavalski ed., ‘China and the Global Politics of Regionalization’ 
(Ashgate: 2009), Journal of Chinese Political Studies, Vol.17, No.1, March 2012. 
 
Policy Papers 
• [Published] Report of the Economic and Social Development Group: Combine Our Efforts, The 43rd 
Graduate Study Programme, ‘The UN at 60: The Road Ahead’, United Nations Information Service, 
United Nations Office in Geneva (October 2005) 
 
PRESENTATIONS OF DISSERTATION CHAPTERS 
• Dissertation Project ‘Trade Wars and Currency Conflict: China, Japan, and South Korea’s 
Responses to U.S. Protectionism, 1971-2013’, Korean Studies Dissertation Workshop, Social Science 
Research Council, Monterey, CA, USA (July 1-5, 2013) 
 
• Dissertation Ch.5 ‘Exchange Rate Policies as Responses to U.S. Currency Appreciation Pressures: 
The Japanese yen, the South Korean won, and the Chinese yuan, 1971-2013’, 2014 International 
Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, Canada (March 26-29, 2014) 
 
• Dissertation Ch.4 ‘Resorting to International Institutions to Resolve Trade Imbalances? U.S. 
Protectionism via GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation’, Section on International Political Economy, Session 
on WTO and International Trade Disputes, The Midwest Political Science Association Annual 
Conference, Chicago, USA (April 12-15, 2012) 
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• Dissertation Ch.3 ‘Responses to the Recurring Cycles of Trade Protectionism from the GATT to the 
WTO: U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations on Trade with Japan, South Korea, 
and China’ 2013 International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, USA 
(April 3-6, 2013); also presented at the PhD Dissertation Workshop in Global Political Economy at the 
Balsillie School of International Affairs, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (April 24-26, 2013) 
 
• Dissertation Ch.1 ‘Introduction: Defining Trade Wars and Currency Conflicts’& Dissertation Ch.2 
‘The Theoretical Framework: Political Capacity and Industrial Interests’, Visiting Fellows Seminar, 
Rajawali Fellows Institute, the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation, Harvard 
Kennedy School, Cambridge, MA, USA (September 10, 2013) 
 
OTHER PAPER PRESENTATIONS & INVITED TALKS 
• ‘Shifting Away from the WTO: Intellectual Property in the TPP and the TTIP’, 2015 Transatlantic 
Policy Symposium, ‘Beyond Tariffs: Trade Relations and the Transatlantic Relationship in the 21st 
Century’, BMW Center for German and European Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign 
Service, Georgetown University (February 6, 2015) 
 
• ‘Striking the ‘21st Century’ Trade Agreement: The Case of Intellectual Property Rights in the TPP 
Negotiations and U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Relations’, Center for International Business Education 
and Research, School of Business, George Washington University (June 7, 2014) 
 
• ‘Striking the 21st Century Trade Deal: The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement – Perspectives from 
Japan & South Korea’, Korea Caucus and Japan Caucus Joint Seminar, the Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University (November 21, 2013) 
 
• ‘The Change of Tides: The Future of U.S.-Northeast Asian Trade Wars and Currency Conflict’, 2013 
ISA-Northeast Annual Conference, Providence, Rhode Island, USA (November 7-10, 2013) 
 
• ‘Echoes of the Asian Financial Crisis in Reverse: Capital Controls and Currency Wars in the wake of 
the Global Financial Crisis’, The Tobin Project Democracy and Markets Graduate Student Forum, 
Cambridge, MA, USA (October 18, 2013); also presented at the GR:EEN-GEM PhD Summer School, 
'Squaring Multilateralism & Multipolarity – Multilateralizing the Emerging Multipolar World: Trends 
& Challenges', Fudan University, Shanghai, China (August 20‐24, 2012) 
 
• ‘Dealing with the Open Economy Policy Trilemma? China’s Dream Agenda of Financial Reforms’, 
2013 Association of Chinese Political Studies Annual Meeting and International Symposium, “China’s 
Domestic and International Relations: Expanding Reforms and Global Influence?”, University of Costa 
Rica, San José, Costa Rica (August 22-23, 2013) 
 
• ‘U.S. Policies on Northeast Asian Countries: China, Japan, South Korea’, invited lecture for visiting 
Japanese students from Koushi High School, Niigata Prefecture, Japan, Boston University, Boston, 
USA (August 5, 2013) 
 
• ‘Wither Regional Bloc Formation? Intra-Regional Trade Imbalances among China, Japan, and South 
Korea’, Conference on Regional Leadership, Norms and Diversity: Comparing the Asia-Pacific with 
Europe, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan (January 29-30, 2013) 
 
• ‘Trade Imbalances, Financial Crises, and Currency Debates: 3 Decades of Stumbling Blocks to U.S.-
Northeast Asian Economic Relations’, Panel on The Domestic Sources of Economic and Security 
Relations in the Asia-Pacific, 2012 International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, 
USA (April 1-4, 2012); Revised version of the paper presented at the Harvard Contemporary Japanese 
Politics Study Group, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA (December 14, 2012) 
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• ‘Legalization and China: The Politics of WTO Dispute Settlement in the Age of Trade 
Imbalances’, 2011 Association of Chinese Political Studies Conference, ‘China’s Accession to the 
WTO 10 Years Later: International Institutions and China’s Domestic and Foreign Policies’, College 
of Foreign Affairs University (外交学院), Beijing, China (October 22-23, 2011) 
 
• ‘貿易不均衡の解消の為の国際機関の利⽤用: GATT/WTOへの訴訟による⽶米国の保護主義の発⽣生
’, Seminar Series, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo, Japan (October 14, 2011)  
 
• ‘Resorting to International Institutions to Resolve Trade Imbalances? U.S. Protectionism via 
GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation’, Social Science Dissertation Workshop, the Institute of Social Science, 
the University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (September 29, 2011) 
 
• ‘From ‘Cardinal Sin’ to Policy Agenda? The Role of Capital Controls in Emerging Market 
Economies: A Study of the Korean Case, 1997-2011′, Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Symposium, Korea 
Economic Institute of America, Washington, DC, USA (August 24, 2011)  
 
• ‘Trade Surpluses and Renminbi Internationalization: The Political Economy of China’s Quest for Key 
Currency’, The 23rd Association of Chinese Political Studies Annual Meeting & International 
Symposium, ‘100 Years after the 1911 Chinese Revolution: Reflections and Forecasts’, King’s 
College, London, United Kingdom (June 17-19, 2011) 
 
• ‘Bargaining for More: China’s Initiatives and Dilemmas for East Asian Free Trade in the era of 
Economic Partnership Agreements’, Conference on ‘China’s Role in Global & Regional Governance’, 
The S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore (March 10-11, 2011) 
 
• ‘The Influence of Global Trade Imbalances on Sovereign Wealth Funds: China’s SWFs under the view 
of U.S.-China Trade Imbalances’, The 16th Association of Chinese Professors of Humanities and 
Social Sciences in the United States International Conference, ‘Engaging China: Sino-American 
Relations, Sustainable Development, and Beyond’, Harvard University, Boston, United States 
(November 5-7, 2010); Revised version of the paper presented at the International Studies Association 
Annual Convention, Montréal, Canada (March 16-19, 2011) 
 
• ‘The Politics of Economic Regionalization: China's Initiatives for Soft Power in East Asia’, The 23rd 
Association of Chinese Political Studies Annual Meeting & International Symposium, 'China in Search 
of Sustainable Development, Social Harmony, and Soft Power', Endicott College, Beverly, 
Massachusetts, USA (July 30-August 1, 2010) 
 
• ‘Regional Investment since the Financial Crises: Sovereign Wealth Funds in East Asia (東アジアの政
府系ファンド)’, The 4th Young Lions Boston Japanese Benkyokai, Boston University, Boston, USA 
(May 12, 2010) 
 
•  ‘Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism: The Power Structures of Trade, Finance, Investment in Northeast 
Asia’, 2010 Midwest Political Science Association Annual National Conference, Chicago, USA (April 
20-24, 2010) 
 
• ‘The Political Economy of Trade and Investment: The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds in Asset 
Markets in East Asia in the era of a Financial Crisis’, Harvard Conference of the Harvard Project for 
Asian and International Relations, Cambridge, USA (February 18-21, 2010) 
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• ‘The Roots of Stunted Legalism in Northeast Asia: The Domestic Politics of Regional Financial 
Cooperation since the Asian Financial Crisis’, 2010 International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA (February 18, 2010)  
 
• ‘Bilateralism vs. Multilateralism: Rethinking Japan's Strategy for Trade and Investment in East Asia’ 
｢二国間主義と多国間主義：東アジアにおける日本の貿易・投資戦略の再検討｣, The 3rd Young 
Lions Boston Japanese Benkyokai, Boston University, Boston, USA (December 23, 2009) 
 
• ‘Implications of the Bilateral Swap Agreements in Northeast Asia: Regional Financial Cooperation in 
the era of a New Critical Juncture’, The 2nd Young Lions Boston Japanese Benkyokai, Boston 
University, Boston, USA (May 13, 2009) 
 
• ‘Financial Regionalism Reinvented? Financial Deregulation and Economic Reform in Japan and 
Vigilant Financial Regionalism in Northeast Asia’, Harvard Conference of the Harvard Project for 
Asian and International Relations, Cambridge, USA (February 2009) 
 
• ‘Financial Deregulation and Economic Reform in Japan: Stagnation or Renewal of the Economy?’ 
2009 International Studies Association Annual Convention, New York, USA (February 2009) 
 
• ‘Implications of the Currency Swap Agreement in Northeast Asia: Regional Financial Cooperation in 
the era of a New Critical Juncture’, Panel on Regional Economy, Boston University Conference on 
East Asia, Boston, USA (February 2009) 
 
• ‘The Evolution of China’s Relationship with the World Bank: From Debtor and Beneficiary to 
Partnership’, Session on Finance and Development, The 17th Northeast Asia Economic Forum Young 
Leaders Training and Research Program in Regional Cooperation and Development, Nankai 
University, Tianjin, PRC (October 2008) 
 
• Discussant, Panel on ‘The Origins and Effects of International Law’, 2008 American Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting, Boston, USA (August 2008)  
 
• ‘Institutional Challenges of UN Sanctions: Legal Initiative of the United States’, 2008 Midwest 
Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, USA (April 2008) 
 
• ‘State Compliance through legislation within International Institutions: Perspectives from Northeast 
Asia: China, South Korea, and Japan’, Toronto Group for the Study of International, Transnational, 
and Comparative Law, University of Toronto and Osgoode Law School, Toronto, Canada (January 
2008) 
 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
As Instructor: 
• ‘Contemporary International Relations of East Asia’ (PS188-08), Department of Political Science, 
Tufts University (Spring 2013) 
• ‘China: From Revolution to Reform’ (IR370/PO369), Department of Political Science, Boston 
University (Summer II 2010)  
• ‘Theory and Practice of International Relations’ (GVT261), Department of Government, Suffolk 
University (Fall 2009) 
 
As Teaching Assistant: 
• ‘Contemporary East Asian Economics’ (IR/EC368), Department of International Relations, Boston 
University (Fall 2012) 
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• ‘Rise of China’ (IR365/PO374), Department of International Relations, Boston University (Fall 2009) 
• ‘Southeast Asia in World Politics’ (IR369), Department of International Relations, Boston University 
(Spring 2009) 
• Teaching Assistant for 5 courses, Department of Political Science, Korea University (Spring 2005-
Spring 2007) 
- ‘Global Agenda in the 21st Century’ (taught in English) (Fall 2006, Spring 2007)  
- ‘Introduction to International Relations’ (taught in English) (Spring 2005)  
- ‘International Organizations’ (taught in English) (Spring, 2006)  
- ‘UN and Global Security’ (taught in English) (Fall 2006)  
- ‘East Asian Regionalism and International Relations’ (taught in Korean and English) 
(Spring 2007)  
 
RESEARCH ASSISTANTSHIPS 
2013.06-2013.07 Research Assistant for Professor William W. Grimes  
Abenomics: The Bank Of Japan’s Quantitative Easing and Inflation Targeting,  
the Abe Administration’s Structural Reforms and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
Department of International Relations, Boston University (Boston, USA) 
 
2012.06-2012.07 Research Assistant for Professor Kevin P. Gallagher 
South Korea’s Capital Controls in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2011 
Department of International Relations, Boston University (Boston, USA) 
 
2005.03-2005.06 Research Assistant for Professor Shin-wha Lee 
Department of Political Science, Korea University (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
2004.07-08 Ph.D Dissertation Research Assistant for Su-mei Ooi (Ph.D, University of Toronto) 
The International Dimensions of Democratization –  
A Comparative Study of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore 
East Asia Institute (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
2003-2004 Undergraduate Research Assistant 
Ilmin International Institute & Institute for Peace Studies,  
Korea University (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE & TRAINING  
2013.09 
 
Participant in the WITA-GWU Intensive Trade Seminar,  
Washington International Trade Association and the 
International Trade and Investment Program at the Elliot School of International Affairs,  
George Washington University (Washington, D.C, USA) 
 
2009.10-2010.04 Director for the Fulbright Study Group on Northeast Asia for the 2010 Fulbright Annual Forum  
Department of International Relations, Boston University /  
Massachusetts Fulbright Association (Boston, USA) 
 
2006.03-2007.06 Researcher for CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) Korea &  
NTS-Asia Ilmin International Relations Institute, Korea University (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
2007.03-2007.05 Participant in the World Bank Global Development Learning Network Global Issues Seminar 
KDI (Korea Development Institute) School of Public Policy and Management (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
2005.09-2006.03 Intern for the Department of Political Affairs, Security Council Subsidiary Organs  
Sanctions Branch 
United Nations Headquarters (New York, USA) 
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2005.09 Media Assistant for the 2005 World Summit 
Department of Public Information, Media Liaison Accreditation Unit,  
UN Headquarters (New York, USA) 
 
2005.08 Ministerial Assistant for Ha-jin Jang, Former Minister of Gender Equality and Family,  
Republic of Korea for ‘Beijing +10: the 10th Anniversary Commemoration of  
the 4th World Conference on Women’ (Beijing, China) 
International Relations Office, Ministry of Gender Equality (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
2004.12-2005.12 Trainee for the Specialized UN Internship Programme 
Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Seoul, South Korea) 
 
COMPUTER SKILLS 
• STATA • EViews 
• R • LaTeX (TeXShop) 
  
 
NATIONALITY 
Republic of Korea (J-1 U.S. Visa) 
 
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY 
• English (Fluent)  
• French (Advanced) 
* Achieved DELF (Diplôme d’Etudes en Langue Français) (1er Degré : 2002, 2nd Degré : 2003) 
* Achieved DALF (Diplôme Approfondi de Langue Française) (B1: 2003, B3/B4: 2005) 
   Attestation, Cours d’été, Université de Genève, Geneva, Switzerland (2002) 
   Attestation, Institut Français des ALPES (IFALPES), Annecy, France (2002) 
• Chinese (Advanced)                 
              * Achieved New HSK (新汉语⽔水平考试：New Chinese Proficiency Test) 
                 Written Tests passed : Level 3 (2010), Level 4 (2011), Level 5 (2011) 
                 Spoken Tests passed : Intermediate Level (2011), Advanced Level (2012) 
  Advanced Chinese studies, CHINARO Language Institute, Seoul, Korea (2002-2005) 
  Advanced Chinese studies at Chinese Cultural Center (中国⽂文化院), Seoul, Korea (2006) 
  Advanced Chinese studies at the School of International Studies, Peking University, Beijing, 
China (2011-12) 
• Japanese (Fluent) 
              * Achieved JLPT (⽇日本語能⼒力試験：Japanese Language Proficiency Test, Level 1 (2009) 
              * Achieved New JLPT (新⽇日本語能⼒力試験),  Level N1 (2010)               
  Advanced Japanese studies, PAGODA Language Institute, Seoul Korea (2005-2006) 
  Intensive Kanji studies, Boston University, Department of Modern Languages and Comparative 
Literature (2010)  
  Advanced Japanese studies, Center for Japanese Language Education, the University of Tokyo 
(2010-2011) 
• Korean (Native) 
 
REFERENCES: Dissertation Committee Members 
  
William W. Grimes (Principal Adviser) 
Professor of International Relations & 
Political Science 
Joseph Fewsmith (2nd Reader) 
Professor of International Relations & 
Political Science, 
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Pardee School of Global Studies 
152 Bay State Road 
Room 110 
Boston, Massachusetts 02215 
(617) 353-9420 
(617) 353-9290 fax  
wgrimes@bu.edu 
Pardee School of Global Studies 
156 Bay State Road 
Room 401 
Boston, Massachusetts 02215 
(617) 353-6344 
(617) 353-5350 fax  
fewsmith@bu.edu 
  
Kevin P. Gallagher (3rd Reader) 
Associate Professor of International Relations 
Pardee School of Global Studies 
Department of International Relations 
154 Bay State Road 
Room 400 
Boston, Massachusetts 02215 
(617) 353-9348 
(617) 358-0190 fax 
kpg@bu.edu 
 
Douglas L. Kriner (4th Reader) 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
              Department of Political Science 
232 Bay State Road 
Room 206 
Boston, Massachusetts 02215 
(617) 358-4643 
(617) 353-5598 fax 
dkriner@bu.edu 
  
Graham K. Wilson (Department Chair) 
Chair and Professor of Political Science 
              Department of Political Science 
232 Bay State Road 
Room 215 
Boston, Massachusetts 02215 
(617) 353-2540 
(617) 353-5598 fax 
               gkwilson@bu.edu 
 
